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In his own handwriting, he set down a concise synthesis of the studies by Monk Hermann, which 
he left José Arcadio so that he would be able to make use of the astrolabe, the compass, and the 
sextant. José Arcadio Buendía spent the long months of the rainy season shut up in a small room 
that he had built in the rear of the house so that no one would disturb his experiments. Having 
completely abandoned his domestic obligations, he spent entire nights in the courtyard watching 
the course of the stars and he almost contracted sunstroke from trying to establish an exact 
method to ascertain noon. When he became an expert in the use and manipulation of his 
instruments, he conceived a notion of space that allowed him to navigate across unknown seas, to 
visit uninhabited territories, and to establish relations with splendid beings without having to 
leave his study. That was the period in which he acquired the habit of talking to himself, of 
walking through the house without paying attention to anyone, as Úrsula and the children broke 
their backs in the garden, growing banana and caladium, cassava and yams, ahuyama roots and 
eggplants. Suddenly, without warning, his feverish activity was interrupted and was replaced by a 
kind of fascination. He spent several days as if he were bewitched, softly repeating to himself a 
string of fearful conjectures without giving credit to his own understanding. Finally, one Tuesday 
in December, at lunchtime, all at once he released the whole weight of his torment. The children 
would remember for the rest of their lives the august solemnity with which their father, 
devastated by his prolonged vigil and by the wrath of his imagination, revealed his discovery to 
them:  
“The earth is round, like an orange.” 
Úrsula lost her patience. “If you have to go crazy, please go crazy all by yourself!” she shouted. 
“But don’t try to put your gypsy ideas into the heads of the children.” José Arcadio Buendía, 
impassive, did not let himself be frightened by the desperation of his wife, who, in a seizure of 
rage, mashed the astrolabe against the floor. He built another one, he gathered the men of the 
village in his little room, and he demonstrated to them, with theories that none of them could 
understand, the possibility of returning to where one had set out by consistently sailing east. 
 




But this deviation from the Law, which the Law took into account, this violation of the rule did 
not make the marvel any less marvelous. 
 




Objectivity and rationality must be things that we forge for ourselves as we construct a form of 
collective life. So the work of Copernicus is undone. Human beings are back in the centre of the 
picture. Things that had seemed distant become close; product is replaced by process. Apparent 
universals become variable and relative. The things we had seen ourselves as answerable to, we 
are now answerable for. So the body of work that we are about to examine redraws the 
boundaries of responsibility; it is a subtle attempt to change our cultural self-consciousness. 
 






Laws of nature are perceived as playing a central role in modern science. This thesis 
investigates the introduction of laws of nature into natural philosophy in the 
seventeenth century, from which modern science arguably evolved. Previous work 
has indicated that René Descartes was responsible for single-handedly introducing a 
mathematical concept of laws into physics under the form of ‘laws of nature’. 
However, there is less agreement on the originality, causes and aftermath of this 
manoeuvre. This thesis is sensitive to the circumstance that the introduction of ‘laws 
of nature’ in the seventeenth century is a problem for us given our hindsight 
perspective of the origins of modern science, not an explicit concern of the 
actors; ‘laws of nature’ emerged as part of a network of problems and possibilities 
converging in Descartes’ reform of natural philosophy. Then, the appropriation of his 
laws was not an assessment of isolated statements on nature, but a process bounded 
by critical stances towards the Cartesian enterprise involving theological and social 
underpinnings. Accordingly, this thesis approaches ‘laws of nature’ as by-products of 
the changing boundaries between mechanics, mathematics and natural philosophy in 
the seventeenth century and interprets them as embedded within the circumstances 
and interactions among the practitioners of these disciplines in which these laws 
were introduced, criticised and appropriated.   
  
Based on this approach, this thesis tracks the background of Descartes’s project of 
reform of physics from the sixteenth-century fascination for machines that led to 
codifications of mechanics as a mixed-mathematical science, generating quantitative 
ways to design and fabricate physical (artificial) objects (Chapter 1). This approach 
was picked up by Galileo, who transformed it to include natural motion. In so doing, 
Galileo developed a mathematical approach to natural philosophy—a mathematical 
science of motion—which ultimately relied on the physical assumption of the motion 
of the Earth (Chapter 2). An alternative reorganization of mathematics and natural 
philosophy was put forward by the Lutheran theologian Kepler, wh o considered that 
the natural knowledge of the world may be founded a priori by deciphering the 
archetypes that God followed when creating the world. His archetypal cosmology 
provided a link between geometry and natural philosophy, involving mechanics 
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(Chapter 3). However, Descartes moved in a different direction. Instead of 
connecting mathematics to natural philosophy, he tried to anchor both mathematics 
and natural philosophy on certainty, claiming that matter is but extension and that a 
few principles codified all possible interactions among parts of this geometrical 
matter. These principles were three ‘laws of nature’ erected as foundations of an a 
priori physics (Chapter 4). These ‘laws of nature’ received considerable attention in 
England. Informed by local traditions, English writers rejected the causal role 
attributed to laws but reworked their contents in laws of motion that were moved to 
mechanics and extended to astronomy, in line with the local practices of the 
‘elliptical astronomy’ (Chapter 5). The relocation of ‘laws of nature’ from physics to 
mechanics was connected with English debates concerning the role of motion in 
geometry. These discussions drew different consequences for the connections 
between mathematics and nature (Chapter 6). In line with the English appropriation 
of Descartes, the young Newton assumed laws of motion as mathematical 
explanations in mechanics. When asked by Halley about orbital motion, his 
answer displayed characteristics of the English disciplinary setting. However, in 
connection with his historical studies, Newton realised that his laws of motion were 
capable of accounting for the true system of the world and then they were 
transformed into mathematical principles of natural philosophy, redrawing the 
contours of mathematics, natural philosophy and mechanics. The most important 
outcome of this reorganization—the law of gravitation—raised suspicions for going 
beyond the boundaries of established practices in the Continent (Chapter 7).    
  
The thesis concludes that ‘laws of nature’ did not emerge as a generic label 
to denominate findings in science. On the contrary, they appeared as concrete 
achievements with an operative function within Descartes’ reform of natural 
philosophy and consequently embedded within a network of assumptions, traditions 
and practices that were central to the appropriation of ‘laws of nature’. English 
natural philosophers and mathematicians reworked these ‘laws of nature’ within 
different disciplinary settings and put forward alternative ‘laws of motion’ in ways 
not previously noticed. The picture that emerges is not that of an amalgamation of 
previous meanings into a more complex one that was subsequently disseminated. 
9 
 
Instead of a unified concept of ‘laws of nature’, Descartes’ project triggered reactions 
framed within local traditions and therefore it is hard to claim that at the end of the 
seventeenth century there was any agreement on the meaning of ‘laws of nature’ or 
even laws of motion beyond the narrow circles that shared disciplinary commitments 
and values. It was during the appropriation of Newton in the eighteenth century that 
his achievements and those honoured as his peers were labelled with a non-
Newtonian concept of ‘laws of nature’, creating a foundational myth of the origins of 





The idea that one of the main tasks of scientists is to find laws of nature explaining 
the occurrence of natural phenomena is part of our contemporary understanding of 
science. The expression ‘laws of nature’ has different meanings and these have been 
associated to the natural world since ancient times. For example, it was used as a 
synonym of the general order and regularity of nature or, in mathematics, to indicate 
that two things were related without the intention of clarifying why. However, the 
idea that some singular statements denominated ‘laws of nature’ explained the 
occurrence of natural phenomena, that is, stood for the reasons why things occur the 
why they do and not otherwise, was first articulated by René Descartes (1596-1650). 
This thesis investigates Descartes’ introduction of ‘laws of nature’ as singular claims 
explaining the natural world and the immediate impact of this strategy in England’s 
local traditions of enquiry up to the formulation of Isaac Newton’s ‘laws of motion’ 
(1687-1713).  
 
Previous attempts to shed light on the origins of ‘laws of nature’ in this specific sense 
have focused on the meaning of the expression and how it was related to previous, 
different meanings. However, preceding uses of one expression do not explain how a 
term will be used in the future. Therefore, this thesis investigates the specific use of 
‘laws of nature’ in connection with Descartes’ plan to reform the knowledge of the 
natural world. In his Principles of Philosophy (1644), Descartes sketched the 
foundations of a new approach to nature whose purpose was delivering certain and 
unquestionable explanations resulting from his ‘laws of nature’, ultimately founded 
upon the divine perfection. In England, this project was critically appropriated by 
further developing the content of Descartes’ laws and by integrating them into local 
agendas of reform of knowledge, such as those converging at the Royal Society of 
London (1660-1680). Nevertheless, English writers were suspicious of the 
theological implications of Descartes’ project and claimed that some of the ‘laws of 
nature’ did not match the outcome of experiments. Consequently, they reworked the 
‘laws of nature’ into mathematical ‘laws of motion’. These laws of motion did not 
derive from God’s attributes but were conceived as mathematical statements 
describing how things happen in nature. Although these laws of motion did not 
12 
 
uncover the ultimate cause behind the nature, they enabled a high degree of accuracy 
in predicting the occurrence of natural phenomena. In this way, the laws of motion 
transformed the values and practices implied in the knowledge of the natural word 
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I have often wondered, why the planets should move about the sun according to Copernicus’s 
supposition, being not included in any solid orbs (which the antients possibly for this reason may 
embrace) nor tied to it, as their center, by any visible strings; and neither depart from it beyond such 
a degree, nor yet move in a strait line, as all bodies, that have but one single impulse, ought to do (…) 
The cause of inflecting a direct motion into a curve may be from an attractive property of the body 






Writing in 1666 to the Royal Society, Hooke conjectured how the planets find their 
way according to the Copernican arrangement. Hooke’s problem was physical: why 
is it that the planets instead of moving in ‘strait’ lines were continually deviated ‘into 
a curve’ if there was no strings or celestial orbs keeping them in this path? A few 
years later, Newton argued that planets find their way because, according to the 
mathematical law of gravitation, they were ‘continually drawn away from rectilinear 
motions and are maintained in their respective orbits’.2 The idea that planets—and all 
bodies in general—follow specific, mathematical laws and that these laws may 
constitute a sufficient explanation of natural phenomena was elaborated in the 
seventeenth century. Although the expression laws of nature was hanging in the air 
since ancient times as a vague reference to order in the natural world, it acquired a 
different meaning in the hands of René Descartes; a meaning that was critically 
transformed by English natural philosophers, including Hooke and Newton. This 
thesis investigates the introduction of laws of nature into natural philosophy and their 
immediate appropriation in seventeenth-century England. 
 
The idea that laws of nature were central to the seventeenth century is not new. It 
was a commonplace in the foundational studies on the Scientific Revolution—on 
which the discipline of the history of science was erected—that laws of nature were 
the basic unit of the new quantitative science. Alexandre Koyré characterised the 
 
1 Birch, The History of the Royal Society, 1756, 2:91. 
2 Newton, The Principia, 802; 943. 
22 
 
Scientific Revolution as the disappearance of the hierarchically organised cosmos 
and the advent of an infinite universe, united not by its immanent structure ‘but only 
by the identity of its fundamental contents and laws’.3 Rupert Hall filled the period 
from Galileo to Newton with laws. In his view, the most important innovation of the 
seventeenth century was the universality of motion as change of place, that is, that 
the same kind of motion occurred everywhere and that it was ‘invariably subject to 
the same laws’. Consequently, Hall described the most important achievements in 
terms of laws: the law of inertia, Galileo’s law of free fall, Kepler’s laws of planetary 
motion and Newton’s law of universal gravitation.4 However, these uses of laws in 
the history of science were subordinated to more ambitious attempts to ‘capture the 
nature’ of the Scientific Revolution: the mathematisation of nature, the rise of 
experimental sciences or the emergence of a new metaphysics.5  
 
This ‘grand narrative’ was set aside. Distrust towards the generalisations stating the 
essence of the Scientific Revolution, the concentration on a few canonical figures 
and the emphasis on some disciplines in detriment of others considered ‘irrational’ 
(alchemy, astrology) led to question the very idea of a ‘Scientific Revolution’ as a 
‘change that is sudden, radical, and complete’.6 Maybe ‘the Scientific Revolution’ 
was to a large extent a construct of previous historians who reduced the scope of 
their investigations and thus presented this heroic narrative of accumulative progress 
based on individual findings. Accordingly, revisionist tendencies made imperative 
the reassessment of textual evidence, the introduction of new methodological 
approaches, the study of social and institutional settings in which knowledge was 
produced and used, not to mention the consideration of previously neglected 
practices, figures and locations beyond Europe.7 These changes generated a 
 
3 Koyré, Newtonian Studies, 7; Koyré, Études Galiléennes; Koyré, Études d’histoire de la pensée 
scientifique. 
4 Hall, From Galileo to Newton, 1630-1720, 37. 
5 Hall, 13; Koyré, Newtonian Studies, 6; Kuhn, ‘Mathematical vs. Experimental Traditions in the 
Development of Physical Science’. 
6 Cohen, The Revolution in Science, 51–90. 
7 All relevant references on revisionism and the Scientific Revolution cannot be included in one 
footnote. However, see Shapin, The Scientific Revolution; Lüthy, ‘What To Do With Seventeenth-
Century Natural Philosophy? A Taxonomic Problem’; Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the 
Origins of Modern Science; Dear, ‘What Is the History of Science the History Of?: Early Modern 
Roots of the Ideology of Modern Science’; Osler, Rethinking the Scientific Revolution; Roux, ‘Forms 
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spectacular enlargement in the scope and depth of our understanding of the origins of 
modern science. Nevertheless, the idea of laws of nature seems so attached to the 
‘grand narrative’ that the revisionist studies on laws of nature are limited either to 
fragmentary aspects—such as small-scale analysis of specific authors–8 or to 
approaches that, by avoiding the manners now considered outdated, dissolved the 
specific character of the question at hand:9 how and why ‘laws of nature’ were 




My solution to this problem is that ‘laws of nature’ emerged as a by-product of the 
transformations of the disciplinary boundaries between mathematics, mechanics and 
natural philosophy during the seventeenth century. Put otherwise, I read ‘laws of 
nature’ as a function of the redrawing of the boundaries of knowledge in the period. 
The key point here is that ‘laws of nature’ emerged and varied in connection with the 
transformations of the bounds of these disciplines but, at the same time, these 
disciplines were evolving in function of other factors. Therefore, detaching ‘laws of 
nature’ from this fluctuating, disciplinary setting amounts to disconnecting the 
solution from the problem that they were intended to solve. This approach requires 
some clarifications.  
 
1. Hindsight. A significant source of confusion in dealing with ‘laws of nature’ has 
been the failure in recognising the extent to which this is a problem for us, not for the 
 
of Mathematization (14-17 Centuries)’; Cohen, The Rise of Modern Science Explained: A 
Comparative History; Henry, ‘The Scientific Revolution: Five Books about It’. 
8 Steinle, ‘The Amalgamation of a Concept. Laws of Nature in the New Sciences’; Steinle, 
‘Negotiating Experiment, Reason and Theology: The Concept of Laws of Nature in the Early Royal 
Society’; Steinle, ‘From Principles to Regularities: Tracing “Laws of Nature” in Early Modern 
England and France’; Graßhoff, ‘Natural Law and Celestial Regularities from Copernicus to Kepler’; 
Gingerich, ‘Kepler and the Laws of Nature’; Garber, ‘God, Laws, and the Order of Nature: Descartes 
and Leibniz, Hobbes and Spinoza’; Hattab, ‘Early Modern Roots of the Philosophical Concept of a 
Law of Nature’; Jalobeanu, ‘The Cartesians of the Royal Society’; Psillos, ‘Laws and Powers in the 
Frame of Nature’; Domski, ‘Laws of Nature and the Divine Order’. 
9 Ruby, ‘The Origins of Scientific" Law"’; Roux, ‘Les lois de la nature à l’âge classique la question 
terminologique’; Lehoux, ‘Laws of Nature and Natural Laws’; Ott, Causation and Laws of Nature in 
Early Modern Philosophy; Jalobeanu and Anstey, Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion 
Descartes and Beyond. 
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seventeenth-century actors. We are interested in the origin and transformation of 
‘laws of nature’ because during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the 
investigation of the natural world became a ‘quest for laws’ and in an important 
sense, the idea still prevails in contemporary science.10 Arguably, laws became a 
component of current definitions of science.11 Therefore, scholars interested in 
science—philosophers, historians, sociologists—look for answers to questions such 
as ‘what is it to be a law’. But in the seventeenth century, ‘laws of nature’ appeared 
in Descartes as part of an incipient endeavour to outline a systematic way to account 
for natural phenomena. This solution was tied to Descartes’ singular formulation of 
what he called an a priori physics and to its contents. Therefore, projecting ‘laws of 
nature’ beyond Descartes without considering other aspects runs the risk of imposing 
our questions in the place of the actors’ concerns and, instead of clarifying the 
historical development of science, we misconstrue it. The term ‘law’ was not 
common in natural philosophy before 1660.12 Galileo did not name ‘law’ his ‘law of 
free fall of bodies’. The most similar concept in Kepler—both in meaning and use—
to Descartes’ ‘laws of nature’ is ‘archetype’, not the geometrical propositions that he 
denominated ‘laws’ or his references to laws of nature as synonyms of the natural 
order following Lutheran teachings. Neither did Kepler refer to his ‘laws of planetary 
motion’ as ‘laws’. Furthermore, English writers after 1650s were reluctant to adopt 
the terminology of ‘laws of nature’ in natural philosophy; the stipulations of 
Descartes’ ‘laws of nature’ were debated in the mathematical science of mechanics 
and were called ‘laws of motion’. Newton barely used the expression laws of nature 
and his scattered uses of the term in print were controversial. The expression laws of 
nature responds to a particular context in which it was seen as a solution, so not 
attending the specific meanings and circumstances runs the risk of falling into the 
nominalist fallacy of assuming as equal different problems because they are named 
with the same words. 
 
 
10 Charrak, Contingence et nécessité des lois de la nature au XVIIIe siècle; Stan, ‘Newton’s Concepts 
of Force among the Leibnizians’; Shank, Before Voltaire. 
11 Lange, Laws and Lawmakers; Massimi, ‘Prescribing Laws to Nature. Part I. Newton, the Pre-
Critical Kant, and Three Problems about the Lawfulness of Nature’. 
12 Roux, ‘Les lois de la nature à l’âge classique la question terminologique’, 554–55. 
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2. Terminology. The expression laws of nature had been around since the Ancients 
with different meanings. One initial, extended sense was vague and general, as a 
synonym of order or regularity in nature.13 In the Judeo-Christian traditions, this 
notion of order became associated to God as a ‘law-giver’, as the one imposing order 
on nature.14 In the context of scientiæ, the term ‘law’ was used since the Middle 
Ages in mathematics, especially in optics, to denote a natural regularity; this 
regularity, formulated in abstract terms, pointed to a connection between elements. 
For example, the law of refraction—denominated as a ‘law’ by Roger Bacon in the 
twelfth century—related the angle of incidence and the angle of refraction, but the 
law did not contain any causal explanation of this ‘constant conjunction’.15 The 
specific use of ‘laws of nature’ as quantifiable, necessary statements accounting for 
the regularity of phenomena—operating as secondary causes—was introduced by 
Descartes.16 Because this is the most important meaning for my argument, I mark it 
with inverted commas; so by ‘laws of nature’ I make reference to Descartes’ 
‘principal rules according to which it must be thought (il faut penser) that God 
causes the nature of this new world to operate’, in order to differentiate it from other 
uses.17  
 
Descartes’ use of the expression is innovative, but the term was not created ex nihilo: 
he borrowed it from the mixed-mathematical sciences and thus it was associated with 
the idea of regularity. At the same time, Descartes’ conception of God guaranteed the 
necessity and universality of these ‘laws of nature’ in a way that cannot be detached 
from the Catholic context of France.18 However, Descartes’ use cannot be entirely 
 
13 Zilsel, ‘The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law’; Needham, ‘Human Laws and Laws of Nature 
in China and the West (I)’; Needham, ‘Human Laws and Laws of Nature in China and the West (II): 
Chinese Civilization and the Laws of Nature’; Lehoux, ‘Laws of Nature and Natural Laws’; Henry, 
‘The Theological Origins of Laws of Nature and Its Subsequent Secularisation’. 
14 Milton, ‘Laws of Nature’; Roux, ‘Les lois de la nature à l’âge classique la question terminologique’; 
Steinle, ‘From Principles to Regularities: Tracing “Laws of Nature” in Early Modern England and 
France’; Harrison, ‘The Development of the Concept of Laws of Nature’. 
15 Ruby, ‘The Origins of Scientific" Law"’; Roux, ‘Les lois de la nature à l’âge classique la question 
terminologique’, 547–50. 
16 Henry, ‘Metaphysics and the Origins of Modern Science’; See also Psillos, ‘Laws and Powers in the 
Frame of Nature’. 
17 Descartes, AT, 1909, XI:38. 
18 Henry, ‘Metaphysics and the Origins of Modern Science’; Cf. Funkenstein, Theology and the 
Scientific Imagination; Cook, The Young Descartes. Nobility, Rumor and War. 
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explained in terms of the previous occurrences of laws; Descartes’ use was not 
prefigured or foreshadowed in them.19 Therefore, we need to analyse the conditions 
under which the term acquired different meanings and functions: Descartes’ reform 
of natural philosophy. Additionally, Descartes’ introduction of ‘laws of nature’ did 
not banish other meanings of law. His contemporaries had access to mathematical, 
theological and metaphysical meanings and read Descartes’ laws against these 
backgrounds. When Boyle complained that he could not conceive ‘how a Body, 
devoid of understanding and sense … does properly act by Laws’,20 he was 
criticising from a theological angle the conception of laws as immanent in nature, 
although he enthusiastically embraced Descartes’ ‘laws of nature’ with 
modifications. Boyle’s criticism of ‘laws of nature’ was based on the rejection of the 
world implied by Descartes’ physics, not on other meanings of laws available to him.  
 
Finally, by using inverted commas, I also highlight that in this thesis ‘laws of nature’ 
and its immediate appropriations are assumed as historical terms whose meaning has 
to be investigated as any other particular term in the history of science, such as 
Newton’s gravity, Priestley’s phlogiston or Higgs’ boson. During the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, laws of nature became a label to denominate any scientific 
achievement within fields that came to form the modern sciences. The expression 
lost its initial connection with specific statements about motion and particles of 
matter, founded upon divine immutability. However, for the seventeenth century 
actors ‘laws of nature’ were not a label but a technical term, with defined contents, 
associated to Cartesianism—and later to Leibniz. The historian faces the temptation 
of studying ‘laws of nature’ as other terms that operated as labels in the seventeenth 
century, such as ‘axiom’, ‘law’, ‘proposition’ or ‘demonstration’ and then to address 
the history of ‘laws of nature’ as an investigation on scientific demonstration or on 
causation in science. But history rarely follows the order of our philosophical 
anxieties. Although ‘laws of nature’ operated as principles of explanation of the 
natural world and thus as causes, they were introduced and appropriated as specific 
statements regulating the motion of matter as extended. The disciplinary approach 
 
19 Bloor, Barnes, and Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, 46–80; Kusch, ‘Meaning 
Finitism and Truth’. 
20 Boyle, A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv’d Notion of Nature, 42–43. 
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makes clear the function that ‘laws of nature’ played in Descartes and how their 
contents and assumptions were pivotal in their subsequent appropriation in England. 
 
3. Disciplinary boundaries. A central component of my claim is the redefinition of 
disciplinary boundaries between mathematics, mechanics and natural philosophy. 
Historians of science have widely explained that the crisis of the Scholastic 
philosophy was related to important transformations in the way in which disciplines 
were organised and practised during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.21 The 
natural philosophies of the Renaissance and the reception of Copernican astronomy 
are examples of how the strict organisation of knowledge that Scholastic 
philosophers had carefully crafted was in crisis at the end of the sixteenth century.22 
However, the emergence of early modern science did not displace from one day to 
the next the institutional and intellectual settings created over centuries by the 
Scholastics.23 On the contrary, all the authors referred to in this thesis were educated 
in, or somewhat engaged with Scholastic traditions and some of them developed their 
activities in universities, where Aristotle was the dominant authority. It falls beyond 
the scope of this (and of any) thesis to present a full-scale panorama of such 
transformations and it is not necessary for my present purpose. My interest has been 
to examine the aspects of the redefinition of mechanics, mathematics and natural 
philosophy as far as it is related to the introduction of ‘laws of nature’ into natural 
philosophy and their immediate appropriations in England.  
 
 
21 Jardine, ‘Problems of Knowledge and Action: Epistemology of the Sciences’; Wallace, ‘Natural 
Philosophy: Traditional Natural Philosophy’; Lohr, ‘The Sixteenth-Century Transformation of the 
Aristotelian Division of the Speculative Sciences’; DesChene, Physiologia; Mancosu, Philosophy of 
Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century; Barker and Goldstein, ‘Realism 
and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal’; Rutkin, ‘Astrology’; Andersen 
and Bos, ‘Pure Mathematics’; Westman, The Copernican Question : Prognostication, Skepticism, and 
Celestial Order. 
22 Westman, ‘The Astronomer’s Role’; Westman, ‘The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the 
Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican Theory’; Barker and Goldstein, ‘Realism and 
Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal’; Henry, ‘The Fragmentation of 
Renaissance Occultism’. 
23 Feingold, The Mathematicians’ Apprenticeship. Science, Universities and Society in England, 1560-
1640.; Wallace, Galileo and His Sources; Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of the Enlightenment; 
Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics; Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science; 
Levitin, ‘Newton and Scholastic Philosophy’. 
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Consequently, I deal with mechanics, mathematics and natural philosophy as 
practices historically situated in contexts where their very conditions, scope and 
ways of proceeding were at question. This means that, instead of assuming these 
fields as stable platforms on which seventeenth-century writers developed their 
achievements, I approach these author’s enquiries as endeavours to transform the 
traditions in which they were involved, particularly the organisation of scientiæ. It 
may be argued that something similar occurs in contemporary sciences, in the sense 
that findings reconfigure the field at some level; but scientific research today exhibits 
levels of standardisation that makes it hardly comparable to the thin layer of shared 
assumptions in the enquiries of the natural world in the early modern period.24 A 
common feeling of the actors studied in this thesis is that the overall organisation of 
knowledge in which they were initiated and the work of their contemporaries 
required some reform, amendment or even a complete subversion in order to 
introduce new disciplines or to restore forms of lost knowledge. In this sense, these 
authors developed their work with an eye on the transformations of knowledge that 
they were consciously pushing beyond customary boundaries. Therefore, I assume as 
subject of investigation the elements that they used to shape their intellectual 
practices: from the technical elaborations to the varying representations of them as 
part of the strategies deployed in order to persuade their contemporaries of the 
validity both of their findings and of their ways of finding them. These elements 
converge in the disciplinary identities that these authors elaborated, that is, their self-
representations as mechanicians, mathematicians, natural philosophers or 
‘experimental philosophers’ and in the way in which these identities limited or 
motivated interactions within different communities—including virtual communities 
through correspondence networks. ‘Laws of nature’ and the transformed ‘laws of 
motion’ in England were central to the formation of individual, disciplinary 
identities; but also they became part of the shared assumptions of groups, such as the 
early Royal Society or circles associated with Cartesianism.   
 
 
24 Bloor, Barnes, and Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, 140–68; Dear, ‘What Is 
the History of Science the History Of?: Early Modern Roots of the Ideology of Modern Science’; 
Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 3–41. 
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Finally, approaching mechanics, mathematics and natural philosophy as practices 
that went under important reconfigurations during the seventeenth century implies 
that ‘mechanics’, ‘mathematics’ and ‘natural philosophy’ are terms whose meaning 
is changing and even contradictory during the period. For Guidobaldo, mechanics 
was concerned with the material aspects of machines that could be approached 
geometrically only in terms of equilibrium; a mathematical science of motion was 
impossible. Galileo faced Guidobaldo’s challenge and applied mathematical 
procedures of mechanics to motion in general. Meanwhile, Descartes considered that 
mechanics was just a branch of natural philosophy that took shelter in mathematics 
when ancient philosophers confused the knowledge of nature. Newton claimed that 
his achievements in the Principia were part of a ‘rational mechanics’ that 
investigated with mathematical principles connecting forces and motion in general, 
including natural motions and forces generating them. 
 
4. The Scientific Revolution. A full discussion of the problems related to the notion of 
‘the Scientific Revolution’ falls beyond my expectations here. However, this thesis 
contributes to revisit traditional topics, authors and studies. I find useful a non-naïve 
use of the notion of ‘the Scientific Revolution’, as a historiographical term to denote 
some processes during the seventeenth century. It is useful because it locates my 
discussion in a period recognisable for the reader and, at the same time, points to a 
rich historiographic tradition that since ninteenth century has gathered considerable 
evidence and offered a wide-range of perspectives to better understand the origins of 
modern science. The term is also desirable because it works as a short-hand to make 
reference both to this historiographic tradition but also to some historical phenomena 
which validate the use of the term. In the particular case of ‘laws of nature’, I have 
mentioned that the authors I revisit felt that the structures of knowledge dominant in 
their contexts required amendment or radical transformations. The term ‘Scientific 
Revolution’ refers then to these historical phenomena. By ‘non-naïve’ I mean that we 
already know that these reforms were not a radical, sudden break with the past but 
rather complex reorganisation of practices trying to answer to a variety of problems, 
from the encounter with the ‘New world’ to the rediscovery of ancient authorities. 
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The ‘Scientific Revolution’ cannot be reduced to any of these aspects and arguably 
none of them constitute something like its essence. 
 
Another consequence of this is that the alternative projects to transform knowledge 
are not approached in this thesis as fixed in texts that passed from one author to the 
next and whose meaning we should try to clarify by textual comparison. I have read 
the textual evidence as produced by and playing a role in intellectual, social and 
material settings which were complex and changing, as we have learnt from other 
studies on the Scientific Revolution. In this sense, I have dealt with the emergence 
and appropriation of ‘laws of nature’ as embedded within the possibilities and 
limitations of a wide range of circumstances: the casual finding of a book, the 
accidental meeting with an old friends, specific social and political circumstances 
that forced writers to move from places, the threat of wars, the access to a tradition 




The idea that planets—and any particle of matter in the universe—find their way 
following mathematical laws and that this constituted a sufficient explanation in 
natural philosophy was an elaboration of the seventeenth century. The problem of the 
physical explanation of the motion of the planets, as Hooke stated it, was connected 
to Copernicanism. Indeed, it was vividly formulated by Tycho Brahe who, after 
observing the comet of 1577 and calculating that it appeared ‘far above the moon’, 
concluded that ‘the celestial machine is not a hard and impenetrable body, crammed 
full of various real orbs, as was heretofore believed by most people’.25 How the 
‘dissolution of celestial orbs’ gave way to an astronomy based in laws has been 
widely studied in the history of science since its early days.26  
 
25 Rosen, ‘The Dissolution of the Solid Celestial Spheres’, 21–22. 
26 Koyré, The Astronomical Revolution. Copernicus, Kepler, Borelli.; Dreyer, A History of Astronomy 
from Thales to Kepler; Aiton, The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motions; Rosen, ‘The Dissolution of 
the Solid Celestial Spheres’; Gingerich, ‘Kepler, Galileo and the Birth of Modern Astronomy’; 
Westman, The Copernican Question : Prognostication, Skepticism, and Celestial Order; Vesel, 





The problem was originated in astronomy, but one of the most important resources 
for its solution—the explanation based in laws of nature—has its roots in the 
transformations of mechanics in the sixteenth century (Chapter 1). The loose set of 
practices then denominated as mechanical were assimilated by ecclesiastic, political 
and military elites under the form of a mixed-mathematical science. At the end of the 
century, this organisation took diverse forms of axiomatisation. In this context, 
machines were defined as artificial objects whose crucial characteristic was their 
configuration or design: the disposition of their parts in order to produce some 
desired effect. Therefore, the explanation and production of machines relied on the 
reductio of any complex configuration to the form of the lever—the simplest 
machine–, whose properties were explained by the geometry of the circle. In so 
doing, mathematicians practicing mechanics elaborated a new way to account for 
some physical, material objects in geometrical terms.  
 
The explanation based on reductio assumed that mathematics dealt with machines in 
terms of equilibrium, not of motion, and that there had to be a perfect fit between the 
material condition of the machine and its design. Given the innumerable variables 
involved in motion and the essential differences between natural and artificial, 
mechanics could not account for the defining traits of the natural world. However, 
Galileo, educated in the Scholastic tradition of Pisa and in the study of mechanics 
broadly construed, attempted to extend the reductio in order to include natural 
phenomena (Chapter 2). In so doing, Galileo developed a mathematical approach to 
natural philosophy—a mathematical science of motion—that he considered sufficient 
to reject Scholastic explanations and the alternative natural philosophies of the 
Renaissance based on occult qualities. Galileo’s explanations ultimately relied on the 
assumption of an Earth in motion. Thus, Galileo’s axioms, insofar as they are 
mathematical are related to actual motion of this world if the Earth is considered in 
motion; from it, all mathematical constructions relevant to natural philosophy 
obtained empirical significance. Based on these assumptions, Galileo projected a 




Galileo’s practice of natural philosophy quickly attracted attention of mathematicians 
and natural philosophers all over Europe, but it was not the only alternative to refer 
mathematics to the study of natural phenomena. Inspired by Lutheranism, the young 
Kepler ended up teaching mathematics and discovered that by revealing the 
geometric structure of the planetary system he was able to account for the natural 
world (Chapter 3). However, instead of relying on mathematical techniques of 
mechanics, Kepler considered to have found the archetypes that God followed when 
creating the world. His archetypal cosmology provided a link between geometry and 
natural philosophy which also encompassed mechanics. But the point is that Kepler’s 
discovery moved him to put forward a reform of astronomy in order to include 
natural philosophical considerations, such as the central position of the Sun, in 
astronomical calculations. This reform was underpinned by the archetypes 
(geometric and harmonic) instantiated in the quantitative nature of matter, imprinted 
in the human soul by God and acting as formal cause of nature. Ultimately, this 
structure provided the model for Descartes’ reform of natural philosophy. 
 
These initial chapters set the scene for the history of ‘laws of nature’. They constitute 
the immediate context for Descartes’ redrawing of disciplinary boundaries in which 
‘laws of nature’ emerged. However, they should not be considered as a mere 
theatrical scenery disposable after the first act but as an integral part of the entire 
dramatic action, so to speak. Descartes and also the English natural philosophers 
appropriating his ‘laws of nature’ interacted with themes, practices and values 
introduced in these chapters. 
 
In 1630 Descartes formulated a plan to establish an a priori physics: an explanation 
of the effects of the world from their causes that would replace Scholastic natural 
philosophy. This project was inspired by his acquaintance with Kepler from 
Beeckman’s journal (Chapter 4). Instead of connecting mathematics and natural 
philosophy, Descartes conceived his a priori physics as founded upon the claim that 
matter was but (geometric) extension and that its motion, from which all observable 
phenomena emerged, depended on three ‘laws of nature’ that codified all possible 
interactions among parts of matter. In this sense, ‘laws of nature’ did not describe 
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motion but acted as causes rendering it possible. These laws were founded upon 
divine immutability, so they could not be otherwise. The knowledge of the world, 
ultimately explained by ‘laws of nature’, was modelled after the way in which ‘men 
experienced with machinery’ accounted for machines: ‘conjecturing’ about the 
design of their parts. 
 
The Cartesian philosophy provided a systematic substitute for Scholastic philosophy 
with an approach that contemporary philosophers and mathematicians perceived as 
intelligible, although critics appeared everywhere. In England, ‘laws of nature’ were 
integrated into philosophies involving different assumptions such as active 
principles, experimental practices and a local tradition of astronomy underpinned by 
physical considerations—the ‘elliptical astronomy’ inspired by Gilbert and Kepler 
(Chapter 5). Instead of initiating the mechanical philosophy in England, ‘laws of 
nature’ were reworked in the light of local programmes already ongoing. Descartes’ 
view of nature as governed by immanent laws was considered as untenable when 
compared with experiments and as suspicious for theological reasons. For the 
virtuosi, the idea of matter deprived of principles of motion excluded God from the 
operation of the universe and therefore may lead to atheism. Their experimental 
approach had provided evidence of foci of activity in nature, from the motion of 
animals to the growing of metals and plants, and therefore they postulated active 
principles superadded in matter as responsible for these phenomena, although their 
cause remained unknown. Some English writers rejected Descartes’ laws tout court. 
Others considered that Descartes had provided ‘the outer shell’ of nature, the rules 
explaining motion generated by collision, but that he had missed ‘the nucleus’, the 
sources of activity in matter. The ‘elliptical astronomers’ elaborated a conception of 
circular motion as produced by a balance between a reworked version of Descartes’ 
first two laws and an attractive force to the centre. In England, I identified a tendency 
to transform ‘laws of nature’ into laws of motion indicating the move of laws from 
natural philosophy back to mathematical sciences—such as mechanics and 




English virtuosi reworked the stipulations of ‘laws of nature’ into mathematical laws 
of motion. The denial of the causal role of Descartes’ laws entailed a rejection of his 
solution to an a priori physics and then the revised laws became principles of 
explanation in mechanics—not of motion in natural philosophy. This move occurred 
when the mathematical nature of this new field was under discussion. Two 
representative positions of the spectrum of these debates, John Wallis and Isaac 
Barrow, discussed the nature of mechanics, particularly divergent conceptions of the 
role of motion in mathematics (Chapter 6). While Wallis considered that geometry 
measured what was physically performed, Barrow claimed that geometrical figures 
were generated by motion and, therefore, geometry and nature were coextensive. The 
source of this disagreement stemmed from divergent positions on the nature of 
quantity and consequently on the legitimate mathematical methods and their 
applicability to the natural world.  
 
One of the English writers that reworked the ‘laws of nature’ into laws of motion was 
Isaac Newton (Chapter 7). Since his early years, Newton was critical of Descartes’ 
philosophy in general, and developed laws of motion as axioms of mechanics which 
applied also to astronomical computations, in line with the local traditions. When 
Halley visited Newton in 1684 asking about the orbit of planets, Newton’s initial 
solution moved within the boundaries of mechanics. His answer was based on the 
reworked axioms assumed as mathematical hypotheses. However, in revising his 
initial ‘De motu’, Newton realised that he had in his hands not only a mechanical 
puzzle but an insight into the true system of the world known to the ancients. Then, 
the mathematical hypotheses were reworked as ‘laws of motion’ and became 
mathematical principles of natural philosophy. This reorganisation led Newton to 
portray a system of the world in terms of three passive ‘laws of motion’ arising from 
the force of inertia—accepted by everyone—and at least one law arising from the 
active principle of gravity acting at a distance—discovered or recovered by him. The 
main outcome of Newton’s reordering of the disciplines was the law of gravity. 
Reactions against the force of gravity did not wait. Leibniz accused Newton of 
reintroducing occult qualities into natural philosophy, for the Principia did not 
specify how the force of gravity operated and thus Newton had crossed the 
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boundaries of natural philosophy. Newton replied with intricate strategies; one of 
these involved comparing active principles—not the laws of motion—to ‘universal 
laws of nature’ in the Optice.  
 
In the closing Scholium I point to some aspects drawn from tracing the introduction 
of ‘laws of nature’ into natural philosophy and their immediate appropriation in 
England. The emergence of ‘laws of nature’ and their subsequent reworking into 
laws of motion was not a progressive accumulation of pieces that were finally put 
together in a meaning passed on to the Enlightenment. On the contrary, ‘laws of 
nature’ were a built-in component of the transformation of natural philosophy as 
science capable of a priori demonstration in Descartes and therefore their 
appropriation was done against the background of alternative endeavours to connect 
natural philosophy to mathematics or to set them definitively apart. The distinction 
between ‘laws of nature’ and laws of motion reveal unexpected aspects of the 
disciplinary transformations of mechanics, mathematics and natural philosophy. 
Instead of a collaborative effort towards the ‘mathematisation of nature’, the 
rearrangement of disciplines from which ‘laws of nature’ emerged was the outcome 
of competitive views whose origin goes back to the sixteenth-century assimilation of 
mechanics as a mixed-mathematical science. It was in the eighteenth century that the 
expression laws of nature became dominant to unify and make coherent the 





1. Machines and the course of nature  
During the sixteenth century, the loose set of practices and techinques widely 
denominated mechanics became organised under the form of a mathematical mid-
science inspired by Scholastic divisions of knowledge. One important consequence 
of this transformation was the elaboration of a new way to explain and produce 
machines by relying on geometry. This way consisted in the reduction of the 
configuration of any complex machine to the simplest one, the lever, whose 
properties were explained by the geometry of the circle. Thus, uncovering the 
geometric design of machines was thought to make possible, in principle, machines 
performing any task.  
  
The importance of this new way of explaining physical objects may be appreciated 
by two points. First, the shaping of mechanics as a mixed-mathematical science 
stimulated discussions on the differences between machines and nature that were 
interpreted as an opposition between human actions and the workings of nature. This 
latter was repeatedly referred to as the laws of nature, usually meaning the unaided 
course of natural events as different from its altered course as a consequence of using 
machines. However, this opposition is in fact a distinction, for the laws of nature 
were the starting point of the construction of machines. Machines were objects 
ultimately made from (natural) elements disposed according to human intentions, 
modifying their accidental characteristics and not their essential properties. 
Mechanics dealt with machines qua configurations or proportions of natural elements 
arranged to generate effects that unaided nature would never produce. Then, the 
capacity of producing desired effects depends on the configuration of the machine 
(the exact disposition of their parts), crafted according to geometrical proportions. In 
this sense, mechanics became predominantly a mathematical science, for 
mathematics supplied the formative principle of the machines. In contrast with other 
middle-sciences such as astronomy and optics, mechanics could deliver the formal 
cause of its object. Second, the developments in mechanics during the sixteenth 
century and the discussions about its status converged in efforts to codify and arrange 
mechanical knowledge in systematic ways at the end of the century. A significant 
number of these efforts claimed to be restoring mechanics to ‘its former glory’ 
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following the steps of Archimedes, Euclid or some other ancient authority. In so 
doing, these reorganisations incorporated diverse mathematical traditions accounting 
for machines. 
 
These topics are developed in three sections. The first presents some transformations 
of the mechanicians and mathematicians during the sixteenth century. Mechanics 
became central for holding political power and social orders; this transformed the 
boundaries and social places of mechanics and its practitioners. Largely, this 
increasing importance of mechanics was assimilated in the institutional forms of 
knowledge—universities, the humanists’ circles and ultimately the courts—by 
translating and circulating the Mechanical Problems and other ancient works. The 
second section analyses some topics from Mechanical Problems. Of particular 
interests is the way of explaining machines by reducing them to the geometry of the 
circle. Finally, the last section focuses on the systematization of mechanics occurring 
at the end of the century. This sheds light both on the changes of mechanics now 
dressed as a mathematical science and on the explanation of physical objects by 
mathematical principles in terms of design or configuration.  
 
1.1.Beyond the shoe 
At the turn of the sixteenth century, mechanical arts were indiscernible from practical 
mathematics. Practical mathematics included activities employing machines and 
instruments such as architecture, engineering, gunnery, surveying and bookkeeping.1 
Notwithstanding the increasing importance of practical mathematics in Renaissance 
societies, the social status of mathematicians was determined by the medieval social 
distinction between practical mathematicians and the astrologer-physicians.2 Despite 
sharing a significant portion of mathematical knowledge, the practitioners of these 
groups remained in social disparity. Within practical mathematicians there were also 
internal distinctions, for those closer to craftsmanship were regarded as considerably 
inferior. However, as the century ran, the distinction became blurry and more 
 
1 Bennett, ‘The Mechanical Arts’, 673; Jones, ‘Improvement for Profit: Calculating Machines and the 
Prehistory of Intellectual Property’. 
2 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’, 42; Bennett, ‘The Mechanical Arts’; Clagett, The Science of Mechanics 
in the Middle Ages, 164. 
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complex social forms emerged—such as court mathematicians or nobles with 
military-mathematical interests.3  
 
Practical mathematicians were usually trained in the scoule di abaco (schools of 
practical mathematics). These were institutions of varying complexity, ranging from 
single, private tutors paid by the lesson to guilds established in schools and endorsed 
by wealthy merchants with influence on politics. The tradition of these scuole was 
founded on the study of Fibonacci’s Liber abacci (‘The book of calculation’ or ‘the 
book of practical mathematics’), a thirteenth-century compendium of practical 
mathematics adapted to the needs of merchants. The Liber introduced the Hindu-
Arabic numeral system in the West. In subsequent centuries, practical mathematics 
became an integral part of the vernacular schooling. However, Latin schools, in 
which elites were educated, omitted most kinds of mathematics and completely 
rejected practical mathematics, because it added nothing to the social status of their 
students.4 The links among guilds of practitioners trained in practical mathematics 
vary considerably depending on the place: in some cities, the abacists and land 
surveyors had their own guild, but in other towns they were united with masons or 
with elementary-level teachers. Lucca, for example, merged its abbaco school with 
the communal elementary reading and writing school in the sixteenth century. It was 
customary as well that abbachisti, teaching basic arithmetic and geometry, 
bookkeeping and usually serving as accountants of the commune were paid less than 
grammarians, though these were in a similar social position.5  
 
The first significant sixteenth-century development in the tradition of the abacus did 
not change the social status of these mathematicians. The discovery of the solution to 
the third and fourth degree equations gave much visibility to those involved in the 
controversy—Tartaglia, Ferrari and Cardano–, but neither they nor the field 
improved their social status.6 Tartaglia’s works reveal some mid-century perceptions 
of the social status of mechanics from the perspective of a mathematical practitioner 
 
3 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’, 42–44. 
4 Grendler, Schooling in Renaissance Italy, 311. 
5 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’, 43; Grendler, Schooling in Renaissance Italy, 22–23. 
6 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’, 56–67. 
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belonging to the abacus tradition. Tartaglia not only was of ‘humble birth’ but also 
had an unfavourable childhood; it is said that he only learned half of the alphabet, 
because by the time he reached ‘k’ he ran out of funds to pay his private tutor. In his 
later works, he relates how he pieced together his own education. During his lifetime, 
Tartaglia was a teacher of the abacus in Verona before moving to the Venice as 
engineer and surveyor. Irrespective of his achievements in mathematics, he is 
reported to have passed away ‘poor and alone’.7  
 
In the dedicatory letter to Henry VIII of Quesiti e inventione diverse (1546), 
Tartaglia sketched a conception of mechanics mainly concerned with war. Tartaglia 
mentions that Richard Wentworth, his disciple and a nobleman, referred to the 
King’s ‘great delight in all matters pertaining to war’.8 Because of this, he thought 
that ‘new things naturally gratify the human intellect’. In his view, these things were 
the first fruits of his ‘season’ and were presented ‘to gentlemen and to persons of 
high place, not for their quality, but for their novelty’.9 Indeed, the questions and 
inventions contained in the book ‘are mechanical things, plebeian, and written as 
spoken, in rough and low style’. ‘Mechanical’ is presented in the company of 
‘plebeian’, ‘rough’, ‘low’. Furthermore, Tartaglia explains that his book was written 
in the form of a dialogue between an expert and a layman. The writing was so close 
to oral expression (‘written as spoken’) that Baldi in his Cronica (1617) remarked 
how the language ‘brings a smile to the face of those who read his works’.10 The 
form of dialogue, later fuelled by the Mechanical Problems’ structure of question-
answer, dominated the genre until the end of the century, when the axiomatic style of 
Euclid largerly supplanted it. 
 
A different perspective emerges from Robert Norman’s presentation of his 
experimental enquiries on magnets. Norman was an elite craftsman whose reputation 
 
7 Masotti, ‘Tartaglia, Niccolò’, 258, 259; Pisano and Capecchi, Tartaglia’s Science of Weights and 
Mechanics in the Sixteenth Century, 3–20. 
8 On the puzzling question of Tartaglia’s dedicatory in the context of patronage and social classes see 
Pisano and Capecchi, Tartaglia’s Science of Weights and Mechanics in the Sixteenth Century, 57.  
9 Drake and Drabkin, Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy, 100. 
10 ‘Attese nondimeno così poco alla bontà della lingua, che move à risa talhora chi legge le cose sue’ 
Baldi, Cronica de Matematici, 133. 
41 
 
was based on his experience as a seaman that later settled down in Ratcliff to make 
nautical instruments; his sea-compass was widely recognised as a key improvement 
for navigation.11 In his Neue attractiue (1581), Norman exposed the findings on the 
properties of the magnets ‘grounding my arguments onely upon experience, reason, 
and demonstration, which are the grounds of Arts’. Norman is aware that not only his 
way of enquiry but also his conclusions run against the traditional way to ‘discover 
the secrets of nature’ by the ‘learned or ancient writers’. These learned are ‘the 
Mathematicalles’ considering ‘that this is no question or matter for a Mechanitian or 
Mariner to meddle with, no more then is the finding of the Longitude’. The reason 
behind this exclusion is that the matter ‘must bee handled exquisitely by 
Geometricall demonstration, and Arithmeticall Calculation; in which Artes, they 
would have all Mechanitians and Sea-men to be ignorant, or at least insufficientlie 
furnished to performe such a matter’. Norman quoted the proverb of Apelles that 
summarised, in his view, the attitude of ‘the Mathematicalles’ towards the 
‘Mechanitians’ crossing boundaries: ‘Ne sutor ultra crepidam’ (‘Shoemaker, not 
beyond the shoe).12  
 
Nevertheless, the distinction between mechanicians and mathematicians is not based 
on the knowledge of mathematics. Norman emphasised that mechanicians ‘have not 
the use of the Greek and Latin Tongues, to search the varietie of Authors in those 
[mathematical] Artes’. However, ‘they have in English for Geometrie, Euclides 
Elements, with absolute demonstrations: and for Arithmeticke, Records works … 
which books are sufficient to the industrious mechanician to make him pearfect and 
ready in those Sciences, but especially to apply them same to the Art and faculty 
which he chiefly professeth’.13 In other words, mechanicians were as well trained in 
mathematics as other mathematicians, according to him. But this presentation also 
provides some insights into other changes related to mechanics: the allusion to 
mathematical works in ‘vulgar languages’ is a sign of the growing importance of 
mechanics and the improvement of mechanicians for military and civil purposes 
(trade, navigation, infrastructure). The fact that a craftsman published a book (a 
 
11 Taylor, The Mathematical Practitioners of Tudor and Stuart England, 172–73. 
12 Norman, The Newe Attractiue Containyng a Short Discourse of the Magnes or Lodestone, i–iii. 
13 Norman, ii–iii. 
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rather expensive enterprise) implies that he considered his enquiries of public 
interest. The Neue Attractiue originally published in 1581, was enlarged with a 
presentation by William Borough—Treasurer of Queen’s Ships and Master of Trinity 
House—and reprinted in 1585, 1590 and 1592. In this preface, Barlow, an Oxford 
educated clergyman with interest in mathematics and mechanics, said of Norman that 
‘although he was not learned, yet was a very expert mechanician’.14 
 
Some perspectives of the mathematicians on mechanicians highlight further struggles 
for social recognition. During the development of mathematics in the second half of 
the sixteenth century in England some mathematicians, especially those perfecting 
instruments, raised up their social status by stressing the errors of the mechanicians, 
accusing them of being uneducated and vulgar because of their poor knowledge of 
mathematics. Instead of promoting the study of geometry to improve the practice of 
manual workers, as was frequent in Italy, the theme of the ‘vulgar errors’ was to turn 
on the advantage of these mathematicians encouraging the use of sophisticated 
instruments to improve their social status at the expense of the craftsmen’s.15 These 
mathematicians portrayed their carefully crafted instruments and their abstract 
knowledge as a solution to the ‘errors common in [the] daily practice’ of the 
‘ignorant of Arithmetike and Geometrie’. Books and pamphlets disapproving the 
practices of craftsmen circulated in London.16  
 
In the higher range of the social spectrum of mathematics we find the ‘celestial’ 
mathematicians, that is, the astrologer-physicians.17 These were mostly related to 
universities and this safe positioning implied that they sustained conservative role 
alignments.18 Indeed, mathematics held a safe place in the universities given the links 
between astrology, a mathematical discipline, and medicine. While there was no 
degree or licensing in mathematics—a sign of its ancillary position, the mathematical 
 
14 Taylor, The Mathematical Practitioners of Tudor and Stuart England, 172–74. 
15 ‘Yet the errors do not come from the art but from those who practice the art’. Newton, The 
Principia, 381. 
16 Johnston, ‘Mathematical Practitioners and Instruments in Elizabethan England’, 325–26. The 
quotations come from the title of Edward Worsop’s A Discoverie of sundrie errours and faults daily 
committed by Landmeaters, ignorant of Arithmetike and Geometrie (1582) 
17 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’. 
18 Westman, ‘The Astronomer’s Role’, 117. 
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education of physicians was customary and provided mathematics a position beyond 
the quadrivium.19 Widely recognised astronomers and mathematicians obtained their 
degrees in law and medicine, such as Copernicus, or in theology, such as Kepler, and 
usually developed their careers in mathematics outside the universities.20 In fact, 
universities were oriented towards three professions: law, theology and medicine. 
Law and canon law were central as preparation for the clergy, and consequently 
these faculties were powerful and influential. Medicine was prestigious not only 
intellectually, for its close connection with natural philosophy, but also socially for 
its acclaimed utility. The connection between medicine and the preservation of life 
positioning physicians in royal courts dates back to legendary times. 
 
Meanwhile, the connection between astrology and medicine has a long history going 
back at least to Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos. However, a new impetus was given to their 
connection in the Renaissance after the recovery of Neo-Platonic and Stoic sources 
by Marsilio Ficcino and Pico della Mirandola. Celestial bodies influenced life on 
Earth. A collection of theories rooted in ancient times postulated diverse entities 
responsible for these interactions. Astrology provided calculations to diagnose and 
forecast the development of diseases and plagues, the outbreak of wars or the fate of 
the harvest based on the application of mathematical calculations and instruments. In 
the case of medicine, the reformed natural philosophies and medical theories 
challenging Aristotle and Galen provided causal accounts of the entities responsible 
for diseases—Paracelsus, Jean Fernel and Girolamo Fracastoro were the most 
influential. On the other hand, astrology accounted for the conjunctions of the stars 
against the background of fixed stars and the angular separations of heavenly bodies. 
These conjunctions were meaningful to diagnose or even to predict when someone 
reached the point of no return in their way to death.21 This alliance between the 
 
19 Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned Medicine; Andersen 
and Bos, ‘Pure Mathematics’; Westman, ‘The Astronomer’s Role’; Henry, ‘Why Jean Fernel’. 
20 Rose, The Italian Renaissance of Mathematics, 118–20; Westman, ‘The Astronomer’s Role’, 117–
18. 
21 Henry, ‘Why Jean Fernel’; Henry, ‘The Fragmentation of Renaissance Occultism’; Westman, The 
Copernican Question : Prognostication, Skepticism, and Celestial Order, 43–48; 62-66.; Thomas, 
Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century 
England; Rutkin, ‘Astrology’. 
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explanatory role of the (reformed) natural philosophies and the predictive function of 
the astronomer in the person of the physician was a conservative one.22 
 
The connection between astrology and medicine made possible that some 
mathematicians were not limited to teaching introductory studies; they could have a 
place as well in Medical Schools, yet significantly inferior in social status (and 
salary) to professors of medicine. In contrast with the practitioners trained in the 
abacus school, whose highest position was usually as city’s official surveyors, the 
university teachers were required to compile the city’s yearly horoscopes.23 
However, mathematicians connected to universities were in better position when 
compared to its ‘terrestrial’ counterparts because of their connection with medicine, 
not because their mathematical knowledge was highly valued. Interestingly, the link 
between mathematics and medicine amounted to a social bridge that provided 
‘celestial’ mathematicians with a route to climb up in social status that their 
counterparts lacked. Crossing the bridge was not a matter of personal choice; 
mathematics, even celestial, was not a profession standing by itself, lacked social 
recognition and its practise was poorly paid—when paid. The reasons leading Jean 
Fernel, a practitioner of mathematics, to become a physician illustrate this point. 
Fernel tried to make a name for himself and for a living as a mathematical 
practitioner, before completely abandoning mathematics for medicine.24 Since his 
formative years, Fernel was more inclined to mathematics than to the established 
professions—theology, law and medicine–, as it is indicated by his publication of 
three books on mathematics during his training as physician. Subsequently, Fernel 
not only published other books on mathematics (remarkably on cosmography), but 
also accumulated an impressive collection of mathematical books and instruments, a 
very expensive venture by then. His practice and also his attempts to win patronage 
for his mathematical work depict someone with ‘genuine ambitions to establish 
himself as a leading cosmographer’. However, after publishing De proportionibus in 
1528, Fernel fully dedicated to medicine and the publications on the matter quickly 
established his reputation as a leader in the field. By the time that his 1542 De 
 
22 Westman, ‘The Astronomer’s Role’, 118–19. 
23 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’, 43. 
24 On this, see Henry, ‘Why Jean Fernel’, 196–206. 
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naturali parte medicinæ appeared in print, his collection of mathematical books and 
instrument had been decimated. The reason for this change of direction came from 
Fernel’s family. His father-in-law realised that Fernel was not earning enough to 
support his family out of mathematics and was using his daughter’s dowry to fund 
his expensive mathematical undertakings. He also complained that medicine, 
Fernel’s early devotion, was no longer of his interest; in his first biography, it is 
reported that he was so ‘clung to mathematics that neither love of his wife, nor the 
endearments of his children, nor the care of his house, could take him off them’.25 
Once Fernel moved to medicine and climbed up to be a respected professor of 
medicine at the Collège de Cornouailles in Paris, he attracted a huge personal 
practice and became physician of Henri II. By the time of his death, Fernel had 
inspired a considerable number of followers who practised medicine all over Europe 
and left a fortune.26  
 
While ‘celestial’ mathematicians were in a better position than their ‘terrestrial’ 
counterpart, the social status of mathematics was largely considered subsidiary to 
medicine in the former case and ‘plebeian’ and vulgar in the latter. These two trends 
constitute the axes from which the wide-ranging transformations of mechanics 
spread out. As late as 1577, Guidobaldo dal Monte declared against the bad 
reputation of mechanics ‘as for certain recent manipulators of words who deprecate 
mechanics, let them go and wipe away their shame, if they have any, and stop falsely 
charging mechanics with lack of nobility and lack of usefulness’.27 Mechanics was 
still a second-class practise; not everyone was dazzled by the rigour of the 
mathematical proofs or the benefits of their application.  
 
In the meantime, the Italian city-states witnessed some of the most impressive 
developments of mechanics and mathematics, to a large extent, as part of a response 
to the Italian wars and particularly to the disturbance produced by the invasion of 
Charles VIII of France which inaugurated the so-called ‘cannon age’. Military 
technologies—arsenals and the improvement of fortifications—came to be seen as 
 
25 See Henry, 207. 
26 Forrester and Henry, On the Hidden Causes of Things. 
27 Drake and Drabkin, Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy, 243. 
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central to the power of the princes and the political stability of the cities after these 
had proven to be vulnerable to the King’s cannons. In Il Principe (1532), Machiavelli 
assessed the strength of the principalities by their capability to support themselves, 
stressing a well-fortified town. In his view, a powerful prince is the one ‘not hated by 
his people’ and whose ‘town [is] well fortified’.28 This view stimulated to the 
emergence of the milites, ex-soldiers from aristocratic origins who became 
practitioners of mechanics as a contemplative, mathematical science that promoted 
the improvement of the practice of the manual workers by the development of 
mathematics. The ‘syndrome cannon’ and the introduction of the bastion forced 
milites, the professional warriors of aristocratic origins ‘to begin to rely less on their 
horses and more on Euclid for their survival as a distinct social group’.29 Guidobaldo, 
wealthy son of an ex-soldier turned into nobleman for his services to the Duke of 
Urbino and soldier himself for a short time in the wars between the Hapsburgs and 
the Ottomans, not only praised mechanics but practised it, first by getting some 
training at the University of Padua and later by joining the circle of Federico 
Commandino.30 But Guidobaldo’s father was not an isolated case; soldiers and 
military engineers were ennobled by their princes in recognition of their services.31 
 
The interest in mechanics also made its way into different forms of education. 
Mathematics was progressively included in the education of young aristocrats. 
Galileo tutored the young Cosimo II de Medici during some summers and Giovanni 
Magini—who was appointed chair of mathematics at Bologna over Galileo—tutored 
Vincenzo I Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua, who later became a major patron of arts and 
science employing artists like Monteverdi and Rubens.32 By the mid sixteenth-
century major Italian universities rearranged the teaching of mathematics sometimes 
by fusing chairs or by appointing teachers with backgrounds in practical 
mathematics. Astronomical and astrological teaching concerning medicine was still 
 
28 Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. 10. 
29 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’, 44. 
30 Bertoloni Meli, ‘Guidobaldo Dal Monte and the Archimedean Revival’; Baldi, Cronica de 
Matematici, 145–47. 
31 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’, 45. 
32 Drake, Galileo at Work: His Scientific Biography; Heilbron, Galileo; Fenlon, Music and Patronage 
in Sixteenth Century Mantua, 119–60. 
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the centre of the attention, but some teachers with professional background in 
geography, hydrostatics and fortification began to be appointed chairs of 
mathematics. The University of Padua was probably the first, and perhaps the only, 
offering lectures on mechanics based on the Mechanical Problems. Leonico and 
Piccolomini taught there, Guidobaldo attended Catena’s lectures on mechanics by 
1564, as did Baldi from 1573 to 1575.33 Three teachers of mathematics lectured on 
mechanics following the text of the Mechanical Problems: Pietro Catena, Giuseppe 
Moletti and Galileo Galilei. Unfortunately, most of their notes for the lectures are 
lost, except for some of Moletti’s.34 According to the university records, Galileo’s 
duties included publicly teaching mechanics by 1598. It is also known that he had 
been offering private lessons for which various syllabuses still remain—some of 
them gathered together and published posthumously as Le meccaniche.35 
 
The rising of absolutist states in Italy involving alterations in the structure of 
sixteenth-century courts opened new avenues for interaction with political power that 
ended up opening possibilities for the emerging mathematicians. Before these 
changes (1400-1500), courts were unstructured bodies with bureaucratic and 
administrative functions not clearly differentiated. In the new structure, the 
distinction between functions of state management and representation of the prince’s 
power opened a door for mathematicians in court. In practice, this distinction 
modified the above-mentioned axes of the social status of mathematicians. The 
administrators, by hiring practical mathematicians for military and civil works, 
created a new distinction by appointing mathematicians to increase the representation 
of the power of the prince. After gaining the favour of the prince, these new upper-
class mathematicians were responsible for the production of mirabilia to honour their 
patrons such as theatrical machines, or as Galileo did later, the telescope and the 
Medicean Stars.36 But more often than not, practical mathematicians did not play any 
important part in this new role and their social status did not change in any 
considerable way. Another group, that we now identify with ‘fine arts’ (painters, 
 
33 Laird, ‘The Scope of Renaissance Mechanics’, 58–59. 
34 Laird, 58–64; Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 12–15; Rose and Drake, ‘The Pseudo-
Aristotelian Questions of Mechanics in Renaissance Culture’, 92–96. 
35 Rose and Drake, ‘The Pseudo-Aristotelian Questions of Mechanics in Renaissance Culture’, 94. 
36 Biagioli, ‘The Social Status’, 47. 
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sculptors and architects) used this path to increase their position that materialised in 
institutions such as the Accademia del disegno in Florence. These artists shaped a 
fresh conception of visual arts drawn from the same roots of the mechanical arts 
blended with the recovery of mathematics, but stressed ideas of harmony and order 
rather than utility. By putting together architecture, sculpture and painting under the 
idea of disegno, the social status of visual artists increased considerably with this 
new way of patronage, Michelangelo and Vasari being the best examples. Visual 
artists forged a professional identity and found a rewarding way of glorifying the 
prince.37 The resemblance with mechanics is striking: Galileo’s wrapping up of the 
satellites of Jupiter with the mythology making ‘Jupiter’ and ‘cosmos’ into symbols 
for the founder of the dynasty is paralleled with Vasari’s reform of the Palazzo 
Vecchio under Cosimo I, portraying the Medici family in a similar narrative. The 
paintings in the ceilings and the association of mythological names with the uses of 
rooms hinted at a view of the prince and his family fused together with the genealogy 
of Roman gods.38 
 
1.2.The most wondrous thing 
Social and political factors played important roles in shaping mechanics as a 
significant practice in the cultural life of the sixteenth century. This change had 
consequences in the transition of mechanics from a vague set of operational rules 
into a structured science. Mechanics was becoming more visible, some 
mathematicians were gaining respected places in society and mathematical education 
was extending beyond traditional practitioners through several forms of training. In 
this context, the circulation of the Mechanical Problems attributed to Aristotle 
provided a set of concepts and problems to which humanist and mathematicians 
referred in order to codify the dispersed set of rules. Other ancient texts dealing with 
mechanics were translated and circulated during the period, such as Archimedes or 
Hero. However, Mechanical Problems was particularly influential because it 
addressed the pressing question, coming from the most educated, concerning the 
 
37 Biagioli, 54. 
38 Payne, ‘Vasari, Architecture, and the Origins of Historicizing Art’; Kirwin, ‘Vasari’s Tondo 
of’Cosimo I with His Architects Engineers and Sculptors’ in the Palazzo Vecchio. Typology and Re-
Identification of Portraits’; Rosen, ‘A New Chronology of the Construction and Restoration of the 
Medici Guardaroba in the Palazzo Vecchio, Florence’. 
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framework to explain in causal terms the visible achievements of mechanicians and 
engineers.39 The Mechanical Problems’ opening outlined mechanics as a 
contemplative science and its outcomes as matching in certainty those of traditional 
middle-sciences, such as astronomy and optics. Mechanical arts may be the practice 
of mechanicians; but the knowledge involved in their practice—explaining the 
construction and operation of machines—is scientia.  
 
Mechanical Problems is made up of an introduction, noticeably discussed in the late 
Renaissance, and thirty-five problems. Some are daily-life problems, while others are 
more theoretical in nature.40 In this section, I will look at the introduction in order to 
highlight the aspects of the discussion relevant for the transformation of the 
discipline. Although the reception of specific problems was influential in the 
assimilation of the work, the philosophical nature of the opening lines of Mechanical 
Problems and the prestige of its attributed author made it stand out.41 The main 
concern of the introduction is to depict the knowledge of the problems called 
mechanical (τῶν προβλεμάτων μηκανικὰ) as a science (επιστήμη), rather than to 
differentiate what happens by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and what occurs beyond it (παρὰ 
φύσιν) or to distinguish between natural and artificial; these are subordinate claims. 
According to the tradition receiving the text in the Renaissance, the introduction is 
divided in three parts: general considerations, the lever and the peculiarities of the 
circle. 
 
The introduction starts off with two kinds of things considered wondrous 
(Θαυμάζεται):42 in the domain of things occurring by nature, those whose cause is 
unknown; among things occurring beyond nature, those that come about by means of 
 
39 Valleriani, ‘The Transformation of Aristotle’s Mechanical Questions’; Laird, ‘The Scope of 
Renaissance Mechanics’; Rose and Drake, ‘The Pseudo-Aristotelian Questions of Mechanics in 
Renaissance Culture’. 
40 Cf. Schiefsky, ‘Art and Nature in Ancient Mechanics’; Schiefsky, ‘Structures of Argument and 
Concepts of Force in the Aristotelian Mechanical Problems’. Leeuwen, The Aristotelian Mechanics. 
41 Because sixteenth-century writers did not doubt about the authenticity of the text, I assume for my 
argument that Aristotle is the author.  
42 847a10-11. I have used the Greek text in Aristotle, ‘Mechanical Problems’. 
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art (διὰ τέχνην). In the second case, Aristotle specified that their purpose is the 
benefit of humankind (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις). The course of nature, 
acting ‘always in the same way and simply’ (ἀεὶ τὸν αὐτὸν … τρόπον καὶ ἁπλῶς), is 
contrasted to what is useful (τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον) that ‘changes in many ways’ 
(μεταβάλλει πολλαχῶς).43  
 
The distinction between things occurring by nature and those beyond it has been the 
focus of attention since the early modern period. The complexity of the passage is 
better understood when it is noted that ‘by nature’ is a central concept in Aristotelian 
thought encompassing, among others, necessity (ἀνάγκη) and what belongs to 
something in itself (καθ᾽αὐτό), not to mention potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality 
(ἐνέργεια). In fact, the development of the constitutive principle of substances 
(εἰδός) individuating them—from potentiality to actuality–is said to occur ‘by 
nature’. On the other hand, Aristotle uses παρὰ φύσιν in inconsistent ways: (1) 
beyond nature in the sense of supernatural, or something exceeding the scope of 
natural processes. (2) It can refer to something contrary to nature, for example 
natural as opposed to violent or forced motion. (3) It is widely used in the corpus to 
signify what is unusual, not as a general rule but as an exception, for example when 
explaining ‘monstrous births’ (τέρας). Finally, it can signify ‘beyond nature’ not in 
the sense of something outside the domain of nature but of something that nature 
does not do without human intervention. This last notion has notable precedents in 
Hippocratic medicine as is widely referred to by Aristotle when dealing with this 
art.44 When reading the opening passage using the second meaning, as some 
traditional readings did, art and nature seems to be conflicting.45 When this sense is 
combined with the third, art is reduced to the study of violent motion, being a 
 
43 847a15-16. 
44 Schiefsky, ‘Art and Nature in Ancient Mechanics’, 75–76; Leeuwen, The Aristotelian Mechanics, 
161. 
45 See Krafft, ‘Die Anfänge einer theoretischen Mechanik und die Wandlung ihrer Stellung zut 
Wissenschaft von der Natur’. 
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consequence of differentiating between phenomena occurring κατὰ φύσιν as subject 
of natural philosophy, and phenomena occurring παρὰ φύσιν as subject of 
mechanics. But the opposition in this passage is between the constant operation of 
nature and the changing nature of human needs and desires, not between art and 
nature.46  
 
The changing character of human desire, as opposed to the regularity of nature, 
implies that ‘whenever, then, it is necessary to do something beyond nature, because 
of the difficulty we are at a loss and have need of an art’.47 The passage is not 
entirely clear, because the adverb ‘whenever’ (ὃταν) does not specify under which 
circumstances it is necessary to do something beyond nature. It seems plausible to 
infer that ‘whenever’ refers to those cases in which the regular nature and the 
changing desire do not coincide. On the other hand, the passage states that in those 
cases ‘we are at a loss’ (ἀπορίαν) and ‘have need of an art’. Stones naturally fall, but 
if we wish to lift them up, because of the difficulty—the one-way course of nature–, 
we need to know how. This situation is described as ‘being at a loss’ (ἀπορία), which 
is the state previous to knowledge in which we are perplexed. Because of this, we 
need an art. In Nichomachean Ethics, a text widely used in the sixteenth-century 
universities, Aristotle claims that  
Art is identical (ταὐτὸν) with a state of capacity to make (τέχνη 
καὶ ἓξις), involving a true course of reasoning. All art is concerned 
with coming into being (γἐνεσιν), i.e., with contriving and 
considering how (τεχνἀζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν) something may come 
into being (…) art is concerned neither with things that are, or 
come into being, by necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης), nor with things that do 
so in accordance with nature (κατὰ φὐσιν).48  
 
46 Schiefsky, ‘Art and Nature in Ancient Mechanics’, 77; Micheli, Le origini del concetto di 
macchina, 86. 
47 847a18-19. 
48 Nic. Eth. 1140a4-10. For the Greek text I have followed Aristotle, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 
ed. J Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). For the translation, I have followed Aristotle and 
Johnathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005);  
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In the light of this passage, rather than claiming that mechanitians are required to act 
against nature, Aristotle claimed that when we want to do something not performed 
by nature itself we are initially perplexed; in consequence, we require knowledge 
(ἓξις) of the know-how (τεχνἀζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν), an art. This specific art uses 
‘devices’: ‘we also call that part of art that assists in such situations a device 
(μηχανήν)’.49 In other words, this art is the knowledge of bringing into existence 
devices assisting us to go beyond nature, for human benefit. The passage is 
summarised by quoting Antiphon: ‘By means of art we gain mastery over things in 
which we are conquered by nature’.50 
 
At this point, Aristotle introduced two examples of the kind of situation in which a 
device supports us in going beyond nature: when ‘the lesser master the greater’ and 
when ‘things possessing a small inclination move great weights’. In Aristotle’s view, 
these are general instances of what he called mechanical problems (τῶν 
προβλεμάτων μηκανικὰ).51 Although the references are general, the first can be 
understood in the light of the paragraph immediately following, in which Aristotle 
claimed that one of the most surprising achievements of mechanics was the 
movement of a great weight by a small force using a lever. Aristotle considered the 
lever a paradigm of mechanics, for it is the simplest machines by which ‘a great 
weight can be moved by a small force’. The second makes references to the inclined 
plane, a machine widely used in antiquity, yet the knowledge of its law appeared 
later.52 
 
These general considerations locate mechanical problems between mathematics and 
physics: ‘These [mechanical problems] are not entirely identical with physical 
problems nor entirely separate from them, but they have a share in both mathematical 
 
49 In translating this central concept, I have followed Schiefsky, ‘Art and Nature in Ancient 
Mechanics’; Leeuwen, The Aristotelian Mechanics. For a philological study of μηχανή see Micheli, 
Le origini del concetto di macchina, 9–20. 
50 Cf. Schiefsky, ‘Art and Nature in Ancient Mechanics’, 78–79; Micheli, Le origini del concetto di 
macchina, 139, 143. 
51 847a22-24. 
52 Roux and Festa, ‘The Engima of the Inclined Plane’. 
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and physical speculations: for the ‘how’ (ὣς) in them is made clear through 
mathematics, while the ‘about what’ (περὶ ὃ) is made clear through physics’.53 The 
passage sums up an Aristotelian commonplace: that some sciences take their object 
from one discipline and their way to explain it from other. However, this should not 
be taken as any kind of mathematical physics. On the contrary, the idea that every 
science has its proper object and method lies at the heart of Aristotelian thought 
(μετἀβασις εἰς ἂλλο γένος).54 Mixed or middle-sciences, as they came to be known 
in the Middle Ages, are not the exception. Aristotle’s definition of science implies 
that knowledge of something is always taken from some perspective: physics is the 
knowledge of nature per se, that is, of natural things insofar as they are natural. 
However, natural objects can be considered from other viewpoints—from any of the 
categories—which are accidental, but also provide some knowledge. Put otherwise, 
we can consider things from different perspectives: science in its proper sense 
considers things from what makes them being what they are (εἰδός), but we can also 
consider them insofar as they are measurable, for example.55 The passage, then, 
clarifies that mechanics belongs to this kind of knowledge: its ‘what about’ comes 
from physics; its way to deal with it (‘how’) from mathematics. Aristotle claims here 
that mechanics belongs to the sciences considering physical objects not qua natural, 
but qua mathematical: natural objects are measurable, although measurability is not 
their defining characteristic.56 As renaissance commentators highlight, this definition 
includes astronomy, optics and music.57 On the other hand, the objects of mechanics 
are natural objects modified in order to fulfil human desires and, in consequence, 
their explanation should include this desire as final end (τέλος).  
 
In the Aristotelian context, to know is to know why and in this sense, the possibility 
to specify the causes of the phenomenon.58 In the kind of mechanics that Aristotle 
 
53 847a25-30. 
54 See Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, 299–327. 
55 On this see Met. 983a24-984b22; 193b22-30 and Post. An. 78b36-39. See also Schiefsky, ‘Art and 
Nature in Ancient Mechanics’, 90–91; Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand.  
56 See Cat. 1b25-6a35. 
57 Laird, ‘The Scope of Renaissance Mechanics’; Rose and Drake, ‘The Pseudo-Aristotelian Questions 
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58 See, for example, Met. 982a20-982b-10. 
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sketeched, the formal cause would be provided by mathematics, because it 
establishes the principles of explanation (ὣς). The primary cause of all mechanical 
phenomena is the circle (Πάντων δὲ τῶν ποιούτων ἒχει τῆς αἰτίας τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ 
κύκλος).59 Because the way of explaining is mathematical, the geometric properties 
of the circle provide the principles or causes of mechanical phenomena. The circle is 
described as wondrous, for it encompasses the combination of opposites, ‘the most 
wondrous thing’. The fundamental opposition is that between ‘the moving and the 
stationary’ acting at the same time in generating the circle: tracing a circle 
encompasses both. The mathematical properties of the circle, from which all 
mechanical phenomena could be explained, include: (1) the presence of the concave 
and the convex in the circumference. (2) The simultaneous motion in opposite 
directions—backwards and forwards—of the extremes of a diameter when a circle is 
rotating on its centre. And finally, (3) the fact that, as it rotates, a point farther from 
the centre moves faster than one closer to it. 
 
Because of these properties, the argument runs, there is nothing strange in the circle 
being the origin of all these wondrous things (οὐδὲν ἂτοπον τὸ πάντων εἶναι τῶν 
θαθμάτων αὐτὸν ἀρχήν).60 By origin (ἀρχήν) Aristotle means the principle of 
explanation of these mechanical wonders that, once made clear, are not marvellous 
anymore. The circle is the starting point of the mechanical explanation, for the 
phenomena of the balance can be explained (ἀνάγεται) in terms of the circle and 
those about the lever in terms of the balance and ‘nearly all other problems of 
mechanical movement can be explained in terms of the. The core of the passage is 
the verb ἀνάγεται whose meaning is central not only in terms of how mechanics 
should proceed in the Mechanical Problems but also became relevant to the late 
renaissance projects of restoring ancient mechanics.61 The verb has a wide variety of 
meanings in ancient Greece: in a physical sense, it means leading up (from a lower 
 
59 847b16-17. 
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place to a higher); in a more abstract sense, it can be translated as bringing back, 
referring to (its principles), reducing one thing to another (forms of syllogisms) or 
finally reckoning or calculating. Commandino systematically rendered it as reducere 
and Guidobaldo assumed this verb as the cornerstone of the procedures in 
mechanics: all kind of machines can be reduced to most basic principles of geometry 
in order to demonstrate their properties.62 What appears as wondrous at first sight can 
be explained in terms of the properties of the circle; from the lever to any mechanical 
problem. Aristotle added that by using these properties of the circle ‘craftsmen make 
an instrument concealing the original circle, so that the marvel of the machine is 
alone apparent, while its cause is invisible’.63   
 
1.3. La virtù de la machina 
The distinction between natural and artificial lies at the heart of mechanics as a form 
of knowledge. Mechanical Problems sketched a science of machines rather than 
straightforwardly tackling the general question of what is artificial and how it differs 
from the natural. However, the characterisation of mechanics and the kind of 
problems postulated in the work recurrently brought up the distinction. Most 
Renaissance translators had something to say about this. Some of the most puzzling 
passages were interpreted in the light of other Aristotelian works particularly by 
humanist scholars. Also, some practitioners of mathematics attempted to reconcile 
the Mechanical Problems with other ancient authors such as Archimedes, 
Apollonius, Hero, and Pappus, considering Aristotle’s mechanics as embedded in a 
more general trend. In so doing, these practitioners began to deal—not always fully 
aware of it—with incompatible approaches to mechanical problems that either 
emphasised or rejected the role of motion. These tensions surface in the attempts to 
codify and axiomatise mechanics.  
 
Mechanical Problems was published for the first time in Greek as part of Aldus 
Manutius’ edition of Aristotle’s works (1495-1498); there is no record of any 
 
62 Bertoloni Meli, ‘Guidobaldo dal Monte and the Archimedean Revival’; Drake and Drabkin, 
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previous reception. The Venetian humanist Vittore Fausto made the first Latin 
translation in 1517. However, Niccolò Leonico Tomeo’s overshadowed this 
translation in 1525. This went through successive editions, becoming the standard in 
the sixteenth century; Galileo’s copy, for example, was an original 1525 edition.64 
Tomeo, a professor of Aristotelian philosophy at Padua and protégé of cardinal 
Besarion, also translated other works of Aristotle. The translation of Mechanics was 
published together with translations of and commentaries to De motu animalium, De 
animalium incessu, and an extract of Proclus’ commentary to Plato’s Timaeus.65 His 
1525 translation of the Mechanical Problems includes commentaries on the 
Aristotelian text and diagrams that were removed from subsequent editions.66 
Because Tomeo’s interest is mainly philological rather than mathematical, his 
commentaries were harshly criticised both by philosophers and mathematicians for 
not extending or developing the conceptual and mathematical aspects of the text.67  
 
From Tomeo’s philological angle, there are revealing aspects both in his translation 
of and in his commentary to Mechanical Problems. The first sentence of the 
translation, highlighting the wondrous character of some phenomena, reads: 
‘Miraculo sunt ea quidem quæ natura contingunt quorum ignorantur causæ: illa vero 
que preter naturam quæcunque ad hominum utilitatem arte fiunt’.68 The commentary 
omits all reference to natural things whose cause we ignore and focuses on the nature 
of the productions of art. ‘Preter naturam’ is referred to the outcomes of art insofar as 
they repeatedly go beyond the ‘laws of nature’ (quoniam sæpenumero ars naturæ 
transgressa leges). The main goal behind this transgression is the benefit of man. 
Tomeo illustrated this with the case of stones and timber used to make the walls and 
beams of a house, arranged against their natural tendencies, emphasising how they 
 
64 Rose and Drake, ‘The Pseudo-Aristotelian Questions of Mechanics in Renaissance Culture’, 80. 
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were shaped by art. From here, Tomeo concluded that the simplicity of the natural 
course contrasts with the complex variety of uses invented by art.69  
 
After this, Tomeo claimed that Greeks called this art ‘mechanics’ because it made 
use of machines to multiply forces in order to overcome the course of nature. 
Because the use of machines seems to be the distinctive feature of this art, Tomeo 
made central the definition of machine.70 In his view, machines were complex 
instruments made of the conjunction of matter (ex continenti materiæ coniunctione), 
capable of moving weights (pondera) by the arrangement of spheres rotating and 
revolving (per orbium quosdam rotates et circuitiones).71 Three major issues arise 
from this definition: machines are not mere devices or instruments, but a specific 
kind of artificial object composed of instruments; machines are made of matter, i.e., 
they are ultimately formed by natural elements. Finally, the arrangement or design of 
the natural elements composing machines is their form and these can be explained in 
mathematical terms. The geometrical nature of mechanics relied on the unique 
(mathematical) configuration of its subject.  
 
Tomeo’s definition of machine implies a difference with plain instruments, relying 
on a tradition going back to Plato.72 Both machines and instruments are material 
objects with particular functions, largely used to simplify human activities. 
Nonetheless, machines are more complex than instruments, for they incorporate what 
Greek denominated μῆτις (ingenium) that is, the materialisation of design. While 
instruments are material objects shaped to improve human performance in specific 
activities (for example, a knife), machines are the result of ingenium: they require 
knowledge and planning. If machines are human constructions after designs 
(inventions) they presumably have a history: Hero attempted to reconstruct the 
genesis of the lever.73 The Greek language crystallised this distinction in two 
 
69 Leonico Tomeo, xxiii. 
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different terms: μηχανή for machines and ὂργανον for instruments.74 In the sixteenth 
century, Vitruvius became the most influential source to define machine. According 
to him a machine ‘est continens ex materia coniunctio, maximas ad onerum motus 
habens virtutes’ (a machine is a combination of matter, mainly efficacious in moving 
great weights). Vitruvius, then, clarified that machines ‘need more workmen and 
greater power to make them take effect’, whereas instruments ‘accomplish their 
purpose at the intelligent touch of a single workman’. 75  
 
A similar set of arguments was further developed in Giuseppe Moletti’s Dialogue on 
Mechanics (1576). Moletti held the professorship of mathematics at the University of 
Padua, just after Pietro Catena, the first lecturer on the Mechanical Problems, and 
immediately before Galileo. The Dialogue pursued two related goals: the 
presentation of mechanics as a noble discipline worthy of the admiration and 
dedication of a prince and the foundation of mechanics on Euclid’s geometry, that is, 
to lay down the Euclidean principles that Moletti considered to underlie Aristotelian 
mechanics.76 In dealing with the subject of mechanics, AN, the character usually 
asking, prompts debate about the topic by quoting the Vitruvian definition of 
machine and immediately adding that he did not understand the distinction between 
machine and instrument. The Prince, PR, the character usually staging Moletti’s 
points of view, replied that the distinction is such in terms of ‘workmanship’ (la 
differenza è manifesta appreso à quello poi che gli la distingue dal lavoro).77 This 
difference is illustrated with two examples. Machines are represented by the 
mechanical clock, in which ‘there is much workmanship and gears’, while 
instruments are exemplified with a lever having ‘little workmanship and no gears’. 
But Moletti’s argument goes further. In his view, ‘workmanship’ was not enough to 
distinguish between these two kinds of objects, ‘because more or less workmanship 
does not make a sensible difference or change the species’. The substantial difference 
lies on the contrivance: ‘if the contrivance is good or if the craftsman has thought it 
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out well (Ma si bene il machinamento, ò l’havervi l’artefice pensato su), then from 
such contrivance I shall with as much reason call the press with which one presses 
wine a machine as a crossbow or arquebus’.78 Put otherwise, the distinctive 
characteristic of machines is the complexity of ‘machinamento’ (ingenium) not of 
‘workmanship’; what truly distinguishes a machine is the materialisation of a design. 
Moletti was not the only one insisting upon the intellectual character of machines 
over their material condition.  
 
The emphasis upon machines as products of the mind was a consequence of shaping 
mechanics as a mathematical science. At the same time, this opened the door to the 
integration of other mathematical developments into mechanics, put forward by the 
systematisation projects inspired in the recovery of Euclid and Archimedes, such as 
Moletti’s and Guidobaldo’s, and ultimately framed in the idea coming down from 
Aristotle that mechanics is some kind of theoretical knowledge.  
 
These projects, however, have to be read against the background of other mid-
century debates about the disciplinary nature of mechanics leading to divergent 
conclusions on the balance between mathematics and natural philosophy. 
Mechanical Problems put on the table the idea that there was some kind of 
theoretical knowledge about machines. The kind of problems studied by this science 
belonged both to mathematics and to natural philosophy, but Mechanical Problems 
hardly specified what this meant. Divergent approaches, coming from humanists, 
teachers and practitioners of mathematics ended up in mutual disqualifications and 
bitter disputes. Tartaglia suggested that mechanics might be considered either 
mathematically—removed from any physical consideration—or else physically.79 
Guidobaldo condemned this approach for misunderstanding the proper approach of 
mechanics and the nature of its subject. In his view, Tartaglia’s position assumed that 
Mechanics could be considered apart from either geometrical 
demonstrations or actual motion! Surely when that distinction is 
made, it seems to me … that all they [Tartaglia and similar 
mathematicians] accomplish by putting themselves forth 
alternately as physicists and as mathematicians is simply that they 
 
78 Laird, 83. 
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fall between two stools, as the saying goes. For mechanics can no 
longer be called mechanics when it is abstracted and separated 
from machines.80 
Tartaglia’s view articulated a conception deriving from his own practice, from his 
own way of dealing with mathematical problems coming from different traditions. In 
fact, Tartaglia embraced the medieval tradition of the science of weights that 
Commandino and Guidobaldo rejected on the grounds of inadequately appealing to 
experience and mathematics in their approach. Guidobaldo described the medieval 
science of weights as ‘a thick mist of ignorance’.81 Guidobaldo insisted on the central 
character of machines as physical objects, which is one-of-a-piece with his 
understanding of mechanics as a discipline eminently mathematical. In his view and 
following the lines of Mechanical Problems, the mathematical character of 
mechanics consists in the reduction of (reducere) any machine to simpler forms and 
all these to the lever, whose mathematical principles constitutes the starting point of 
mechanics.82 Nevertheless, Guidobaldo’s insistence on the centrality of machines 
underlines its material character and offers an interesting nuance of the emerging 
views of the relationship between mathematics and physical objects. The material 
character of machines is central to the axiomatisation projects set in by Moletti and 
Guidobaldo. But this aspect was already present in mechanical trends, at least, since 
Vitruvius’ definition and it utterly found a longer expression in Galileo’s science of 
materials introduced as a scienza in his Discorsi.83 The main point of the material 
character of machines is that, while the methods and proof of mechanics are 
mathematical, its subject comes from physics, i.e., it is ultimately a natural 
phenomenon.  
 
At the end of the century, mechanics begins to acquire an identity as a science. The 
insertion into universities, the publication of textbooks and manuals and the new 
social forms of practitioners indicate this transformation. Mechanics was considered 
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as a theoretical, mixed-science, branch of mathematics, different both from natural 
philosophy and from the activity of building machines (mechanical arts). The 
prevailing sense of mechanics circulating before different groups paid attention to the 
Mechanical Problems referred to the practice of craftsmen, as it has been mentioned 
above.84 The theoretical character of mechanics, emerged as a form of assimilation 
into dominant schemes of knowledge, provided a wide range of points of contact 
with dissimilar mathematical traditions. The science of mechanics is not only a 
theoretical, causal explanation of the machines already existing and produced by 
mechanical arts; it also explains why any machine produces the effects it does. Thus, 
uncovering the principles of mechanics was expected to boost the construction of 
new machines. In his commentary to Mechanical Problems, Piccolomini claims that 
this work investigates ‘the true reasons for almost all the wonderful machines which 
not only have already been discovered but which will be invented in the future’.85 
The study of the Mechanical Problems is not limited to the explanation but it is 
projected into ‘the future’. 
 
The theoretical, causal nature of mechanics is not opposed to the material dimension 
of its subject. On the contrary, the material character of machines was a defining 
feature of mechanics and introduced a series of theoretical and operative 
requirements. This is prominent in Guidobaldo’s mathematical practice. In 
explaining the balance, Guidobaldo claimed that the weights of the balance act on 
lines of descent converging toward the centre of the world, not on parallel lines as it 
was supposed by Tartaglia. The fact that the two weights attached to the sides of a 
balance were conceived not as parallel but as convergent towards the centre, bore 
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important consequences in Guidobaldo’s mathematical analysis of this machine—
and others—that were criticised since his own times until Duhem.86  
The diagram represents a balance (DCE) and DS and ES are the lines of descent 
converging towards the centre of the earth. D and E are the weights. According to 
Tartaglia, D would be heavier than E because the angle of contact HDG would be 
smaller than the angle KEG. According to Guidobaldo, E would be heavier, because 
the angle SEG would be smaller than the angle SDG.87 Guidobaldo has been 
criticised for the excessive rigour of his approach, making virtually impossible to 
build a balance acting this way. But what underlies this view is not a case of pedantry 
but a complex relationship between mathematical rigour and the physical world, 
encompassing the material character of the machines with the mathematical design. 
The distinction between the geometrical conception and the actual, material machine 
is not a distinction between theory and practice, but rather between different types of 
practices. In Guidobaldo’s Mechanicorum liber, machines are represented under two 
forms, next to each other, pointing to the dependence of the geometric design on the 
material configuration.  
 
86 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 30–32. 
87 My analysis follows Bertoloni Meli, 30–32. 
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scent are parallel. Even with this concession, however, the conclusions by Tartaglia
and his associates still would not follow. Dal Monte countered their arguments in
a variety of ways, arguing, for example, that they had taken the two weights sep-
arately, but since they are joined they have to be considered together.30 Whereas a
single weight attached to one arm of a balance would tend to fall obliquely to the
center of the world, two weights attached to the arms of a balance would tend to
fall parallel to the line between the center of gravity of the balance and the cen-
ter of the world. The issue was not so much dal Monte’s “punctilious” mind but
Figure 1.4. Dal Monte’s lines of descent (Mechanicorum liber). In this complex diagram DCE rep-
resents the tipping balance with weights in D and E. Angles KET and HDO are equal. According to
Tartaglia, the body in D would be heavier than the body in E because the angle HDG would be
smaller than the angle KEG. The difference would come from the angles of contact TEG (between
the tangent TE and the arc EG), which has to be added to KET, and ODG (between the tangent
DO and the arc DG), which has to be subtracted from HDO. According to dal Monte’s hypothetical
reasoning, angle SEG would be smaller than SDG, where S is the center of the Earth; therefore the
body in E would be heavier. Thus, rather than returning to the horizontal position, the balance
would move downward. On the mistaken interpretation by Duhem and his followers, this diagram
would be the hallmark of dal Monte’s pedantry because of his belief that the lines of descent of the
weight of a balance are not parallel among themselves but converge toward S.
Figure 1. Dal Monte’s representation of the lines of descent of a balance. 





This connection between mathematical design and material aspects of the machine is 
also manifest in Guidobaldo’s emphasis on the precision of the tools used to build 
machines out of their geometrical representation. These tools were meant to be a 
bridge between the geometrical representation and the figure, not between theory and 
practice. If the right tools were selected, theory will finally agree with experience: 
Guidobaldo’s mechanics is based on equilibrium, not on motion.88 Were the 
approach based in terms of motion, the materials composing the machine would 
generate disturbances in the mathematical analysis. Because elements have their own 
natural tendencies, the nature of the body would interfere with the expected 
mechanical effects. However, in the case of equilibrium, the imperfections of matter 
would not generate such a disturbance between the geometrical figure and the 
material conditions, for the geometrical analysis would ultimately provide insights 
into the counterbalance of these natural tendencies in the production of the machine. 
A major consequence of this approach is the impossibility of a mathematical science 
of motion.89 For Guidobaldo, the disagreement between machines and geometrical 
constructions is not a discrepancy between a theoretical prediction and a test or 
experiment, but a physical limitation in materialising what can be proven as certain 
of machines in geometry. These limitations may be the lack of skills of the 
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instrument maker, the inadequacy of the tools or the contingency of matter but this 
does not run against the mathematical conclusions.  
 
The relationship between mathematics and the natural world assumed in 
Guidobaldo’s view of mechanics, as different and original when compared to other 
mixed-sciences, depends on the conception of machines as artificial objects 
embodying an intentional design—the artificial character of machines and its 
properties, originated in their mathematical configuration altering the natural 
tendencies of the elements, in order to accomplish a specific effect. In this sense, 
machines generate effects transgressing the laws of nature (Tomeo) or in opposition 
to the laws of nature (Guidobaldo). We have seen, however, that artificial and natural 
realms were not disconnected. Machines were thought of as natural objects 
transformed by design in order to redirect the course of nature. This does not create a 
new kind of object in a strong, metaphysical sense. However, the introduction of a 
design implies different theoretical resources in order to causally explain its 
properties.  
 
I have suggested that some sixteenth-century scholars on mechanics held that 
machines exist as arrangements of natural elements following a complex, 
mathematical design according to the principles of the circle. Mechanics was 
primarily concerned with these principles as causes (αἰτία), explaining the generation 
of effects. The Vitruvian definition of machine highlighted how the properties of the 
circle are embedded in the machine as their constitutive element. The second part of 
this definition clarifies that ‘a machine is a combination of matter, mainly efficacious 
in moving great weights. Such a machine was set in motion by art in rotating circles, 
which the Greeks called (κυκλικὴ κίνησις)’ (ea movetur ex arte in circulorum 
rotundationibus).90 The operation of machines is possible by the arrangement of orbs 
rotating and revolving,91 that is, the materialisation of the properties of the circle 
mentioned in Mechanical Problems. In clarifying the position of mechanics between 
mathematics and natural philosophy, Tomeo claimed that machines are made of 
 
90 Vitruvius, De arch. X, 1. 1, 332. 
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natural materials: bars are made of iron and balances and trebuchets out of wood and 
copper. In this sense and beyond controversy, they are natural things (rebus quae 
sine controversia naturales existunt). However, the mode of knowledge of 
mechanics (operandique vim) is mathematical because starting from the natural 
materials we search for the circles, diameters and circumferences contained in 
matter. In Tomeo’s view, mechanical knowledge consists of principles of design 
(formarum rationes) abstracted from weights and quantities that naturally exist in 
matter.92 In contrast with the connection between mathematics and the natural world 
that we have seen in Guidobaldo, Tomeo explained the mode of knowledge of 
mechanics following the lines of Aristotle’s on epagoge, rather than the 
materialisation of a geometrical configuration. However, Tomeo, as well as Moletti 
and Guidobaldo, emphasised the design or arrangement of the machine as its 
distinctive characteristic, discoverable through mathematics. Their differences reveal 
their philosophical and disciplinary backgrounds. 
 
Moletti’s Dialogue introduced the matter in a different way. The emphasis here, as in 
Guidobaldo, was on the useful character of mechanics in order to build machines 
based on mathematics, instead of the interest of harmonising mechanics with the 
corpus, prevalent in the approach of humanists like Tomeo and Piccolomini. In the 
Dialogue, the prince tells the story that according to Proclus, Hero had built a big 
ship for Ptolemy, King of Egypt. Once built, the whole population of Syracuse was 
not enough to launch it into the water. Archimedes said that he wanted him to launch 
it by himself, to which the King is reported to have laughed. Archimedes made a 
machine, the King set it in motion and it began to draw the ship into the water.93 
Moletti’s point seems rather trivial, but it contains the seed of his main argument, for 
the moral of the story is that ‘We shall determine what the cause was that made the 
ship go into the water.  
And we shall find it to have been the machine, not as made of 
ropes and iron, for one must suppose that those who tried to launch 
it would have used both ropes and ironworks to do it, but they did 
 
92 Leonico Tomeo, xxiv.: ‘Pondera quinetiam & mensuras, quae in naturali licet existant material, ab 
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not succeed. Therefore, we shall say that it was the power of the 
machine (la virtù de la machina), which is none other than its 
property, and thus it follows that the machine is the subject of 
which we now seek the property.94 
Instead of emphasising the material strenght of the machine, Moletti’s strategy 
resembles Guidobaldo’s approach in which there is a primacy of la virtù over the 
properties of matter. This property arises from ‘the form of the machine (forma della 
machina), which is the same as the principle of the machine, and so when we know 
the principle, we shall know both the form and the cause of the power of the 
machine’.95 Moletti clarified that by the principle or power of the machine he was not 
making reference to its capacity to perform effects but to ‘its intrinsic power’ (la 
intrinseca virtù della machina). 
 
This conception of machines, defined by a design in terms of arrangement, is the 
foundation of Guidobaldo’s programme of axiomatisation of mechanics. Guidobaldo 
assembled his mechanics out of the historical materials that he gathered from ancient 
authors, fitting them into the model of certitude and rigour stemming from the 
geometrical root of mechanics, following lines of Commandino. In Guidobaldo’s 
view, Aristotle, ‘the leader of the philosophers’, established some physical principles 
of the science, while Archimedes, who ‘alone is to be praised most eloquently, in 
comparison with all other mathematicians’, developed these into mathematical 
principles.96 To illustrate his admiration, Guidobaldo added that Archimedes created 
a model of the universe enclosed in a sphere so perfect and accurate ‘exhibiting the 
nature of the heavens by their precise motions’ that ‘the nature herself is thought to 
have imitated his [Archimedes’] hand’. Also, that Archimedes was able to pull a load 
of ‘5000 pecks’ using just one hand with the help of a block and tackle. Guidobaldo 
also brought up the ‘engines of war’ that Archimedes invented to defend Syracuse 
against the Romans. The power of mechanics in the hands of Archimedes, remarked 
Guidobaldo, allowed him to claim that if he could get a place to stand, he shall move 
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the earth, ‘a statement in such conflict with the laws of nature’ (eam vocem naturae 
legibus adeò repugnantem protulerit). The mathematical genius of Archimedes is 
praised in function of his ability to build powerful machines (the model of the 
universe, the tackle and the engines of war), to overcome the laws of nature. 
 
In Guidobaldo’s origin myth of mechanics, Aristotle and Archimedes functioned as 
supreme authorities laying down the principles on which the science of mechanics 
was built. Indeed, Aristotle and Archimedes are discussed and reworked in the 
Mechanicorum liber.97 Despite their central role, Guidobaldo’s historical conception 
is not limited to them. Other mechanicians, such as Hero, Ctesibus and Pappus did 
not reach the pinnacle of mechanics, as did Archimedes, yet ‘they had a remarkable 
understanding of the subject’, especially Pappus, to whom Guidobaldo declares his 
deepest admiration. This admiration is based on two features: first, that Pappus never 
‘depart[ed] even a nail’s breath from the principles of Archimedes’; and second, 
because in his works the teachings of mechanics are ‘gathered together, as in an 
abundant store’. Indeed, Pappus highlighted how ‘all cases of machines’ could be 
reduced to the five primary machines, whose mathematical principles were 
‘brilliantly investigated’. Guidobaldo’s story goes: a ‘mist of ignorance’ which 
covered ‘all the earth’ (a reference to the medieval science of weights) almost buried 
the science of mechanics which can now be re-established thanks to the works of 
Commandino and others who ‘shone like the sun’, dispelling ‘the darkness’. 
Guidobaldo suggests that Jordanus de Nemore and his followers had taken the place 
of the true mechanicians, holding ideas that ‘they themselves now declared valid and 
correct’, but they have to be ‘shaken and overturned’ by the rigour of mathematics. 
But not only the medieval authors; Tartaglia and other contemporaries are considered 
by Guidobaldo as still covered by this ‘mist of ignorance’ concealing the ancient 
mechanics. Guidobaldo’s rejection of the the scientia de ponderibus runs at odds 
with most of the leading mathematicians of his age—including Galileo. 
 
Considering himself as part of the recovery of knowledge, Guidobaldo devotes 
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himself to ‘what a lever is, a pulley, wheel and axle, wedge and screw and how they 
should be arranged so that weights may be moved’. By establishing ‘the many 
properties present in those machines by virtue of the lever, properties connecting 
force and weight’ (potentia et pondus), Guidobaldo hoped to rearrange the science of 
mechanics. The proper way to do this ‘from its foundation to its very top’ is by 
revealing the properties of the balance. These would explain the functioning of the 
lever, to which all the remaining simple machines could be reduced. In so doing, 
Guidobaldo is putting together the pieces of re-emerging mechanical traditions. 
Indeed, Guidobaldo embraced Pappus’ idea that the science of mechanics was an 
explanation of any machine by its reduction to the form of one of the five machines. 
However, Guidobaldo went further and argued that these five machines are to be 
utterly reduced to the lever, which, in fact, is mathematically explained by the 
properties of the balance—the central argument of Mechanical Problems.98 
According to Guidobaldo’s Mechanicorum liber, Pappus promised ‘to show that the 
screw is nothing but a wedge used without percussion, which makes its movements 
by means of a lever, and this is lacking his book, we shall attempt to show this and, 
moreover, to reduce the screw to the lever and the balance in order that ultimately we 
shall understand it completely’. The ultimate reduction to the geometrical principle 
of the lever would be the completion of the science of mechanics. 
 
* * * 
 
This reduction of machines to geometry exhibits a pattern of solving problems by 
mathematical techniques in which the principles of demonstration constitute the 
foundation of demonstration and of the construction of machines.99 The purpose of 
this reduction was to uncover the mathematical principles underlying the operation of 
machines and to open the possibility to build better ones in the future. Guidobaldo’s 
reductionist approach—encompassing complex material arrangements, mathematical 
 
98 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 24; Bertoloni Meli, ‘Guidobaldo Dal Monte and the 
Archimedean Revival’; Bertoloni Meli, ‘Mechanics’; Bennett, ‘The Mechanical Arts’; Schiefsky, 
‘Structures of Argument and Concepts of Force in the Aristotelian Mechanical Problems’; Laird, ‘The 
Scope of Renaissance Mechanics’; M. Henninger-Voss, ‘Working Machines and Noble Mechanics: 
Guidobaldo Del Monte and the Translation of Knowledge’. 
99 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects; Bennett, ‘The Mechanical Arts’; M. Henninger-Voss, 




principles and the demonstration of the mathematical properties of machines from 
geometrical representations—reflects the challenges derived from the reorganisation 
of mechanics as a middle-science of theoretical nature. Guidobaldo’s solution to 
these challenges rearrenged mechanics as a science mainly concerned with the 






2. ‘The dancing whirl of the stars’. Galileo’s reductio of 
motion 
 
Nature first made things in her own way,  
and then made human reason skilful enough to be able to understand,  
but only by hard work, some part of her secrets. 
Galileo, Dialogue.1  
 
It is hard to deny that Galileo formulated the ‘law of free fall’. However, there is no 
evidence of him using the expression ‘law of free fall’ in the meaning later attributed 
to it. In the Excellency of the Mechanical Hypothesis, Boyle mentioned ‘the laws of 
acceleration in heavy bodies descending’.2 In the Principia, Newton suggested that 
‘the descent of heavy bodies is in the squared ratio of the time’, and implied that 
Galileo knew the first two laws of motion and their corollaries.3 Later, Voltaire 
presented this passage to his readers as the ‘laws of the descent of bodies discovered 
by Galileo’ (loix de la chûte des corpes).4 The attribution of ‘the law of free fall’ to 
Galileo is common currency in the history of science, including authoritative 
translations. In the opening lines of the Dialogue, the English translator put these 
words in the mouth of Salviati: 
Yesterday we resolved to meet today and discuss as clearly and in 
as much detail as possible the character and the efficacy of those 
laws of nature which up to the present have been put forth by the 
partisans of the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic position on the one 
hand, and by the followers of the Copernican system on the other.5 
Galileo’s original reads ‘razioni naturali’, alluding to the natural arguments or 
reasons as opposed to biblical or theological. Interpreting this expression as ‘laws of 
nature’ rather than as ‘natural arguments’ suggests that Galileo’s aim was the 
examination of systematic natural philosophies whose outcome was ‘laws of nature’. 
In this way, both ‘world systems’ are presented as isomorphic. The effect of this 
approach has played no minor role in the consolidation of traditional narratives of the 
 
1 Galileo, Dialogue, 306. 
2 Boyle, Works, vol. 8:107. 
3 Newton, The Principia, 424. 
4 Voltaire, Elémens de la philosophie de Neuton, 217.  
5 Galileo, Dialogue, 9.  
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scientific revolution: Galileo’s laws of free fall and the isochronism of pendulums 
constitute premises of Newton’s laws of motion and the universal gravitation.6 
 
From the overall majority of translations and scholarship on Galileo, it appears that 
his achievements can be formulated without distortion in terms similar to Descartes’ 
or Newton’s, although he did not conceive them in such a way. These approaches 
locate the expression laws of nature out of history and make it a general concept that 
may be applied indiscriminately to any kind of product recognised as knowledge. 
This is a sophisticated version of a somewhat ‘text-book’ approach that couches the 
history of scientific thought in terms of laws. Moreover, an opposite view comes 
from the terminological studies of laws of nature. Roux suggested that Galileo’s part 
in this story has to do with his use of the term ‘rule’, which is ‘less general’ and 
‘more artificial’ than law. However, the term rule, as Roux claims, denotes a 
numerical relationship indicating a human way to measure rather than the 
enunciation of the essence or nature of things. The assumption seems to be that 
Galileo did not use the term law in any significant way.7  
 
In this chapter, I present Galileo under a different light. ‘Laws of nature’ emerged as 
by-products of transformations taking place in the disciplinary boundaries of 
mechanics, mathematics and natural philosophy. While Galileo did not rely on the 
expression laws of nature to organise his achievements and nothing in his thought 
plays a role comparable to Cartesian ‘laws of nature’, his work was a sustained effort 
to reformulate the questions of natural philosophy in a mathematical way, drawing 
from the traditions outlined in the previous chapter. Thus, Galileo plays a central role 
in the history of laws of nature because he carried out a significant transformation in 
the boundaries of disciplines dealing with motion by offering a mathematical 
explanation of it which was appropriated as a standard of practice by Beeckman and 
Descartes but also in England. In his formulation, Galileo mobilised concepts and 
patterns of explanation from the recently fashioned science of mechanics. Galileo 
 
6 See, for example, Hall, From Galileo to Newton, 1630-1720; Koyré, Études galiléennes; Cf. Roux, 
‘Forms of Mathematization (14-17 Centuries)’; Palmerino, ‘The Geometrization of Motion: Galileo’s 
Triangle of Speed and Its Various Transformations’. 
7 Roux, ‘Les lois de la nature à l’âge classique la question terminologique’, 546.  
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rendered plausible a mathematical science of motion and made it available for his 
contemporaries. By the time Descartes’ Principia Philosophiæ appeared in print in 
1644, most of his readers were familiar with its approach by elements already 
circulated in Galileo’s Dialogo and Discorsi.8 Also, these readers connected Galilean 
achievements with models similar to those Descartes depicted in his Principia. 
Furthermore, Galileo’s extension of mechanics to include phenomena falling 
exclusively into the domain of natural philosophy a generation before him, prompted 
a conception of mathematical axioms or principles as causal explanations. Galileo’s 
conception of mathematical principles and causality was informed by the Jesuits’ 
standardisation of Aristotle’s teaching. Finally, Galileo felt that his mathematical 
approach to natural philosophy was enough to reject both Peripatetic explanations 
and the emerging alternatives to them based on occult qualities.9  
 
In elaborating a mathematical science of motion, Galileo developed a view of causal 
but non-essentialist explanations in natural phenomena, in a way similar to 
mechanics in connection with machines and different from both the Peripatetic and 
the naturalist philosophies of the Renaissance. However, these explanations 
ultimately relied, as I will argue, on the assumption of an Earth in motion. In a sense, 
Galileo’s axioms, rules or principles, insofar as they are mathematical, are not 
comparable to (physical) ‘laws of nature’. In other words, the applicability of 
Galileo’s mathematical principles to nature relies on the (physical) postulate of the 
motion of the Earth. In fact, once the motion of the Earth is assumed, it shall be clear 
which set of mathematical axioms are relevant to natural philosophy. 
 
This claim is developed in three sections. In the first, I present the terminology that 
Galileo employed to shape a mathematical science of motion and indicate conflicts 
emerging with its sources. Galileo’s approach to mathematics was ultimately 
founded on a view of knowledge as certain but restricted. In the second, I sketch 
Galileo’s appropriation of the reductio and its application to problems of natural 
philosophy, particularly to local motion. In the third, I claim that the validity of 
 
8 Henry, ‘Galileo and the Scientific Revolution’, 6. 




Galileo’s mathematics concerning the natural world relies on the assumption of the 
motion of the Earth. 
 
2.1. From the Jesuits to God 
Galileo’s demonstrative terminology for mathematics (axioms, principles and 
definitions) follows the logical tradition of the Jesuits’ version of Aristotelianism.10 
There was a solid tradition of Jesuits’ textbooks elaborating and interpreting the 
Aristotelian corpus in a particular way that was influential not only for Galileo but 
for Descartes as well. The Jesuit model of education, that operated a network of 
schools across Europe and the colonies, relied on the Ratio Studiorum—the order of 
studies—and associated manuals concerning particular topics under Aristotle’s 
tutelage.11 According to the definitions offered in Valla’s Logica, the dominant 
textbook on Aristotelian logic, Aristotle had stated that axioms are propositions that 
must be known necessarily by anyone who would learn a science and require no 
demonstration, while positions (positiones) need not necessarily be foreknown.12 
Positions, at the same time, are twofold: suppositions (suppositiones)—wherein 
something is affirmed or denied of another—and principles or definitions (principia 
sive definitiones)—wherein no affirmation or denial is made. Galileo’s early De 
demonstratione followed closely, yet not verbatim the terminology of Valla’s 
Logica. Galileo, however, did not elaborate further these terms. In Galileo’s version, 
axioms were neither suppositions nor positions, but propositions so easily known that 
no one refuses to acknowledge them. Suppositions were propositions assumed as true 
without demonstration, although they could be demonstrated. ‘Terms or definitions’ 
in Valla’s Logica or ‘principles or definitions’ in Galileo were not suppositions 
because they were not propositions and did not affirm being or nonbeing; they 
expressed meanings but do not state their domain, that is, whether they are universal 
or not.13  
 
 
10 Wallace, Galileo and His Sources. 
11 DesChene, Physiologia; DesChene, ‘Forms of Art in Jesuit Aristotelianism (with a Coda on 
Descartes)’; Gabbey, ‘Descartes’s Physics’. 
12 Wallace, Galileo and His Sources, 112. 
13 Wallace, 112–13. 
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At first sight, Galileo’s use of this terminology appears consistent with the Jesuit 
teachings and with Valla’s Logica. However, Galileo slightly transformed the use in 
order to advance on demonstrations about the natural world since his early studies on 
hydrostatics. The use of the strictly defined terms of mathematics to the ‘proof of 
natural facts’ immediately attracted the attention of natural philosophers. When 
Galileo’s ideas began to appear in print, for example in the Discourse on floating 
bodies, his mathematical-mechanical approach to questions traditionally concerning 
natural philosophy did not pass unnoticed. The transgression of disciplinary 
boundaries, as well as the departure from the mechanical tendencies compatible with 
dominant trends of Aristotelianism, are summarised in the words of Vicenzio di 
Grazia, professor of natural philosophy at Pisa. Di Grazia considers that are far from 
the truth ‘those who wish to prove natural facts by means of mathematical reasoning, 
among whom, if I am not mistaken, is Galileo’. In his view, all sciences and all arts 
‘have their own principles and their own causes by means of which they demonstrate 
the special properties of their own subject’. Di Grazia considered, following 
Aristotle, that ‘we are not allowed to use the principles of one science to prove the 
properties of another’. Trying to prove natural properties with mathematical 
arguments is ‘demented, for the two sciences are very different’. The correct 
procedure in enquiring on natural bodies is the study of ‘motion as their natural and 
proper state’, while the mathematician abstracts from all motion.14  
 
This remark underlines one of the organising principles of Aristotle’s division of 
knowledge, the so-called metabasis. Sciences were distinguished according to their 
subject; hence each one should be approached in a specific, unique way. The result is 
that the outcome of one science cannot be extrapolated to any other, that is, the 
principles or reasons achieved in one domain cannot be transplanted to any other.15 
Di Grazia charged Galileo of investigating natural properties by ‘mathematical 
arguments’. But Galileo was aware of this transgression and had anticipated the 
criticism:16  
 
14 Quoted in Shea, Galileo’s Intellectual Revolution, 34–35. 
15 Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination; Wallace, Galileo and His Sources; Shea, 
Galileo’s Intellectual Revolution; Jardine, ‘Problems of Knowledge and Action: Epistemology of the 
Sciences’. 
16 Shea, Galileo’s Intellectual Revolution, 35. 
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I expect a terrible rebuke from one of my adversaries, and I can 
almost hear him shouting in my ears that it is one thing to deal with 
matters physically and quite another to do so mathematically, and 
that geometers should stick to their fantasies, and not get involved 
in philosophical matters where the conclusions are different from 
those in mathematics. As if truth could be ever be more than one; 
as if geometry in our day was an obstacle to the acquisition of true 
philosophy; as if it were impossible to be a geometer as well as a 
philosopher, so that we must infer as a necessary consequence that 
anyone who knows geometry cannot know physics, and cannot 
reason about and deal with physical matters physically! 
Consequences no less foolish than that of a certain physician who, 
moved by a fit of spleen, said that the great doctor Acquapendente, 
being a famous anatomist and surgeon, should content himself to 
remain among his scalpels and ointments without trying to effect 
cures by medicine, as if knowledge of surgery was opposed to 
medicine and destroyed it.17 
In his defence, Galileo used an example from medicine, which had an unclear status 
in the Aristotelian divisions of knowledge.18 Medicine dealt with the motion of 
natural bodies and, in this sense, it was a causal, theoretical discipline. However, this 
knowledge was directed to heal, and in consequence, medicine also shared some 
characteristics with arts. Galileo appealed to the benefits that physicians—arguably 
belonging to the domain of natural philosophy—may obtain from surgery—
associated to manual arts. With this example Galileo illustrates the idea that the truth 
is never in contradiction with the truth to support his claim that mathematical 
inferences cannot be in contradiction with natural philosophy. Avoiding the 
discussion on the approaches, Galileo shifted the emphasis from procedures to 
contents: the outcomes of disciplines cannot be in contradiction and in consequence 
their methods are not bounded to their initial subject. 
 
From a different angle, Galileo’s arguments against Di Grazia point to a salient 
problem of the application of mathematics to natural philosophy: how the 
mathematical principles may refer to the natural world (‘that geometers should stick 
to their fantasies, and not get involved in philosophical matters where the 
conclusions are different from those in mathematics’). The point that the outcomes of 
 
17 Shea, 35. 




disciplines cannot be in contradiction because the truth is indivisible ultimately rests 
on God. Galileo’s treatment of certainty in mathematics sheds light on how the 
terminology of mathematics became available for explaining the natural world in 
contrast with God’s way to know the world. In the concluding remarks of the first 
day of the Dialogo, Galileo held that human understanding (l’intendere) can be 
conceived in two modes: extensive and intensive. Extensively, that is ‘with regard to 
the multitude of intelligibles which are infinite’, human understanding tends to be 
zero, because a thousand of certainties are zero when compared to infinity (l’intender 
umano è come nullo). However, intensively that is, the understanding of one 
proposition, human intellect knows it perfectly (cioè perfettamente), and ‘thus in 
these it has as much absolute certainty as Nature itself has’.19 Only mathematical 
propositions are of this kind, and while human understanding knows less 
propositions, the mode of knowing intensively is comparable to the divine 
understanding. But how is it that a mathematical proposition has the same certainty 
that ‘Nature itself has’? 
 
One aspect of this problem has to do with the way of reaching at these mathematical 
certainties. In Galileo’s views, the human way to grasp these propositions (modo di 
conesere) was also from God. Galileo explained this with a mathematical example: 
the knowledge of a circle. God, ‘by a simple apprehension of the circle’s essence, 
knows without time-consuming reasoning all the infinity of properties’. By contrast, 
‘our method’ (modo) proceeds with reasoning step by step, from one conclusion to 
another’. In knowing a circle, the human understanding begins with one of the 
infinite properties and assuming it as the definition, proceeds by reasoning to another 
property, and from this to a third, and then to a fourth and so on. Then properties of 
things ‘are included in the definitions of all things’. From the point of view of God, 
all these properties ‘are perhaps but one in their essence’. In other words, our limited, 
step-by-step modo of reaching the mathematical truths presents to us a collection 
that, from God’s point of view, is just one single truth. This piecemeal modo of 
knowing also implies that the human mind ‘is clouded with deep and thick mists’ 
 




which disperses when we have mastered (ci siamo fatti padroni) conclusions firmly 
established and from them we proceed to make inferences, that is, to uncover further 
properties. Galileo illustrated this point: ‘what more is there to the square on the 
hypotenuse being equal to the squares on the other two sides, than the equality of two 
parallelograms on equal bases and between parallel lines? And is this not ultimately 
the same as the equality of two surfaces which when superimposed are not increased 
but are enclosed within the same boundaries?’ On the margin, Galileo writes that 
‘infinite properties are perhaps but one’.  
 
Our piecemeal way of reaching knowledge presents as multiple what might be one in 
Nature and from God’s ‘point of view’. A further problem appears from this 
multiplicity of properties: that we are able to postulate an infinite variety of 
definitions not necessarily corresponding to those in nature. Our ‘clouded’ 
understanding may take for natural just a way of conceiving things not dwelling in 
nature. The order of the mathematical reasoning does not correspond per se with the 
natural order. On the contrary, the finitude of the approach may constitute not only a 
limitation in terms of only acceding to pieces, but in following the wrong paths. In 
the Discorsi, introducing the question of motion naturally accelerated—a kind of 
motion he considered as accidental in his early works–, Galileo claimed that ‘it is 
appropriate to seek out and clarify the definitions that best agrees with the 
accelerated motion which nature employs (utitus natura)’. The problem is not that, 
for the sake of developing mathematics, it is possible to ‘invent at pleasure’ some 
kind of motion and explore its consequences in the way that some men have derived 
spiral and conchoidal lines from certain motions, though nature makes no use of 
these (licet talibus non utatur natura). Indeed, mathematics has widely benefited 
from assuming these motions from which man have laudably demonstrated their 
essentials from assumptions (symptomata ex suppositione demonstrarunt).20 In the 
Discorsi, Galileo claimed to be confident that his definition of naturally accelerated 
motion ‘best agrees with the essence of naturally accelerated motion’ by looking into 
the properties of ‘acceleration for descending heavy bodies’. The definition is right 
because it has been found by ‘the very powerful reason that the essentials 
 
20 Galileo, Two New Sciences, 153; Galileo, Opere, VIII, 197. 
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successively demonstrated by us’ are seen to be in agreement with that which 
‘physical experiments show forth to the senses’ (quae naturalia experimenta sensui 
repræsentant).  
 
Galileo solved this problem by adapting the procedures of the science of mechanics, 
particularly the reductio, to the study of the natural motion of bodies pace 
Guidobaldo. His studies on motion appeared in the Discorsi (1638), but these were 
developed in earlier. In fact, in the dramatic action of the Third Day, the participants 
in the dialogue discussed a Latin treatise that is said to be written by an Academician 
friend of Salviati. The order of presentation of the subject and the adoption of the 
reductio follow the early De motu (1589-1592). 
 
2.2.‘Scienza nuova et ritrovata da me’ 
Since his early works, Galileo attempted to explain local motion by adapting 
procedures and concepts rooted in mechanics. The idea that the wondrous operation 
of complex machines could be elucidated if viewed as (that is, reduced to) an 
arrangement of balances, whose functioning was explained by mathematical 
principles and definitions, proved to be central to the ancient project of mechanics, 
particularly Pappus’ and Hero’s, as we have seen. By the mid-sixteenth century, this 
reductio was thought to cover also the central procedure of the Mechanical 
Problems, in which the entire operations of machines could be reduced (ἀνάγεται) to 
the lever and this to the ‘miraculous’ properties of the circle, as illustrated in 
Guidobaldo’s Mechanicorum Liber. The efforts at systematising mechanics tailored 
this reductio to the axiomatic models of Euclid and Archimedes, putting further 
pressure on the mathematical principles on which mechanical explanation rested. 
However, the axiomatisation of mechanics in the hands of Guidobaldo, Benedetti or 
Moletti was not a simple adjustment of a ready-made science into a well-known 
model. Guidobaldo replaced the Aristotelian idea of the circle and its properties for 
Pappus’ centres of gravity as the foundational principle of mechanics. However, the 
axiomatic (self-evidential) characteristics of the centres of gravity ended up being 
problematic in light of the observations drawn from experiments with the inclined 
balance. Guidobaldo reformulated his principle to the gravitas secundum situm, 
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already present in the tradition of the scientia de ponderibus that Guidobaldo fiercely 
despised. Nonetheless, the generation of mathematicians after Guidobaldo, for 
example, Galileo, Torricelli or Roberval, did not direct their efforts at replacing the a 
priori principles of the scientia de ponderibus or those of the Mechanical Problems 
for other a priori principles. They became less concerned with axiomatising 
mechanics on a priori principles. They were more interested in extending the 
applications and techniques of mechanics than in systematising its foundations, 
although both ideals were not mutually exclusive. Concerning foundations, their 
practice takes for granted that mechanics was a mathematical science and thus, their 
approach postulated principles in order to solve specific problems, following the 
practice attributed to Archimedes.21  
 
In his early Mechanics (1599), Galileo assumed the centres of gravity as foundation 
of this science, but postulated as well the idea of momentum, meant as a ‘tendency to 
move caused not so much by the heaviness of the moveable body as by the 
arrangement in which heavy bodies have among themselves’.22 That is, through such 
moment a less heavy body can counterbalance some other heavier bodies, ‘as in the 
steelyard, a little counterweight is seen to raise a very heavy weight not by excess of 
heaviness but rather by its distance’. The determination of this momentum involved 
weight, distance and velocity. A mechanics built on centres of gravity was mainly 
concerned with the generation of equilibrium. However, the introduction of 
momentum, as different from the natural tendency to move downwards (called here 
heaviness), involved motion in the analysis of mechanical arrangements. In so doing, 
Galileo went out of the straight jacket of equilibrium to which Guidobaldo and 
Commandino had attempted to reduce mechanics in their quest for certainty. These 
early formulations proved to be particularly successful, for example, in reducing the 
screw to the lever by means of his analysis of the inclined plane. In the Discorsi, 
Galileo still praised himself in the form of the Academician for this achievement, 
coming from ‘an old treatise on mechanics written at Padua for the use of his pupils, 
demonstrated at length and conclusively in connection with his treatment of the 
 
21 Palmieri, ‘Breaking the Circle’; Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects; Bennett, ‘The Mechanical 
Arts’.  
22 Galileo, On Motion and On Mechanics, 151. 
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origin and character of the marvellous instrument, the screw’.23 An important 
consequence of the introduction of motion into the mathematical science of 
mechanics is Galileo’s development of an alternative to deal with a natural 
philosophical issue in a way different from the qualitative approach of the 
Scholastics and from the natural philosophies based on principles such as sympathy 
and antipathy emerging as alternatives to this latter.24 
 
Galileo’s mathematical approach to the motion of natural bodies has two important 
backgrounds that were ultimately rooted in the interpretation of Aristotelian texts that 
evolved as critical stances of them.25 The first derives from the criticisms to 
Aristotle’s ideas on projectile motion that was challenged as early as John 
Philoponus’ (c.490-570) commentary on Physics. The most accepted interpretation 
of this phenomenon in Physics, labelled as the theory of antiperistasis, held that 
Aristotle assigned to the air the function of keeping the projectile in motion, for it 
was displaced backwards by the initial motion of the body but when it reached the 
back of the body pushed it forwards. Philoponus pointed out that air played 
inconsistent roles and, instead attributed the motion of projectiles to an incorporeal 
force. Similar criticisms and alternatives were put forward by Avicenna (c. 980-
1037) and Jean Buridan (c. 1295-1363). These explained the sustained motion of 
projectiles by some kind of power or force transmitted by the mover to the projectile 
at the beginning of motion. The motion of projectiles belonged in principle to the 
domain of forced or violent motions, but debates on antiperistasis over the centuries 
brought up views challenging fundamental tenets of Aristotelian natural philosophy, 
for example, that projectile motion was a combination of natural and forced motion 
and, in consequence, that a body may have opposite tendencies at the same time; or 
that the mover and the moved shall be in contact action. Disciplinary and conceptual 
distinctions between natural and forced motions became blurry because some of 
these alternatives called upon mathematical approaches such as those of the 
fourteenth-century calculatores implicitly challenging fundamental claims of 
 
23 The demonstration referred is in La Meccaniche Galileo, 169–77. 
24 Henry, ‘Galileo and the Scientific Revolution’, 20–30; Feingold, ‘The Occult Tradition in the 
English Universities of the Renaissance: A Reassessment’, 89. 
25 Cf. Orozco-Echeverri, ‘Force in Renaissance Science’. 
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Aristotelian natural philosophy.26 On the other hand, Jesuits at the Collegio Romano 
had long debated on Aristotelian topics and especially on natural philosophy. Their 
readings of Aristotle’s Physics dealt with some conceptual tensions in the general 
view of motion; they also focused on the specific aspects related to the causes of 
motion and the possibility of motion in a void. Jesuits were concerned with three 
issues: the possibility of motion between the natural and the violent; the requirements 
for the continuity of motion and finally the existence of a point of rest at the moment 
of reflection.27  
 
In De motu (c. 1590), Galileo put forward a mechanical explanation of natural 
motion, combining elements coming from Aristotle’s mechanics, Archimedean 
hydrostatics and the medieval scientia de ponderibus. However, he presented these 
developments in the context of natural philosophy, not as an exercise in the mixed-
science of mechanics. De motu starts off with equating Aristotle’s explanation that 
bodies are heavy (gravius) because they have a natural tendency to move in some 
direction, with that of ‘the philosophers’ not adducing any other reason than 
Providence to explain the ‘existing arrangement’ of the world. By contrast, he 
‘anxiously sought from time to time to think of some cause, if not necessary, at least 
reasonable and useful’.28 Galileo established that the cause generating all natural 
motions downwards and upwards is the ‘essential heaviness or lightness’ of the 
moving body (lationem omnen naturalem, sive deorsum sive sursum… gravitates vel 
levitate fieri). All elements (earth, water, air and fire) were heavy, but some move 
upward and others downward depending on a difference of gravitas between the 
element and the medium in which they move, not because they were looking for their 
natural place, as Aristotle held.29 In the absence of a medium, all bodies would 
simply fall because of their intrinsic gravitas, including those traditionally 
 
26 Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 419–626. 
27 Wallace, Galileo and His Sources, 162–65. 
28 Galileo, On Motion and On Mechanics, 14–15.  
29 The ‘motus elementorum’ dispute in Pisa between Girolamo Borro, Francieso Buonamici and 
Franceso di Vieri had already advanced some ideas in this direction and circulated important 
criticisms to and qualifications of Aristotle coming from Simplicius, Philoponus, Alexander of 
Aphrodisia and Themitius Salvia, ‘From Archimedean Hydrostatics to Post-Aristotelian Mechanics’; 
Camerota and Helbing, ‘Galileo and Pisan Aristotelianism’. 
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considered light (air and fire). Specific gravitas is defined in terms of proportions:30 
‘we define as equally heavy (gravius esse) two substances which, when they are 
equal in size, are also equal in gravitas’.31 Following this definition, Galileo 
remarked that lightness, central to the Aristotelian explanation of air and fire, was not 
a quality but just the negative difference between specific gravitas of the body and 
the medium. Then, Galileo moved on to ‘demonstrate’ some consequences: that 
bodies of the same gravitas as the medium move neither upwards nor downwards; 
that bodies lighter than water cannot be completely submerged. Right after, Galileo 
advanced in a notion of velocitas that departed from Aristotle. In his view, velocitas 
is the ratio of motion in function of the specific gravitas of the body.32 The 
immediate consequence of this approach is that, if motion is generated by the 
interaction of the body with the medium, in the void, the velocitas of the mobile 
would not be infinite and instantaneous as claimed by Aristotle but it would be as the 
specific gravitas of the body, for the numerical value of the medium’s weight would 
be zero. In Galileo’s words: ‘the body will move in a void in the same way as in a 
plenum’.33 
 
The image emerging from this conception of natural motion, in which bodies sink or 
float on Earth according to specific gravitas, supported the analogy between bodies 
moving naturally and the weights of a balance. If motion was explained as a function 
of the arithmetic difference between the specific gravitas of the body and the 
medium, this amounted to redefine motion in term of equilibrium, rather than 
tendencies or qualities: ‘We shall first consider what happens in the case of the 
balance, so that we may then show that all these things also happen in the case of 
bodies moving naturally’. After explaining the principle of the balance, Galileo 
 
30 Shea, Galileo’s Intellectual Revolution, 119; Camerota and Helbing, ‘Galileo and Pisan 
Aristotelianism’; Palmieri, ‘Breaking the Circle’. 
31 Drake has pointed out that this conception of weight is roughly equivalent to specific gravity or 
relative density. Galileo, On Motion and On Mechanics, 13.  
32 Translating velocitas as speed or velocity may be misleading. It is important to have in mind that 
this velocitas is a direct ratio between two homogeneous quantities; a ratio between space and time 
was inconceivable. Thus, velocitas is not an average (as we tend to conceive velocity after the 
calculus); it may refer to the space traversed in a given time (or distance) or the time elapsed to 
traverse a given space (time interval). Salvia, ‘From Archimedean Hydrostatics to Post-Aristotelian 
Mechanics’. On divergent approaches to ratios, cf. Section 6.2 
33 Galileo, On Motion and On Mechanics, 41–50. 
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concluded that ‘the heavier cannot be raised by the less heavy’ and, in consequence 
and contrary to Aristotle, ‘what moves moves, as it were, by force and by the 
extruding action of the medium’; that is, natural motion upward and downward is 
caused by the interaction of the body with the medium and not as a realisation of its 
inner tendency to move.34 But beyond this, the redefinition of motion in mechanical 
terms turned the Aristotelian distinction between natural and forced motion upside-
down. In fact, if motion was caused by the difference of gravitas, this would amount 
to claim that it is forced rather than natural in the Aristotelian view, since it is not the 
realisation of the internal tendency of the body looking for its natural place but the 
interaction with the surrounding medium which produces motion. The analogy 
between the natural motion of bodies and the weights of the balance was used by 
Galileo for the reductio of natural motion to the weights of a balance and for the 
subsequent application of the mathematical principles of mechanics to the 
understanding of natural bodies in motion: 
the motion of bodies moving naturally can be suitably reduced 
(congrue reducatur) to the motion of weights (ponderum) in a 
balance. That is, that the body moving naturally plays the role of 
one weight in the balance, and a volume of the medium equal to 
the volume of the moving body represents the other weight 
(pondus) in the balance.35 
The reductio applied to the motion of natural bodies became, in Galileo’s hand, the 
crucial way to overcome the reservations that Guidobaldo and Benedetti had 
expressed concerning the impossibility of a mathematical science of motion.36 Since 
De motu, Galileo’s application of reductio to natural motion began to appear as a 
redefinition of bodies in which their fundamental properties or ‘passions’ (passiones) 
were carefully isolated from those ‘accidental’ in mathematical definitions. 
Accidental properties were postulated as responsible for unexpected and 
unpredictable effects and hence, accounted for the disagreement between the 
mathematical achievements and the observations. Once defined, the essential 
properties could be handled mathematically and included into the principles from 
 
34 Galileo, 22–23. 
35 Galileo, Opere, I, 259; Galileo, On Motion and On Mechanics, 23, 39–41. 
36 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 68–79; Bertoloni Meli, ‘Guidobaldo Dal Monte and the 
Archimedean Revival’; M. Henninger-Voss, ‘Working Machines and Noble Mechanics: Guidobaldo 
Del Monte and the Translation of Knowledge’; Renn and Damerow, The Equilibrium Controversy. 
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which demonstrations and conclusions should be drawn. Galileo identified this 
procedure with the analytic method employed by mathematicians ‘to track down 
what we believe to be the true cause of this effect’.37 For example, in De motu, 
Galileo claimed that gravitas is the essential cause of natural motions, as we have 
mentioned, and remarked that acceleration observed in free fall was only a 
perturbation generated by accidental causes. However, these perturbations do not run 
against the truth of the mathematical principles and their capability to grasp aspects 
of nature from which other conclusions may be demonstrated. 
 
In De motu, Galileo formulated a reductio from which he later developed his ideas 
on motion naturally accelerated. This reductio also made blurry the distinction 
between natural and forced motion. Explaining the motion of a body descending 
uniformly on an inclined plane, Galileo claimed that this motion was equivalent to 
the motion of the same body uniformly falling through a media of greater and greater 
density, making use of the approach he established in the first chapters.38 In other 
words, Galileo compared the motion on an inclined plane with the motion of a body 
going through mediums offering different resistance. Based on this comparison, 
Galileo concluded that the body will descend vertically with greater force than on an 
inclined plane in proportion as the length of the descent on the incline is greater than 
the vertical fall. However, the validity of this conclusion required a further 
clarification. Galileo remarked that ‘this proof must be understood on the assumption 
that there is no accidental resistance (occasioned by toughness of the moving body or 
of the inclined plane, or by the shape of the body)’. The accidents disturbing his 
proof and potentially showing a disagreement between his mathematical conclusion 
and observations are material. In consequence, mathematical reasoning requires that 
‘we assume that the plane is, so to speak incorporeal or, at least, that it is very 
carefully smoothed and perfectly hard, so that, as the body exerts its pressure on the 
plane, it may not cause a bending of the plane and somehow come to rest on it, as in 
 
37 Galileo, On Motion and On Mechanics, 88. On the analytic method of demonstrative sciences to 
investigate nature, see especially Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 
Ptolemaic and Copernican, 57–59, where Galileo contrasts Aristotle's use of experience with that 
advanced by the 'mathematical philosopher'. 




a trap’. But not only the inclined plane should be assumed as ‘perfectly hard’; the 
moving body ‘must be assumed to be perfectly smooth, of a shape that does not resist 
motion, e.g., a perfectly spherical shape, and of the hardest material or else a fluid 
like water’.39 Galileo followed Guidobaldo’s perfect fit between the geometrical 
design and the material realisation of the machine. However, instead of seeking the 
material perfection adjusted to the geometrical design, Galileo developed a 
mathematical approach to control material conditions and, in a sense, to make them 
irrelevant in the demonstration. Indeed, the elimination of disturbances validated 
Galileo’s mathematical conclusion on the motion of bodies on inclined planes, but he 
pushed this reductio forward by postulating that the motion of a perfectly shaped 
body on a perfectly smooth surface is parallel to the horizon: ‘If everything is 
arranged in this way, then any body on a plane parallel to the horizon will be moved 
by the very smallest force, indeed, by a force less than any given force’.40 The 
parallelism between the horizon and the path of the body is a condition that no body 
on Earth can fulfil but that appears here as basic for the demonstration. In so doing, 
this arrangement represented a body subject to no external resistance, that is, without 
any tendency to move: being parallel to the horizon, the angle of the plane does not 
exert any influence and being perfectly circular, it is perfectly balanced on its centre 
of gravity aligned with the only point of contact with the plane. The reduction of the 
motion to the ‘essential’ conditions allows Galileo to apply the principles of 
mechanics. Because this body is in perfect equilibrium, it is like an equal-armed 
balance with two equal ends, in which its weights are fully balanced by the resistance 
of the plane. Therefore, ‘the least force’ would set this body in motion, because the 
smallest force (or ‘a force less than any given force’) is sufficient to make it move 
along the same direction of the impulse it received, as in the case of the balance in 
perfect equilibrium.41  
 
The situation described above faces two major challenges concerning Galileo’s 
mathematical conception of motion when considered against the background of 
previous natural philosophy and mechanics. On the one hand, that the motion of the 
 
39 Galileo, On Motion and On Mechanics, 65. 
40 Galileo, 65–66. 
41 Salvia, ‘From Archimedean Hydrostatics to Post-Aristotelian Mechanics’, 125. 
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body on the horizontal plane is ‘neither natural nor forced’. In fact, it is not natural 
because natural tendencies are counteracted and ‘if its motion is not forced motion, 
then it can be made to move by the smallest of all possible forces’. On the other 
hand, the idea of a balance whose weights suspended form a right angle had been 
highly controversial by the late sixteenth century, as it has been pointed in the 
previous chapter. In fact, Guidobaldo and Benedetti argued against Tartaglia that the 
lines of descent never made a right angle, because the weights directed towards the 
centre of the Earth were convergent.42 On this point Galileo replied that he assumed 
the angles to be right under ‘the protecting wings of the superhuman Archimedes’, 
who made a similar assumptions in his Quadrature of the Parabola. In other words, 
Galileo’s treatment of motion required the abstraction of disturbing material 
conditions (such as the lines of descent of a balance on the Earth). However, Galileo 
recognised that the reductio of the body moving on a horizontal plane to the 
(controversial) equal-armed balance presented a further difficulty: ‘that a plane 
cannot actually be parallel to the horizon, since the surface of the earth is spherical, 
and a plane cannot be parallel to such a surface’. Galileo then compared the motion 
of a sphere rolling around the ‘horizontal’ plane with that of a sphere spinning 
around its vertical axis, with its centre coinciding with the centre of the Earth. In this 
case, the principle of the ‘smallest force’ also applies and the motion of the sphere 
spinning around its centre would continue clockwise or anti-clockwise, depending on 
the direction of the initial impulse. From the solution to the problem of the 
parallelism of the plane Galileo drew some conclusions of his mechanical principles 
motion of celestial bodies (Pari ratione de cælo est iudicandum). If the sphere 
spinning around its centre is subject neither to an external force nor to a natural 
tendency ‘a star will be able to retard the motion only when it is being moved away 
from the place toward which it naturally tend. But this never happens in a rotation 
that takes place about the centre of the universe, for there never is upward and never 
downward motion. Therefore, the motion will not be retarded’.43 The outcome of 
Galileo’s reductio of natural bodies to the essential properties of motion is a set of 
definitions, axioms and demonstrations whose validity ultimately rests on the 
 
42 Wallace, Galileo and His Sources, 206; Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 30–32. 
43 Galileo, On Motion and On Mechanics, 73–74; Salvia, ‘From Archimedean Hydrostatics to Post-
Aristotelian Mechanics’, 125–27. 
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certainty of mathematics. However, Galileo was confident that his mathematical 
principles grasp the essence of the properties (passiones) which ‘nature does 
employ’.44  
 
This way of conceiving bodies has been read as the primacy of reasoning and 
mathematics over sense experience and experiments. This is a long-debated topic in 
Galileo’s scholarship. Whether this approach is Platonist, Neo-Platonist or 
Archimedean, Galilean reduction of bodies and their accidents to properties has a 
function in connection with mechanics. Bodies are defined in a mathematical way so 
that mathematical demonstrations may be certain of them; however, they may be 
different from what appears to the senses. It is important to keep in mind that 
accidents, as mentioned above, played a central role generating a discrepancy 
between the mathematical conclusions and experiments. In explaining the motion of 
projectiles as a form of parabolic motion, Galileo claimed that ‘considerable 
disturbance arises from the impediment of the medium; by reason of its multiple 
varieties, this disturbance is incapable of being subjected to firm rules, understood 
and made into science’.45 The medium alters the heaviness, speed and shape of which 
‘no firm science can be given’. Guidobaldo had already noticed this. However, the 
recognition of the existence of these elements, yet not ‘subjected to rules’, makes 
possible to operate in practise ‘under those limitations of experience’.46 Mathematics, 
in this case, sheds light on the confusing elements of sense experience. A stronger 
claim on the primacy of certainty over experiments appears in the Dialogo, when 
discussing about the motion of a stone falling from the ship’s mast. The point 
discussed was that, according to Salviati, a stone falling from the ship’s mast strikes 
in the same place, no matter if the ship moves or stands still. In reaction to 
Simplicio’s denial of this point, Salviati asked whether Simplicio had ‘ever made this 
experiment of the ship’. Simplicio replied that he had never done it, but the 
‘authorities who adduced it had carefully observed’. However, Simplicio asked 
Salviati if he had performed the experiments to ‘declare it to be certain’. Salviati 
replies that ‘without experiment, I am sure that the effect will happen as I tell you, 
 
44 Galileo, Two New Sciences, 153; Galileo, Opere, VIII, 197. 
45 Galileo, Two New Sciences, 224. 
46 Galileo, 225. 
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because it must happen that way’, that is, because it is certain from a mathematical 
point of view. The point here is that the certainty of the conclusion depends on the 
validity of the mathematical procedure, not on experience.47 The certainty of 
principles comes from reasoning, yet they have to explain our world. It is possible to 
postulate empirical principles in order to analyse natural phenomena. If their 




From the previous sections, three elements clarify Galileo’s place in the history of 
laws of nature. First, the adaptation of the mechanical reductio to the natural motion 
of bodies made possible to operate with definitions stating general properties from 
which new properties could be further discovered by applying mathematical 
procedures. In this way, Galileo shaped a mathematical science of motion. Second, 
the conception of certainty, contrasted with God’s way to understand, conceived 
human reasoning as a piecemeal way to proceed, whereby a multiplicity of properties 
stands for what in reality might be one and the same thing. This provided a validation 
of the use of mathematics in understanding the natural world but at the same time, set 
limits to the human capacity to understand; a moderated form of scepticism regulates 
the ‘optimism’ deriving from the concept of certainty. Finally, this piecemeal 
approach rendered it possible to consider questions of natural philosophy without 
fulfilling the causal requirements of the dominant trends of Aristotelianism. In other 
words, Galileo provided a set of mathematical definitions and principles that may 
adumbrate human experience, but they did not ultimately establish why motion is 
that way and not otherwise, that is, why some specific kinds of motion exist in nature 
rather than others. 
 
Since the first reflections on motion in De motu, Galileo built mathematical 
definitions that, inspired by the analysis of machines, involved natural motion, and 
attempted to include the motion of celestial bodies. Although these early 
demonstrations appeared problematic to Galileo and his immediate circle and 
 
47 Galileo, Dialogue, 168. 
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underwent important transformations through his intellectual development, the 
application of mechanical notions and procedures to motion tore down conceptual 
distinctions of Aristotelian natural philosophies, specially the distinction between 
motion of celestial and terrestrial bodies. From the analogy between the weights in a 
balance and a body in perfect equilibrium on a plane parallel to the horizon, Galileo 
made inferences reaching celestial bodies.  
 
In this context, it seems reasonable to me why Galileo came to embrace 
Copernicanism with such enthusiasm: it provided a general foundation explaining 
why some kinds of motion were real and subject to mathematical analysis yet not 
immediately perceivable by sense experience. This view seems to emerge as soon as 
Galileo embraces Copernican astronomy. However, the circumstances of Galileo’s 
discovery and enthusiasm for Copernicus’ approach are not completely clear.48 In the 
earliest surviving records of his Copernicanism, in letters to Mazzoni, May 30, 1597 
and to Kepler August 4, 1597, Galileo claimed that he had been able to explain 
physical phenomena that could not be explained in the old astronomy. From 
‘Copernici sententiam’, Galileo claimed, he had been able to find out causes of 
multiple natural effects (Ex tali positione multorum etiam naturalium effectum 
caussæ sint a me adinventae).49 Although the context of this claim is the theory of 
tides, it is hard to believe that Galileo did not have in mind as well the mechanical 
analysis of natural motion of bodies, including the consequences it had for celestial 
bodies. Galileo’s telescopic discoveries of the first decade of the 1600s, the rule of 
free fall, the isochronism of pendulums and the analysis of parabolic motion led him 
to the idea of writing a systema mundi.50 In Sidereus Nuncius (1610), Galileo 
presented his observations of the moon and attempted to explain the variations of its 
light depending on its position regarding the sun and the earth assuming the 
Copernican arrangement of bodies as the causes of these variations. He commented 
that ‘these few remarks suffice us here concerning this matter, which will be more 
fully treated in our System of the world’. However, he sketched the plan of this book 
 
48 Koyré, Galileo Studies, 129; Heilbron, Galileo, 215; Henry, ‘Galileo and the Scientific Revolution’; 
Drake, Galileo: Pioneer Scientist, 70. 
49 Galileo, Opere, X, 68. 
50 Henry, ‘Galileo and the Scientific Revolution’; Drake, Galileo: Pioneer Scientist, 79–80. 
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in which ‘the solar reflection from the earth will be shown to be quite real—against 
those who argue that the earth must be excluded from the dancing whirl of stars for 
the specific reason that it is devoid of motion and light’. The main point shall be that 
the earth is a ‘wandering body surpassing the moon in splendour, and not the sink of 
all dull refuse of the universe’.51 This same enthusiasm is mentioned in a letter to the 
Tuscan Secretary of State, in exchanges concerning Galileo’s appointment as 
mathematician to the Duke in May 1610. In describing his future projects, Galileo 
mentioned ‘two books on The system or the constitution of the universe, an immense 
concept and full of philosophy, astronomy and geometry’. Interestingly, the letter 
also mentioned three books on local motion, ‘an entirely new science in which no 
one else, ancient or modern, has discovered any of the most remarkable properties 
which I demonstrate to exist in both natural and violent movement, whence I may 
call this a new science and one discovered by me [scienza nuova et ritrovata da me] 
from its very foundations’.52 Galileo’s discovery of Copernicus as a cause explaining 
motion balanced the asymmetrical attitude attributed to his early work: ‘the different 
attitude Galileo entertained toward suppositiones in astronomy and those in 
mechanics had to do with the possibility of establishing, by direct or indirect 
recourse to experience, the truth of the latter, coupled with a somewhat disinterested 
resignation over the impossibility of doing the same with the former’.53 The truth of 
the Copernican system that he thought he could demonstrate implied that the 
properties postulated in mathematics could be dealt with as causes and effects of 
motions in the natural world. 
 
As we have seen, central to Galileo’s approach was the idea that mathematical 
definitions may capture essential aspects of nature. This view of mathematical 
definitions was not intended to fill the requirements of Aristotelian four causes. Since 
his early logical works, Galileo came to replace the four Aristotelian causes with 
what he called causa per se, as opposed to the causa per accidens which ended up 
being operative categories of reductio. Galileo distinguished between the properties 
required to define and explain one thing and the accidents interfering with that 
 
51 Galileo, Opere, III, 75. 
52 Galileo, X, 351–52. 
53 Wallace, Galileo and His Sources, 261. 
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knowledge. In his mature works, Galileo put forward that mathematical definitions 
and principles refer to essences. In the Second Day of the Dialogo, Simplicio 
claimed that the cause of the motion downwards was ‘gravity’, in the Aristotelian 
sense of a tendency to move towards the centre of the Earth. Salviati replied that he 
was wrong: ‘what you ought to say is that everyone knows that it is called ‘gravity’, 
but its essence, of which essence you know not a bit more than you know about the 
essence of whatever moves the stars around’. Although we can postulate properties 
and make demonstrations, ‘we do not really understand what principles or what force 
it is that moves stones downwards’.54 Defining properties of bodies, which naturally 
occur, does not amount to uncovering the ultimate essence of bodies. The knowledge 
of some aspects of the natural world cannot be mistaken for the whole. Humans’ 
knowledge is not God’s knowledge. In fact, Galileo claimed that ‘there is not a single 
effect in nature, even the least that exists, such that the most ingenious theorists can 
arrive at a complete understanding of it’.55 However, Galileo is not claiming that 
mathematical knowledge of nature is a previous stage of an essentialist, more 
advanced form of knowledge. On the contrary, his contrast between the mathematical 
approach based on definitions and the Aristotelian presumed knowledge of the 
substance, points to an alternative conception of knowledge.  
 
This may be clarified by bringing back the form of scepticism that I read as a 
regulative principle of the idea that we can attain knowledge of limited aspects of 
nature. The piecemeal approach is regulated by abandoning the idea that knowledge, 
to be such, has to be exhaustive; it can be, on the contrary, intensive and deductive 
and thus it can be revised and improved. In the Discorsi, Galileo presented the 
science of motion as ‘a gateway and a road to a large and excellent science (…) a 
science into which minds more piercing than mine shall penetrate to recesses still 
deeper’.56 This scepticism is the counterpart of the anthropocentric, limited view of 
knowledge that Galileo attributed to Aristotelianism. Speaking through Salviati in the 
Dialogo, Galileo reminded Simplicio that thinking that God did not create anything 
in vain does not mean that we are able to understand the purpose of everything in the 
 
54 Galileo, Dialogue, 272. 
55 Galileo, 116. 
56 Galileo, Two New Sciences, 190. 
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universe: ‘it is brash for our feebleness to attempt to judge the reason for God’s 
actions, and to call everything in the universe vain and superfluous which does not 
serve use’. In Salviati’s words, there is a great ineptitude on those who ‘would have 
it that God made the universe more in proportion to the small capacity of their reason 
than to His immense, His infinite, power’.57 The reduction of all possible 
knowledge—God’s view—to the human understanding is the root of Aristotelianism. 
Simplicio’s views are charged with implying ‘the vain presumption of understanding 
everything, that can have no other basis than never understanding anything’. In 
Salviati’s views, by contrast, ‘I cannot bring myself to believe that there may not be 
other things in the universe dependent upon the infinity of the universe of its 
wisdom, at least, so far as my reason informs me’.58  
 
* * * 
 
To conclude, it seems that the best judgment on this moderated view of knowledge, 
with its emphasis upon certainty and its dependency on the Copernican premise as a 
condition of the mathematical demonstrations—together with the achievements on 
the mathematical motion of bodies showing the gap between Galileo and the ‘laws of 
nature’—is reported by Descartes when, writing to Mersenne, he claimed that 
‘[Galileo] has not investigated matters in an orderly way, and has merely sought 
explanations for some particular effects’.59 Certainly, Galileo would disagree with 
the first claim, but it seems to me that he would not be in disagreement with the idea 
that he was looking for the (mathematical) explanation of the particular effects 
following from an Earth in motion. However, this apparently fragmentary project 
was, in fact, his way of building the systema mundi, relying on a piecemeal approach 
of knowledge, to the discovery of only part of the secrets of nature.
 
57 Galileo, Dialogue, 427, 429. 
58 Galileo, 116. 




3. Kepler’s rearrangement of (the science of) the stars  
3.1. Kepler’s laws revisited 
The early success of Kepler’s ‘laws of planetary motion’, boosted to a large extent by 
their central place in Newton’s Principia, has led us to project a disproportionate 
image of these accomplishments in Kepler’s works. Accounts of the scientific 
revolution depict Kepler’s achievements in terms of laws. Indeed, Kepler’s career is 
usually presented as an explicit quest for the laws of planetary motion.1 Other 
studies, aware of Kepler’s absence of a sound concept of law, rely on the use of 
quotation marks to call the attention to this. Rather than recognising this as a 
problem, they just go around it: ‘Kepler himself was still not sure of the validity of 
the area theorem (to avoid the notion of ‘law’)’.2 
 
Other historians have gone beyond the customary practise of prefixing ‘law’ to 
Kepler’s three most famous findings. A wider use of the term supports stronger 
claims concerning the emergence of modern science or the revolution in astronomy. 
Koyré weighed up Kepler’s contribution to modern science as an innovative 
conception of the universe governed by universal mathematical laws explaining its 
order: ‘What is radically new in Kepler’s conception of the world is the idea that the 
Universe is governed by the same laws in all its parts and that these laws are strictly 
mathematical’.3 A variant of this appears in Caspar’s monumental biography: 
‘Kepler’s greatest service [is] that he substituted a dynamic system for the formal 
schemes of the earlier astronomers, the law of nature for the mathematical rule, and 
causal explanation for the mathematical description of motion. Thereby he truly 
became the founder of celestial mechanics’.4 By rooting astronomy in physics, 
Kepler transformed the mathematical rules into laws of nature, the mathematical 
description into causal explanation.  
 
 
1 Kozhamthadam, The Discovery of Kepler’s Laws, 1. Dreyer, A History of Astronomy from Thales to 
Kepler, 373. 
2 Graßhoff, ‘Natural Law and Celestial Regularities from Copernicus to Kepler’, 157. 
3 Koyré, Études d’histoire de La Pensée Scientifique, 56. 
4 Caspar, Kepler, 136. 
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In contrast with these readings, terminological studies of laws have pointed out that 
Kepler’s use of ‘law’ is restricted to the description of specific phenomena, such as 
the law of reflection in optics or to the principle that governs the motion of a planet 
making possible to trace its trajectory in astronomy. A mathematical sense of law 
related to proportion or to geometrical relationships seems to be present as well.5 
However, none of the occurrences of the term law refers to the sense that became 
fashionable after Descartes. A ‘metaphysical use’—that is, laws in reference to God 
as lawgiver—also appears in a few places of Kepler’s correspondence and works but 
it does not seem associated with any of the meanings previously mentioned.6 
 
Nevertheless, these studies leave out important elements of Kepler’s peculiar uses of 
the term law. ‘Law’ and ‘laws of nature’ expose important aspects of Kepler’s 
lifetime vision of setting up astronomical enquiries on physical considerations; at the 
same time, these terms point to the traditions on which this project relies. Firstly, 
Kepler’s mentions of ‘law’ in a theological sense—metaphysical, in Roux’s 
classification—are connected to astronomy in a vague, general way. The conception 
of God as lawgiver emphasising his ruling of nature is prominent in debates on 
providence and the role of nature in the knowledge of God derived, such as in the 
works of the reformer Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), widely influential during 
Kepler’s formative years.7 Secondly, there is a mathematical sense of law referring to 
numerical, geometrical or harmonic proportions or to observable regularities 
ultimately representable in geometry. Because quantity is the essence of what 
exists—including matter–, most historians have misleadingly assumed that this sense 
of the term is equivalent to ‘laws of nature’. However, not all mathematical 
relationships are termed as laws; in order to be so, they need to be compatible with a 
physical explanation and to reveal an archetype. In other words, these mathematical 
laws—which Kepler usually labelled as geometrical—do not contain, or are not by 
themselves, physical explanations, yet they have to be compatible with them. 
 
5 Roux, ‘Les lois de la nature à l’âge classique la question terminologique’, 549–51. 
6 Roux, 555. 
7 Caspar, Kepler, 44–50; Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen; Barker and Goldstein, ‘Theological 
Foundations of Kepler’s Astronomy’; Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 124–73; 
Westman, ‘The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican 
Theory’; Gerdes, ‘Johannes Kepler as Theologian’. 
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Thirdly, law can make reference to a rule of calculation; it may be a method of 
simplifying ways of constructing astronomical tables by applying geometrical 
procedures. In its most general sense, this law is a procedure or device and the 
relationships to which it points does not have to correspond to the physical world; 
this is what Kepler means when observing that in astronomy, geometrical and 
astronomical hypotheses are not the same, for geometrical hypotheses are used to 
calculate and the circles and figures there postulated do not dwell in nature.8 In the 
Commentaries on the motion of Mars, the ‘area law’ was initially formulated as an 
easier way to calculate the numerical values required by the ‘distance law’, which 
Kepler formulated on physical grounds (that the rate at which a planet moves in its 
orbit is inversely proportional to its distance from the Sun, given a force originating 
from the Sun).9 This interpretation of law as a rule of calculation became central in 
the reception of Kepler’s ‘area law’ and ‘distance law’.10 Fourthly, there is a sense of 
law encompassing mathematical and theological meanings, ultimately rooted in the 
archetypal cosmology. Because God made man and nature ‘embracing a certain 
pattern of the creation of their functions’, Kepler reasoned that man and nature ‘also 
observe the same laws along with the Creator in their operations’.11 This idea 
supports the conclusions concerning harmonic proportions, for it makes possible to 
legitimise the connection between the sensible harmonies of human music to the 
intellectual harmonies of God’s universe.12 
 
These variants of ‘law’—in line with terminological approaches—would be enough 
to revisit Kepler for the history of laws of nature. However, my claim is that Kepler’s 
relevance lies in the underpinnings allowing him to encompass mathematics and 
physics, that is, in the theologically inspired cosmology filling the gap between the 
demonstrative mathematics and the explicative (causal) requirements of natural 
 
8 Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science, 98. 
9 In the Epitome, however, Kepler realised that the distance law and the area law are not equivalent. 
On this see Aiton, ‘Kepler’s Second Law of Planetary Motion’; Thoren, ‘Kepler’s Second Law in 
England’; Caspar, Kepler, 131–32. 
10 Russell, ‘Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion: 1609–1666’; Aiton, ‘Kepler’s Second Law of 
Planetary Motion’; Thoren, ‘Kepler’s Second Law in England’; Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific 
Method. 
11 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 146; Kepler, KGW, 1940, 6:104. 
12 Kepler, KGW, 1949, 14:21–41; Stephenson, The Music of the Heavens, 90–100; Martens, Kepler’s 
Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 136–41. 
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philosophy. Put otherwise, if historians seem to have agreed that in Kepler 
astronomy in the classical sense culminated and the foundation of a new celestial 
mechanics began, all this is just a consequence of his most important achievement: 
the discovery of the blueprints of the Creation. The complex Neo-Platonic reading of 
the Christian cosmogony underpinning the archetypal cosmology provides the link 
among different traditions, practices and concepts stemming from mathematics and 
natural philosophy. The archetypes operate at all levels of Kepler’s endeavours, from 
the most abstract reflections on the nature of reality to the most specific 
calculations.13 Indeed, archetypes—and not laws—bind together God, man and 
nature, making of the universe a knowable entity. At this point, it becomes clearer 
why Koyré, Caspar and others attributed to laws of nature what in fact belong to the 
archetypes. The ‘lois de la nature’ play in Descartes’ philosophy a role comparable 
to the archetypes in Kepler’s thought, for both laws and archetypes are eventually 
justified by metaphysics to make mathematical results relevant to natural philosophy. 
Kepler and Descartes followed similar paths: all material things are essentially 
defined by quantity (Kepler) or by extension (Descartes); knowledge is ultimately 
dependent upon eternal ideas of mathematics that God imprinted in man’s souls, 
together with the idea of a deity; these ideas are sufficient to provide a full account of 
nature in causal terms. The next chapter will suggest that this similarity is not a mere 
coincidence. However, the most important difference is that Kepler’s archetypes 
have no agency, they do not exert any kind of activity in the world; they are formal 
causes. The universe is ordered because it reflects or instantiates God’s perfection; 
and this order can be grasped by identifying geometrical or harmonic patterns 
underlying the apparent chaotic, disordered material gathered from sense-experience. 
But neither the laws nor the archetypes actually govern the Keplerian universe; they 
do not operate as ‘secondary causes’. Kepler made clear that archetypes have no 
causal efficacy (Archetypos, et quia horum per se nulla efficacia est).14  
 
Therefore, Kepler should be included in the history of laws of nature because of his 
redefinition of the disciplines concerned with the heavens. Kepler is widely praised 
 
13 Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the New Astronomy. See, also Field, Kepler’s Geometrical 
Cosmology; Kozhamthadam, The Discovery of Kepler’s Laws. 
14 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:63. 
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for being ‘the first to envision astronomy as a part of physics’.15 In Kepler’s account, 
astronomy had reached a dead-end in the works of Copernicus and Brahe, for the 
cosmological implications of their mathematical hypotheses were contradictory, yet 
both were observationally equivalent. Thus, it was not possible to decide which 
system corresponded to the actual constitution of the universe on purely 
mathematical grounds. His Commentaries on the motion of Mars, whose subtitle 
reads New astronomy based upon causes or celestial physics,16 was an explicit 
redrawing of the boundaries of mathematical astronomy in order to include natural 
philosophical considerations and thus to move astronomy away from its standstill. 
Kepler believed that astronomy was progressive, and the necessary move to set it in 
motion again was the introduction of elements from physics.17 Mathematical 
equivalence did not entail physical equivalence. Thus, the decision on which world-
system or astronomical hypothesis provided a better account of the heavens should 
be settled by involving natural philosophy. This redefinition, which implied the 
consideration of physical problems into astronomy, provided the model for 
Descartes’ a priori physics, as I will argue in the next chapter, and stimulated the 
tradition of ‘elliptical astronomy’ in England by refreshing Gilbert’s 
accomplishments, a topic that I will explore in chapters 5 and 7. 
 
In order to develop these claims, this chapter is divided in three more sections. The 
next contextualises Kepler’s works, especially the Mysterium Cosmographicum (or 
The Sacred Mystery of the Cosmos),18 in the Lutheran debates on the role of nature in 
the conception of the divine providence. Next, I will examine the archetypal 
cosmology on the redefinitions of God as an architect, matter as quantity and human 
knowledge as recollection/observation. It will appear how the archetypes operate as 
formal causes because they are co-eternal with God, find their place in matter and 
constitute the foundation on which all justification shall ultimately be founded. 
Finally, it will analyse Kepler’s reform of the sciences of the heavens and their 
 
15 Stephenson, Kepler’s Physical Astronomy, 2. 
16 Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 3. 
17 Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science, 222; Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the 
New Astronomy, 103. 
18 Barker and Goldstein, ‘Theological Foundations of Kepler’s Astronomy’, 99. 
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mutual interaction derived from his cosmology. This section emphasises that 
Kepler’s reform of knowledge aims at an astronomy founded upon physics, not to 
found physics a priori. This is an important case to contrast with the Cartesian use of 
metaphysics to validate the causal function of his laws of nature, as ultimate 
principles of his a priori physics in the next chapter. 
 
3.2.The Keplerian problem 
The redefinition of astronomy as a consequence of Kepler’s cosmology is connected 
to the debates on providence promoted by Melanchthon and his followers. The 
distinction and interaction between disciplines, as well as their specific ways to deal 
with their subjects, are corollaries of the archetypal universe, in which not only 
geometric and harmonic ratios are principles of demonstration, but also Man as the 
centre and purpose of God’s creation. Relevant to this context is that Melanchthon’s 
main reason to turn down the cosmology of the De revolutionibus—not its 
mathematical astronomy—was the rejection of the theological implications of 
removing man from the centre of the cosmos.19 Kepler’s Mysterium 
Cosmographicum directly answers to this theological problem in two ways. First, the 
Earth—man’s abode—occupies not the centre but a very special place, in the middle 
of the progression of celestial bodies from the Sun to Saturn; the centre is reserved to 
the Sun, representing God the Father around which all planets move. At the same 
time, man mirrors God in his capability to know the archetypes of the creation and in 
acting according to them. Kepler remarked that in their ‘works men ordain in 
accordance with harmonic laws’ (quae hominis ab harmonicas leges ordinant), laws 
consonant with God’s archetypes. In so doing, Kepler put forward a conception of 
human knowledge encompassing archetypal, mathematical and physical levels. 
Kepler explicitly subscribed to a revised version of Neoplatonic anamnesis as the 
foundation of knowledge, yet the entire recollection is underpinned by the central 
role of observations.20 Second, the archetypal character of the universe entails a 
redefinition of matter as quantity that Kepler nicely put in a shell: ‘ubi materia, ibi 
 
19 Cf. Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 172–73; Westman, ‘The Melanchthon 
Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican Theory’. 
20 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 289–306. 
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geometria’.21 The view of nature in terms of mathematics allowed Kepler to claim 
that sound knowledge of God can be reached through the contemplation of his 
perfect works, not only his written word, the Scripture, but nature. Thus, the 
possibility of knowledge is a central, theological aspect of Kepler’s defence of 
Copernicanism. 
 
Melanchthon’s early interests in astrology were related to his way of explaining signs 
from God that the present world was near the end. The observation of the comet of 
1531 was widely read as an indication that something drastic was about to happen, 
yet neither Luther nor Melanchthon seem to have interpreted it in an apocalyptic 
way.22 However, during the same month of the observation of the comet, 
Melanchthon wrote a eulogy on the study of astrology and astronomy, in the form of 
a letter to his friend Simon Gyranaeus, that came to be prefixed to the widely spread 
edition of Sacrobosco’s De sphaera (1531).23 Melanchthon claimed that astronomy 
was valuable for Christians because it delivered teachings about Providence. Indeed, 
providence was defined as ‘a knowledge by which God foresees everything and a 
government by which He protects His whole creation’.24 Astrology was a legitimate 
way of reaching knowledge of God and, thus, an efficient way to increase faith. But 
not all kind of practices labelled as astrology were convenient to achieve this goal. 
An authentic astrology should be based in physics, in order to understand ‘what 
effects the light of the stars has on simple and mixed bodies, and what kind of 
temperaments, what changes and what inclinations it induces’. Consequently, this 
astrology was not unfounded speculation but based on the ‘observation of physical 
causes which are ordinances of God’. Just as physics looked for causes and effects in 




21 This famous sentence occurs in De fundamentis astrologiae certioribus, Kepler, KGW, 1941, 4:17. 
22 Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 124–25. 
23 Kusukawa, 126; Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen, 70–77. 
24 This definition is taken from the Initia doctrinae physicae, 203 as quoted in Kusukawa, The 
Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 154–55. 
25 Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen, 77. 
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This vindication of astrology as a way to reveal God’s intentions was part of a wider 
conception of the function of natural philosophy in revealing Providence. 
Melanchthon believed that the observation of celestial bodies could reveal that God 
is the creator and also that he cares for the world. From this knowledge it was also 
possible to draw rules for ethical behaviour and the appreciation of the scope of 
divine free will.26 In other words, knowledge of nature revealed that there is a God, 
architect of the world. Also, this knowledge can offer guides to social and moral 
behaviour, although it cannot reveal the mysteries of Christ. Understanding the 
natural world cannot increase the faith in Jesus Christ, for nature did not reveal 
elements to recognise the incarnation and sacrifice of God the Son; revealed truths on 
salvation remained reserved for the gospel. This constraint was consequence of the 
fall, for human beings in their original state would have been able to derive the 
nature and will of God from the heavens. Philosophy then helps restoring the 
knowledge of natural law (in the sense of moral, ethical behaviour) lost by the fall.27 
Astronomy reveals God’s governance of the heavens. Melanchthon saw traces of the 
original knowledge in Plato who, ‘should be judged to have said not only eruditely 
but also in conformity with religion that eyes were given to us for the sake of 
astronomy. For eyes were certainly given especially for this reason: that they may be 
guides to seeking some knowledge of God’. Seeking for knowledge is aligned with 
religion, while those who despised astronomy ‘were deliberate atheists’. Indeed, by 
not studying astronomy, they ‘removed providence’, because if these men ‘had dealt 
with this doctrine they would have discovered the manifest footprints of God in 
nature’ and, in so doing, they ‘would have been forced to admit that this totality of 
things was both made and is governed by a certain Mind’. This was ultimately 
supported by the ‘the authority from Scriptures where it is written, ‘let them [the 
lights] be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years [Genesis 1.14]’.28 
Astronomy is presented here as a natural activity: for its sake, eyes were given to 
humans. In stating this, Melanchthon sketched the idea that removing providence 
 
26 Methuen, 78; Barker and Goldstein, ‘Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century 
Astronomy: A Reappraisal’, 95; Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 129. 
27 Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen, 78; Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science, 96–
103. 




from our understanding of nature is detrimental both for theology and astronomy. In 
his view, the connection between the study of nature and providence was not 
accidental or optional. ‘Epicureans’ were labelled as atheist because they did not 
recognise God as creator and of course they were not astronomers. 
 
Furthermore, failing to recognise God’s governance of the world amounted to 
denying the law-like pattern exhibited by the regularity of celestial bodies. Drawing 
from this theological point, Melanchthon formulated a version of the argument from 
design, available to him in ancient sources such as Cicero’s De Natura Deorum. In 
his Initia doctrinæ physicæ (1549), the order and regularity of celestial motions 
demonstrated that ‘there is an architectonic mind of this world, because it is 
impossible for this most beautiful order of things (corporum) and of celestial 
motions, position of elements and conservation of species, mind and knowledge 
ruling life in man, to have come into being by chance or to subsist by chance’.29 God 
is referred to as a ‘Mind’, stressing his architectonic role. This specific formulation 
of the argument from design is connected with some other ideas: God formed the 
human mind in such a way that its natural function is to look for the ‘consideration of 
nature’ like ‘swimming to a fish or singing to a nightingale’.30 In this study of nature 
in which the human mind uncovers God’s providence, geometry and arithmetic 
function as ‘wings’ necessary for knowing God.  
 
In Melanchthon’s cosmology, human beings occupied the central place of creation. 
This position is geographical and eschatological, and both meanings are inextricably 
connected. Men’s location in the centre of the cosmos is a sign of divine love. 
Certainly, God created ‘this great and wondrous work (…) so that it might be the 
dwelling place of human nature’. The universe and specially the celestial bodies and 
heaven were designed in such a way that human beings could uncover the divine 
providence, for ‘God wished to be known and beheld’. In other words, the entire 
universe was created by ‘the goodness of God and His immense love towards 
 
29 Kusukawa, 157. 
30 Melanchthon, De astronomia et geographia, 297 as quoted in Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen, 85. 
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mankind’.31 But God’s love towards men was not restricted to seeds ‘vestiges of 
divinity’ in the creation; he also endowed human beings with a soul ‘inflamed with 
love and enthusiasm for the truth and rousing’, providing them with a natural 
tendency to search for knowledge, and making men capable of reaching certainty. In 
Melanchthon’s words,  
The whole nature of things is like a theatre for human mind, which 
God wished to be watched. For this reason He placed in the minds 
of men the desire of considering things and the pleasure which 
accompanies this knowledge. These reasons invite healthy minds 
to the consideration of nature, even if no use followed. Just as 
vision delights, even if no use followed, so the mind also, by its 
own nature, is led to beholding things. Therefore, these are the 
reasons of this study, especially because to consider nature is to 
follow one’s own nature, and consideration per se leads to the most 
pleasant joy, even if other uses did not follow.32 
The universe is an intentional creation of God for men’s benefit. A clear sign of this 
divine love is the natural tendency to seek knowledge, even if that knowledge is not 
useful (‘even if no use followed’).  
 
Furthermore, only heavens reveal God’s providence in a direct way, yet all nature is 
God’s creation, including animals and ‘lower beings’. Melanchthon offered 
theological arguments for the distinction between the heavens—in which the perfect 
motion of celestial bodies can be described mathematically–, and the sublunary 
region of generation and corruption—where change and imperfection are outside the 
domain of quantity. Because mathematics provides the means to explain and 
understand the perfection of the heavens, it is the best way to reach the knowledge of 
God through nature. Although the sublunary region was also created following a 
divine plan, Melanchthon observes that its order points to the observer in the first 
instance to the influence of the stars and then only indirectly to God. Thus, if the 
human mind is expected to reach the knowledge of God, it has to transcend its 
immediate surroundings and make observations of the celestial bodies, by whose 
regularity and perfection it is possible to attain the knowledge of God.33  
 
31 Melanchthon, Initia doctrinae physicae, 213f quoted and translated in Kusukawa, The 
Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 154. 
32 Melanchthon, Initia doctrinae physicae, 189 as quoted and translated in Kusukawa, 150. 




Mathematics lay at the centre of Melanchthon’s reinterpretation of natural 
knowledge.34 Although the reformer was using a Platonic idea (that geometry and 
arithmetic are ‘wings’), the interpretation he made was done under his religious 
interests: mathematics were ‘wings’ necessary for knowing God. In his writings 
about education, Melanchthon put forward the idea that arithmetic and geometry 
were propaedeutic for the study of syllogisms and thus preparatory for philosophy; 
but beyond this pedagogical function, geometry accounted for God’s governance as 
clearly as a picture appears to the eyes. Knowledge, in consequence, is natural to 
human beings: 
I hope you (…) blaze with the desire of knowing that most 
beautiful teaching of celestial motions and effects. This step should 
be made through geometry. You will believe that you should thank 
God when you devote yourself to these studies. For it was said by 
Plato most gravely: ‘God always geometrizes’, that is, I understand 
it, He governs everything and with the surest law regulates the 
heavenly courses and the whole of nature (gubernare omnia et 
certissima lege cursus cœlestes et totam naturam regere). Hence it 
is hardly doubtful that he approves the study of those who, as if 
observing the lines of the course of the heavens, know and worship 
the Ruler Himself.35 
Geometry delivered knowledge of the divine design and governance of nature from 
the regularity of celestial motions. But geometry was not like the ladder that should 
be thrown away after climbing up. Melanchthon interprets the Christian teaching 
stating that God created man in his own image as meaning that the human mind was 
created as capable of understanding nature through mathematics and, in this sense, 
geometry reveals the correspondence between God the geometer, the ordered nature 




34 Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen; Westman, ‘The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg 
Interpretation of the Copernican Theory’, 75; Westman, The Copernican Question : Prognostication, 
Skepticism, and Celestial Order; Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy. 
35 Melanchthon, Praefatio in geometricam, 110 as quoted in Kusukawa, The Transformation of 
Natural Philosophy, 139–40. 
36 Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen, 83. 
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The governance of God is described in terms of ‘laws’, in a theological sense, with 
implications for mathematics. Sometimes Melanchthon switches from ‘laws of 
nature’ to ‘laws of motion’: ‘When the mind considers this wondrous order of nature, 
namely those laws of motion (videlicet ipsas motuum leges), the fixed species of 
planets and animated beings and their modes of generation and the periods of their 
duration, it is necessary to infer a prior and knowing cause, namely God the creator, 
by whose design this whole order is both established and governed as well as 
conserved, just as the teaching about God in the Church clearly teaches’.37 This use 
of ‘laws of motion’ is close to the unspecific view that Jardine also identified in 
Reinhold, Peurbach and others.38 However, given Melanchthon’s conception of 
astronomy, in which the order of nature is specifically understood in geometrical 
terms as related to the regularity of celestial motions, this use of the term constitutes 
a slight departure from the vague use of the term as synonym of the order of nature.  
 
The reasons to reject the Copernican cosmology are related to Melanchthon’s 
connection between his moral philosophy as rooted in a natural philosophy in which 
man constituted the ultimate goal. Thus, man’s abode, the earth, had to be located in 
the middle of the physical universe, the centre of creation.39 In consequence, 
Melanchthon and his followers accepted with enthusiasm the mathematical 
calculations of Copernicus because they led to better accuracy in predicting planetary 
positions; however, they rejected Copernican cosmological claims, on the ground of 
the patent contradiction with their basic premise of the human location in the centre 
of the universe.40 
 
These ideas widely circulated in Kepler’s Tübingen.41 Maestlin and Kepler studied 
theology under the tutelage of Jacob Heerbrand (1521-1600), a pupil of Melanchthon 
 
37 Melanchthon, Initia doctrinae physicae, 410, as quoted and translated in Kusukawa, The 
Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 158. 
38 Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science, 242. 
39 Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 172–73; Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen, 100. 
40 Westman, ‘The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican 
Theory’. 
41 Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen. Stimulus to a Theological Mathematics; See also Barker and 
Goldstein, ‘Theological Foundations of Kepler’s Astronomy’; Kusukawa, The Transformation of 
Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon; Caspar, Kepler; Westman, The Copernican 
Question : Prognostication, Skepticism, and Celestial Order; Westman, ‘The Melanchthon Circle, 
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who wrote a famous Compendium theologiæ. From the 1580s onwards, this became 
the textbook for teaching theology. It is worth noting that the major difference with 
Melanchthon is that, instead of emphasising the ethical and theological consequences 
of the creation, Heerbrand developed an interest in creation itself commenting on 
both Moses account in Genesis and Plato’s Timaeus, giving priority to Moses’ 
account. Heerbrand’s discussions of the creation of the heavens exhibit an up-to-date 
knowledge of astronomical issues.42  
 
It appears that the context of the Lutheran Reform in which theology was redefined, 
establishing new connections with astronomy and natural philosophy set the context 
for Kepler’s works. It is in this context that Kepler answers to pressing questions. 
These questions had assumptions and consequences different from those raised in the 
astronomical tradition of Ptolemy. By giving to astronomy a central place in this 
reformed theology, astronomy faced challenges without counterpart in the medieval 
tradition of mixed-mathematical sciences coming through the Arabs. Therefore, 
questions asking for the number of the planets, their true order, their mutual 
interaction or their effects on the life on earth were embedded in a specific 
theological context that sets the problems and provides concepts and methods not 
necessarily present in these terms in the tradition of mixed-mathematical sciences. In 
this light, Kepler’s astronomy should be read, to some extent, as embedded in the 
Lutheran response to Copernicus. The opening sentence of the ‘Praefatio Antiqua’ of 
the Mysterium Cosmographicum (MC) locates the project within the context of a 
theological re-formulation of the geometrical cosmology: 
I propose, reader, to demonstrate in this little book that most Good 
and Great Creator, in the Creation of this moving world, and the 
arrangement of the heavens, referred to those five regular solids, 
well known from Pythagoras and Plato to our own time, and that to 
their nature he fitted the number of the heavens, their proportions, 
and the plan (ratio) of their motions.43 
The ‘secret’ revealed in the work is the reason for the number and proportion of 
celestial motions rather than the determination of the position of the planets at any 
 
Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican Theory’; Gerdes, ‘Johannes Kepler as 
Theologian’. 
42 Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen, 112–13. 
43 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:23. 
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given time.44 The mention of God locates this ‘little book’ in the context of the 
providence as it relates to the Copernican astronomy/cosmology. Indeed, Kepler 
presented astronomy as the field in which his theological activity took place, as he 
remarked in a letter to Herwart von Hohenburg: ‘Since we astronomers are priests of 
the highest God in regard to the book of nature, it benefits us to be thoughtful, not of 
the glory of our minds, but rather, above all else, of the glory of the Creator’.45 And, 
in a letter to the Faculty of Theology he is even more forceful: ‘I wished to be a 
theologian; for a long time I was troubled, but now see how God is also praised 
through my work in astronomy’.46 
 
3.3.Reading the blueprints 
Kepler’s universe was modelled by God following a strict mathematical plan that 
human beings are created to decipher. From the study of astronomy, it followed that 
‘there is a God, founder of all nature, and that in the very mechanics of it he had care 
for the humans that were to come’. Kepler praised himself for being the first to have 
uncovered the blueprints of the creation in six thousand years—the presumed age of 
the Earth. However, Kepler acknowledges that some predecessors, such as Plato and 
Pythagoras, had partial adumbrations.  
 
The idea that the world was created by God following a mathematical plan that 
emanated from His own nature constitutes Kepler’s point of departure and arrival. 
The first direction can be appreciated in his first published work, the Mysterium 
Cosmographicum (1596). Kepler attempted to demonstrate that the Copernican 
arrangement of celestial bodies could be derived a priori from the geometrical 
structure of the universe upon which God drew when creating the world: the five 
‘Platonic’ solids. Some years later, the harmonic proportions of the Harmonice 
Mundi (1619) played a similar role, for they were presented as patterns constituting a 
priori the motion of the planets and the eccentricity of their orbits, alongside with 
other phenomena such as the action of celestial bodies on earth and human music. In 
 
44 Barker and Goldstein, ‘Theological Foundations of Kepler’s Astronomy’, 100. 
45 Letter to Herwart von Hohenburg, March 26 1598, Kepler, KGW, 1945, 13:193. 
46 Kepler to the Theological Faculty, 28 February 1594 as quoted in Aiton, ‘Johannes Kepler and the 
“Mysterium Cosmographicum”’, 175. 
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the reverse direction, Kepler postulated that the authentic knowledge of nature 
disclosed that behind the apparent diversity of phenomena lay order, proportion and 
beauty and, therefore, an intelligent God that framed the world. Kepler deduced that 
atheism was not only dangerous for religion but incorrect in philosophy, for it 
implied a substantive limitation in the knowledge of nature; in fact, astronomers not 
recognising God as creator restricted astronomical demonstrations to the calculation 
of planetary positions ruling out the true knowledge of the heavens. Kepler refers 
explicitly to these two orders when putting together the arguments in the Harmonice 
Mundi: the ontological, deductive order would be God-nature-man and the 
epistemological man-nature-God.47 
 
The God of Kepler was adorned with the attributes of the Christian God (omnipotent, 
omnipresent, omniscient, merciful). However, Kepler emphasises his perfection and 
his power as creator, virtues that he considered as indissolubly linked. The 
connection between divine perfection and his role as maker of the universe underpins 
the idea that God followed a plan for creating the world. Kepler interpreted the 
perfection of God as implying that everything was created with reason or purpose 
according to the divine design. Because of this, Kepler usually portrayed God as an 
architect. Meanwhile, the universe somewhat shares the attributes of the creator. In 
the Mysterium Cosmographicum, Kepler claimed that ‘the most perfect builder must 
needs produce a work of greatest beauty, for it is not now, nor ever was, possible (as 
Cicero, following Plato’s Timaeus shows in his book on the Cosmos) that the best 
should ever be anything but the most beautiful’.48 God is the most perfect creator and 
thus his works mirrored this perfection: ‘the nature of all things imitate God the 
founder (conditorem), to the extent possible in accord with the foundation of each 
thing’s own essence’.49 From this characterisation of God, Kepler drew two 
cosmological consequences: that geometry is (in) the essence of God and, in 
consequence, (in) the essence of his works; then, God, nature and man mirror each 
other.  
 
47 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 283. 
48 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:24. Cf. Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 173; Caspar, 
Kepler, 366; Bertoloni Meli, Equivalence and Priority, 424. 




The characterisation of God as an architect placed geometry in the centre of 
cosmology. In the second chapter of the Mysterium Cosmographicum, which 
summarises the cosmology on which the theory of the solids rests, Kepler explained 
that for creating the world God preconceived an Idea. The origin of this idea of the 
world is but God himself, for he could only have derived it from his own essence; 
because only God existed before the creation, God himself had to be its source.50 In 
explaining why God relied on specific patterns when creating the world, Kepler 
moves one step back and claims that the ultimate origin of the archetypes is 
geometry which is nothing but God himself:  
Geometry, which before the origin of things was coeternal with the 
divine mind and is God himself (for what could there be in God 
which would not be God himself?), supplied God with patterns for 
the creation of the world, and passed over to Man along with the 
image of God: and was not in fact taken in through the eyes.51 
The idea that geometry was co-eternal with God also appears in Kepler’s annotations 
to Proclus’s commentary on Euclid, quoted in extenso in the Book IV of the 
Harmonice Mundi. In this chapter, Kepler discussed the nature of mathematical 
things (mathematicas species) in order to justify the need for the harmonic ratios in 
explaining planetary motions. Kepler’s argumentative strategy was to throw in with 
the Neoplatonic tradition of Proclus against Aristotle. Kepler claimed that 
mathematical ideas were prior to sensible things and thus could not be ‘taken in 
through the eyes’, while Aristotle in Metaphysics argued against Plato that universals 
were but abstracted from sensible things and do not exist independently from them.52 
This conception runs against Kepler’s project of using mathematics to demonstrate a 
priori some characteristics of the world as it was created by God. In fact, Kepler 
blamed Aristotle’s atheistic view of nature for this philosophical mistake.53 
Reflecting on the nature of numbers in his early De quantitatibus libelli, Kepler 
remarked that the higher questions concerning the origin of counting and numbers 
 
50 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:44–45.  
51 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 304. 
52 See Lohr, ‘The Sixteenth-Century Transformation of the Aristotelian Division of the Speculative 
Sciences’; Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science, 225–27; Drake and Drabkin, 
Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy. 
53 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 297–98; Kepler, KGW, 1940, 6:219–20. 
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remained ‘inaccessible to Aristotle, inasmuch as he was ignorant of the true God’.54 
The reply to Aristotle in the Harmonice Mundi took the form of a long quotation 
from Proclus’ Book on Euclid to which Kepler interpolated his Christian reading of 
the Neoplatonic conception of mathematics.55 Maybe no other piece better displays 
Kepler’s interpretation, in his own Christian way, of the Neoplatonism as expressed 
by Proclus [Italics are Proclus’ quotation and round brackets are Kepler’s 
comments]:  
The soul itself is the generator of mathematical species and 
concepts. But if, containing them in itself as first patterns or 
paradigms, it makes them take their essential character, in such a 
way that their generation (the Christian understands, the creation 
of sensible things) is nothing but the propagation of species which 
were previously in it (that the mathematical reasons for the creation 
of bodies were coeternal with God, and that God is pre-eminently 
soul and mind, whereas human souls are images of God the 
Creator, even in essentials in their own way, is known to 
Christians) then we shall agree with Plato, in saying this, and the 
true essence of mathematics will have been discovered by us.56 
The Neoplatonic claim stating that mathematical ideas were imprinted in human 
souls and that experience is but an awakening of them becomes, in Kepler’s hand, 
the Christian doctrine of the creation of man in God’s image. Moreover, the 
‘propagation of species’ is also interpreted as the creation of bodies which, for 
Kepler, is the instauration of quantity in which geometry became three-dimensional 
matter or body.  
 
If geometry belongs to the essence of God, body (corpus) was created to instantiate 
the divine ideas in God’s mind before the creation and, in consequence, its nature 
was geometrical. God created body to express the archetypes, geometric in nature.57 
Body was central to God’s plan because it allowed him to make a finite, perfect 
universe—infinitude is a negative characteristic for Kepler.58 Since God was perfect 
and thus had to create the most beautiful universe, he turned to the three-dimensional 
 
54 Cifoletti, ‘Kepler’s De Quantitatibus’, 235. 
55 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 299–302; Kepler, KGW, 1940, 6:218–21. 
56 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 299. 
57 Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 48–49. 
58 In fact, the indeterminacy implied in infinitude is contrary to the idea of number and proportion that 
Kepler attributes to the universe as the work of a perfect God. Cf. Kepler, KGW, 1945, 13:35. 
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body in order to avail himself of rational constraints upon which to shape the created 
cosmos and determine a finite number of planets.59 This cosmogonic idea is sketched 
in the Mysterium Cosmographicum: 
In the beginning, God created body; and if we know the definition 
of body, I think it will be fairly clear why God created body and 
not any other thing in the beginning. I say that what God intended 
was quantity. To achieve it he needed everything which pertains to 
the essence of body; and quantity is a form of body, in virtue of its 
being body, and the source of its definition.60  
The geometric nature of body, its definition in terms of quantity rather than quality, 
also implied that ‘space without matter is negation’.61 In fact, the basic principles of 
creation (the curved and the straight) and space were derived from the nature of 
quantity as the essence of body. The creation of physical powers in matter in order to 
generate motion in the universe instantiate quantity as well.62 In the first edition of 
the Mysterium Cosmographicum Kepler claimed that ‘quantity in fact was created in 
the beginning together with matter; the heavens were created the second day’. For 
the 1621 edition, Kepler added: ‘Rather, ideas of quantity are and were co-eternal to 
God Himself. These ideas are also exemplars in souls made in the image of God 
(being their essence as well)’.63  
 
The idea that geometric ideas were innate, as defining the contemplative faculties of 
our soul, is but one small part of a Kepler’s theory of soul.64 In line with 
Neoplatonism, Kepler characterised knowledge as anamnesis. Against abstraction, 
Kepler argued that: 
Since quantities possess constructability not by virtue of the 
figures’ passing before the eyes, but in virtue of being clear to the 
eyes of the mind, in virtue not so much of having been abstracted 
from sensible things but of never having been associated with 
them, therefore, we have rightly established abstract quantity as the 
 
59 Davenport, ‘Did Johannes Kepler Have a Positive Theory of the Real Presence?’, 326. 
60 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:44. 
61 Kepler, 8:65. 
62 Cf. Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 109.  
63 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:26. 
64 See more in Boner, ‘Kepler’s Living Cosmology: Bridging the Celestial and Terrestrial Realms’; 
Escobar, ‘Kepler’s Theory of the Soul: A Study on Epistemology’. 
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terms for archetypal proportions, that is those which are 
constructible from the divisions of the circle.65  
This characterisation of knowledge occurs as part of Kepler’s attempt to find the 
causes of the harmonic proportions in the division of a circle into equal parts in the 
Harmonice Mundi, which ‘are made geometrically and knowably, that is, from the 
constructible regular plain figures’.66 Kepler founded harmonic proportions in 
geometry as different from other theories of proportions based on the meaning of 
integers of the Pythagorean. Kepler’s solution was that geometry, co-eternal with 
God, supplied patterns ‘for the furnishing of the world, so that it should become best 
and most beautiful above all most like to the Creator’. But geometry not only 
supplied patterns to God when creating the world but also, insofar as man’s soul (and 
other souls) are images of God, patterns provided the way to ‘command each of their 
own bodies, to govern, move, increase, preserve and also particularly propagate 
them’. In the case of human mind, Kepler stressed that ‘they use the very same 
[proportions] as laws for performing their functions and for expressing the same 
proportions in the motions of their bodies’.67 Because of this, geometry connects God 
with humans, as Kepler writes in a letter to von Hohenburg: ‘Those [geometric] laws 
are within the grasp of the human mind; God wanted us to recognise them by 
creating us after his own image so that we could share in his own thoughts’.68 
 
The view of God as an architect also legitimised the causal reasoning. In Kepler’s 
view, any precise enquiry is but a variant of the more general form: why did God 
create things this way and not otherwise? Instead of describing the observable world 
and then formulating possible causes, his cosmology postulated a priori reasoning as 
the first step in the investigation of the world; causation thus is always necessary 
causation.69 As we have seen, the purpose of creation was to exhibit the divinity of 
the Creator (ad adumbrandam in mundo diuinitatem Conditioris).70 This divinity was 
 
65 Kepler, KGW, 1940, 6:303; Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 304. 
66 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 9. 
67 Kepler, KGW, 1940, 6:104–5; Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 145–47. 
68 Kepler, KGW, 1945, 13:308–9. 
69 Barker and Goldstein, ‘Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A 
Reappraisal’; Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science; Jardine, ‘Problems of 
Knowledge and Action: Epistemology of the Sciences’; Martens, ‘Kepler’s Solution to the Problem of 
a Realist Celestial Mechanics’. 
70 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:45. 
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expressed under the form of geometrical archetypes. Because of that, Kepler claimed 
that God distinguished between the curved and the straight when creating quantity in 
the world, in order to represent the divine and the creatures respectively. The 
distinction between the curved and the straight as the fundamental division appeared 
prominently in the Neoplatonic literature of the Renaissance typically referred to 
Nicholas of Cusa. Kepler pushed this claim forward and stated that the perfect 
curved figure, the sphere, is the image of the One God in the Holy Trinity: the Father 
is the central point, the Son the surface, and the Holy Spirit the regularity of the 
relation between the point and the circumference.71 The archetype of the Trinity, the 
image of God in geometrical terms, accounted for the most general and basic features 
of the visible world: ‘The Sun in the centre, which was the image of the Father, the 
Sphere of the Fixed Stars, or the Mosaic waters, at the circumference, which was the 
image of the Son, and the heavenly air which fills all parts, or the space and 
firmament, which was the image of the Spirit’.72 The necessary properties of the 
sphere, as the archetype of the Trinity, causally aacounted for the characteristics of 
the visible world.  
 
This interplay between the divine, the geometrical and the physical dominates 
Kepler’s works.73 Kepler’s most important works, the Mysterium Cosmographicum 
and the Harmonice Mundi were attempts to uncover the geometric and harmonic 
archetypes ordering and explaining the actual constitution of the world. These works 
were the most important for Kepler because they dealt with his most cherished 
subject: the harmony—as synonym of order and beauty—of the world. Other works 
such as the Astronomia Nova were subordinated to cosmological interests. In a letter 
to von Hohenburg, Kepler confessed that his interest in having access to Tycho’s 
thorough observations was cosmological rather than astronomical: ‘One of the most 
important reasons for my visit to Tycho was the desire, as you know, to learn from 
him more figures for the eccentricities in order to examine my Mysterium and the 
 
71 Kepler, 8:44. 
72 Kepler, 8:24. 
73 Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 49. 
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just mentioned Harmony for comparison. For these speculations a priori must not 
conflict with experimental evidence; moreover, they must be in accordance with it’.74 
 
The Mysterium Cosmographicum explained (cur ita, non aliter essent) the number, 
quantity and motion of the orbs.75 Kepler rejected numerological accounts, because 
in explaining the foundation of the world we should not argue based on the meaning 
that numbers have acquired from things following the creation.76 Rheticus had 
claimed in the Narratio Prima that God created only six planets based on the 
perfection of the number. Instead, Kepler argued that the five regular geometric 
solids (the cube, tetrahedron, dodecahedron, octahedron and icosahedron), nested 
inside each other in a particular order, gave a precise account of the size of the 
planetary orbits and of the exact number of planets. The spheres circumscribing the 
solids would be the spaces of planetary orbits. Because there are only five solids, 
only six spheres could be circumscribed. But not only the exact number of planets 
was derived from the properties of this unique class of geometric solids; the position 
of planets was also connected to the properties of these figures, according to their 
resemblance to the sphere which determines their nobility. The sphere is the most 
perfect geometric figure because all its sides are equidistant from its centre; the 
centres of the faces of the perfect solids are equidistant from the centre of the solids 
and, in this sense, they participate of the perfection of the sphere. But this argument 
is ultimately archetypal. In the Epitome (1671-1621) Kepler claimed that the perfect 
solids ‘imitate the sphere—which is an image of God (Dei imaginem)—as much as a 
rectilinear figure possibly can, arranging all their angles in the same sphere. And they 
can all be inscribed in a sphere’.77 Kepler divided these solids into primary (the cube, 
the tetrahedron and the dodecahedron) and secondary (the octahedron and the 
icosahedron), according to their geometric properties.78 The purpose of these 
elaborations was to define the order of the solids in the nested model. Bearing in 
mind God’s love for humanity, the earth (‘supreme and epitome of the entire world 
 
74 Kepler, KGW, 1949, 14:130; Baumgardt, Johannes Kepler. Life and Letters, 61. 
75 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:23. 
76 Kepler, 8:25. 
77 Kepler, KGW, 1953, 7:272; Kepler, Epitome, 28. 
78 See Field, Kepler’s Geometrical Cosmology, 53–60; Caspar, Kepler, 60–71; Martens, Kepler’s 
Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 40–56. 
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and the noblest among all stars’) is the starting point of the measurement of all orbits 
and its position divides the primary from the secondary solids.79 The position of earth 
is not arbitrary and, according to the archetype of the perfect solids, it occupies a 
special, unique place in the progression of celestial bodies from the sun to Saturn. In 
this disposition, Kepler praised the work of God the architect: ‘From motion we have 
orbits, and bodies [the perfect geometric solids] from the number and magnitude. It 
only remains that we said with Plato that ‘God always geometrises’ and in this fabric 
of mobiles inscribed solid bodies within the spheres and these spheres within solids, 
so that no solid body remained unclothed in the inside and in the outside by mobile 
orbits’.80 From this geometric model, Kepler derived a priori the sizes of the orbits 
and compared them with the a posteriori calculations resulting from Copernicus’ De 
revolutionibus, a work performed by his former teacher Michael Maestlin at Kepler’s 
request. However, Kepler asked Maestlin to accomplish the calculation having the 
true Sun as centre, instead of the mean sun—a point in space just off the true Sun 
that Copernicus had used for his calculations following astronomical practices. 
According to the Mysterium Cosmographicum, the Sun was anima motrix and then it 
was the starting point of the calculations of planetary positions. However, in this 
work Kepler did not offer more evidence that the Trinitarian archetype and the idea 
of action-at-a-distance to account for the central position of the Sun. A more detailed 
argumentation of this change was central to the Astronomia nova, where Kepler 
elaborated that geometrical points could not cause motion and then, geometric 
calculations in astronomy should be referred to the Sun.81 The coincidence between 
the polyhedral distances compared with the Copernican calculations was fit enough 
to count as an empirical support.82 See, for example, a comparison between the 
polyhedral (distances without the Moon) and the Copernican distances: 
 
79 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:52. In the Epitome Kepler expands this argument by claiming that ‘the nature 
of man, the observer creature and future dweller on the Earth, was taken up among the archetypal 
causes (inter causas Archetypicas fuit)—as being one who was going to reckon the magnitude of the 
solar body and contemplate the differences of day and night’. Kepler, KGW, 1953, 7:317; Kepler, 
Epitome, 77.  
80 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:47. 
81 Martens, ‘Kepler’s Solution to the Problem of a Realist Celestial Mechanics’; Martens, Kepler’s 
Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 47; Stephenson, Kepler’s Physical Astronomy; Field, Kepler’s 
Geometrical Cosmology. 





Nevertheless, the geometric archetype of the polyhedra appears as insufficient to 
account for the variation of planetary motion once Kepler demonstrated that planets 
move in non-circular orbits. The Mysterium Cosmographicum explained the structure 
of the universe in a static way. But in the Astronomia Nova, Kepler demonstrated 
that planets move in ellipses whose one focus is the Sun and that a line drawn 
between the Sun and the planet sweeps equal areas in equal times of its orbit. Putting 
these assertions together indicated that the motion of the planet changes depending 
on its distance from the Sun: a planet moves faster when it is near its perihelion and 
slower by its aphelion. In the language of the polyhydric archetypes, the ‘cube and 
octahedron which are spouses do penetrate their planetary spheres somewhat; the 
dodecahedron and icosahedron which are spouses do not altogether follow theirs, 
whereas the tetrahedron exactly touches both’. If planets move in ellipses, the five 
regular solids were not enough to account for the observed motions. Kepler was 
aware of this: 
From that fact it is evident that the actual proportions of the 
planetary distances from the Sun have not been taken from the 
regular figures alone; for the Creator, the actual fount of geometry, 
who, as Plato wrote, practices eternal geometry, does not stray 
from his own archetype. And that could certainly be inferred from 
the very fact that all the planets change their intervals over definite 
periods of time (…) [I]t is fitting that the Creator, if He paid 
attention to the proportion of the orbits in general, also paid 
attention to the proportion between the varying distances of the 
individual orbits in particular, so that the attention should be the 
same in each case, and that one should be linked with another.83 
 
83 Kepler, KGW, 1940, 6:299; Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 407. 
Figure 3. Polyhedral distances without the moon. Kepler, KGW, 8:82 
118 
 
In order to explain the planetary distances and the motion of planets, Kepler 
postulated that the pattern of celestial motion was harmonic rather than polyhedral. 
Early thoughts on this were formulated in letters to Edmund Bruce—an Englishman 
in contact with Galileo, von Hohenburg and Maestlin in 1599.84 Over the next years, 
Kepler penned some thoughts concerning the role of musical harmony in the 
explanation of different phenomena. The developments of these ideas on harmony 
were finally put together in the Harmonice Mundi Libri V, published in 1619. In it, 
Kepler formulated the relation between the sizes and the periods of planetary orbits 
which came to be known as the ‘harmonic law’. The book revived the ancient 
tradition of the ‘music of the heavens’, as a critical answer to Ptolemy’s Harmonics 
founded upon his geocentric model and monophonic understanding of music.85 
 
The Harmonice Mundi developed a conception of harmony beyond music. Kepler’s 
universal harmony encompassed astronomical, astrological and physical enquiries all 
of them underpinned by the idea that all these forms of harmony had the same 
mathematical basis.86 In connection with his wider cosmological and theological 
commitments, Kepler criticised the Pythagorean numerological approach that defined 
harmony in terms of numerological relations between integers and put in its place an 
harmonic theory based on geometrical relations between physical quantities.87 In 
addition, for a relation to be harmonic, its beauty had to be perceived by a soul; in the 
case of human music, this soul was the human mind; in the case of the planetary 
system, its harmony was designed to be perceived by its centre, a soul in the Sun.88 
The harmonic theory provided, then, further archetypal evidence on the Copernican 
arrangement. Furthermore, astronomy became ‘the most precise and objective field 
for harmonic discovery’.89 
 
 
84 Caspar, Kepler, 85–96; Stephenson, The Music of the Heavens, 90–97; Martens, ‘Kepler’s Solution 
to the Problem of a Realist Celestial Mechanics’, 112–14. 
85 Stephenson, Kepler’s Physical Astronomy, 16–53. 
86 Stephenson, The Music of the Heavens, 4; Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 
115. 
87 Stephenson, The Music of the Heavens, 131–34; Walker, ‘Kepler’s Celestial Music’. 
88 On this see Boner, ‘Kepler’s Living Cosmology: Bridging the Celestial and Terrestrial Realms’. 
89 Stephenson, The Music of the Heavens, 5. 
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Kepler’s harmonic consideration began before he had access to Ptolemy’s 
Harmonics. By 1607 he received a copy of the original Greek and was struck by the 
similarity between his thought and Ptolemy’s.90 However, Kepler considered himself 
in a better position than Ptolemy, for he had knowledge of the true arrangement of 
the heavens—the Copernican system—and of the polyphonic harmony developed by 
Gioseffo Zarlino, Vincenzo Galilei and others during the sixteenth century. The first 
two books of the Harmonice Mundi dealt with mathematics, establishing the 
geometrical foundations upon which Kepler would later postulate the harmonic ratios 
of nature and man. In the third book Kepler focused on musical harmony, 
formulating concepts such as durus and mollis, roughly similar to ours of major and 
minor and other musical concepts that he later applied to celestial harmony. In the 
fourth book, Kepler turned to astrology, rejecting a large part of the traditional 
practices.91 Kepler postulated an astrology concerned with the influence of stars 
when their harmonies were perceived by the soul of the Earth, generating effects 
such as winds, rain and all kind of storms; on the other hand, astrology was 
concerned with the influence of stars when perceived by the human soul, changing 
human temperaments.92 The fifth book dealt with the astronomical harmonies of the 
world. Kepler came up again with the polyhedra. At this point, Kepler came to 
believe that geometrical harmonies—harmonic ratios that give rise to musical 
harmonies—provide the underlying theory, the ratio, to account for all the 
polyhedral proportions. In this sense, the second chapter of the fifth book presented a 
wide range of ratios among numbers of edges, faces, plane angles and solid angles, 
among others.93 Next, Kepler classified the polyhedra under these criteria. The 
outcome was that the regular polyhedra embodied the geometrical principles of 
abstract harmony and the nesting model accounted for the beauty of the structure of 
the Copernican arrangement of celestial bodies. However, the nested model only 
provided an answer to the structure of the universe, not to the universe in motion; in 
other words, the nested model could not explain the eccentricities and the periodic 
 
90 Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 390–91; Kepler, KGW, 1940, 6:289. 
91 Cf. Walker, ‘Kepler’s Celestial Music’, 245. 
92 Field, ‘A Lutheran Astrologer: Johannes Kepler’. 
93 Stephenson, The Music of the Heavens, 130–32. 
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times. The harmonic archetypes filled the gap and provided further evidence of 
God’s perfection in creating the world.  
 
Thus, Kepler’s God was not only an architect but also a composer. This means that 
for establishing the motion of planets, their variations and the eccentricity of 
planetary orbits God relied upon musical harmonies. In this case, we see again an 
interplay between the divine, the geometrical and the physical. The basic tenet of 
Kepler’s harmony of the heavens held that the ratio of variation of the motion of 
planets was equivalent to proportions of length string producing sounds.94 If 
variations in the length of a string on Earth generated sounds perceived as beautiful 
and harmonious by the human mind, celestial motions produced no sound but give 
raise to a real harmony tuned to be perceived by the soul of the Sun. This perfect 
harmony was founded on the fact that the arc of the motion of planets as calculated 
from the Sun—centre of the music of the heavens and mover of the planets—
followed harmonic proportions both between an individual planet’s aphelial and 
perihelial motions and between adjacent planet’s diverging and converging motions. 
Kepler calculated the diurnal motions and interpreted them in terms of his harmonic 
proportions. 
 
Apparent diurnal motions in column 4 correspond to observations—that is, the 
results of astronomical calculations. Except for Mercury, there is a perfect harmony 
in the motion of single planets and in the case of paired planets (columns 1 and 2) the 
disagreement is minimal. Kepler adjusted one of the extreme motions for each 
planet, the perihelial motion for the inferior planets, the aphelial motion for Earth and 
superior planets, so these adjusted motions (in column 5) show how nearly harmonic 
the actual (‘observed’) proportions are.95 Hitherto, Kepler has explained that the 
motion of planets followed harmonic proportions; the next step was to prove that 
there was a common scale in which these planetary motions were tuned. Kepler 
assumed the motion in the perihelion and the aphelion of Saturn, the slowest and 
 
94 Kepler understands musical harmonies as generated by the length of string rather than by wave 
lengths—as we do. This difference explains Kepler’s understanding of musical harmonies in terms of 
geometrical proportions. 
95 Stephenson, The Music of the Heavens, 149–51. 
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most external of the six planets. Following his musical theory, these motions of 
Saturn represented (the lowest) G in the musical scale. Then, he calculated the 
distribution of the motions of the remaining planets in successive musical octaves, 
according to the observations of the apses established in the previous table. Based on 
these results, Kepler attempted to demonstrate that the universal consonances of the 
six planets existed in a similar way to a counterpoint of four human voices; Kepler 
assigned to planets human voices—soprano, alto, tenor and bass—although he was 
aware that planetary motions do not produce sound as human music. In the 
intelligible music of the heavens, Saturn and Jupiter are bass, Earth and Venus alto, 
Mars is tenor and Mercury soprano. The existence of a planetary harmony and a 
polyphonic celestial music has been demonstrated, in Kepler’s view. The final step in 
the long and difficult Book V was the show the agreement between the polyhedral 
theory and the harmonic proportions. The polyhedra served as a ‘rough model’, 
while the harmonic proportions among the apparent motions determined the final 
dimensions of the planetary spheres.96  
 
96 Stephenson, 230. 
Figure 4. Apparent extreme planetary motions. Kepler, KGW, 6:311-312 
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The theological orientation of Kepler’s understanding of nature not only shaped his 
intellectual itinerary but his arrangement of knowledge and particularly the 
subordination of disciplines. 
 
3.4.The subordination of sciences 
The previous section offered elements to understand Kepler’s reform of astronomy as 
embedded in a cosmology theologically driven. This reform is most visible in the 
New Astronomy based upon causes or celestial physics, treated by means of 
commentaries on the motion of Mars published in 1609, yet hints were already 
outlined in the Apologia pro Tychone contra Ursum, composed between 1600 and 
1601.97 Traditionally known as the Astronomia Nova, Kepler usually referred to this 
work by the less ambitious part of the title, Commentaries on the motion of Mars. 
The Mysterium Cosmographicum did not exhibit the technical knowledge in 
astronomy nor the mathematical skills characteristic of the Commentaries on the 
motion of Mars whereby Kepler would break with the ‘spell of circularity’.98 
However, these advancements in astronomy were not detrimental to the early 
cosmology; the discoveries on planetary motion based on the enquiries on Mars led 
Kepler to set forth the harmonic archetypes which he eventually reconciled with the 
polyhedral model. The motivation behind Kepler’s first visit to Tycho in 1600, in 
which he was assigned to elaborate the theory of Mars, was to gain access to the 
Danish’s accurate observations in order to advance in his harmonic examinations, 
including the corroboration of the calculations of the Mysterium Cosmographicum.99 
But the peculiarities of the motion of Mars and the wide range of observations 
available occupied Kepler’s mind until the summer of 1605, when he put together his 
enquiries on the topic.100 The achievements in astronomy were developed within the 
framework of the early cosmology and its theological assumptions, as Kepler 
acknowledged in the Preface to the second edition of the Mysterium 
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Cosmographicum. According to him, his astronomical achievements ‘illustrate or 
perfect’ aspects already covered by the Mysterium.101  
 
The process leading to the findings that eventually appeared in the Astronomia nova 
made manifest that the development of astronomical ideas, following the archetypal 
cosmology, entailed a re-definition of the discipline as it was practiced by the end of 
the sixteenth century.102 When Kepler arrived in Prague for his first visit to Brahe, he 
was assigned to resume Longomontanus’ work on Mars. But as Kepler tells to von 
Hohenburg, ‘I would already have concluded my researches about world harmony, 
had not Tycho’s astronomy so shackled me that I nearly went out of my mind’. The 
complexity of the observations prevented Kepler from rushing into conclusions just 
to support his harmonic speculations. In the same letter, Kepler added that ‘Those 
speculations may not a priori run counter to obvious empirical knowledge, rather 
they must be brought into agreement with it’.103 Indeed, as Kepler became familiar 
with the intricacies of the motion of Mars, he realised that there was more at stake 
than the explanation of the motion of a single planet. Kepler saw himself as the 
architect that may use all these materials ‘according to a plan’. It is not hard to guess 
to which plan Kepler was making reference. In a letter of the period, Kepler 
summarises his views on Brahe and the potential use of his observations:  
Tycho possesses the best observations and consequently, as it 
were, the material for the erection of a new structure; he has also 
workers and everything else which one might desire. He lacks only 
the architect who uses all this according to a plan. For, even though 
he also possesses a rather happy talent and true architectural 
ability, still he was hindered by the diversity of the phenomena as 
well as by the fact that the truth lies hidden exceedingly deep 
within them. Now old age steals upon him, weakening his intellect 
and other faculties or, after a few years, will weaken them that it 
will be difficult for him to accomplish everything alone.104 
 
101 Kepler, KGW, 1963, 8:9. 
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In the light of the Mysterium Cosmographicum, it is not surprising that Kepler found 
that all the astronomical work done in Brahe’s factory required order and direction. 
The collection and uses of observations to calculate planetary positions was but part 
of the task of the astronomer, for ‘the truth lies hidden exceedingly deep within 
them’. In the metaphysics of the Mysterium, Kepler had claimed that God added the 
mind to the senses for the sole purpose of seeking the causes from our 
observations.105 This deeply informed Kepler’s conception of astronomy as a practice 
primarily concerned with observations. 
 
A glimpse of this reformed view of astronomy before its full realisation in the 
Astronomia Nova was sketched in the Apologia. The first important aspect is the role 
of observation in Kepler’s Neoplatonic conception of knowledge and its implications 
for astronomy. Against the sceptics and those claiming that astronomy was not 
capable of proper demonstrations,106 Kepler argued that ‘the astronomer ought not to 
be excluded from the community of philosophers who inquire into the nature of 
things’.107 Kepler accepted the traditional definition of astronomy as concerned with 
the calculation of planetary positions in order to predict what motions will appear in 
the future: ‘One who predicts as accurately as possible the movements and positions 
of the stars performs the tasks of the astronomer well’. However, ‘one who, in 
addition to this, also employs true opinions about the form of the universe performs it 
better and is held worthy of greater praise’. Kepler explained that ‘the former draws 
conclusions that are true as far as what is observed is concerned; the latter not only 
does justice in his conclusions to what is seen, but also (…) in drawing conclusions 
embraces the inmost form of nature’.108 The reason behind this is the Neoplatonic 
claim that ‘in all acquisition of knowledge it happens that, starting out from these 
things which impinge on the senses, we are carried by the operation of the mind to 
higher things which cannot be grasped by any sharpness of the senses’. However, 
this does not mean that the mind completes what we gather from the senses, as it 
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happens when hypotheses are contrived to observe the celestial motions—a thesis 
that Kepler attributes to Ursus. On the contrary, Kepler claims that  
we first of all perceive with our eyes the various positions of the 
planets at different times, and reasoning then imposes itself on 
these observations and leads the mind to recognition of the form of 
the universe. And the portrayal of this form of the universe thus 
derived from observations is afterwards called astronomical 
hypotheses.109  
In Kepler’s view of knowledge, senses are driven by reason in a process ultimately 
leading to uncover the archetypes of the creation (the ‘form of the universe’). 
Observations, then, are not raw material for the mind to interpret, but the starting 
point of a process in which the mind is awoken to uncover the structure underlying 
the arrangement and motion of celestial bodies.110 Therefore, an astronomical 
hypothesis is not an imaginary contrivance to explain observations, but the outcome 
of an intellectual process in which the mind eventually unearths the causes 
underlying these observations. In short, Kepler draws from his Neoplatonic 
conception of knowledge a disciplinary consequence: that astronomy, insofar as it is 
concerned with observations, uncovers the causes or form of the universe.  
 
A second important aspect from the Apologia is Kepler’s claim that astronomical 
hypotheses can provide an account ‘of the form of the universe’. In his view, 
astronomy could not only be concerned with computing planetary positions, for any 
mathematical representation of the heavens involve natural philosophical 
assumptions. Kepler is not claiming that mathematical representations of celestial 
motions (i.e., world-systems or astronomical hypotheses)111 may be used for natural 
philosophy; he is rather making the strong statement that any mathematical 
representation of celestial motions entailed physical consequences. A contrast with 
Ursus may clarify this point. In his Tractatus, Ursus had claimed that ‘a hypothesis 
or fictitious supposition is a portrayal contrived out of certain imaginary circles of an 
imaginary form of the world-system, designed to keep track of celestial motions’. 
Ursus explained that these contrived hypotheses ‘are nothing but certain fabrications 
 
109 Jardine, 92/144. 
110 Escobar, ‘Kepler’s Theory of the Soul: A Study on Epistemology’; Boner, ‘Kepler’s Living 
Cosmology: Bridging the Celestial and Terrestrial Realms’. 
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which we imagine and use to portray world-systems’. These hypotheses only needed 
to agree with and correspond to a ‘method of calculation of celestial motion, even if 
not to the motions themselves’.112 That is, hypotheses ‘can be preserved and 
maintained’ if they could predict the position of a celestial object, although they may 
be in open contradiction with natural philosophy, ‘for otherwise they would not be 
hypotheses, or (which is the same thing) fictitious suppositions, but true (not 
contrived) images of a true (not imaginary) form of the world-system’. Astronomers, 
in consequence, were required (aitema) to ‘fabricate hypotheses, whether true or 
false and feigned, of such a kind as may yield the phenomena and appearances of the 
celestial motions and correctly produce a method for calculating them’.113 In his 
support, Ursus quotes in extenso Osiander’s Preface, emphasising that since the 
astronomer ‘cannot by any means apprehend the true causes, he must conceive and 
devise causes or hypotheses of such a kind that when assumed they enable those 
motions to be calculated correctly from the principles of geometry (…) provided that 
they yield a reckoning consistent with the observations’.114 The impossibility of 
reaching the true causes explaining the observed positions of celestial objects 
necessarily led astronomers to ficticious ‘hypotheses’. 
 
Kepler’s entire Apologia is arguably the reply to this point, but I will only highlight 
two aspects. Kepler redefined the idea of ‘hypotheses’ by presenting a history of the 
use of the term and by establishing its precise meaning in the study of the heavens.115 
In astronomy, ‘we demonstrate with the help of numbers and figures some fact about 
a star we have previously observed, from things we have seen when carefully and 
meticulously examining the heavens. Then in the demonstration we have set up, the 
above-mentioned observation constitutes a hypothesis upon which that 
demonstration chiefly rests’. However, Kepler remarked, ‘when we speak in the 
plural of astronomical hypotheses, we do so in the manner of present-day learned 
discourses. We thereby designate a certain totality of the views of some notable 
practitioner, from which totality he demonstrates the entire basis of the heavenly 
 
112 Ursus, Tractatus in Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science, 41. 
113 Ursus, Tractatus, in Jardine, 42. 
114 Jardine, 42–43. 
115 See Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the New Astronomy, 50–56. 
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motions’. These premises are both ‘physical and geometrical’. In truth, Kepler’s 
strategy was to argue that astronomical and geometrical hypotheses were different, 
although both were implied in the calculation of planetary positions. Kepler 
illustrated his point with instances from the history of astronomy: ‘when Ptolemy 
said that the motions of the planets slow down at the apogee and are speeded up at 
the perigee, he set up an astronomical hypothesis; but when he introduced the equant, 
he did so as a geometer for the sake of calculation’.116 Kepler polishes off his 
argument by stating that 
Altogether there are three things in astronomy: geometrical 
hypotheses; astronomical hypotheses; and the apparent motions of 
the stars themselves. Accordingly, there are two distinct tasks for 
an astronomer: one, which truly pertains to astronomy, is to set up 
astronomical hypotheses such that the apparent motions will follow 
from them; the other, which pertains to geometry, is to set up 
geometrical hypotheses of whatever kind (for there can often be 
various kinds of geometry) such that from them those prior 
astronomical hypotheses, that is, the true motions of the planets 
unadulterated by the distortion of the sense of sight, both follow 
and can be worked out. 
The distinction between geometrical and astronomical hypotheses were the soil in 
which the seeds of the Astronomia Nova germinated. Kepler condemned Ursus for 
the word ‘hypotheses’,117 for in making geometrical and astronomical hypotheses 
equal they reduced astronomy to its ‘mechanical part’, that is to the calculation of 
observations. Kepler admited that astronomical hypotheses may be geometrically 
equivalent, that is, that two astronomical hypotheses may explain the same celestial 
observations without any apparent superiority from the mathematical point of view. 
However, ‘even if the conclusions of two hypotheses coincide in the geometrical 
realm, each hypothesis will have its own peculiar corollary in the physical realm’.118 
This is the crux of Kepler’s reform of astronomy developed in the form of 
commentaries on the motion of Mars. The first part of the Astronomia Nova 
displayed the mathematical demonstration of the observational (that is, the 
computational) equivalence of the Ptolemaic, Braheian and Copernican systems (‘the 
 
116 Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science, 154. 
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equivalence of hypotheses’).119 However, in Kepler’s view, only the (slightly-
reformed) Copernican system provided a true account of celestial motions, only the 
physical corollary of the Copernican hypothesis was true.  
 
Kepler’s reform of astronomy was developed in the Astronomia Nova. The title 
suggests a reform of all astronomical theory, but the work is mainly concerned with 
the study of Mars. However, the consequences of the study of Mars outlined the 
implications for the entire solar system, from which the work actually put forward a 
new astronomy. Moreover, the generalisation of the new astronomical theory to the 
entire system of the world occurred some years later in the Epitome Astronomiæ 
Copernicanicæ (1617-1621). In the introduction to the Astronomia Nova, Kepler 
claimed that the purpose of the work was ‘to reform astronomical theory in all three 
forms of hypotheses [Ptolemaic, Braheian and Copernican], so that what we compute 
from the tables may correspond to the celestial phenomena’.120 The first part of the 
work, which Kepler calls the ‘the ground plan’, demonstrated that the main 
astronomical hypotheses are equivalent in observational terms. The bottom line here 
is that, from the mathematical point of view it was not possible to claim which 
hypothesis was better. In so doing, Kepler was reinforcing the position concerning 
the progress of astronomy mentioned above: rather than claiming that the astronomy 
of the ancients was perfect and needed to be re-established—such as Ursus held–, 
Kepler considered that the practice of astronomy required appealing to something 
outside mathematics in order to progress. Two assumptions are at play here: first, 
Kepler’s view of the development of human history and knowledge, in which the 
Christian revelation helped restoring the knowledge of nature that had been lost as a 
consequence of the fall.121 Second, the new cosmology championed in the Mysterium 
was centred on the notion of quantity as the essence of matter. From the disciplinary 
point of view, one important corollary of equating matter with quantity was that all 
use of geometry necessarily involved physical consequences. 
 
 
119 Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 38. 
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The reform of astronomical theory entailed, therefore, a reform of astronomy as 
practice. In the Mysterium and in the Apologia were at play the metaphysical and 
epistemological reasons to challenge astronomy as practiced by the end of the 
sixteenth century. However, in the Astronomia, Kepler now faced a different 
challenge: to prove in the arena of astronomy that this reform was not only desirable 
and necessary but also possible. The way to solve this conundrum was surprising for 
the reader of the time: 
Meanwhile, although I place this goal first and pursue it cheerfully, 
I also make an excursion into Aristotle’s Metaphysics, or rather, I 
inquire into celestial physics and the natural causes of the motions. 
The eventual result of this consideration is the formulation of very 
clear arguments showing that only Copernicus’s opinion 
concerning the world (with a few small changes) is true, that the 
other two are proved false, and so on.  
Defining the true astronomical hypothesis led to ‘an excursion into Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics’.122 The outcome of this was that the reformed Copernican hypothesis 
was true and that the other hypotheses were ‘proved false’. The adjustments to the 
accepted hypothesis came from the introduction of physical considerations into 
astronomy, being the most important one the postulation of the true Sun as the centre 
of astronomical calculations, following the physical postulate that ‘the power that 
moves the planets resides in the body of the sun’.123 In fact, Kepler argued that a 
mathematical point, such as the mean Sun or the centre of the Ptolemaic model 
cannot have the physical properties that the centre of the world should have to 
account for the fact that a planet ‘is moved less vigorously when it recedes from the 
point whence the eccentricity is computed’; in other words, ‘that the weakening of 
power is in the ratio of the distances’.124 Physical considerations became the 
touchstone of astronomical computations. 
 
For the reader of the time, appealing to natural philosophy to solve astronomical (qua 
mathematical) problems was to mix disciplines inadequately. Even readers 
 
122 Kepler follows the Reading according to which Metaphysics dealt with corpus mobile as sub 
ratione entis creati. See Lohr, ‘The Sixteenth-Century Transformation of the Aristotelian Division of 
the Speculative Sciences’, 51. 
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sympathetic to Copernicus, such as Maestlin, rejected Kepler’s tactic. Maestlin had 
been enthusiastic of Kepler’s approach in the Mysterium, especially concerning the 
possibility of demonstrating a priori astronomical conclusions. Maestlin was willing 
to accept the polyhedral hypothesis as an excursion into final causes;125 after all, the 
idea that mathematics may account for final causes had precedents in the sixteenth-
century debates on the nature of mathematics.126 However, Maestlin could not accept 
the introduction of efficient causes in astronomy, such as ‘the natural causes of 
motion’. In a letter concerning the Epitome, Maestlin reminded Kepler that the 
astronomical computations were ‘founded upon Geometry and Arithmetic’ and that 
‘physical conjectures’ confused the reader instead of enlightening him. However, in 
Kepler’s view, the connection between mathematics and physics was necessary for 
archetypal reasons. In the Astronomia Nova, Kepler clarified that  
all things are so interconnected, involved, and intertwined with one 
another that after trying many different ways by which I might 
attain to the reform of astronomical calculations, some well-
trodden by the ancients and others constructed in the emulation of 
them by their example, none other could succeed than the one 
founded upon the motions’ physical causes themselves, which I 
establish in this work.127 
This interconnection between the mathematical level of astronomy and the physical 
level of efficient causes was guaranteed by the archetypal cosmology, particularly by 
the redefinition of bodies as quantities. 
 
The reformed conception of astronomy, encompassing mathematics, ‘physics and 
metaphysics’ had been presented as well in 1604 in the ‘Prooemium’ to the 
Astronomia Pars Optica—a work that Descartes read and commented on to 
Beeckman.128 Kepler begins in a familiar way: ‘Astronomy, which deals with the 
motions of the heavenly bodies, principally has two parts’. The first part is concerned 
‘with the investigation and comprehension of the forms of the motions (forma 
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motuum)’ and is claimed to be subservient to (natural) philosophy. The other part, 
‘arising from it’, investigated ‘the positions of the heavenly bodies at any given 
moment’: this second part was described as having ‘a practical orientation’ and 
‘laying the foundation for prognosis’. Arithmetic and Geometry were presented ‘as 
Plato used to say, as a pair of wings’ supporting astronomy, for Arithmetic serves 
more ‘the practical part’ and Geometry ‘the contemplative’. The conclusion of 
astronomy would be arithmetical, comprising the tables of motions ‘and the 
ephemerides derived from them’. The division between theoretical and practical 
astronomy constituted Kepler’s attempt to present astronomy as a practice capable of 
providing an account of the heavens from which the calculations derive. In other 
words, by claiming that astronomy had two different but connected parts Kepler was 
introducing (natural) philosophical considerations into astronomy and, at the same 
time, modifying the goal of the computational tasks of astronomy, now bounded by 
the principles of natural philosophy. The fruit of astronomy was the tables of motion, 
a project undertaken by Brahe and culminated by Kepler in the Tabulæ Rudolphinæ 
(1627).  
 
After this dual division, Kepler claimed that astronomy was founded upon two kinds 
of principles: ‘the observations’ and the ‘physical or metaphysical axioms’. The 
observational principles were long-recognised components of astronomy by the 
sixteenth century and included ‘the mechanical part, dealing with instruments and the 
way of using them, which the phoenix of astronomers, the late Tycho Brahe, 
published five years ago’ and the ‘historical part’ comprising the observation 
themselves. Kepler told that ‘twenty-four books of the most meticulous observations 
of this sort were left by Tycho Brahe’. Then, he added a third part concerning optics, 
‘for the observed things in heaven and their motions take place through the mediation 
of light and shadow’. This is the subject of the book and Kepler recognised important 
predecessors in this field.129 But Kepler’s novelty appeared in the presentation of a 
fourth, physical part comprising ‘the physical and metaphysical principles’, of a 
different kind from the observational.130 These principles dealt with ‘the efficient 
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causes of the motions, or the movers; the formal causes, or figures that movers strive 
for; the material causes or orbs; and the physical intension or remission of motions’. 
Kepler presented a celestial physics as a constitutive part of astronomy, that is, a part 
of astronomy concerned with efficient, formal, material and final causes of the 
celestial motions. Kepler remarked that this fourth part would appear under the form 
of ‘Commentaries on the motions of Mars (…) which I think I can call the key to a 
deeper astronomy’. Physics may deal with the heavens from a metaphysical point of 
view that is, in the words of Benito Pereira, ‘considering the substance of the 
heavens and the stars, whether it is ingenerable and incorruptible, whether it is 
simple or composite, whether it is elementary or is rather a certain fifth essence’, but 
‘even if the physicist and the astrologer deal with the same heaven, they deal with it 
in different ways’. In fact, the astrologer was not ‘concerned to seek and posit causes 
that are true and agree with the nature of things, but only causes of such a kind that 
he can universally, conveniently and constantly give and account of all those things 
which appear in the heavens’—words similar to Ursus’. 131 Claiming that there was a 
‘celestial physics’ modelled after the causal procedures of physics as part of 
astronomy was worrying for Kepler’s contemporaries, for it clearly violates the 
division of the sciences or, as Osiander claimed in the preface to the De 
revolutionibus this would ‘throw into confusion the liberal arts’.  
 
The Epitome Astronomiæ Copernicanæ put together all the elements related to his 
reform of astronomy. Two elements from the Epitome further clarify that Kepler’s 
reform cannot be read as the foundation of an a priori physics à la cartesienne. 
Kepler argued in favour of founding astronomy in physics, that is, borrowing the 
principles from a higher discipline in the order of sciences to act as framework for a 
derived one; this would solve the problem of the ignorance of the causes as presented 
by Pereira, Osiander, Ursus and others. Kepler’s strategy fits within the Aristotelian 
conception of natural philosophy of the Posterior Analytics.132 To understand this 
qualification it is necessary to bring up the already-mentioned view according to 
which Kepler does not entirely reject Aristotle’s achievements, but reads them as 
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partially mistaken by his ignorance of the philosophical consequences of omitting the 
role of God in the creation. For Kepler, this was not a trivial claim. It implied 
Aristotle’s mistaken views on the nature of mathematical entities and the idea of 
abstraction. Kepler corrected this view embracing a Christian version of 
anamnesis.133 It is not surprising, then, that the title page of the fourth book of the 
Epitome, dealing with the heavens, was presented ‘as a supplement to Aristotle’s On 
the Heavens’.134 In the introduction to the book, Kepler explained the differences: 
that he replaced the multiplicity of movements in single planets by demonstrating 
that the motion of the planet is not uniform and that this was causally explained by 
the eccentricities which, in turn, derived from ‘the Archetype of the harmonic 
cosmos’; in consequence, ‘it is established that this cosmos cannot be better than it is 
and that it is impossible that the world should not have been created at a fixed 
beginning in time’.135 
 
In the Epitome, Kepler also resumes his thoughts on astronomical hypotheses and 
their causes. In the scheme of the Epitome, Kepler divides astronomy in five parts 
(the same stated in the Optica, but in different order): Historical concerning the 
observations; optical concerning hypotheses; physical concerning the causes of 
hypotheses; arithmetical concerning tables and calculations and finally mechanical 
concerning instruments.136 The physical part of astronomy is presented as ‘in the 
highest degree relevant to the purpose’ of which the astronomer cannot be 
‘dispensed’. For the astronomer ‘should not have absolute freedom to think up 
anything they please without a reason’; on the contrary, the astronomer should be 
able to give ‘causas probabiles’ for their hypotheses ‘on which you propose as the 
true causes of the appearances’. In so doing, the astronomer establishes ‘in advance 
the principles of your astronomy in a higher science, namely physics or 
metaphysics’. Kepler explained that the astronomer was not prevented ‘from using 
those geometrical, physical or metaphysical considerations pertaining to those higher 
disciplines that are supplied to you by the very exposition of the specific discipline, 
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provided that you do not introduce any begging question’. Once the astronomer has 
advanced into this path, he is now ‘master of what he has set out to do, insofar as he 
had devised causes of motion’ which are in accord ‘with reason’ and fit ‘to give rise 
to everything that the history of observations contains’. From the multiple enquiries 
into singular phenomena, making calculations and postulating causes, the astronomer 
now ‘draws together in a single form those things’. At this point, the astronomer was 
no longer concerned with the ‘demonstration of the phenomena’, useful for everyday 
life, but ‘aspires with the greatest joy in philosophising, to a higher end’. This higher 
end, to which the astronomer ‘by geometrical and by physical arguments’ directs his 
efforts is no other than place ‘before the eyes an authentic form and disposition or 
furnishing of the whole universe’. This form is the book of nature, in which ‘God the 
creator manifested and represented in part and by a kind of writing without words his 
essence and his will towards making’.137 Kepler is aware of the controversial nature 
of the introduction of physics into astronomy, but he insisted on its necessity. As he 
claimed elsewhere in the Epitome, rejecting physics in astronomy was striking off the 
head of astronomy.138 However, physics constituted the framework for solving 
astronomical problems by providing true causes in the form of principles, that is, by 
offering foundations on which the astronomical reasoning should be based. Physics 
and metaphysics established the nature of the heavens and the causes of motions 
which must be assumed in astronomical calculations.139 In other words, because 
metaphysics and physics constituted the starting points of astronomy by providing 
principles from which the astronomer may derive probable causes, astronomy was 
ultimately capable of accounting for the form of the world. Kepler clarified that the 
astronomer put together ‘in a single form those things which he had previously 
determined one at a time’, that is, he built an astronomy consistent with physics and 
metaphysics. In so doing, the ordered universe ultimately revealed the creator and his 
intentions.  
 
* * * 
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The division of the sciences—and especially those concerning the stars—was 
articulated to the new cosmology. But Kepler did not see his work as a rebuttal of his 
predecessors, not even of Aristotle; on the contrary, Kepler portrayed himself as 
correcting them by his discovery of the blueprints of the creation. In so doing, Kepler 
attributed the determination of formal and final causes to the archetypal explanations, 
although they were not enough to account for nature; the world could not entirely be 
unveiled a priori. The world is not only structure (quantity), but also motion caused 
by forces ultimately associated to minds or souls considered by natural 
philosophy.140 In the case of planetary motion, Kepler drew once and again on 
Gilbert’s ‘philosophy of magnetism’ as a necessary element to justify his 
achievements in reforming Copernicus system. In the closing paragraph of the fourth 
book of the Epitome, Kepler contended that the souls to which he had alluded in 
connection with the motion of the planets were not intelligences ‘which draw forth 
the celestial movements out of themselves as out of a commentary which employ 
consent, will, love, self-understanding’. On the contrary, these souls ‘are of a lower 
family and bring in only an impetus—as if a certain matter of movement—by a 
uniform contention of forces, without the work of mind’. These souls, however, 
ultimately performed their actions according to the archetypes, as formal and final 
causes, for ‘[these souls] find the laws, or figure, of their movements in their own 
bodies, which have been conformed to Mind—not their own but the Creator’s—in 
the very beginning of the world and attuned to effecting such movements’.141 There 
is no tension here between an ‘animistic trend’ going back to the Renaissance and a 
‘new mechanical world-view’ just emerging. Kepler was re-drawing the boundaries 
of disciplines according to his view of the world in which ‘all things are so 
interconnected, involved and intertwined with one another’.142 The full 
understanding of the creation implied, therefore, an interaction between the 
disciplines, not a reduction of them. 
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4. ‘Laws in nature’: Descartes’ a priori physics 
The body of the Sun is the source of the power that drives all the planets around. Moreover, I have 
specified the manner [in which this occurs] as follows: that the Sun, although it stays in one place, 
rotates as if on a lathe, and out of itself sends into the space of the world an immaterial species of its 
body, analogous to the immaterial species of light. The species itself, as a consequence of the rotation 
of the solar body, also rotates like a very rapid vortex through the whole breadth of the world, and 
carries the bodies of the planets along with itself in a gyre, its grasp stronger or weaker according to 
the greater density or rarity it acquires through the law governing its diffusion. 
 
Kepler, ‘Introductio’, Astronomia Nova1 
 
The matter of the heaven, in which the Planets are situated, unceasingly revolves, like a vortex having 
the Sun as its centre, and that those of its parts which are close to the Sun move more quickly than 
those further away; and that all the Planets always remain suspended among the same parts of this 
heavenly matter. For by that alone, and without any other devices (machinamentis), all their 
phenomena are very easily understood. Thus, if some straws or other light bodies are floating in the 
eddy of a river, where the water doubles back on itself and forms a vortex as it swirls; we can see that 
it carries them along and makes them move in circles with it. Further, we can often see that some of 
these straws rotate about their own centres, and that those which are closer to the centre of the vortex 
which contains them complete their circle more rapidly than those which are further away from it. 
Finally, we see that, although these whirlpools always attempt a circular motion, they practically 
never describe perfect circles, but sometimes become too great in width or in length, so that all the 
parts of the circumference which they describe are not equidistant from the centre. Thus we can easily 
imagine that all the same things happen to the Planets; and this is all we need to explain all their 
remaining phenomena. 
 
Descartes, Principia, III, 30.2 
 
4.1. Family resemblance 
Kepler’s archetypal cosmology provided the a priori foundation for his mathematical 
astronomy. At the same time, this cosmology endowed mathematical conclusions 
with causal (physical) significance and thus Kepler claimed to have inaugurated a 
‘celestial physics’. The most important astronomical (mathematical) implication of 
this change of perspective was the restauration of the central place of the Sun for the 
computations of the position of the planets, based on the philosophical claim that the 
Sun was the source of motive power of the planets. Largely, the so-called ‘Kepler’s 
laws’ emerged as mathematical consequences of this approach encompassing 
mathematics and physics, although both disciplines remained separated. As 
summarised in the epigraph to this chapter, Kepler developed a physical account of 
the motion of the planets introducing some species, similar to light, emanated from 
 
1 Kepler, KGW, 1937, 3:34.  
2 Descartes, AT, 1904, IX:92. 
138 
 
the rotating Sun and thus moved the planets with them in vortices. God impressed in 
the human soul the blueprints of the world; that is, the soul contained the archetypes 
from which Kepler claimed to have derived a priori the principles of his astronomy 
and his celestial physics. Because these principles were imprinted in the soul, human 
beings could attain certain knowledge of them and derive consequences. In a similar 
way, Descartes’ sketched a natural philosophy proceeding from causes to effects, 
starting from ‘laws of nature’. Descartes’ strategy resembles Kepler’s: his solution to 
the problem of the certainty of natural philosophy consisted in appealing to 
mathematics for providing causal principles ultimately founded on divine 
immutability. The connection between mathematics and a new metaphysics 
explaining the creation of, and relationship with the world guaranteed the certainty of 
the foundations of the knowledge of the natural world. Based on the laws of nature, 
Descartes put forth a cosmology in which streams of rotating particles, denominated 
vortices, accounted for the motion of planets, the phenomena on earth and light. 
Arguably, Descartes’ reform of natural philosophy has a strong family resemblance 
to Kepler’s celestial physics: providing a priori foundations to make possible the 
demonstration of the effects by their causes. This is summarised in The World, where 
Descartes’ declared that ‘apart from the three laws that I have explained, I wish to 
suppose no others but those that most certainly follow from the eternal truths on 
which mathematicians have generally supported their most certain and most evident 
demonstrations’. These truths were the principles of God’s creation, by means of 
which ‘He disposed all things in number, weight and measure’.3  
 
The family resemblance between Kepler and Descartes goes beyond a mere 
coincidence. In the Tentamen (1689), Leibniz praised Kepler’s astronomical 
discoveries, claiming that he was the ‘first mortal man to make public the laws of the 
heavens’. Although Kepler could not ‘determinate the causes of so many and so 
unvarying truths’, Leibniz claimed, he opened ‘the way to investigation of causes’, 
such as the vortex explaining that rotating bodies’ endeavour to recede from the 
centre along the tangent. ‘But later Descartes made brilliant use of these reasonings, 
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though in his usual manner he concealed their author’.4 Leibniz did not indicate the 
source of this, but he points to a connection between Kepler’s laws and Descartes’ 
plenist physics. Furthermore, Leibniz was right in pointing out that Descartes 
concealed Kepler in his published works, for the only few references to the German 
astronomer are located in the correspondence and in some unpublished manuscripts. 
These references are mainly concerned with optics, particularly with the law of 
refraction circa 1620, with one notable exception which I will analyse below. 
Descartes read and criticised the Astronomia Pars Optica in his early correspondence 
with Beeckman, but there is no reference to astronomy or to the archetypal 
cosmology.5  
 
Another possible connection between Kepler and Descartes is implied by the 
antecedents surrounding the composition of Le Monde and the important changes 
related to Descartes’ intellectual agenda between 1629 and 1633. Schuster, and 
Gaukroger following him, have noticed that when Descartes visited Beeckman in 
Dordrecht in the autumn of 1628, Beeckman was ‘ploughing through the 
astronomical works of Kepler’.6 Schuster and Gaukroger attributed different 
meanings to the influence that this meeting had on Descartes. Schuster’s account 
emphasises Beeckman’s effort to interpret Kepler’s explanation of the celestial 
phenomena in terms of particles in motion and his refutation of the claim that light is 
immaterial. Meanwhile, Gaukroger accentuates that Beeckman’s reading of Kepler 
shows ‘that there was no longer any reason to separate terrestrial and celestial 
mechanics, in the traditional Aristotelian way, for both realms were amenable to the 
same kind of mathematical and physical treatment’.7 Both readings provide valuable 
insights into the transformation of Descartes’ intellectual career and the emergence 
of mechanism at this stage. From my perspective, the meeting between Beeckman 
and Descartes in the late 1620s implies another crucial aspect. 
 
4 Leibniz, An essay on the causes of celestial motion, translated in Bertoloni Meli, Equivalence and 
Priority, 127–28. 
5 Schuster, ‘Physico-Mathematics and the Search for Causes in Descartes’ Optics—1619–1637’, 478; 
Schuster, ‘Descartes Opticien: The Construction of the Law of Refraction and the Manufacture of Its 
Physical Rationales, 1618–29’, 258–95; Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, 139–46. 
6 Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes, 471. 




The purpose of this chapter is to argue that Descartes’ innovative use of laws of 
nature emerged as part of a project of setting the foundations of a natural philosophy 
as capable of demonstration a priori, that is, of the effects through the causes. 
Descartes’ reform of natural philosophy implied the rejection of powers and qualities 
in matter. In so doing, Descartes brought explicative resources from mechanics into 
natural philosophy which he ultimately justified by appealing to God’s immutability. 
This claim has two essential assumptions. First, that Descartes’ use of laws of nature 
is innovative. The idea of laws of nature has a long and continuous history from the 
Ancients, but before the seventeenth century ‘the concept of laws of nature has been 
used in a rather vague way, to explain “all that we say comes into being”. The 
concept was entirely non-specific’.8 This changed in the works of Descartes, who 
introduced laws of nature as codifications of the basic principles of interactions of 
the particles generating natural phenomena. Descartes’ transplanted the concept of 
mathematical law into natural philosophy and, in so doing, he presented 
metaphysical arguments to support the new domain of explanation of the ‘laws of 
nature’.9 Second, that the visit to Beeckman in the autumn of 1628 triggered in 
Descartes the idea of a systematic explanation of natural phenomena based on 
‘mathematical truths’ that evolved into the ‘laws of nature’; this ‘whole physics’10 
would be a more comprehensive project than the Regulæ. In this meeting, Descartes 
went through Beeckman’s Journal and realised that his Dutch mentor was providing 
an explanation of the motion of planets according to Kepler’s astronomy based on 
corpuscles in motion. This meeting would also provide a missing link between 
Kepler and Descartes, whose similarity has been noticed since their own time. 
Beeckman has been seen traditionally as an initiator of Descartes’ career. However, 
Beeckman was not only an initiator at an early stage of Descartes’ career but also a 
decisive influence in the second meeting in 1628, by providing Descartes with a 
fundamental insight: an all-encompassing natural philosophy founded on 
‘mathematical truths’. This approach better explains the famous break between 
Descartes and Beeckman, for it seems reasonable to consider that Descartes felt 
 
8 Henry, ‘The Theological Origins of Laws of Nature and Its Subsequent Secularisation’, 67. 
9 Henry, ‘Metaphysics and the Origins of Modern Science’. 
10 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:70; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:7. 
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exposed when he realised that the formerly solitary Beeckman came in touch with 
the république des letters, particularly through Gassendi and Mersenne.11  
 
The basic elements of Descartes’ new natural philosophy were put together in the 
unpublished Le Monde (1633), but it is also probable that Descartes’ initial project 
incorporated materials that he subsequently reworked and published in 1637, 
prefaced with the Discourse. I will highlight that Descartes’ solution to the 
foundation of natural philosophy based in the laws of nature as causes had important 
consequences for understanding the activity of the world as extended matter. In a 
way clearly resembling mathematical reasoning, Descartes’ efforts are directed at 
demonstrating that a few general principles were enough to ‘explain all the 
phenomena of nature’,12 making powers and qualities redundant, unnecessary and 
metaphysically problematic. Furthermore, this change of perspective was wedded to 
a redefinition of motion and to the dismissal of traditional ideas of force, impetus and 
attraction. However, these laws should not be considered as mathematical 
abstractions or idealisations. This reading of laws of nature as abstract idealisations 
misrepresents Descartes’ project; in fact, this interpretation is the reason for aligning 
Descartes’ physics with Galileo’s, although Descartes explicitly stepped aside from it 
and rejected Galileo’s reductionist approach. Once I clarify the emergence of 
Descartes’ laws between 1628-1630, I will return to the project of an a priori 
physics, highlighting the disciplinary transformations and particularly the resulting 
conception of mechanics. 
 
4.2. The Beeckman connection  
This section offers evidence in favour of the claim that Descartes’ laws of nature 
emerged within the process of reform of natural philosophy that began in Descartes’ 
mind after visiting Beeckman in 1628. This process can be followed in the 
correspondence with Mersenne between 1629 and 1630. When Descartes visited his 
Dutch friend, Beeckman was so involved in Kepler’s astronomy that he seriously 
considered for the first time the possibility to circulate in print his ideas concerning 
 
11 Berkel, ‘Descartes’ Debt to Beeckman’; Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 60–65; 
Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes, 390–94. 
12 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:70; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:7. 
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natural philosophy.13 Indeed, Beeckman was sketching a systematic explanation ‘of 
the motions of the stars and the Earth’ by ‘correcting’ Kepler’s celestial physics 
based on his understanding of the conservation of motion and on his explanation of 
the causes of celestial phenomena based on matter in motion. Beeckman rejected 
Kepler’s idea that light was immaterial and, in its place, developed a corpuscular 
conception of light integrated to his view of activity in the world—virtually the same 
way to articulate topics in Le Monde, ou traité de la lumière.14  
 
The details of the 1628 meeting between Descartes and Beeckman have been 
reconstructed by different scholars.15 On 8 October he found his old Breda friend in 
the Latin School of Dordrecht, where Beeckman was rector. According to 
Beeckman’s Journal, Descartes informed him of his activities since 1618, mentioned 
his work on algebra—which he promised to send when he returned to Paris—and 
renewed the intention to collaborate. Descartes added that during his travels in 
France, Germany and Italy ‘he had not found anyone, with whom he could discuss 
his ideas as freely and from whom he could expect so much help in pursuing his 
studies’.16 By January 1629, Beeckman received from Paris a manuscript on algebra, 
together with some discussions on a mathematical problem that Descartes apparently 
mentioned the previous autumn. In March 1629 Descartes finally settled in Holland 
and once again visited Dordrecht on his way to Amsterdam. There is no further 
communication until the letter of September or October 1630 in which Descartes 
asked Beeckman to return the Compendium Musicæ, as an angry reaction to 
Mersenne’s insinuation that Beeckman had claimed being Descartes’ teacher back in 
Breda.17 
 
When Descartes visited Beeckman in late 1628 and in early 1629, the rector of 
Dordrecht was fascinated by the study of Kepler’s astronomy. He was particularly 
concerned with ‘correcting’ the causes of celestial motion that Kepler had adduced. 
 
13 Berkel, ‘Descartes’ Debt to Beeckman’, 56; Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 246n24. 
14 Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes, 471–72. 
15 Berkel, ‘Descartes’ Debt to Beeckman’, 50–52; Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 46–
75; Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes, 471; Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, 220. 
16 Beeckman, Journal, 1945, 3:94–95; Berkel, ‘Descartes’ Debt to Beeckman’, 50–51. 
17 Beeckman, Journal, 1953, 4:194. 
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Beeckman openly rejected all explanation based on occult qualities, supernatural 
powers and ‘magnetical powers’, in line with Stevin’s ‘wonder to no wonder’ 
attitude in natural philosophy.18 For example, in reviewing De nive sexangula in 
February 1628—a work that Descartes read in a critical moment during the gestation 
of Le Monde, as I will examine later–, Beeckman judged Kepler’s causal 
explanations as ‘ridiculous and unworthy of a philosopher’ (ridicula et philosopho 
indigna), for ‘this is not adducing a cause (…) but obscuring it’.19 Thus, the 
correction consisted in replacing Kepler’s natural-philosophical causes for those 
satisfying Beeckman’s criteria for intelligible explanations. These criteria deeply 
relied on values guiding the artisan’s practice; the world is thought of as consisting 
of ‘tangible, concrete things that act upon each other in a way he could visualize. He 
[Beeckman] views the world like a craftsman inspecting a machine he is about to 
repair’.20 No mechanicians would appeal to occult qualities or immaterial causes to 
explain the functioning of a machine; on the contrary, mechanical devices show that 
only motion or pressure can produce ‘the rearrangement of parts and hence produce 
work and, for theoretical purposes, the causes of motion and pressures are other 
motions and pressures’. Indeed, Beeckman’s attitude was that ‘there is no point in 
talking about effects if you cannot imagine how they are produced’. From this 
perspective, Beeckman’s work was an attempt to develop a thorough transformation 
of the approach and understanding of the natural world.21 Indeed, the Journal shows 
Beeckman attempts to reform natural philosophy based on mechanical 
intelligibility.22 Gassendi, after meeting Beeckman and reading his Journal in 1629, 




18 Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 130–36; Gaukroger and Schuster, ‘The Hydrostatic 
Paradox and the Origins of Cartesian Dynamics’; Arthur, ‘Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of 
Motion’. 
19 Beeckman, Journal, 1945, 3:34; Cf. Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 146–47. 
20 Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 137. 
21 Schuster, ‘Descartes and the Scientific Revolution, 1618-1634: An Interpretation’, i, 59–60. 
22 Gaukroger and Schuster, ‘The Hydrostatic Paradox and the Origins of Cartesian Dynamics’, 553. 
23 Mersenne, Correspondance, 2:131; Beeckman, Journal, 1953, 4:153; Cf. Berkel, Isaac Beeckman 
on Matter and Motion, 58. 
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Under this light, Kepler’s astronomy became a fertile field for trying out new 
natural-philosophical explanations.24 As the friendship with Descartes was going 
through this fleeting renewal in 1628, Beeckman optimistically brushed some traces 
of his celestial mechanics that moved from the solution of dispersed problems—a 
defining trait of his physico-mathematics—to a more articulated set of explanations 
about the motion of celestial objects. Between July 1628 and June 1629, 21 out of 59 
pages of Beeckman’s Journal dealt with celestial mechanics,25 so that when 
Descartes examined Beeckman’s Journal during his visits of 1628 and 1629, a 
considerable number of pages were devoted to this topic. 
 
Beeckman acquired the Astronomia Nova in August 1628. In the Astronomia Nova 
the motion of planets is generated by an immaterial species emanating from the Sun, 
analogous to the immaterial species of light. Because the Sun rotates on its axis, the 
emanation of this species accounted for the motion of the planets. The analogy 
between (immaterial) light and (immaterial) causes of motion runs through the book. 
The first thing that Beeckman noticed is that Kepler corrected the claim made in the 
Optics that the force of light weakened as the distance from the source increased. 
Beeckman contended that the force of light did not decrease; the right explanation 
was that, as the light moved away from its source, equal quantities of light must 
illuminate spheres of increasing surface area, because ‘light is corporeal’ (lumen esse 
corpus), a particular type of heat emitted by stars—something that Kepler did not 
admit and, in Beeckman’s eyes, induced him to embrace erroneous conclusions.26  
 
Before this review of Kepler’s cosmological works, Beeckman had explained the 
motion of planets around the Sun as the preservation of God’s initial action of 
creation in a medium that did not offer any resistance; in other words, as a 
consequence of his principles of the conservation of motion.27 The criticism of the 
nature of light led Beeckman to realise the potential of streams of light-particles for 
 
24 Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes, 471. 
25 Schuster, 471n. 
26 Beeckman, Journal, 1945, 3:73–74; Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 101–3; 
Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes, 472. 
27 Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 101; DesChene, Physiologia, 276ss. 
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explaining the solar system, in a world less empty than initially thought. Beeckman 
was fully committed to the idea that ‘what can be done with a few means is said to 
have been done badly with many’, so apparently one stream of light-corpuscles may 
account for what Kepler explained by multiple means.28 Initially, he outlined some 
brief ideas about the balance of attractive and repulsive streams of particles holding 
the Moon in its orbit. This balance would be the outcome of the solar rays (repulsive) 
reflected by the Earth and the Earth’s own (magnetic) rays (attractive).29 The initial 
formulation bore some difficulties, for example, that unreflected rays of the Sun 
would attract the Moon to it. A few pages after recording Descartes’ visit in the 
autumn of 1628, Beeckman extended his explanation of the Moon’s balance to the 
solar system, substituting the fixed stars for the Sun and the Sun for the Earth:  
it seems that the same may be said of all planets (…) that the light 
or corporeal virtue of the eighth sphere [the sphere of the fixed 
stars] reflected by the Sun draws (trahat) all the planets to the Sun 
and the Sun repels them. And thus each planet will be affected by 
each of the virtues according to its magnitude or rarity (magnitudo 
aut raritas) and therefore they will be located at different distances 
from the Sun.30 
The ‘rarity’ or ‘magnitude’ of each planet and its motion can be explained in terms of 
their distance from the Sun; for the closer to the Sun a planet was, the stronger was 
the repelling action of the Sun and, conversely, the weaker the pushing strength of 
the ‘corporeal virtue’ of the sphere of the stars. From these draft-annotations emerges 
a general image of a solar system traversed by streams of particles—emanating from 
the stars and the Sun and bouncing on the planets—whose balance explained both the 
location of the planets, their ‘magnitude or rarity’ and their motion. Although these 
annotations did not constitute a fully elaborated explanation of the solar system, 
Beeckman saw with optimism the potential of this line of reasoning and extended the 
formulation to include controversial topics such as the motion of the comets and the 
three motions attributed to the Earth. On the physical explanation of the motion of 
the Earth—a cutting edge problem in 1628, for Galileo’s Dialogo was only published 
 
28 Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 148; Cf. Beeckman, Journal, 1939, 1:10; 
Beeckman, Journal, 1945, 3:26. 
29 Beeckman, Journal, 1945, 3:74–75. A more detailed explanation of this mechanism can be found in 
Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes, 472–73. 




in 1632–, Beeckman remarked that ‘I have shown that all three earthly movements 
are performed without any fictitious internal force (insitâ vi ficticiâ) and that they 
follow in a mathematical way from the movement of particles that are emitted by the 
sun’.31 
 
Entries on Beeckman’s Journal have fuelled debates about his influence on 
Descartes since the seventeenth century. John Smith, after reading Mathematico-
physicarum Meditationum, Questionum, Solutionum Centuria—a compilation of 
entries of the Journal published by Beeckman’s brother in 1644—wrote to 
Constantijn Huygens that ‘I recently have read (…) Descartes’ remarks on the 
magnet, but afterwards I read Centuria (already written in 1628 but published only 
recently), in which, under the numbers 36, 77 and 83 shows that these corpuscules 
were not first thought of by Descartes’.32 Although the influence is still matter of 
debate, my interest is to highlight the historical singularity of Beeckman’s exercise. 
Beeckman was revising some causal explanations of celestial motions—which he 
considered equivocal—based on mathematical (mechanical) principles: that is, 
Beeckman was offering an alternative to the natural-philosophical aspects of 
Kepler’s astronomy borrowing elements from physico-mathematics.33 The central 
point here is that, rather than solving physico-mathematical problems via analogical 
reasoning between the universe and machines—something more common than most 
historians of science have been willing to accept,34 the criticism of Kepler’s natural 
philosophy led to generalisations encompassing corpuscularian (visual) explanations 
with mathematical-mechanical principles. Beeckman’s reading of Kepler was 
specifically and explicitly regulated by two principles that he had derived from his 
 
31 Beeckman, Journal, 1945, 3:108; Cf. Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 101–2. 
32 Berkel, ‘Descartes’ Debt to Beeckman’, 58. For further details on Beeckman’s mechanical 
explanation of the solar system and its connection with Descartes’ mechanical universe see Schuster, 
Descartes-Agonistes, 101; Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 75–103; Gaukroger, 
Descartes: An Intellectual Biography; Arthur, ‘Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of Motion’; Aiton, 
The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motions; Koyré, The Astronomical Revolution. Copernicus, Kepler, 
Borelli.; Koyré, Galileo Studies; Westfall, Force in Newton’s Physics; Descartes, AT, 1908; Ariew, 
Descartes and the Last Scholastics. 
33 Cf. Beeckman, Journal, 1939, 1:244; Cf. Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, 68–69; 
Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 22–24. 
34 See Bennett, ‘The Mechanical Arts’; Bennett, ‘The Mechanics’ Philosophy and the Mechanical 
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practice: the corpuscular nature of light and the idea that change of motion (rather 
than motion) required an explanation:  
Earlier I have written things about the motions of the stars and the 
Earth that are slightly different from his—that is, Kepler’s—ideas 
and perhaps, when I get some free time and am set free from this 
very heavy load, unsuited for all thinking [his position in 
Dordrecht], I will treat these matters much more accurately than he 
does, on the one hand because I start from the fundamental insight, 
which he refuses to acknowledge, that light, as I said before, is 
corporeal, and on the other hand, because he does not know what is 
very true, that is: everything that is moved, will continue to move 
unless it is hindered (omnia semel mota, semper moveri nisi 
immpediantur).35 
Beeckman was not too interested in the specifics of the mathematical astronomy or in 
the details of astronomical observations. However, he was not interested in the a 
priori validation of these principles, as Kepler was. 
These things that Kepler writes about the motion of Mars, in terms 
of physics, please me very much, especially because long before I 
read those things I had thought of the same things and had the 
intention of using them for a reconstitution of astronomy. This can 
be seen in many places in this book [in the Journal], especially 
where I discussed the motion of the Earth in a physical way. Now 
that Kepler has earned this glory before me, I hope that once I will 
be able to finish a work about this subject on the basis of my 
meditations, which he has not seen.36 
 
In summary, apart from stimulating hints on the action of diverse ‘corporeal 
virtues’—streams of particles–motion of planets, Descartes found in Beeckman a 
generalisation of physico-mathematical explanations based on a few principles, that 
is, an innovative way to solve problems. In his correspondence with Mersenne and in 
other public appearances during the years of 1628 and 1629, Descartes kept praising 
his discoveries in optics and the importance of method and he made it appear as 
coherent a set of tenets on method and mathematics that he had failed to articulate in 
the Regulæ. Descartes’ self-presentation, particularly in the Discourse, would give 
the impression, even to scholars in the twentieth century, that there is continuity (or 
unity) rather than a major reformulation in the developments between the Regulæ 
 
35 Beeckman, Journal, 1945, 3:74; Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 56. 
36 Beeckman, Journal, 1945, 3:103; Berkel, ‘Descartes’ Debt to Beeckman’, 56–57. 
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and Le Monde.37 Praising the successes of the method, rather than its failure and 
reformulation, was of course, in Descartes’ best interest.38 Nevertheless, the visits to 
Beeckman and the influence of his reading of Kepler on Descartes’ formulation of 
the vortex theory underpinned by the laws of nature are complex, non-linear 
historical process. The family resemblance between Descartes’ vortex theory and 
Beeckman’s criticism of Kepler’s celestial mechanics shall not lead us to believe that 
the cosmogony of Le Monde has as unique source the correction of Beeckman or that 
Descartes immediately realised the potential of Beeckman’s elaborations when 
reading the Journal; other factors also converge in the genesis of Le Monde and the 
vortex theory.39 However, my point is that in this process of reshaping his intellectual 
identity,40 during the critical years of 1628 to 1630, one central thread in this process 
was Descartes’ idea of an a priori physics anchored on the laws of nature, after 
Beeckman’s style and values in re-writing Kepler’s celestial mechanics guided by his 
physico-mathematical principles. At the same time, the emergence of this new 
physics progressively moved Descartes away from the Galilean way to explain 
natural phenomena by assuming general conditions open to mathematical 
treatment.41  
 
4.3. ‘Unexpected riches’ 
During his first months in Holland, Descartes was mainly concerned with the 
emerging dualism after the Regulæ and with some optical problems. On 8 October 
1629, Descartes wrote to Mersenne that he had received an account of the parhelia 
and decided to suspend all other work to ‘make a systematic study of the whole of 
meteorology’. Reports on parhelia were circulating among mathematicians, 
particularly of the observations that Scheiner reported in March 1629 that 
subsequently were commented on by Gassendi.42 Descartes announced to Mersenne 
 
37 Gilson, Études sur le role de la pénsee médiévale dans laformation de systeme Cartésien, 9–10. 
38 Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes. 
39 Schuster, 453–524; Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, 226–89; Garber, Descartes’ 
Metaphysical Physics; Gaukroger and Schuster, ‘The Hydrostatic Paradox and the Origins of 
Cartesian Dynamics’. 
40 Schuster, ‘The Young René Descartes—Lawyer, Military Engineer, Courtier, Diplomat … and, We 
Might Add, Ambitious “Savant”’, 7–8; Cf. Koyré, Études galiléennes, 127. 
41 Garber, ‘A Different Descartes: Descartes and the Programme for a Mathematical Physics in His 
Correspondence’. 
42 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:29nl2. 
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that he was planning to give some explanation of the phenomenon in a ‘small 
treatise’ and that this treatise would also provide ‘the explanation of the colours of 
the rainbow … and for all sublunary phenomena in general’. Immediately after, 
Descartes requested Mersenne not to speak to anyone about this small treatise that he 
had decided to publish ‘as a specimen of my philosophy (comme un échantillon de 
ma Philosophie) and to hide behind the picture in order to hear what people will say 
about it’.43 It does not seem a coincidence that just after mentioning the new 
project—which, hitherto seems to be moving from the particular (optical) 
explanation of parhelia to the explanation of ‘all the sublunary phenomena’—and the 
confidentiality request, Descartes thanked Mersenne for ‘informing him of the 
ingratitude of his friend [Beeckman]’. In a dismissive tone, Descartes suggested that 
Beeckman may have claimed that he was his master ‘il y a dix ans’ to cause a better 
impression on Mersenne. From the existing record, Beeckman did not claim such a 
thing but apparently Mersenne ‘loved to get people into disputes’.44 For now, 
however, Descartes appeared not to perceive Beeckman as a major threat and he 
remained satisfied just with eroding Beeckman’s intentions in alluding to their 
former apprenticeship in Breda. 
 
In the next letter to Mersenne, on 13 November 1629, Descartes showed his gratitude 
for sending some information on parhelia and for offering to print the ‘small 
treatise’, but he apologised because it is not going to be ready as soon as he expected, 
because ‘rather than explaining just one phenomenon’, he had ‘decided to explain all 
the phenomena of nature, that is to say, the whole of physics’. The optimism does not 
stop right there. Descartes admitted that he had found ‘a way of unfolding’ all his 
thoughts.45 This did not sound exactly as the previous meteorological treatise 
covering ‘all the sublunary phenomena’; the meteorological treatise was evolving 
into a full-length physics. If the road to the natural philosophy of Le Monde started 
off with parhelia, some remarks in this letter gives us a few hints about the direction 
of the project. In the previous letter of October, Descartes had replied to a question 
that Mersenne had sent concerning the time it takes a weight to fall when it is 
 
43 Descartes, I:23; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:6. 
44 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:24; Berkel, Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion, 61. 
45 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:69–70; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:7–8. 
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attached to a cord 2, 4, 8 and 16 feet long.46 Descartes had based his answer on his 
1620s’ findings on the fall of bodies. Between October and November, Mersenne 
enquired back for the calculations behind the answer. In November, Descartes 
replied:  
As for your question concerning the basis of my calculation (…) I 
shall have to include this in my Physics. But you should not have 
to wait for that; so I shall try to explain it. Firstly, I make the 
assumption that the motion impressed on a body at one time 
remains in it for all time unless it is taken away by some other 
cause: in other words, in a vacuum that which has once begun to 
move keeps on moving at the same speed.47 
Descartes explained that as the weight falls, it retains its heaviness and this pushes it 
downwards, but at each moment it receives a new force (novas vires) that makes it 
fall. That is why, as the time increases a weight falling covers some distances more 
quickly.48 The solution to the problem posed by Mersenne explicitly assumes the 
conservation of motion. Interestingly, Descartes enunciated this assumption in two 
ways that he considered equivalent: in the first, he emphasised the conservation of 
impressed motion over time in the absence of other causes; in the second he clarified 
that this means that when a body moved in a vacuum it kept moving ‘semper & 
æquali celeritate’.49 Interestingly, Descartes characterised the conservation of motion 
as remaining in the body, not as a state. Also, because this formulation of the 
conservation of motion assumes that motion is preserved in bodies, the only possible 
way to depict the conservation ‘in it for all times’ is by imagining a body moving in 
vacuum.  
 
From the times of Physico-mathematica, both Beeckman and Descartes had been 
using some form of the conservation of motion, with different emphasis, in 
connection with the explanation of the fall of bodies.50 The point in the letter of 
November 1629 is that the explanation of the fall of weights based on the 
conservation of motion was to be included in his Physics—without mentioning that 
 
46 Cf. Palmerino, ‘Infinite Degrees of Speed: Marin Mersenne and the Debate over Galileo’s Law of 
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47 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:71–72; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:8. 
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Beeckman provided the connection between fall of bodies and conservation in 1618, 
of course.51 In answering to Mersenne, Descartes alluded again to the delay in 
delivering the treatise because its scope has been enlarged. In fact, it should strike as 
evident to Mersenne—as it may do to us—that a ‘small treatise’ that aimed to 
account for an optical phenomenon now included the mathematical calculation of the 
fall of graves relying on natural-philosophical assumptions about the causes of 
motion.  
 
The next letter to Mersenne on 18 December 1629, suggests the beginning of an 
important variation in the scope of Descartes’ project. For the first time Descartes 
alluded to the foundations of physics. Descartes thanks (again) Mersenne for offering 
‘to take care’ of the ‘little treatise’. However, Descartes admitted that he had decided 
not to put his name on it and not to publish it until receiving the ‘painstaking 
scrutiny’ of Mersenne. This ‘on account of theology, which has been so deeply in the 
thrall of Aristotle that it is almost impossible to expound another philosophy without 
its seeming to be directly contrary to the Faith’. Descartes assumed that a new natural 
philosophy may pose a threat to religion. He asked to the Father Mersenne ‘whether 
there is anything definite in religion concerning the extension of created things, that 
is, whether it is finite or infinite and whether in all these regions called imaginary 
spaces there are genuine created bodies’.52 The problem Descartes seemed to be 
facing here was the medieval question of the plurality of worlds.53 The point here is 
not Descartes’ direct interest in metaphysics and theology but rather the derivative 
necessity he expressed in them given his way to formulate a new physics; Descartes 
wa worried about the possibility of modifying some philosophical ideas that may be 
contrary to religion. A clue about the roots of this concern appears when Descartes 
was talking (again) about free fall and particularly by refuting Beeckman’s 
conception. Descartes respectfully corrected Mersenne’s interpretation of the 
increase of gravitas per time unit in free fall and, in so doing, mentions again the 
conservation of motion. There is no significant change in the content of it. But this 
time, Descartes dealt with it in a different way; rather than presenting it as an 
 
51 Cf. Descartes, AT, 1908, X:219. 
52 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:85–86; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:14. 
53 Descartes, The World, 21n41.  
152 
 
assumption, he remarked that he will demonstrate it: ‘We need to bear in mind that 
we are assuming that what is once in motion will, in a vacuum, always remain in 
motion. I shall try to demonstrate this in my treatise’.54 The change seems subtle, but 
it is further clarified in connection with other elements of the letter. The enunciation 
of the principle, with the comment that ‘in meo tractatu demonstrare conabor’, is a 
note that Descartes added on the margin of the letter when he was emphatically 
differentiating his understanding and use of this principle from Beeckman’s. 
Descartes strategy was a reductio ad absurdum of Beeckman’s conclusions 
concerning the speed of motion as he had reported them to Mersenne, particularly 
that once a falling weight reaches a certain point it always continues to fall at a 
constant speed, for the faster the body falls the more air it finds opposing to this 
downwards motion and, in consequence, the air creates a balance. Descartes 
remarked that, Beeckman, supposes that ‘what once begun to move continues to 
move of its own accord’. The conclusions Beeckman extracted from this principle 
were highly plausible ‘and those who are ignorant of arithmetic might be convinced 
by it; but one needs only to be able to count to see that it is unsound’. Next, 
Descartes offered his geometrical demonstration and ironically concluded ‘Ac 
proinde Mathematicé demonstratur illud quod Becmmannus scripserat esse falsum’ 
(Thus it is demonstrated mathematically that what Beeckman wrote is false).55  
 
In this letter of December 1629, Descartes was not only confident in his 
understanding of the mathematical consequences of the conservation of motion, but 
he also remarked that he will offer a demonstration of it in his treatise. From October 
to December as the idea of an a priori physics began to take shape, Descartes has 
moved from dealing with the conservation principle as an assumption to a 
demonstrated principle.  
 
The first letter of 1630 contains three important indications about the development of 
Descartes’ project. First, Descartes began to consider an explanation of the human 
body as part of his physics. At the opening of the letter, Descartes asked Mersenne to 
 
54 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:90; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:15. 
55 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:94; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:16–17.  
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take care of himself when reporting that ‘M. Montais is ill’, until he found if it is 
possible ‘to discover a system of medicine which is founded on infallible 
demonstrations, which is what I am investigating at present’.56 Although the 
reference is succinct, it is important to notice that Descartes’ approach is now 
presented in terms of finding a medicine founded on infallible demonstrations. In the 
Discours (1637), Descartes presented the subjects of the unpublished treatise that we 
now identify with Le Monde as including something ‘about man, because he 
observes these [celestial] bodies’.57 The consideration of human body offered 
particular difficulties, according to the Discours, because he ‘did not have yet 
sufficient knowledge to speak of them in the same manner as I did of the other 
things—that is, by demonstrating effects from causes’.58 However, by January 1630 
Descartes was to integrate medicine into his larger, renewed natural philosophy. 
Second, for the first time in the correspondence with Mersenne, Descartes showed an 
interest in ‘qualities’. Descartes thanked Mersenne for sending him ‘the qualities that 
you have extracted from Aristotle’ and added that he already had a longer list 
‘derived from Verulam’ and remarked that ‘this is one of the first things that I will 
try to explain. This should not be incredibly difficult, because once the foundations 
have been laid, they will follow from them’.59 While this mention of qualities 
occurred in the middle of a list of short topics in which Descartes is replying to 
Mersenne’s requests, its central importance for the project is evident when Descartes 
claimed that this is one of the first things he will try to explain. In fact, the core of Le 
Monde will be an innovative explanation of qualities in terms of matter in motion, as 
an attempt to invalidate the naturalist philosophies of the Renaissance and, of course, 
the Scholastic explanations based in forms and qualities.60 But the passage also 
suggested that qualities are not assumed as principles explaining phenomena. 
Descartes may need to explain why, however, qualities are so important in other 
philosophies. In consequence, he was interested in finding an exhaustive list of them, 
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consulting on Aristotle, Verulam and his own memory. (Interestingly, the section of 
Le Monde explaining the three elements and their qualities opens alluding to what 
‘The Philosophers’ maintain).61 Third, Descartes asked Mersenne if he had made 
experiments to see ‘whether a stone thrown with a sling, or a ball shot from a 
musket, or a bolt from a crossbow, travels faster and has greater force in the middle 
of its flight than it has at the start, and whether its power increases’. Descartes 
expounded that the common opinion was that this is the case, although his own view 
differed: ‘I find that things that do not move of their own accord but are impelled 
must have more force at the start than they have straight after’.62 In fact, from 
Aristotle to Aquinas, the common belief about the motion of projectiles claimed that 
their violent motion implied a greater speed in the middle of the flight than at the 
beginning or end.63 Similarly Cardano, in De Subtilitate, had subscribed to the same 
opinion, explaining that this was caused by the disturbance of the air put in motion 
by the projectile.64 It is important to notice that Descartes was asking about 
experiments performed by Mersenne, that is, he was enquiring for empirical evidence 
that may be different from the common conclusions on the matter.  
 
The letter on 25 February 1630 suggests that Descartes was exploring the 
consequences of the conservation of motion in explaining diverse phenomena, such 
as the rebounding of balls that he had previously discussed with Mersenne. In the 
letter of January, Descartes had conceded that the rebounding occurred partially 
because the air inside the ball pushed the ball upwards in rebounding ‘like a 
spring’.65 Descartes explained that the main cause of this was ‘the continuation of the 
motion which is present in all rebounding bodies’, that is, in his words: ‘From the 
fact that a thing has begun to move it follows that it continues to move for as long as 
it can: and if it cannot continue to move in a straight line, rather than coming to rest, 
it rebounds in the opposite direction’. This explanation was not restricted to balls 
rebounding, but also to ‘the matter of all other bodies, both of which rebound and 
 
61 Descartes, AT, 1908, X:23; Descartes, The World, 16–17. 
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those against which other rebound, such as the strings of a tennis racket, the wall of a 
tennis court, the hardness of the ball’.66 The analogy with the bouncing tennis balls 
that Descartes had used in explaining the nature of light in refraction is now extended 
to explain the interaction of any part of matter.67 the conservation of motion as 
presented here, states that the body will move ‘as long as it can’, that is, Descartes 
has deprived the formulation from concepts such as force and vacuum. Also, he 
included the straight direction at a fundamental level. However, this variant is not 
formulated as an independent principle, but it seems to be implied in the idea of the 
conservation of motion.  
 
In the letter of 4 March 1630, Descartes made a direct reference to Kepler, in the 
context of his meteorological enquiries. After mentioning that it snowed ‘a bit here, 
at the same time that you mentioned’, Descartes complained that the winter was ‘so 
warm in this country that we have not seen any ice or snow and I had already 
considered writing you to complain that I had not known how to make any remark 
about it in my Meteors’. After the anecdote, he asked ‘if Mr. Gassendi has any other 
comments concerning snow, apart from those that I had seen in Kepler, and I had 
already remarked in winter, De nive sexangula et grandine acuminate, I would be 
very glad to know them’.68 At first glance, Descartes’ mention may be just part of his 
attempt to collect evidence in order to support his developments or to avoid 
controversial claims. However, De nive provided Descartes’ with a concrete 
geometrical understanding of the distribution of particles in space that can be 
appreciated in Chapter 13 of Le Monde, when Descartes explains the corpuscular 
nature of light integrating it with his cosmology.  
 
Kepler’s De nive (1611) starts off with the question ‘why snowflakes in their first 
falling, before they are entangled in larger plumes, always fall with six corners and 
with six rods, tufted like feathers?’. Kepler contended that there has to be a necessary 
cause, ‘for if it happens by chance, why do they not fall just as well with five corners 
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or seven?’69 In a move typical of his archetypal approach, explored similar cases in 
nature and found that a similar condition can be appreciated in the honeycombs, 
because they are built ‘on a six-cornered plan’. When considered in their three 
dimensions, these cells formed regular rhomboids. Kepler explored the geometrical 
properties of these solid rhomboid to conclude that ‘this is the geometric figure, as 
near as possible to a regular solid, which fills space, just as the hexagon, square, and 
triangle are the fillers of a plane surface’.70  
 
This aptness—that the ‘sixcorneredness’ is the most capable distribution of particles 
for filling space–, is also seen in the pomegranate: ‘if one opens up a rather large-
sized pomegranate, one will see most of its loculi squeezed into the same shape’.71 
Kepler explained how the round loculi are squeezed and concluded that ‘when 
collected in any vessel [equal pellets] come to a mutual arrangement in two modes, 
according to the two modes of arranging them in a plane’. In order to pack ‘solid 
bodies as tightly as possible’, the pellets will be either squared (A) or in triangles (B). 
In the case where pellets are squared, Kepler explained that any pellet is touched by 
four neighbours in the same plane and by one above and one below. However, if the 
pellets are packed in triangles, every pellet is touched by its four neighbours in the 
same plane but also by four in the plane above and by four below, and so throughout 
 
69 Kepler, The Six-Cornered Snowflake, 7. 
70 Kepler, 11. 
71 Kepler, 13. 
Figure 5. Kepler's arrangements of solid 
bodies to fill space, either squared (A) or 




one will be touched by twelve and ‘under pressure spherical pellets will become 
rhomboid’.72  
 
The fact that Descartes read De nive and commented on it with Mersenne shows that 
his knowledge of Kepler was not restricted to optics and that in the crucial period of 
formulation of his new physics, he was reading Kepler. In chapter 13 of Le Monde, 
Descartes articulated his theory of light at a cosmological level. Descartes’ intention 
was to explain the generation of light in his universe full of corpuscles of matter. In 
the specific case of the solar system, Descartes focuses on describing the tendencies 
of the second element according to the laws of nature by providing a micro-
corpuscular analysis. Schuster has suggested that most of the mathematical elements 
of the analysis ultimately derive from hydrostatical investigations that Descartes 
conducted in 1618-9.73 Descartes represented the motion of fluids—water—in a way 
inverted to how light was presented in Le Monde. However, while early fluids were 
represented as continuous (Figure 6), the second element was represented as particles 
(boules) (Figure 7). Indeed, Descartes depicted in Le Monde the second element in 
the triangular distribution in which Kepler had argued that the loculi should be 
placed to leave the minimum space between them. In explaining how light from the 
Sun was seen on a specific point, Descartes needed to explain how the particles 
follow their tendencies without interference. In order to prove his claim, he first 
 
72 Kepler, 14–15. 
73 Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes, 501–7. 
Figure 6. Representation of a fluid with a 
tendency to fall in a hydrostatical manuscript 
1618. Schuster, 2013: 510. 
 
Figure 7. Second element filling the 
whole space. Descartes, AT XI: 93 
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supposes that the particles of the second element move in an empty space and then he 
adds that this space is, in fact, ‘filled with the matter of the first element’. However, 
they do not interfere with the motion of the particles of the second element because 
‘they are as ready to leave the places they occupy as other bodies are to enter 
them’.74 The figure 7 is part of explanation of how the parts of the second element 
that must advance towards a point—the human eye—will stop after having filled the 
whole space, full with particles of the first element. Because these boules are 
‘arranged in a space which is narrower than that which they leave’, they completely 
filled the space in the triangular distribution mathematically demonstrated by Kepler.  
 
So far, the correspondence with Mersenne has shown that Descartes extended the 
initial project of explaining a particular phenomenon into a full-scale reform of 
natural philosophy requiring a new foundation. Reading the letter of 18 December 
1629, we find that Descartes had already anticipated that an a priori physics 
accounting for all natural phenomena would be in conflict with well-established 
principles derived from Aristotle and, in consequence, may lead to controversies in 
theology and religion. The letter of 15 April 1630 shows Descartes’ introduction of 
laws of nature within the framework of his project and the subsequent creation of a 
new metaphysics based on reason, justifying his new a priori enterprise. For these 
reasons, this letter can be considered as the final stage of Descartes’ formulation of 
the project of a new physics, displaying the full scope of this project. However, the 
awareness of the extent of the project indicates how far Descartes was from 
completing this project, for as he recognised three years later, when he abandoned it, 
that it still required further elaboration.75 But the point here is that in the path leading 
from the first interest in parhelia to the emergence of laws of nature, Descartes 
sketched a reform of natural philosophy in tension with accepted views of 
Aristotelian philosophy. His solution was the recourse to a new metaphysics, that is, 
the assertion of metaphysics as validating the foundations of knowledge.76 This new 
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natural philosophy based on metaphysics ultimately removed powers and qualities 
from matter and accounted for the activity of matter in a way that was subject to 
mathematical analysis. After April 1630 Descartes would not extend further his 
project but would dedicate himself to the articulation of it by developing different 
branches, from the human being to the stars. 
 
Three aspects indicate the edges of Descartes’ project in the letter of 15 April 1630. 
The first is a manifestation of the awareness of its full scope when updating 
Mersenne about it. From the previous letters it is possible to infer that Mersenne was 
urging Descartes to send the tract and in return Descartes solved some problems, 
usually observing that the ultimate solution would be contained in his physics. These 
comments gave the impression that the treatise was going to be materialised soon. 
However, in this letter Descartes sets himself a deadline of three years to deliver the 
full text. Rather than adding new phenomena explaining this new date, Descartes 
confessed to Mersenne, that when he moved to Holland he was forced to abandon the 
tracts on which he was working in Paris for he acquired ‘unexpected riches’. This 
alludes to the attempt to solve specific problems that finally directed him towards Le 
Monde: ‘It is as if a man began building a house and then acquired unexpected riches 
and so changed his status that the building he had begun was now too small for him’. 
These unexpected riches were found in his 1628 encounter with Beeckman. 
Descartes acquired the idea of his new natural philosophy, a general framework on 
which he set a priori the foundations of a new explanation of the world. The limit of 
the project is visible here because at this point, Descartes had managed to transform 
the mathematical ideas into principles of demonstration which, in his view, will 
remain as such: ‘I am sure that I will not change my mind again; because what I now 
possess will stand me in good stead no matter what else I may learn; and even if I 
learn nothing more, I shall still carry out my plan’.77  
 
The second and central aspect of this letter is the allusion to a new way of validating 
the ‘laws of nature’ as mathematical truths explaining the world. Descartes 
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introduced the topic when making some remarks on a book—not identified—dealing 
with theology that Mersenne had sent. Descartes, who did not do anything for 
nothing, claimed that although the question was theological and, in consequence, 
‘beyond my mental capacity’, it does not seem outside his province because it does 
not concern revelation ‘which is what I call theology in the strict sense’. Descartes 
then commented that he had been concerned with metaphysics for long time and that 
during the first months in Holland he was planning to write a treatise on it. In fact, he 
claimed that he was still interested in developing it but ‘I do not think it opportune to 
do so before I have seen how my treatise on physics is received’. In the following 
years, Descartes will consolidate the idea that metaphysics is only interesting to the 
extent that it is connected with natural philosophy; beyond this, metaphysics was 
unnecessary and even adverse, for ‘your mind will be drawn too far away from the 
physical and observable things, and become unfit to study them’.78 Back to the letter, 
Descartes moved from the comments on the book to introduce his own ideas, as he 
planned to present them in his ‘treatise on physics’. Descartes was interested in 
checking with Mersenne and others possible objections and controversies concerning 
his views,79 but the intention seems to be circulating a new way ‘to speaking of God’ 
which he now considered necessary to back up his natural philosophy. The concept 
of laws of nature makes its first appearance precisely when Descartes is articulating 
physics, mathematics and metaphysics:  
In my treatise on physics I shall discuss a number of metaphysical 
topics and especially the following. The mathematical truths which 
you call eternal have been laid down by God and depend on him 
entirely no less than the rest of his creatures. Indeed, to say that 
these truths are independent of God is to talk of him as if he were 
Jupiter or Saturn and to subject him to the Styx and the Fates. 
Please do not hesitate to assert and proclaim everywhere that it is 
God who has laid down these laws in nature [lois en la nature] just 
as a king lays down laws in his kingdom.80 
 
78 This is said in the Entretien avec Burman Descartes, AT, 1903, V:165. 
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For a seventeenth-century reader, it was not immediately evident why a treatise on 
physics shall include mathematical truths that is, why mathematical principles may 
have place in the explanation of natural phenomena. Of course, the Galilean way had 
associated mathematics with natural philosophy, but Descartes was aware that 
Mersenne also worked under this banner and had opted for the probabilistic approach 
of an operational natural philosophy based on appearances.81 Descartes himself had 
been solving problems within the Galilean approach, although the development of 
his own natural philosophy based on laws as causes would make it impossible for 
him to remain working in this way.82 Therefore, it was not that evident why he 
should deal with metaphysical issues in a treatise on physics. This awkwardness will 
become even more evident in Descartes’ replies to Mersenne in May 1630. Descartes 
strategy consisted in providing a metaphysical validation of these mathematical 
truths (a ‘demonstration’) to guarantee their applicability in natural philosophy, as he 
had cautiously suggested in the letter of 18 December 1630. In a succinct but clear 
way, Descartes explained that he will deal with the metaphysical issue of the 
mathematical truths, that is, to conceive them as creatures of God or ‘laws in nature’. 
The metaphysical claim here is that the mathematical truths that operate as principles 
are introduced directly by God in nature and, in consequence they ‘depend on him 
entirely no less than the rest of his creatures’. In the equivalent passage of Le Monde, 
Descartes utterly supports his idea of mathematical laws as creatures in nature with 
the famous reference to the Bible saying that ‘God … disposed all things in number, 
weight and measure’.83  
 
Since the early days of the scholarship on laws of nature, the idea that the concept 
ultimately derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition has made a long career.84 
However, it is interesting to appreciate at this level of detail in the correspondence, 
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that Descartes was not deriving the concept of laws of nature from the Christian 
tradition but rather relying on some theological and metaphysical claims to justify his 
use of an idea of law coming from mathematics as a principle of his physics. The 
metaphysical underpinning of mathematical truths transforming them in laws is, in 
fact, a solution to the problem of the legitimation and applicability of the 
mathematical (mechanical) principles to the domain of ‘tous les phænomenes de la 
nature’. The main difference between Descartes’ laws of nature and the previous 
occurrences of the term concerns their specificity.85 Indeed, Descartes did not 
formulate laws as a metaphor of order; the metaphor he mentions in the letter of 
April 1630 is between God and a king imposing laws on nature and on his kingdom 
respectively, but Descartes is clear enough in pointing out that laws are creatures in 
nature. The metaphysical validation of mathematical truths as laws of nature asserts 
their existence in nature. Because of this, Descartes emphasised their direct 
dependency on God, although the point is not entirely clear so Descartes has to go 
through it once and again in May clarifying ‘in quo genere causæ Deus disposuit 
æternas veritates’ (by what kind of causality God established the eternal truths).86  
 
The metaphysical foundation of mathematical truths was not restricted to their 
existence in nature but Descartes also extended it to account for their cognoscibility. 
This was a consequence of the fact that this new metaphysics validates principles of 
knowledge. In a way that clearly resembles Kepler’s account of the human 
knowledge of the archetypes, Descartes claimed that ‘there is no single one 
[mathematical truth] that we cannot grasp if our mind turns to consider it. They are 
all mentibus nostris ingenitæ (inborn in our minds) just as a king would imprint his 
laws on the hearts of all his subjects if he had enough power to do so’. The full 
metaphysical justification for the inborn ideas will constitute the core of the third of 
the Meditationes. However, it is important to notice that since the introduction of 
laws in natural philosophy, Descartes was aware that the metaphysics validating this 
move could not be restricted to the relationship of God with nature but it also 
required to account for the way in which human beings may have access to the 
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knowledge of that relationship. In fact, the very possibility of a natural philosophy a 
priori depends on this cognoscibility, as it is stated in Le Monde:  
The knowledge of these truths is so natural to our souls that we 
cannot but judge them infallible when we conceive them distinctly, 
nor doubt that if God had created many worlds, they would be as 
true in each of them as in this one. Thus those who know how to 
examine the consequences of these truths and of our rules 
sufficiently will be able to recognise effects by their causes. To 
express myself in scholastic terms, they will be able to have a 
priori demonstrations of everything that can be produced in this 
new world.87 
The previous quotation displays both directions of Cartesian metaphysics emerging 
from the introduction of laws of nature: the necessity of laws because of their 
dependence on God and their a priori cognoscibility in virtue of their innate 
character. The connection between these two directions is clarified in the Fifth part 
of the Discourse, when Descartes said that he had ‘noticed certain laws which God 
has so established in nature, and of which he has implanted such notions in our 
minds, that after adequate reflexion we cannot doubt that they are exactly observed 
in everything which exists or occurs in the world’.88 In a way similar to Kepler’s the 
connections among God, nature and men, explained in metaphysics, constitutes the 
foundation of the order in the world and, in consequence, the possibility to reach a 
certain knowledge of such order. Descartes was aware that his metaphysics required 
further developments and, in consequence, anticipated some objections.  
 
The details of Descartes’ doctrine of the creation of eternal truths have attracted the 
attention of notable scholars for decades.89 However, my interest here is to point to 
the fact that when introducing laws of nature in his treatise of physics Descartes was 
aware that he was transgressing the boundaries of natural philosophy and 
metaphysics by dealing with God in this way. As I have mentioned before, Descartes 
asked Mersenne to circulate the idea that God established laws in nature. 
Immediately after this request, Descartes claims: ‘I hope to put this in writing, within 
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the next fortnight, in my treatise on physics … I want people to get used to speaking 
of God in a manner worthier, I think, than the common and almost universal way of 
imagining him as a finite being’.90 
 
A third important aspect of the 15 April 1630 letter is Descartes’ approach to 
corpuscles which appears connected with the rejection of vacuum. In previous letters, 
Descartes had formulated the conservation of motion in terms of bodies moving in a 
vacuum. The metaphysical impossibility of vacuum, associated with the 
identification of bodies, space and extension, became a central assumption of the 
Cartesian world, connected as well with the circularity of motion and the 
homogeneity of matter. In a world full of matter, when a body leaves its place, it 
always enters into that of another and thus ‘all motions that occur in the world are in 
some way circular’.91 This development occured when Descartes was replying to a 
question posed by Mersenne on rarefaction and condensation: 
The corpuscles (ces petits cors), which enter a thing during 
rarefaction and exit during condensation, and which can penetrate 
the hardest solids, are of the same substance as visible and tangible 
bodies; but you must not imagine that they are atoms, or that they 
are at all hard. Think of them as an extremely fluid and subtle 
substance filling the pores of other bodies. You must admit that 
even in gold and diamonds there are certain pores, however tiny 
they may be; and if you agree also that there is no such thing as a 
vacuum, as I think I can prove, you are forced to admit that these 
pores are now full of some matter which can penetrate everywhere 
with ease. Now heat and rarefaction are simply an admixture of 
this matter.  
Rarefaction and condensation were traditionally explained in terms of interstitial 
voids within the particles of a body. In a previous letter to Mersenne of 25 February 
1630 Descartes had explained rarefaction and condensation by comparing bodies 
with pores with a sponge full of water, claiming that ‘it is certain that when 
something is condensed it loses some of its parts, and retains the bulkier parts, just as 
a sponge which is full of water loses water when you press it’.92 In putting forward 
his improved solution in the letter of April 1630, Descartes dropped some hints 
 
90 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:146; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:23. 
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indicating the rejection of vacuum. In contrast with the explanations based on void 
and the influential ether of Sebastian Basso,93 Descartes postulated the homogeneity 
of matter, that is, both the solid and tangible bodies and the particles going through 
their corpuscles ‘are of the same substance’. Descartes had identified matter with 
extension since the Regulæ, but the consequences of this claim only become evident 
here when the introduction of laws allowed him to dismiss the concept of vacuum 
and, in consequence, he reduced motion to impact. In so doing, Descartes distanced 
himself from ancient atomism. In the succinct explanation of rarefaction, Descartes 
claimed that the petits cors entering the bodies through rarefaction and leaving in 
condensation accounted for the varying densities of bodies. Nevertheless, these 
corpuscles should not be considered as atoms but as extremely ‘fluid and subtle’. It is 
not accidental that these characterisations of corpuscles as ‘not at all hard’ interacting 
with subtler corpuscles filling the pores of the body appeared just a month after 
having mentioned Kepler’s De Nive, in which the same concepts accounted for the 
shape of snowflakes.  
 
4.4. Men experienced with machinery 
The examination of Descartes’ correspondence with Mersenne between 1628 and 
1630 has revealed the development of basic tenets of Cartesian natural philosophy 
and metaphysics, triggered by the transformation of some principles and values of his 
practice coming from mechanics. The elaboration of these into ‘laws of nature’ 
called for a metaphysical foundation and, as a consequence, all this implied the re-
working of the central tenets on which Aristotelian physics was based. We have seen 
that, as the principles of motion became ‘laws of nature’, Descartes also 
substantiated the early claim that matter is extension as a philosophical affirmation 
concerning its particulate, homogenous nature and consequently rejected any void. 
The’ laws of nature’ offered an alternative natural philosophy to that based on 
powers and qualities of matter; a natural philosophy founded a priori could explain 
better the phenomena of nature and, in consequence, the previous concepts 
accounting for the activity of nature and its properties should be dismissed. Although 
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Cartesian views were challenged since their very formulation, not only in the 
Continent but also across the Channel, their influence during the seventeenth century 
remains beyond doubt. ‘If Cartesianism was seductive to seventeenth-century 
thinkers—Henry explains—it was almost certainly because it seemed to offer the 
only fully worked out system that was capable of replacing the still prevailing 
scholastic philosophy lock, stock, and barrel’.94 The purpose of this final section is to 
argue that when extending mechanical principles to explain natural phenomena, 
Descartes also projected some core tenets of mechanics, a mixed-mathematical 
science, on his new natural philosophy. In particular, the new natural philosophy 
based on laws of nature and corpuscles adapted to the natural world the mathematical 
structure of explanation that late sixteenth-century and early seventeenth-century 
mechanics had developed to account geometrically for the operation of machines. A 
not well-noticed consequence of this is that Descartes then conceived mechanics as a 
branch of natural philosophy, rather than as a mathematical discipline. 
 
The new natural philosophy entailed a redefinition of the terms in which natural 
explanations had been traditionally couched. If the world was full of homogeneous 
matter and all phenomena arose by collision according to motions codified in the 
laws, any void became metaphysically impossible, powers and qualities unnecessary, 
space was but the three-dimensionality of body, and motion, once introduced by 
God, was transmitted by collision. This redefinition has two different but 
interdependent layers: on one level, Descartes tried to carve new metaphysical 
definitions out of the vocabulary of Scholastics, particularly in the Principia 
Philosophiæ, to fully articulate (and to make intelligible to his readers) his natural 
philosophy; sometimes this was done in order to clarify the innovative use of old 
terms, although this approach usually generated confusions and controversies—for 
example, Malebranche’s occasionalism relies on Descartes’ ambiguous use of 
concurrentia and Henry More’s criticism of Descartes’ conception of motion stems 
from the classification of motion as a modus. On the other hand, Descartes 
incorporated terms coming from mixed-mathematics into his new natural philosophy; 
but again, he constantly contrasted the proper ‘philosophical’ (his) meaning with the 
 
94 Henry, ‘The Reception of Cartesianism’, 118. 
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‘vulgar’ or ‘common sense’ (others’) use. Among these, I will focus on the idea of 
dispositio as new explanandum in the reformed natural philosophy.95 
 
In a letter to (again) Mersenne of 26 April 1643, Descartes summarised his 
achievements on occasion of solving a concrete problem. This letter is important for 
several reasons: at this time, Descartes had already published his Meditationes, so he 
had fully elaborated the metaphysical underpinnings of his physics. Also, the contrast 
between laws of nature and powers and qualities is brought up to solve concrete 
questions formulated by an unidentified correspondent through Mersenne, so from 
here it is possible to appreciate an application of laws of nature in solving 
mechanical problems. Finally, because his physics was not yet published, Descartes’ 
answer provided a summary of the core tenets of the Principia Philosophiæ.  
An unknown correspondent wrote to Mersenne asking to refer to his friend Descartes 
three issues on which he disagrees with someone else (also unidentified). The first is 
whether two missiles equal in every aspect, that is matter, size and shape, starting off 
with the same speed, in the same direction and in the same medium must necessarily 
travel the same distance or whether their behaviour may depend on the time during 
which they have been in contact with the moving force (force). The second asks 
whether it is necessary that a body that impressed motion on another travels, after the 
impact, with the same speed that the one on which motion was impressed. The third 
one is whether there is any other quality—such as the one pulling the missile to the 
earth or like the heat produced in the iron by the fire–, apart from the air resistance, 
that could cause the motion impressed on a missile to perish.96  
 
Descartes felt compelled to provide an abrégé of his physics. He could not answer 
without making clear that some of the problems involved in these questions 
concerned the concepts used in their formulation. Before offering his answers, 
Descartes postulated two ‘principles of physics’. The first is that ‘I do not suppose 
there are in nature any real qualities, which are attached to substances, like so many 
little souls to their bodies, and which are separable from them by divine power. 
 
95 Cf. Psillos, ‘Laws and Powers in the Frame of Nature’, 89–90. 
96 Descartes, AT, 1899, III:654–55. 
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Motion, and all the other modifications of substance which are called qualities, have 
no greater reality, in my view, than is commonly attributed by philosophers to shape, 
which they call only a mode and not a real quantity’.97 This negative formulation 
reveals interesting aspects of the redefinition of motion. Descartes claimed that he 
did not assume real qualities attached to substances separable from bodies by divine 
power, that is, he openly rejected the doctrine of substantial forms and his Scholastic 
reappraisal involving God’s action.98 Put otherwise, Descartes rejected the idea that 
bodies had powers and qualities as real attributes, that is, that exist and may be (at 
least in thought) considered as separated from bodies by the unlimited power of God. 
Interestingly, Descartes illustrated his criticism with the misleading conception of 
motion as a quality. Motion was not a real quality but something comparable to 
shape, that in Scholastic terminology was called a modus—a terminological choice 
that would be at the heart of the exchange with Henry More.99 In order to support his 
first ‘principle of physics’, Descartes offered two arguments: the first is that he does 
not see that ‘the human mind has any notion, or particular idea, to conceive them 
[qualities], so that when we talk about them and assert their existence, we are 
asserting something we do not conceive and do not ourselves understand’. This is the 
negative version of the argument claiming that the mathematical truths, as principles 
of physics, were imprinted in our souls.100 The second argument asserted that 
Scholastics introduced the idea of qualities because they thought they could not 
explain all phenomena without them; however, Descartes claimed that he will show 
that phenomena are better explained without them. 
 
The second principle is that ‘Whatever is or exists remains always in the state in 
which it is, unless some external cause changes it; so that I do not think there can be 
any quality or mode which perishes of itself’. Descartes explained this state in 
comparison with shape, in the sense that ‘if a body has a certain shape, it does not 
 
97 Descartes, III:648–49; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:216. 
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99 Hatfield, ‘Force (God) in Descartes’ Physics’; Webster, ‘Henry More and Descartes: Some New 
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lose it unless it is taken from it by collision with some other body; similarly if it has 
some motion, it should continue to keep it, unless prevented by some external cause’. 
Instead of offering arguments for this principle, he just rounded off the question 
claiming that he proved ‘this by metaphysics’.101 Here, Descartes drew his first law 
from the rejection of power and qualities. In the correspondence with Mersenne 
between 1628 and 1630, the formulation of what this law stated changed 
considerably over time and was stripped of vacuum just when it became a law of 
nature, together with the development of the corpuscles as opposed to solid atoms; 
that is, when the principle, initially formulated as a mathematical abstraction, was 
inserted into natural philosophy as accounting for the observable changes in the real 
world acquired a different dimension. It is worth noting that Descartes formulated the 
first law as a statement on the activity of nature; that is, that the laws of nature 
accounted for motion in a world where matter did not play any causal role. As we 
know since April 1630, this law was ultimately demonstrated metaphysically. For 
this necessary connection between laws and metaphysics, Descartes sketched some 
metaphysical ideas underpinning the laws of nature in the 1643 letter namely, that 
God is ‘entirely perfect and unchangeable’ so that it seem absurd that ‘any simple 
thing’ which existed contained in itself the principle of change, particularly ‘the 
principle of its destruction’. Descartes highlighted with this argument that the first 
law is but a consequence of the principle of the conservation of the quantity of 
motion in the world and of the divine immutability. 
 
In this letter, the definition of motion was a consequence of these two principles:102 
‘Since motion is not a real quality but only a mode, it can be conceived only as the 
change by which a body leaves the vicinity of some others: and there are only two 
kinds of change to consider, the one, change in its speed, and the other, change in its 
direction’. The idea that motion is to body just as shape, modified all the conceptual 
relations that Aristotle had established between substance and its accidents and made 
trivial the innumerable amount of medieval accounts based on the idea of motion as 
 
101 Descartes, AT, 1899, III:649; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:216. 
102 In the Principia, Descartes shall present laws of nature as a logical consequence of his definition of 
motion (II, 36). This order is not accidental, see Gueroult, Descartes’ Philosophy Interpreted 
According to the Order of Reasons, 1:7–8. 
170 
 
alteration. Descartes had criticised the Aristotelian idea of motion since the Regulæ, 
rejecting the ‘misleading’ idea that almost any (quantitative and qualitative) 
alteration was a case of motion and should be explained in terms of the rich 
Aristotelian lexicon of act and power, substance and accident, generation and 
corruption. In Le Monde, Descartes formulated as paradoxical the Scholastic idea 
that motion could occur ‘without any body’s changing place, such as those they call 
motus ad formam, motus ad calorem, motus ad quantitatem’. In his view, ‘I know of 
no motion other that which is easier to conceive of than the lines of geometers, by 
which bodies pass from one place to another and successively occupy all the spaces 
in between’.103 In other words, the only real change was that of place or local 
motion, but this could not be understood as a change arising from the qualities of the 
body. The rejection of qualities as causes implied that motion in the ‘ordinary sense’, 
as ‘the action by which a body travels from one place to another’, was wrong. 
Because there were no qualities or powers moving the bodies but only bodies 
pushing each other, motion was ‘the transfer of one piece of matter, or one body, 
from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in immediate contact with it, and 
which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies’. Descartes was 
aware of the controversial character of his definition and explained why the rejection 
of qualities entailed this new meaning: ‘And I say ‘the transfer’ (translationem) as 
opposed to the force or action which brings about the transfer, to show that motion is 
always in the moving body as opposed to the body which brings about the 
movement’.104 
If matter was deprived of powers and qualities, to the point that the foundation of 
Cartesian natural philosophy was this lack of any capacity of self-movement in 
bodies, what is the source of activity in nature? How can the variety of phenomena 
emerge? If the motion of particles is the ultimate way of explaining, what is the 
ultimate source of this motion? How is it distributed in matter to generate phenomena 
as diverse as the circulation of blood, the rainbow, the snow and the motion of 
planets? The answer is God and the laws of nature. At the metaphysical level, God’s 
immutability guaranteed the certainty and universal applicability of these laws in 
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natural philosophy. But from the point of view of natural philosophy, God was also 
the (primary) cause of all phenomena, for ‘we must say that God alone is the author 
of all the motions in the world in so far as they exist and in so far as they are 
straight’,105 that is, at the most fundamental level of laws of nature. Descartes 
specified that God ‘started to move the matter’ with a determined quantity of motion 
which remained constant because of the laws of nature.106 The interesting question, 
then, is not what is the efficient cause (God) but, instead, how ‘it’ operates. In 
Principia, Descartes explained that 
After this consideration of the nature of motion, we must look at its 
cause. This is in fact twofold: first, there is the universal and 
primary cause—the general cause of all the motions in the world; 
the second there is the particular cause which produces in an 
individual piece of matter some motion which it previously lacked. 
Now as far as the general cause is concerned, it seems clear to me 
that this is no other than God himself. In the beginning, he created 
matter along with its motion and rest; and now, merely by his 
regular concurrence, he preserves the same amount of motion and 
rest in the material universe as he put there in the beginning.107 
This article sets out the metaphysical foundation of laws of nature and, as we have 
seen, of the Cartesian explanation of the activity in the world. Descartes claimed that 
the universal cause of motion is God, while the particular causes are the laws of 
nature. Instead of relying on powers and qualities in nature, Descartes put in their 
place the idea of a God creating extended matter and setting it in motion according to 
his immutable nature. In fact, all the diversity of phenomena arose when the particles 
began to move: ‘let us think of the differences that He creates within this matter as 
consisting wholly in the diversity of the motions He gives to its parts’.108 From this 
immutability derives the character of necessity of the laws. If God is immutable, his 
actions in a sense do not change. The combination of God and laws of nature as 
cause of motion has been subject of intense debates since the seventeenth century, 
for the formulation is ambiguous enough to allow occasionalist and concurrentist 
interpretations.109 From the point of view of the transformation of disciplines, 
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Descartes was reframing natural philosophy in a way that included claims whose 
validity depended on a new metaphysics, concerning a conception of God and his 
connection with the world. The connection is such that, from the divine immutability 
Descartes infered that ‘it is most reasonable to think’ that the quantity of motion in 
the world remained the same and, in consequence, the study of natural philosophy 
was the clarification of the specific changes of motion in the particles of matter or 
bodies according to the laws derived from God’s attributes. These changes occurred 
according to the three laws of nature and the rules of motion that, seen from this 
perspective, are but laws and rules governing the redistribution of motion in 
particular interactions.110 The causal role of laws of nature implies that these 
interactions occur in a determinate way because of the laws of nature, rather than 
according to them.111 In other words, laws of nature determine—as powers and 
qualities did before—the outcome of the interaction between any particles or bodies 
in the world, although they are not directly observable. Descartes’ point seems to be 
that laws ‘in nature’ are enough to account for all the diversity of phenomena without 
any resource to powers and qualities.  
 
Descartes’ laws of nature were explicitly formulated as the starting point of a new 
way to understand nature. All phenomena should be explained in a way that 
ultimately referred to the ‘laws of nature’. But the fact that ‘laws of nature’ provided 
the principles of demonstration did not entail that all demonstrations shall be reduced 
to them. Put otherwise, the formulation of laws did not entail that the totality of 
phenomena may be logically derived from them; if laws constituted the basic 
principles of explanation, it was the task of the natural philosopher to build up 
accounts based on them, not to show that every phenomena could be reduced to laws, 
as we saw in the first two chapters. In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes explained that 
the discovery of the order underlying natural phenomena ‘is the key and foundation 
of the highest and most perfect science of material things which men can ever attain. 
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For if we possessed it, we could discover a priori all the different forms and essences 
of terrestrial bodies, whereas without it we have to content ourselves with guessing 
them a posteriori’.112 If the ‘laws of nature’ provided the foundations for explaining 
the natural world, their formulations did not paint the whole picture. In Le Monde, 
Descartes claimed that ‘we must say that God alone is the author of all the motions in 
the world in so far as they exist and in so far as they are straight, but that it is the 
various dispositions of matter that render the motions irregular and curved’. 113 A 
parallel claim occurs in Principia, just after Descartes formulated the first law of 
nature: ‘what is in motion always, so far as it can, continues to move’. Descartes 
immediately added: ‘But we live on the Earth, whose composition is such that all 
motions occurring near it are soon halted, often by causes undetectable to our 
senses’. In other words, because on Earth—that is, in the range of our experience—
we do not immediately observe the first law, it does not mean that it does not underly 
the phenomena that we perceive through experience. The validity of laws of nature 
guaranteed their applicability to phenomena, but how can we arrive at the 
explanation of specific, singular phenomena which are the ultimate interest of natural 
philosophy? Descartes explained that in this he was greatly ‘helped by considering 
artefacts’. In his view, there was no difference between ‘artefacts and natural bodies 
except that the operations of artefacts are for the most part performed by mechanisms 
which are large enough to be easily perceivable by the senses—as indeed must be the 
case if they are to be capable of being manufacture by human beings’. However, 
natural effects depend on structures ‘so minute that they completely elude our sense’. 
But, given that ‘mechanics is a division or special case of physics, and all the 
explanations belonging to the former also belong to the latter’ it is not less natural 
‘for a clock constructed with this or that set of wheels to tell the time than it is for a 
tree which grew from this or that seed to produce the appropriate fruit’. Put 
otherwise, because mechanics was but a part of natural philosophy, their way of 
explanation were also aligned. Interestingly, as Beeckman did before him, Descartes 
appealed to the form of knowledge in mechanics to explain knowledge of the natural 
world: 
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Men who are experienced in dealing with machinery can take a 
particular machine whose function they know and, by looking at 
some of its parts, easily form a conjecture about the design of the 
parts, which they cannot see. In the same way I have attempted to 
consider the observable effects, and parts of natural bodies, and 
track down the imperceptible causes and particles which produces 
them.114 
This passage is traditionally quoted to support Descartes’ reduction of nature to 
mechanical operations and, in consequence, natural philosophy to mechanics. 
Sometimes it is considered the birth certificate of the mechanical philosophy. 
However, in the light of the evidence I have presented, this is rather simplistic. 
Descartes claimed that in order to understand the production of natural effects he has 
been helped ‘by the consideration of artefacts’. It is easy to conclude from here that 
he was formulating the famous idea of the universe as machine.115 But from the 
disciplinary point of view, Descartes only claimed that he relied on the way in which 
mechanics uncovered the design of the parts of a machine. However, the case of 
uncovering the secrets of nature is not as the case of the mechanician building a 
machine, for this would put men in the place of God. In Descartes’ analogy, an 
experienced mechanician is presented with a machine that he had not created. 
Because he ‘was experienced’ in how machines function, he could ‘easily form a 
conjecture about the design of the parts, which they cannot see’. In the case of 
natural philosophy, the ‘experience’ of the mechanician is replaced by the knowledge 
of the laws of nature from which he can ‘track down the imperceptible causes and 
particles which produces them’, that is, to explain the effects by causes. Instead of 
reducing the world to a machine, Descartes claimed that we know the world in the 
same way that a mechanician knows a machine that he did not create: ‘conjecturing’ 
about the design of the parts. The difference is that our ‘conjectures’ are laws of 
nature derived from divine immutability. And this is exactly what the Cartesian 
natural philosopher does: ‘understand how all the things in nature could have arisen’, 
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Nevertheless, because human knowledge is not divine knowledge, ‘it should not 
therefore be inferred that they [natural phenomena] were in fact made this way’. 
Instead of uncovering the blueprints of the creation, Descartes’ philosophy was 
directed towards ‘the application of ordinary life’, that is, its main interest was to 
find a way to understand how things could have been done. To illustrate the contrast 
between human and divine points of view, Descartes borrowed an example from 
mechanics, claiming that ‘just as the same mechanician could make two clocks 
which tell the time equally well and look completely alike from the outside but have 
completely different assemblies of wheels inside, so the supreme mechanician of the 
real world could have produced all that we see in several different ways’.116 In so 
doing, Descartes incorporated the ideal that knowledge is not certain concerning 
particular things by uncovering their genesis; on the contrary, knowledge is certain 
because we can establish, based on the metaphysical certainty of mathematical laws, 
how things are in general, that is, how they necessarily may arise from a specific 
design. In summary, the world can be understood as (a mechanician understands) a 
machine: by forming ‘a conjecture’ on its design. This idea, as we have seen in the 
first chapter, was elaborated in the late sixteenth-century as mechanics became a 
geometrical explanation of physical (artificial) objects.   
 
The previous argument rests on the idea that mechanics was a branch of natural 
philosophy, so ‘all explanations belonging to the former also belong to the later’. All 
mechanical explanation was a natural-philosophical explanation because mechanics 
was a branch of natural philosophy. Garber interprets this claim in exactly the 
opposite way: ‘mechanics subsumes physics: everything in physics now receives a 
mechanical explanation, that is to say, everything is explained as if it were a 
machine’.117 But Descartes claimed exactly the opposite. In concluding the Principia, 
the work traditionally considered as the first modern alternative to Aristotelianism, 
Descartes noticed that: 
In attempting to explain the general nature of material things, I 
have not employed any principle which was not accepted by 
Aristotle and all other philosophers of every age. So this 
philosophy is not new, but the oldest and most common of all. I 
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have considered the shapes, motions and sizes of bodies and 
examined the necessary results of their mutual interaction in 
accordance with the laws of mechanics, which are confirmed by 
reliable everyday experience.118 
This claim seems to run at odds with Descartes’ attempt to establish a new natural 
philosophy. But Descartes’ point was that his principles, that is, the laws of 
mechanics, were accepted ‘by Aristotle and all other philosophers of every age’. In 
this Descartes followed Mersenne who, at the same time, followed Baldi, in 
believing that all the mechanical laws of Archimedes, Guidobaldo and Baldi 
stemmed from the Mechanical Problems.119 The difference is that, while Aristotle 
and others conceived that these principles apply to machines only, Descartes claimed 
that in the way of explaining of mechanics was hidden the right way of accounting 
for natural phenomena. In this way, mechanics was founded on natural philosophy. 
 
* * * 
 
The connection between natural philosophy and mechanics appears in a letter from 
Descartes to Fromondus in 1637. Fromondus criticised Descartes because his 
philosophy was similar to mechanics, in the sense that his philosophy ‘seems too 
“crass” for him, because, like mechanics, it considers shapes and sizes and motions’. 
Descartes answer was historical. In his view, mechanics has always been a true part 
of natural philosophy but, when the latter was corrupted, mechanics ‘took refuge 
with the mathematicians’. ‘This part of philosophy—Descartes added—has in fact 
remained truer and less corrupt than the others, because it has useful and practical 
consequences, and so any mistakes in it results in financial loss. So if he despises my 
style of philosophy because it is like mechanics, it is the same to me as if he despised 
it for being true’.120 Descartes ‘restablished’ the status of mechanics not by providing 
an axiomatic organisation of its principles—like Guidobaldo and friends did—but by 
re-placing it in the domain of natural philosophy. When the tree of physics ripens, 
some of its fruits are mechanical.  
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5. ‘The outer shell’: Cartesian laws in England 
 
The French philosophy will inform us, that the Earth as well as other bodies is indifferent in 
itself to rest, or its contrary. 
 
Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661).1  
 
5.1. The interregnum 
It is often claimed that laws of nature, such as Descartes’, became the landmark of 
the ‘new science’ by replacing explanations based on causes. In the 1980s, Drake 
argued that the search for ‘causes of events in nature that guided the Aristotelian 
science’ was superseded by a ‘quest for laws of nature based on experiment and 
measurement’.2 This ‘process by which causes gave way to laws in science may be 
considered as having begun’ in Galileo’s early hydrostatical works.3 More recently, 
Lynn Joy refined this approach, claiming that different Aristotelian traditions held 
rival forms of explanation and therefore the rejection of the ‘scientific innovators’ is 
more complicated than the refutation of a monolithic doctrine of causation. Joy 
claims that these innovators ‘widely reject Aristotle’s account of the four kinds of 
causes as a source of acceptable theories in the specific sciences’.4 However, Joy 
characterises this transformation as the establishment of ‘laws in terms of lawlike 
regularities, according to which the observable features of any ordinary body are 
explained as effects of the organization and motions of the body’s constituent atoms’, 
a view which she attributes to Robert Boyle.5 Recently, Harrison rounded off this 
view claiming that ‘for most natural philosophers laws replaced explanations in 
terms of Aristotelian causes. As Newton put it, there are ‘general Laws of Nature by 
which the Things are form’d; their truth appearing to us by Phenomena, though their 
Causes, be not yet discover’d’.6  
 
1 Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing, 85–86. 
2 Drake, Cause, Experiment and Science. Cf. Schmaltz, ‘From Causes to Laws’; Ducheyne, ‘Galileo’s 
Interventionist Notion of “Cause”’. 
3 Drake, Cause, Experiment and Science, xxv; Cf. Ducheyne, ‘Galileo’s Interventionist Notion of 
“Cause”’, 449. Cf. Chapter 2. 
4 Joy, ‘Scientific Explanation from Formal Causes to Laws of Nature’, 70. Cf. Sections 3.4 and 4.4. 
5 Joy, 92. 
6 Harrison, ‘Laws of Nature in Seventeenth-Century England. From Cambridge Platonism to 




Approaching laws of nature as replacing causes faces at least two difficulties. First, a 
glimpse into historical evidence from Descartes to Newton—such as the one 
presented in this chapter—reveals that the growing talk about ‘laws of nature’ did not 
replace causes but stimulated new forms of laws (such as the laws of motion) 
adapted to views on causation resultant from experimental forms of enquiry; causes 
did not simply give way to ‘experiments and measurement’. Second, the idea of 
replacing Aristotelian-causes for Cartesian-mechanistic-laws reinforces the claim 
that ‘laws of nature’ appeared in a process from Descartes to Newton in which 
natural philosophers were concerned with ‘identify[ing] the lawlike regularities 
exhibited in the organisation and motions of these fundamental elements or atoms’.7 
This approach takes for granted that once Descartes introduced ‘laws of nature’, this 
form of explanation was widely embraced except for some corrections to their 
contents; the new way of explaining in terms of ‘laws of nature’ became dominant 
just after revisions of their stipulations. This attitude has its roots in a common view 
on the ‘mechanical philosophy’ claiming that Descartes provided the first systematic 
alternative to Scholastic philosophy by introducing a new way to understand nature 
in terms of matter and motion. However, Descartes’ mechanistic world ended up 
being too restrictive, so Newton introduced gravitational force into the mechanical 
philosophy. The architecture of the Principia would allow him to claim that gravity 
really exists and is explained by the inverse-square law although its cause remained 
occult. However, Newton privately aimed ‘to reduce the action of an ‘attractive’ 
force of universal gravity to an effect caused by matter and motion, so that his 
system of the world would ultimately conform to the received philosophy of nature’.8 
Claiming that laws replaced causes aligns Newton with this problematic view of the 
development of mechanical philosophy. In this version, the period between Descartes 
and Newton is usually depicted as one of dissemination of the Cartesian idea of laws, 
a mere interregnum.9 
 
7 Joy, ‘Scientific Explanation from Formal Causes to Laws of Nature’. 
8 Cohen, ‘The Principia, Universal Gravitation, and the “Newtonian Style”, in Relation to the 
Newtonian Revolution in Science:’, 56–57. 
9 This approach appears in different degrees in Roux, ‘Les lois de la nature à l’âge classique la 
question terminologique’; Steinle, ‘From Principles to Regularities: Tracing “Laws of Nature” in 




However, a reading sensitive to the disciplinary settings—particularly regarding 
mechanics—leads to different conclusions.10 It is often assumed that mechanics 
became a rather demarcated discipline in the second half of the seventeenth century, 
as the study of motion in terms of Descartes’ laws; mechanics would have provided 
the fundamental analogy uncovering the workings of nature by postulating the 
principles of motion and the homogenous nature of matter, a view allegedly 
epitomised by Boyle. In this traditional view of mechanics—embedded in the story 
of the ‘mechanical philosophy’ just mentioned—Huygens, Wren and Wallis partially 
corrected the visible flaws of Descartes’ rules until the definitive version appeared in 
Newton’s Principia, given Newton’s elucidation of force, momentum and the 
distinction between mass and weight. However, the characterisations and practices of 
mechanics and their connections with mathematics and natural philosophy were not 
monolithic during this ‘interregnum’. Because Descartes formulated his laws as a 
redefinition of the foundations of physics, altering the function or amending the 
contents of ‘laws of nature’ entailed consequences for Descartes’ view of physics as 
established a priori.  
 
The talk about laws that became prominent in English natural philosophy after the 
1650s, and the developments oriented by the experimental commitments promoted 
by, but not restricted to the establishment of the agenda of the Royal Society of 
London converged in the rejection of the foundations of Descartes’ laws: the divine 
immutability and the doctrine of innate ideas. From Barrow to Locke, the Cartesian 
foundations of physics were represented as fictions, whose consequences were 
dangerous for social and religious orders.11 The discomfort with the ‘Cartesian way’ 
reinforced a probabilistic attitude with a mitigated scepticism that was in vogue in 
the early Royal Society. 
 
Concept of Laws of Nature in the Early Royal Society’; Harrison, ‘The Development of the Concept 
of Laws of Nature’; Harrison, ‘Laws of Nature in Seventeenth-Century England. From Cambridge 
Platonism to Newtonianism’. 
10 See Gabbey, ‘Between Ars and Philosophia Naturalis’; Gabbey, ‘Descartes’s Physics’; Gabbey, 
‘Newton’s Mathematical Principles’; Garber, ‘Remarks on the Pre-History of the Mechanical 
Philosophy’; Roux, ‘Forms of Mathematization (14-17 Centuries)’. 




This chapter outlines the appropriation of Descartes’ laws in England before Newton. 
During this period, Cartesian laws were integrated into English philosophies 
involving active principles, experimental practices and a physically-oriented 
mathematical astronomy. Instead of igniting the spark of the mechanical philosophy 
in England—as suggested by the interregnum approach–, English natural 
philosophers reworked the contents and function that Descartes had attributed to laws 
by rejecting their underpinnings and relocating them into the mathematical sciences. 
Descartes’ laws were integrated into disciplinary settings different from that in which 
they were initially postulated. I will explain this in the following sections. In the 
next, I show that English natural philosophers, mathematicians and scholars 
appropriated ‘laws of nature’ as part of the critical reception of Cartesianism in 
general; in this process, a distinctive, new meaning of laws coming from Descartes 
made its way to England. This is visible in the growing talk of laws as 
‘indispensable’ and ‘catholique’, in contrast with other more limited uses of the term 
(for example, the laws of optics or the law of the lever).12 In the third section, I 
analyse how this new meaning interacted with local traditions and how the function, 
contents and foundations of Cartesian laws were modified by encompassing them 
with active principles, experimental commitments and debates on the role of motion 
in mathematics. English natural philosophers adopted the new terminology of laws; 
however, they modified the idea of ‘laws of nature’ according to the background 
against which they weighed up the ‘French philosophy’, particularly by making of 
them mathematical descriptions or measurments—instead of causes—of motion 
elucidated by experiments but whose ultimate causes remained unknown. In the final 
section, I explain the appropriation of ‘laws of nature’ in the local tradition of 
‘magnetical cosmology’, from which it is possible to draw conclusions concerning 
the transformation of ‘laws of nature’ in principles that may be uncovered by 
experiments and represented by mathematics, dealing with forces and powers acting 
in matter. However, the ultimate causes of these forces and powers remained 
unknown. 
 
12 See, for example, Ruby, ‘The Origins of Scientific" Law"’; Roux, ‘Les lois de la nature à l’âge 
classique la question terminologique’; Steinle, ‘From Principles to Regularities: Tracing “Laws of 





5.2. Descartes ‘Englished’ 
The reception of Cartesianism in England has been characterised as a mixture of 
enthusiasm and criticism. An English version of the Discourse (1649) compared the 
work of the translator with that of ‘those who cannot compose the Originals of Titian 
and Van-Dyke, [then] are glad to adorne their Cabinets with copies of them; so be 
pleased favourably to receive his [Descartes] Picture from my hand, copied after his 
own Designe’. The method of the Discourse was presented as the ultimate guide to 
‘Enquire into Nature’, to ‘attain to the Knowledge of the Truth’; for ‘all lovers of 
Learning’, said the translator, ‘I have Englished this Essay’. This ‘Englished’ 
Descartes was not limited to the translation. In line with the trends of his home 
country, the anonymous translator highlighted that Descartes ‘invites all lettered men 
to his assistance in the prosecution of this search [the Knowledge of Truth]; that for 
the good of Mankinde, They would practise and communicate Experiments, for the 
use of all those who labour for the perfection of Arts and Science’.13 The passages of 
the Discourse promoting experiments provided the translator the occasion to align 
Descartes with the ‘House of Solomon’. There was no mention of metaphysics, of 
the doctrine of inborne ideas or of the proofs of the existence of God which appear 
all over the Discourse. On the contrary, Descartes was seen under the light of the 
experimentalism and the collective fact-gathering enterprise; a call to the communal 
endeavour of building natural knowledge for the ‘good of Mankinde’. 
 
One of the first enthusiasts and, at the same time, critic of Descartes in Cambridge 
was Henry More.14 He saw in Descartes a powerful ally against atheism but 
subsequently moved towards a harsher position. Although More was critical since his 
first exchange with Descartes in the late 1640s, he widely discussed the implications 
and assumptions of some of the most influential Cartesian theses. In so doing, he 
 
13 Anonymous, ‘To the Reader’ in Descartes, A Discourse of a Method for the Wel-Guiding of Reason 
and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences. 
14 Henry, ‘The Reception of Cartesianism’; Henry, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental 
Philosophy’; See also, Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science; Leech, The Hammer of 
the Cartesians : Henry More’s Philosophy of Spirit and the Origins of Modern Atheism; Webster, 
‘Henry More and Descartes: Some New Sources’; Jesseph, ‘Mechanism, Skepticism, and Witchcraft’. 
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spread Cartesian ideas and vocabulary.15 However, the reception of Descartes in 
England, and consequently of his laws, was not restricted to More. As early as 1648, 
William Petty critically referred to Descartes by echoing Bacon’s characterisation of 
Scholastics as spiders: ‘[Descartes] employed in spinning the cobwebs out of bare 
suppositions & out of Principles, which though may be true, yet are remote 
abstracted & generall’.16 The remoteness of these principles, that is, their 
disconnection from experience, was perceived as problematic both for their validity 
and for their utility in explaining natural phenomena. 
 
Writing almost at the same time as More, another Cambridge scholar put forward a 
sharp criticism of the Cartesian world governed by laws. In his view, the ‘Cartesian 
hypothesis’ could not account for the diversity of phenomena and, at the same time, 
it was not a good way ‘to think about God’. The young and ascending Isaac Barrow 
considered in 1652 ‘that the Cartesian hypothesis concerning matter and motion by 
no means satisfies the principle phenomena of nature’.17 This oratio summarises 
Descartes’ second part of the Principia, including the most relevant premises for the 
‘laws of nature’. The innumerable external objects we perceive should be conceived, 
according to Descartes, as mere extension which is inseparable from the idea of 
corporeal matter. ‘Which thing being supposed, while a great many different things 
can easily be deduced, such as what space is, to wit, that there is no vacuum or empty 
space, [… ] most importantly it is possible to deduce the following: that the world is 
one, cohering together everywhere, and occupying all imaginable space, with its 
matter existing joined together and everywhere the same. And it is completely known 
through this one thing, namely, that it is extended. And such is the nature of 
Cartesian matter’. Barrow noticed that this matter ‘can exist only in a two-fold 
manner, namely in motion and at rest’. Ironically, Barrow remarked that ‘beyond this 
there seems nothing more subtle to note concerning the nature of motion and rest’. 
However, it was necessary to consider ‘that there are primary and secondary causes 
of motion: God is thought to be the primary cause of motion and rest who, in the 
 
15 Harrison, ‘Laws of Nature in Seventeenth-Century England. From Cambridge Platonism to 
Newtonianism’, 133–36. 
16 Henry, ‘The Reception of Cartesianism’, 117–18. 
17 Stewart, ‘“Fleshy Books”’, 39. Cf. Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton, 79. 
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beginning, created matter at the same time as motion and rest’. From the divine 
immutability, it followed that ‘he moved the parts of matter in diverse ways when he 
created them in the beginning. And surely he would conserve all this matter in the 
same manner and, for the same reason, would conserve the amount of motion the 
same’. Because of this ‘he could form and establish certain rules and laws that, in 
turn, effect secondary causes and particular motions similar to those motions that 
appear in individual bodies’. Barrow clearly grasped Descartes’ causal function of 
laws. Next, Barrow succinctly enunciated the three laws of nature, following closely 
the Cartesian wording. The first section of the Oratio concludes remarking that 
‘These [the laws of nature] being supposed and conceded, Descartes thought that 
whatever changes, generations, alterations are observed in the nature of things, and 
whatever phenomena are observed in Nature, they could all be sufficiently 
explained’. However, Barrow’s target was to show that ‘this is not the case’.18 
 
Barrow’s reconstruction of the reasoning connects the nature of matter as extended, 
the rejection of vacuum and the divine immutability to the causal ‘laws of nature’. 
Barrow carefully extracted the core of the Cartesian reasoning in order to criticise it. 
Nevertheless, Barrow never developed a natural philosophy and ‘laws of nature’ did 
not figure in his subsequent works. Because his reconstruction of the Cartesian 
hypothesis grasps the inextricable connection of the idea of laws with other 
substantial claims, Barrow did not feel that ‘laws of nature’ were worthy of pick up; 
his most famous student felt similarly.  
 
Other English authors resumed Descartes’ laws and incorporated them into their 
works. Walter Charleton inserted Cartesian laws in his monumental Physiologia in 
1654. In it, he followed Gassendi, not Descartes. This is significant because 
Descartes had openly rejected the basic assumptions of atomism—atoms and void. 
However, Charleton reviewed the Cartesian laws and used them as premises in 
building his own atomistic explanations of natural phenomena. When enquiring for 
the ‘elaters or springs’ of air, causing ‘its suddain restitution to its natural 
constitution’, his answer was ‘that, as it is the most catholique Law of Nature, for 
 
18 Barrow, ‘Oratio’, 83–85; Stewart, ‘“Fleshy Books”’, 70–72. 
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every thing, so much as in it lies, to endeavour the conservation of its originary 
state’, So in the case of the spring of air ‘it is the essential quality of the Aer, that its 
minute particles conserve their natural Contexture, and when forced in Rarefaction to 
a more open order, or in Condensation to a more close order, immediately upon the 
cessation of that expanding, or contracting violence, to reflect or restore themselves 
to their due and natural contexture’.19 The first law of Descartes is interpreted as 
explaining condensation and rarefaction. But apart from the references to specific 
laws, Charleton placed laws at the centre of his physiological project; his view of 
motion differed from Descartes, to a large extent as a consequence of his 
reconciliation of atomism with Helmontianism.20 Like most of his English fellows, 
Charleton conceived matter as endowed with principles of activity. For Charleton, 
‘Because, Motion being the Heart, or rather the Vital Faculty of Nature, without 
which the Universe were yet but a meer Chaos; must also be the noblest part of 
Physiology’. This meant that ‘if Motion and Quiet be the principal modes of Bodies 
Existing, as Des Cartes (in princip. philosoph. part. 2. sect. 27.) seems strongly to 
asserts if Generation, Corruption, Augmentation, Diminution, Alteration, be only 
certain species, or more properly the Effects of Motion’. However, the knowledge of 
these effects of motion ‘results from our perception of the Impulses made upon the 
organs of our senses, by their species thither transmitted’. In consequence, ‘the 
Physiologist is highly concerned to make the contemplation of Motion, its Causes, 
Kinds, and Universal Laws, the First link in the chain of all his Natural Theorems’.21 
This characterisation of motion as the subject of physiology exhibits two 
characteristics I have mentioned before: Cartesian laws are detached from the main 
premise about the nature of matter as extended and inert; in its place, Charleton 
claimed that ‘in Nature there is no Faculty but what is active’, that is, that every 
‘Compound Bodie is naturally endowed’ with a ‘Motive virtue’.22 In addition, these 
laws are presented as ‘universal’ and put next to ‘causes’ and ‘kinds’ as the main 
subjects of the ‘physiologist’. 
 
 
19 Charleton, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana, 34; Wang, ‘Rarefaction and 
Condensation’. 
20 Henry, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy’, 341. 
21 Charleton, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana, 435. 
22 Charleton, 271. 
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Another recurring English view of the Cartesian philosophy was its hypothetical 
nature. Most virtuosi saw in this ‘hypothetical physics’ an important slap in the face 
to the anti-dogmatic style championed by the Royal Society associated to its fact-
gathering, Baconian approach. Joseph Glanvill, the ‘most skilful apologist of all 
virtuosi’,23 praised Descartes, ‘the Grand Secretary of nature’, for ‘giving a particular 
and Analytical account of the Universal Fabrick’. However, Glanvill regretted that 
‘he intends his principles but for Hypotheses, and never pretends that things are 
really or necessarily as he hath supposed them: but that they may be admitted 
pertinently to solve the Phenomena, and are convenient supposals for the use of 
life’.24 Against the dogmatism attributed to the Aristotelians, the syllogistic 
demonstrations and the physics of matter and form, Glanvill acclaimed the project of 
the Royal Society for ‘the credit which the mathematics have with you, your 
experimental way of enquiry, and mechanical attempts for solving the phenomena’. 
Although Glanvill claimed that it was not in the interest of the Society to refute other 
doctrines, ‘some of you … publicly own the Cartesian and atomical hypotheses; 
these, I say, are arguments of your no great favour to the Aristotelian’. The ‘doctrine 
of matter and form’ was ‘of no accommodation’ to the ‘design’ of the Society which 
is ‘improving the minds of men in solid and useful notices of things, helping them to 
such theories as may be serviceable to common life, and the searching out the true 
laws of matter and motion, in order to the securing of the foundations of religion 
against all attempts of mechanical atheism’.25 
 
Charleton identified the ‘true laws of matter and motion’ as the core of the ‘designs’ 
of the Royal Society. He was not alone in this. This assessment is part of the intricate 
process of defining the objectives and approaches of the Society encompassing 
private and public interests.26 Indeed, the communications by Wallis, Wren and 
Huygens in the late 1660s on the laws of impact and the subsequent portrayal by 
Oldenburg of the Royal Society as concerned with ‘the Principles and Laws of 
 
23 Westfall, Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England, 18. 
24 Glanvill, Scepsis scientifica, 211–12; Cf. Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton, 112–
13. 
25 Glanvill, Scepsis scientifica, a2. 
26 Hunter and Wood, ‘Towards Solomon’s House’; Hunter, ‘The Royal Society and the Decline of 
Magic’; Dear, ‘Totius in Verba’; Hall, ‘Mechanics and the Royal Society’. 
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motion’27 are just the best known parts of the story, but hardly the only ones. In any 
case, Charleton remarked that instead of engaging in disputes against the dominant 
philosophy, even having the resources against Aristotle—mathematics, experiments 
and the ‘mechanical attempts to solve phenomena’–, the Royal Society opted for 
improving ‘the minds of men’ for useful purposes, and for finding the ‘laws of matter 
and motion’ that secure the foundations of religion against ‘mechanical atheism’. 
Notice that Charleton remarked that these laws were the ‘true’ ones as part of the 
growing feeling by the mid-1650s that Cartesian mechanical philosophy may lead to 
atheism. 
 
The talk of laws in England in the Cartesian sense was not restricted to the abstract 
collision of bodies. Before the submissions of Wallis, Wren and Huygens in 1668-
1669, Cartesian laws had made their way in England. The evidence suggests that this 
debate resembles a fruit rather than the root of an ongoing process.28 Moreover, the 
use of Cartesian laws was not restricted to individual, isolated works. In a meeting of 
the Council of the Royal Society, in 9 May 1666, Oldenburg ‘produced’ a discourse 
by Wallis concerning the flux and the reflux of the sea. Wallis opened his hypothesis 
claiming  
How much the World, and the great Bodies therein, are manag’d 
according to the Laws of Motion, and Statick Principles, and with 
how much more of clearness and satisfaction, many of the more 
abstruse Phenomena, have been solved on such Principles, within 
this last Century of years, than formerly they had been; I need not 
discourse to you, who are well versed in it.29 
Wallis’ hypothesis postulated that the motion of two interacting bodies must be 
calculated around the centre of the system; in the particular case of the tides, Wallis 
claimed that it is not the centre of the Earth that describes an orbit around the sun, 
but the centre of gravity of the Earth and the Moon. Thus, the inequality in the 
Earth’s distance from the Sun was the cause, for example, of the annual variation in 
the height of the tides.30 This novel hypothesis also explained the diurnal and 
 
27 Oldenburg, Correspondence, 1968, 5:512. 
28 Cf. Steinle, ‘From Principles to Regularities: Tracing “Laws of Nature” in Early Modern England 
and France’, 221. 
29 Wallis, ‘An Essay of Dr. John Wallis....about the Flux and Reflux of the Sea’, 264. 
30 Oldenburg, Correspondence, 1966, 3:109.  
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monthly variation in the tides. Wallis’ hypothesis was an attempt to provide a 
mathematical explanation correcting Galileo’s theory of tides in the Dialogo.31 
However, the point of departure of the mathematical hypothesis was the first ‘law of 
nature’: 
Now in order to the giving account of these three Periods [diurnal, 
monthly and annual], according to the Laws of Motion and 
Mechanick Principles; We shall first take for granted, what is now 
adayes pretty commonly entertained by those, who treat of such 
matters; That a Body in motion is apt to continue its motion, and 
that in the same degree of celerity, unless hindered by some 
contrary Impediment; (like a Body at rest, to continue so, unless by 
some sufficient mover, put into motion).32 
Notice that the first Cartesian law is assumed as a principle of ‘Mechanick’. This 
hypothesis on tides was originally presented in a letter to Boyle in 25 April and 
afterwards read at the meeting of the Society. Oldenburg wrote back to Wallis in 5 
May—before the public discussion—concerning the possibility of printing this paper 
in the Philosophical Transactions, to which Wallis replied that he ‘was not averse 
from it, if first it be approved by (…) ye Society’.33 Wallis then accepted and the 
discourse circulated in the Philosophical Transactions. Wallis was utterly interested 
in developing this hypothesis, and Oldenburg asked to a considerable number of 
correspondents living by the sea in Germany, Italy, England, Ireland, Scotland and 
America to provide information to advance in the hypothesis.34 Oldenburg forwarded 
to Wallis objections and suggestions from members of the Society and from readers 
of the Transactions. Some of these objections, including Wallis’ rebuttals were also 
printed in the journal.35 The centrality and importance of the first Cartesian law, in a 
discourse that circulated widely indicates the acceptance of the idea of laws as 
principles of explanation of physical phenomena, not restricted to the debate of the 
collision of bodies. Wallis remarked that the idea of laws, and particularly the first 
law, ‘is now adayes pretty commonly entertained by those, who treat of such 
matters’. As far as I have been able to track, nobody objected to Wallis’ use of the 
 
31 See Bonelli and Russo, ‘The Origin of Modern Astronomical Theories of Tides’. 
32 Wallis, ‘An Essay of Dr. John Wallis....about the Flux and Reflux of the Sea’, 268. 
33 Oldenburg, Correspondence, 1966, 3:107–9. 
34 Evidence of Oldenburg interest in a wide circulation of the hypothesis is his request of a Latin 
version Wallis, Correspondence, 440.  
35 Oldenburg, Correspondence, 1966, 3:xxiv. 
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Cartesian laws.36 However, his use of laws was not connected with uncovering the 
physical causes of the tides; Wallis’ laws did not operate as causes. Wallis remarked 
that central to the history of tides was the connection between the Earth and the 
Moon explained ‘whether by any Magnetick, or what other Tye’. Put otherwise, ‘the 
connection being known’, he does not need to provide any explanation  
as to this purpose; as that the motion of the one follows of the other 
(the Moon observing the Earth as the Center of its periodick 
motion) may well enough be looked as one Body, or rather one 
Aggregate of Bodies, which have one common center of Gravity ; 
which Center (according to the known Laws of Staticks) is in a 
streight Line connecting their respective Centers, so divided as that 
its parts be in reciprocal proportion to the Gravities of the two 
Bodies.37  
Wallis provided a mathematical explanation in terms of laws of motion (‘staticks’) 
with experimental outcomes not requiring the specification of the immediate cause 
generating the phenomenon. Wallis claimed that mathematical laws were principles 
explaining quantitative properties of motion, although their cause was unknown. In 
so doing, Wallis was transforming in a radical way the Cartesian use of law. This 
way of dealing with natural philosophical problems was plausible for English natural 
philosophers, as we shall see next. 
  
5.3. ‘Dead and thoughtless principles’ 
The recourse to active principles and occult qualities in England opened possibilities 
for new uses of (Cartesian) laws including experiments and a varied range of 
mathematical techniques. This is visible in the integration of Cartesian laws into the 
‘elliptical astronomy’ that practiced mathematical astronomy as bounded by and 
connected with natural philosophy, inspired by the ‘magnetical philosophy’ of Bacon 
and Gilbert.38  
 
 
36 The initial reactions to Wallis’ hypothesis are summarised in Birch, The History of the Royal 
Society, 1756, 2:89: 93. Wallis received a summary of these Wallis, Correspondence, 250–51. 
37 Wallis, ‘An Essay of Dr. John Wallis....about the Flux and Reflux of the Sea’, 271–72. 




The reception of Descartes in England was critical since its first inception.39 English 
natural philosophers quickly gathered that the Cartesian suppositions concerning the 
inactivity of matter and the resulting reduction of all activity in nature to motion 
generated by collision ‘satisfies by no means the principle phenomena of nature’ as 
Barrow claimed in 1652.40 In part, this critical attitude was a consequence of the 
different agendas that English natural philosophers were pursuing, inspired by the 
experimental programmes of Bacon and Gilbert. In spite of the limitations and flaws 
that they attributed to the Cartesian laws and the potential dangers for religion, 
Cartesianism was not rejected tout court. Cartesian philosophy may be defective, but 
it was a promising substitution for the discredited Scholastic philosophy. The 
Cartesian hypothesis ‘concerning matter and motion’ may be problematic, but ‘the 
scope and power of the Cartesian system, and its easy intelligibility, could hardly fail 
to make a huge impression on educated consciousnesses’.41 ‘Laws of nature’ came to 
stand for this intelligibility. Instead of Scholastic-style definitions—which Descartes 
himself debunked, English natural philosophers saw in laws ‘catholique’ and 
‘indispensable’ statements that may be compatible with active principles and 
therefore susceptible of experimental ‘verification’. 
 
Active principles and occult qualities were embedded in the experimental philosophy 
of seventeenth century England.42 The constant reference to active principles at least 
since the 1630s up to and including Newton indicates ‘that there may be a clear 
tradition of active principles in English matter theory at this time’.43 This tradition of 
active principles is a relevant background on which the ‘laws of nature’ were 
considerably transformed in England. If Descartes considered that his laws of nature 
were sufficient to ‘explain all the phenomena of nature’,44 making powers and 
 
39 Rogers, ‘Descartes and the English’; Henry, ‘The Reception of Cartesianism’. 
40 Barrow, ‘Oratio’. 
41 Henry, ‘The Reception of Cartesianism’, 123. 
42 Henry, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy’. Henry has further developed details of 
this general claim in Henry, ‘Robert Hooke: The Incongrous Mechanist’; Henry, ‘Boyle and Cosmical 
Qualities’; Henry, ‘The Fragmentation of Renaissance Occultism’. See also, Hutchison, ‘What 
Happened to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?’; Feingold, ‘The Occult Tradition in the 
English Universities of the Renaissance: A Reassessment’; Wang, ‘“Though Their Causes Be Not yet 
Discover’d”’. 
43 Henry, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy’, 342. 
44 Descartes, AT, 1897, I:70; Descartes, CSM, 1984, III:7. 
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qualities in matter redundant, his English fellows disagreed. In the hands of the 
English virtuosi, ‘laws of nature’ made necessary some other principles of activity in 
matter. Accordingly, the virtuosi disseminated the Cartesian idea of law with some 
radical transformations.  
 
Two aspects of this tradition are central to this transformation of laws: (1) that 
passive matter could not ‘save the phenomena’ of everyday experience and therefore 
(2) some active principles which inhere in matter superadded by God account for 
them, although their cause is unknown. In this way, occult qualities or principles of 
activity in matter ‘so important for understanding the true nature of God’s creation, 
could only be evinced, it was claimed, by experimental procedures’.45 The 
commitment to the establishment of matters-of-fact made reasonable to postulate 
occult qualities whose effects could be uncovered experimentally, although their 
cause remained hidden. These views were underpinned by religious and social 
assumptions. The Cartesian world-view, seen through the English lens, implied that 
the world did not require divine intervention to operate after its initial creation. If the 
world was set in motion and could endure in this way indefinitely by the endless 
transmission of the same amount of motion by the laws of nature, it was easy to 
imagine that God was not required at all.  
 
The criticisms of ‘laws of nature’ for their inadequacy in accounting for phenomena 
and for their dangerous theological implications are prominent in Barrow’s Oratio. 
After the thorough summary of the ‘Cartesian hypothesis’ already mentioned, 
Barrow claimed that ‘this hypothesis is not able to give a suitable cause of many 
phenomena with which the philosophical man could be content’. The ‘consensus’ of 
philosophers, scholars and even the alchemists show how wrong is the solitary 
Descartes in giving birth to ‘all this Theatre … only from the brain of a single 
man’.46 In Barrow’s view, the singularity of opinion against the consensus was a 
powerful argument to invalidate his opponent. Among the various phenomena that 
the Cartesian hypothesis could not explain, Barrow emphasised the animal motion, 
 
45 Henry, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy’, 338. 




particularly ‘certain natural spirit … joined to the heart or brain … Without it the 
body would putrify most horribly in two days’. But Descartes ‘has not … nobly set 
this forth, in saying body is a mere bulk or mass of homogeneous nature, divided into 
parts of various shape, in which there are diverse motions, flowing by a clearly blind 
law, with no presiding spirit, no directing wisdom in the actions, no endeavour to a 
goal and no other efficient intervening thing than the ordinary maintenance of God’. 
The general assessment of Descartes hypothesis, is negative: 
For [Descartes] all things are established by God, devoid of innate 
power. All effects occur by force and with affliction, and the 
internal principles, thus far admitted by a vast consensus of 
Philosophers, are rejected by him, together with the idea of striving 
for ends [intentione finium]. And in place of these they [Plato and 
Aristotle] will exclaim, that Descartes has laid out dead and 
thoughtless principles; nature without soul; the outer shell without 
the nucleus.47 
The omission of active principles in matter was a peculiar feature of this problematic 
hypothesis against which, ‘the general consensus of philosophers’ disagreed. Barrow 
not only opposed the authority of the Ancient philosophers to the inadequacy of the 
Cartesian hypothesis, accusing Descartes’ of leaving aside ‘two of the four causes’; 
he also invoked that of ‘our Baron of Verulam’. The point here was to stress that 
Descartes recognised ‘no ends or goals of natural agents, no desires, no instincts in 
things inherent from the beginning, but utterly banishes the entire lot of affections, 
hostilities, contrarieties, sympathies and antipathies’. All these elements are the life, 
soul or nucleus of nature. Barrow put forth that an important layer of the natural 
world, on which there was vast agreement among philosophers, naturalists, 
alchemists, could not be explained by the Cartesian hypothesis. This blatant omission 
made manifest that the hypothesis failed to grasp the core of the natural world. 
Instead, Descartes delivered ‘dead and thoughtless principles’. Simultaneously,  
He thinks unworthily of the Supreme Author of things who asserts 
that God has created in a single manner only one, homogeneous 
matter, dull and inanimate, extending through all the acres of 
immense space, and that, by the single instrument of motion, he 
directs these festive games and the whole mundane comedy, like a 
woodworker or artificer, who repeats and displays his single art ad 
nauseam. Rather, it seems he thinks more worthily of God who 
believes God has, out of his immense goodness and kindness, 
 
47 Stewart, ‘“Fleshy Books”’, 74; Barrow, ‘Oratio’, 88. 
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imparted to innumerable species each its own particular essence, 
bestowing on each one its own peculiar desire and individual 
means of acting, distributing all things in a fitting order in their 
proper degree and station for their mutual aid, and subordinating 
some to others according to a preordained order of things. 48 
In Barrow’s view, the ‘laws of nature’ (‘the single instrument of motion’) were 
inevitably linked with an impious cosmology, based on ‘dull and inanimate’ matter, 
and making of God some kind of puppet master doing the same trick once and again 
forever. A view of the world in which matter is endowed with principles of activity, 
according to their ‘own particular essence’ in ‘a fitting order in their proper degree 
and station for their mutual aid’, that is, sympathies, ‘it is better piously’.49 While 
some English natural philosophers praised the universality (‘catholique’) of Cartesian 
laws, Barrow saw in them a ‘general, loose and indeterminate’ feature, so that ‘one 
could with greatest justice think that whatsoever appears according to these laws, 
happened by a certain accident or by chance’. The generality was further evidence of 
their uselessness.  
 
However, not all those who rejected the Cartesian exclusion of activity in matter got 
rid of laws of nature; on the contrary, the opposite seems to be the case. However, 
laws were not conceived as causes. From Glanvill and Charleton to Boyle and 
Hooke, ‘laws of nature’ were reworked into programmatic statements and into 
explanations of phenomena. Perhaps the most famous programmatic statement 
concerning the enquiry of the natural world in the seventeenth century is Boyle’s 
characterisation of the ‘mechanical philosophy’ in the The Origin of Forms and 
Qualities (1666-7), which generations of historians made the golden standard of the 
strict mechanical philosophy, for reducing all explanation to matter in motion.50 
Boyle agreed ‘with the generality of Philosophers so far as to allow, that there is one 
Catholick or Universal matter common to all Bodies, by which I mean a Substance 
extended, indivisible and impenetrable’. Following the Cartesian reasoning, Boyle 
explained that because this matter was ‘in its own Nature but one’ the diversity we 
 
48 Barrow, ‘Oratio’, 89–90; Cf. Stewart, ‘“Fleshy Books”’. 
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see in bodies arose from motion that ‘must have various tendencies’. In order to 
clarify this conception of motion, ‘hotly disputed’, he reviewed that ‘Antient 
Corpuscularian Philosophers, not acknowledging an Author of the Universe, were 
thereby reduc’d to make Motion congenite to Matter’. Boyle provided two arguments 
against this view: first, motion should not be included in the definition of matter 
because ‘the nature of Matter, which is as much Matter, when it rests, as when it 
moves’. Second, because when ‘a portion of matter may from Motion be reduc’d to 
Rest’ remained at rest unless ‘some external Agents be set a moving again’. Next, 
Boyle praised ‘the Excellent Des cartes’ for having revived the opinion of the Greeks 
that ‘the Origine of Motion in Matter is from God’, specifically through laws of 
motion: 
and not onely so, but that thinking it very unfit to be believ’d, that 
Matter barely put into Motion, and then left to it self, should 
Casually constitute this beautiful and orderly World: I think also 
further, that the wise Author of Things did by establishing the laws 
of Motion among Bodies, and by guiding the first Motions of the 
small parts of Matter, bring them to convene after the manner 
requisite to compose the World, and especially did contrive those 
curious and elaborate Engines, the bodies of living Creatures, 
endowing most of them with a power of propagating their 
Species.51 
Boyle’s appropriation of ‘laws of nature’ entailed a revaluation of them to make laws 
of motion compatible ‘with our Hypothesis’. Boyle criticises the idea that ‘these 
Cartesian Laws … could bring meer Matter into so orderly and well contriv’d 
Fabrick as This World’. In Boyle’s view, God created the world and established 
laws, but mainly he also did  
contrive some portions of that Matter into Seminal Rudiments or 
Principles, lodg’d in convenient Receptacles, (and as it were 
Wombs,) and others into the Bodies of Plants and Animals: one 
main part of whose Contrivance, did, as I apprehend, consist in 
this, That some of their Organs were so fram’d, that, supposing the 
Fabrick of the greater Bodies of the Universe, and the Laws he had 
establish’d in Nature, some Juicy and Spirituous parts of these 
living Creatures must be fit to be turn’d into Prolifick Seeds, 
whereby they may have a power, by generating their like, to 
propagate their Species.52 
 
51 Boyle, Works, vols 5, 305–6. 
52 Boyle, vols 5, 352–3. 
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Boyle introduced principles of activity in matter to account for some varieties of 
motion in nature and to correct the undesirable theological consequences of the ‘laws 
of nature’ stating that the same quantity of motion remained in the world. The 
validity of laws, as laws of motion, was subsidiary of ‘the contrivance’ of nature 
which contained ‘seminal rudiments or principles’ causing matter to move: these 
seeds, not the laws, generated motion.  
 
5.4.‘Elliptical astronomy’ 
Perhaps the soil on which the Cartesian laws were most fruitful in England was the 
‘magnetical cosmology’. The movement was inspired by Gilbert’s attempts to 
provide a physical explanation of the motion of the Earth. In De magnete (1600) 
Gilbert formulated experiments on the magnetical properties of the terrella—small 
spherical loadstone—in order to treat ‘of the globe of earth as a loadstone’. Gilbert 
concluded that ‘magnetic energy (…) exists in the earth just as in the terrella’.53 The 
magnetic nature of Earth accounted for terrestrial gravitation, the Earth’s constant 
orientation in space, its daily rotation generated by the magnetic influence of the Sun 
and the compact between the earth and the moon. The effect of the magnetical 
influence was not limited to the Earth but thanks to the Sun’s conception as a giant 
magnet, it extended all over the Solar System.54 Gilbert’s efforts to provide a 
physical explanation of the motion of the Earth, as implied by the Copernican 
hypothesis, gave rise to a tradition that ranges up to the end of the century.  
 
Arguably, Gilbert’s most enduring contribution to the development of English 
astronomy was the analogy between magnetism and gravity. His conception of 
magnetism rejected the possibility of actio in distans and explained the mutual 
attraction of magnets as the outcome of their capacity of self-motion in virtue of their 
souls. 55 Nevertheless, in the English natural philosophy that reached up to Hooke, 
magnetism and gravity were regarded as paradigmatic cases of action-at-a-distance 
and thus non-reducible to contact action. Thanks to Bacon’s appropriation of Gilbert, 
magnetism and gravity were conceived in terms of action-at-a-distance. This 
 
53 Gilbert, De Magnete, 313–14. 
54 Bennett, ‘Cosmology and the Magnetical Philosophy 1640-1680’, 165–66. 
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influence is visible in John Wilkins, Walter Charleton, John Wallis, Christopher 
Wren and Robert Hooke.56  
 
One important stimulus for the development of this tradition came from Kepler’s 
physica cœlestis. Kepler had formulated an astronomy based on natural philosophy 
which, in order to explain the orbital motion, drew explicitly from Gilbert’s 
magnetical philosophy.57 English astronomers and natural philosophers of the first 
half of the seventeenth century, who considered Gilbert as ‘the founder of the 
experimental method’, interpreted Kepler’s work as part of the same endeavour.58 
English astronomers were already analysing the motion of planets in terms of 
physical causes under Gilbert’s influence, so Kepler’s astronomy did not depart form 
their assumptions. At least since the 1630s, astronomers associated with the 
‘magnetical cosmology’ enthusiastically incorporated Kepler’s astronomical and 
cosmological developments into their own work, in contrast with their Continental 
counterparts who explicitly rejected Kepler’s natural philosophy and cosmology for 
transgressing the boundaries of astronomy.59 The ‘magnetical cosmologists’ or 
‘elliptical astronomers’, as some of them referred to themselves once Kepler was 
widely accepted, did not see the entire Cartesian philosophy as challenging their 
developments.  
 
The reception of Kepler in England was mainly associated with the names of 
William Crabtree, Jeremiah Horrocks and William Gascoigne. Horrocks, a young 
Cambridge scholar, was dissatisfied with the work of the Dutch mathematician Philip 
van Lansberge, particularly with his tables. Thanks to the advice of Crabtree, who 
recommended buying Kepler’s works, Horrocks turned to Kepler between 1636 and 
1637.60 When Horrocks got the Tabulæ Rudolphinæ in May 1637, he wrote to 
Crabtree that it is ‘a most absolute piece of work’.61 Largely influenced by Kepler’s 
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astronomy, Horrocks revised Kepler’s tables—from which he predicted the 1639 
transit of Venus–, developed a theory of the moon and based on harmonic reasoning, 
calculated the planetary distances and the size of the universe.62 In his short life, 
Horrocks provided a fundamental link between the work of Kepler and the English 
cosmology. 
 
Following Gilbert, Horrocks was concerned with the explanation of planetary motion 
in terms of magnetic attraction. In the same spirit, Horrocks critically revised 
Kepler’s major tenets.63 Central to Kepler’s account of planetary motion was the idea 
that magnetic fibres within the Earth maintained a constant direction with respect to 
the zodiac, despite the Earth’s rotation, and so caused the Earth to be alternately 
attracted to and repelled from the Sun. Horrocks’ dissatisfaction with this 
explanation led him to find alternative explanations in conical pendula: the bob of the 
pendulum moved in an oval, and the line of apsides of the oval advanced just as in 
planetary motion.64 In this model, the planet was attracted to, but never repelled by 
the Sun. However, the oval described by the conical pendulum was concentric, while 
Kepler had calculated an eccentric path. Horrocks conjectured that, in the case of the 
pendulum, a wind could cause the orbital oval of the conical pendulum to become 
eccentric. In the case of the planets, it would be due to an internal propensity, a 
tendency of the planets to rest in the place where they were first placed, their aphelia. 
Horrocks explained this in detail that: 
ye eccentricity of ye planets is caused by the contention between ye 
Suns magneticall (and always attractive) virtue, and ye planets 
dulnes naturally desiring to rest unmoved, which dulnes, while ye 
Suns circular motion carrys ye planet from ye aphelium, is 
conquered, and so ye planets motion inceraseth in fastnes; but when 
ye Suns circular revolution doth recarry it backe toward the 
aphelium, the natural torpor and dulnes increaseth, by ye presence 
and neerness of yt place where it would rest…. Keplers Astronomy 
differes from mine…: He gives ye planets a divers nature (good 
and bad) yt they may eyther come to ye Sun or fly away at their 
pleasure, or at least (as his second thoughts are) so dispose 
themselves (inspite of all ye Suns magneticall power) yt ye Sun is 
 
62 Wilson, ‘On the Origin of Horrocks’s Lunar Theory’; Chapman, ‘Horrocks, Crabtree and the 1639 
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bound to attract or expel them, according to yt position, wch 
themselves defend against all ye Suns labouring to incline the 
fibers. I on ye contrary, make the planet naturally to be averse from 
ye Sun, and desirous to rest in its own place, caused by a material 
dulnes naturally opposite to motion, and averse from ye Sun, 
without eyther power or will to move to ye Sun of itselfe.65 
Kepler’s explanation of planetary motion postulated magnetic properties in the Earth 
and the Sun; Horrocks moved in a different direction. In his view, the magnetic 
virtue of the Sun was compensated by what he calls ‘material dullness naturally 
opposite to motion’, a natural tendency in the Earth to find its own place. The 
interaction of these components explained the eccentricity of the oval orbit. The 
place where the Earth ‘desires’ to rest was the aphelion which, in Horrocks’ 
cosmology, was the point where God placed it in the fourth day of the creation. In 
place of Kepler’s repulsion, Horrocks introduced an ‘aversion’ to the Sun as the 
natural desire of Earth to find its own place. In Astronomia Kepleriana, Horrocks 
borrowed the term ‘inertia’ from Kepler to characterise ‘this natural dulnes’: ‘The 
cause of the eccentricity is, in consequence, the very essence of the Planet, that is, its 
natural inertia ad motum, which tends to keep it in its place against the abduction of 
the Sun’.66 
 
Although Horrocks’ papers remained unpublished until the 1670s, some members of 
the Royal Society had access to them in the 1660s, particularly Wallis, who met 
Horrocks in Cambridge.67 An important stimulus in the development of the 
magnetical cosmology, initially gathered around the Gresham College in London, 
came from the move to Oxford by the mid-century;68 figures such as Seth Ward, 
John Wallis and John Wilkins emerged and interacted here. Writing in the 1650s, 
Ward, the Savilian Professor of Astronomy reported that ‘not one man here, who is 
so farre Astronomicall, as to be able to calculate an Eclipse, who hath not received 
the Copernican System, (as it was left by him, or as improved by Kepler, Bullialdus, 
our own Professor, and others of the Ellipticall way) either as an opinion, or at 
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leastwise, as the most intelligible, and most convenient Hypothesis’.69 In this context, 
Christopher Wren learned about Kepler, probably through Seth Ward. Wren, and 
Hooke after him, integrated the laws coming from Descartes with the elliptical 
astronomy by conceiving planetary motion as a compound of an impressed motion 
and an attractive force from the Sun. In so doing, they transformed the idea of law by 
encompassing it with a conception of motion as generated by forces, rather than by 
collision and impact.  
 
In his inaugural address as Professor of Astronomy at Gresham College in 1657, 
Wren recalled the major achievements of astronomy and placed Gilbert as the 
founder of a new philosophy. In a draft of this address, Wren stated that thanks to the 
correspondence between the terrella and the ‘great Magnet of the Earth’, Gilbert 
found out ‘a new Science’ upon which ‘Cartesius’ built. At the same time, Gilbert’s 
experiment gave ‘occasion to Kepler (…) of introducing Magneticks into the 
Motions of the Heavens, and consequently of building the elliptical astronomy’.70 It 
is noteworthy that Wren sees Gilbert as founding a new philosophy and Descartes as 
building on it. Wren’s ‘new philosophy’ is not the ‘mechanical philosophy’ of Boyle, 
revived by the ‘Excellent Descartes’, but the ‘new Science’ of Gilbert. Wren’s 
approach to Descartes’ laws of nature is framed within his commitment to the ‘new 
philosophy’.  
 
A key to understand this subordination of Descartes to Gilbert appears in a letter. The 
King had accepted an invitation to visit the Royal Society and Oldenburg wrote to 
some members about the experiments that should be performed for that occasion. 
Wren replied that:  
Experiments for the establishment of natural philosophy are 
seldom pompous. It is upon billiards and tennis-balls, upon the 
purling of sticks and tops, upon a vial of water, or a wedge of 
glass, that the great Des Cartes hath built the most refined accurate 
theories, that human wit ever reached to; and certainly nature, in 
the best of her works, is apparent enough by obvious things, were 
they but curiously observed. The key, that opens treasures is often 
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plain and rusty; but unless it be gilt, the key alone will make no 
shew at court.71 
Wren’s account inscribed Descartes’ in the context of the experimental practises. 
Descartes’ ‘accurate theories’ were the outcome of experiments inadequate for the 
royal visit. Interestingly, Wren mentioned that ‘certainly nature, in the best of her 
works, is apparent enough by obvious things, were they but curiously observed’. 
While Barrow saw laws of nature as insufficient given their ultimate foundation in a 
problematic metaphysics, Wren focused on the innumerable Cartesian references to 
experiments and considered that his ‘accurate theories’ may be subject of 
experimental verification, particularly the rules of motion that spelt out the third 
Cartesian law. The experiments that Descartes presented here and there were 
regarded as underpinning his theories and thus improving these experiments should 
lead to better conclusions.  
 
Sprat attributed the Royal Society’s interest in the laws of motion, which ended up in 
the debate on the collision of bodies by the end of the 1660s,72 to the personal 
interests of Christopher Wren. Perhaps the search for the ‘true’ laws of motion 
exhibits, like no other topic, the dynamics of the early Royal Society, for it lies at the 
crossroads of personal and collective concerns. At the same time, the quest for laws 
was constant subject of disagreement between those who defended an orientation 
towards some forms of antiquarianism (fact-gathering) without any theoretical 
direction and those who stood for a more organised, systematic agenda, including the 
experimental validation of hypotheses.73 It is no coincidence that the debate on the 
collision of bodies, including all the experimental displays concerning pendula—
with trials on top of St. Paul’s cathedral–, added to the correspondence with a 
Continental figure of the stature of Huygens, occurred during an identity crisis of the 
Royal Society.74 In this context appeared Sprat’s History of the Royal Society of 
London (1667). There, Sprat remarked Wren’s role in single-handedly introducing 
into the Society his interest in the laws of motion, as part of a personal interest that 
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had been going for some years.75 Sprat’s presentation of Wren as the main fellow 
concerned with the ‘doctrine of motion’ provides interesting elements. First, Sprat 
claimed that the ‘doctrine of motion’ established ‘the principles of philosophy’ by 
‘geometrical demonstration’; that is, the idea that motion is the centre of natural 
philosophy is not challenged here, but it is precisely in this sense that the laws of 
nature were dubbed as laws of motion. Second, Sprat mentioned that Descartes made 
some experiments on which he established his entire system. Again, the view that 
Descartes had proceeded in a similar way to that championed—or said to be 
championed—by the Royal Society allowed Sprat to explain that, because some of 
the Cartesian conclusions seemed flawed, Wren developed more sophisticated 
experiments including the construction of instruments for this purpose.76 Descartes 
was read in line with experimental practices and, in consequence, his project was a 
valid enterprise for the fellows. Sprat highlighted the importance of this ‘doctrine of 
motion’ which, in the hands of Wren, achieved ‘true Theories’ validated by 
‘hundreds of Experiments’. Rather than founding principles on conjectures, Wren 
was said to offer experiments. In the last place, and more interestingly, Sprat 
characterises the principles of this doctrine with the traditional terms in which the 
English appropriated Descartes’ laws: as ‘fundamental and universal’. Beyond that, 
Sprat points to application of these principles as bringing up phenomena traditionally 
associated with active principles such as generation, corruption, alteration but in 
general ‘all the Vicissitudes of Nature’ that arise from the ‘meeting of little Bodies’. 
From the reference it is not possible to infer whether these ‘little Bodies’ have self-
motion, active principles or operate only by contact action.  
 
Furthermore, it is hard to say that Sprat’s account of the Royal Society provides 
accurate historical information, largely, because it appears in the context of the crisis 
that I have mentioned. However, we can corroborate Wren’s early interest in the 
topic from an episode triggered by the central importance of the laws of motion in 
the Royal Society. Hooke had been performing ‘experiments of motion’ at least since 
1662 and, as required by his obligations as demonstrator, he needed the approval to 
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pursue these experiments as part of the activities of the Society.77 In the meeting of 
22 October 1668, the president, The Viscount Brouncker, ‘desired, that it might be 
considered, whether it were so proper or necessary to try this sort of experiments, 
since Monsr. Huygens and Dr. Christopher Wren had already taken great pains to 
examine that subject, and were thought to have also found a theory to explicate all 
the phaenomena of motion’.78 Brouckner was present when Huygens met Wren and 
performed these experiments. From his correspondents, Oldenburg already had 
gathered some information about the activities of Huygens during his visit to London 
in April 1661. Spinoza had enquired of Oldenburg in 1665 whether it was true, as 
Huygens presumed, that ‘all his former discoveries concerning motion … had 
subsequently been verified by experiments in England, which I can hardly believe’.79 
In trying to uncover the story, Oldenburg wrote to Robert Moray, a Scottish diplomat 
and natural philosopher. Moray’s reply provides some interesting details: 
When Mr Hugens came first over wee were with him at his lodging 
at the end of Newstreet in Convent Garden, where hee told us 
amongst other things of what he had done in the businesse of 
motion, as hee hath done to your friend of late. At that time Mr 
Rook & Dr Wren had made diverse experiments with balls of 
wood & other stuff hanging by threads whereof you may remember 
to have seen some, upon Mr Hugens undertaking to solve all 
questions of motion according to his rule Dr Wren did propose 
some which he had tryed by experiments, and Mr Hugens did in a 
very short space solve them so as it was concluded by all the 
solution did agree with the experiments that had been made. The L. 
Brouncker was there present too & perhaps your self to. of this you 
may assure your friend. So that Mr Hugens is sure to have the 
better of des Cartes in those things which have been determined by 
Experiments.80 
Apart from depicting the image of how the meetings went, Moray’s description 
shows that by that time, the experimental investigation on the laws of motion was 
conducted by experiments on pendula (‘with balls of wood & other stuff hanging by 
threads’); the same instrument to advance on astronomical examinations. According 
to this evidence, it is clear that Wren was actively concerned with trying experiments 
on the laws of motion when he met Huygens in 1661 (‘Dr Wren did propose some 
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which he had tryed by experiments’). Huygens was probably trying to amuse his 
hosts with conclusions from his unpublished De motu corporum ex percussione 
(1658), in which he had established some new rules for collision which he 
communicated to the Royal Society in 1668-9. It is not surprising, then, that when 
Wallis, Wren and Huygens submitted their papers on the laws of motion by 1668-9, 
Wren’s and Huygens’ were equivalent.81 
 
So far, we have seen that by the time Wren met Huygens in London he already had 
put forward some conclusions on the laws of motion including experiments that he 
shared with Huygens. These studies on the laws of motion occurred as Wren was 
putting forward his results on ‘elliptical astronomy’. The studies on the ‘laws of 
nature’ were integrated into his wider intellectual interests which ultimately were 
framed within the ‘new philosophy’ put forward by Gilbert (Bacon) and invigorated 
by the work of Kepler. Indeed, Wren had conceived orbital motion in terms of a 
central, attractive force and some ‘imprest motion’. When the dispute over the 
priority for the reciprocal inverse-square law surfaced in 1686, Newton wrote to 
Halley asking him whether Wren had knowledge of this proportion. After meeting 
Wren, Halley reported to Newton that:  
According to your desire in your former, I waited upon Sr 
Christopher Wren, to inquire of him, if he had the first notion of 
the reciprocall duplicate proportion from Mr Hook, his answer 
was, that he himself very many years since had had his thoughts 
upon making out the Planets motions by a composition of a 
Descent towards the sun, & an imprest motion; but that at length he 
gave over, not finding the means of doing it. Since which time Mr 
Hook had frequently told him that he had done it, and attempted to 
make it out to him, but that he never satisfied him, that his 
demonstrations were cogent.82 
Noteworthy, the subject of controversy here is not the explanation of planetary 
motion by the composition of two forces, but whether ‘Sr Chr. Wren knew ye 
duplicate proportion wn I gave him a visit, & then Mr Hook (by his book Cometa 
written afterward) will prove ye last of us three yt knew it’.83 Halley and Newton are 
not unbiased sources. However, this reinforces the idea that neither Halley nor 
 
81 Hall, ‘Mechanics and the Royal Society’. 
82 Halley to Newotn, 29 June 1686 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:441–42. 
83 Newton to Hally, 20 June 1686 Turnbull, 2:435. 
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Newton made any further remark on the idea that planetary motion was composed of 
‘a descent towards the sun’ and ‘an imprest motion’.84 Wren avoided the controversy 
by claiming that he did not find ‘the means of doing it’, but he claimed that he knew 
the composite nature of the orbital motion.  
 
Meanwhile, Wren was not the only fellow interested in laws before the Society 
incorporated them into their agenda. As early as 1662, Hooke’s experiments included 
Cartesian laws when investigating the free fall of bodies. Given Mr Hooke’s lower 
social status, in comparison with Dr Wren’s, it seems implausible that Sprat would 
introduce a controversial topic such as the ‘doctrine of motion’ backed up by a lower 
authority.85 However, in early records of the Royal Society, Hooke appears as 
invoking Cartesian laws and presenting them in formalised ways as part of his 
experimental trials. In the mentioned experiments on the free fall, the entry reads: 
Now as exact trials of this kind may be very useful in mechanics, 
so could they be made with bodies perfectly solid, would they be 
for the establishment of one of the chiefest philosophical 
principles, namely, to shew the strength, which a corpuscle moved 
has to move another; and though Des Cartes’, put it as a: principle, 
that si corpus C plane quiesceret, essetque paulo majus quam B, 
quacunque cum celeritate B moveretur versus C, nunquam ipsum C 
moveret sed ab eo repelleretur in contrariam partem: yet these 
experiments do seem to hint, that the least body by an acquired 
celerity may be able to remove the greatest ; though how much of 
its motion is imparted to the bigger, body, and how much of it is 
recoiled into the smaller, be not determined by these experiments.86 
Leaving aside the omission in Sprat’s history, from the story of Wren and from the 
record of Hooke’s experimental activity the appropriation of laws of nature, as laws 
of motion, was not restricted to mechanics. Hooke was in fact enquiring whether 
there was some loss of motion in the collision of bodies and then the total quantity of 
motion in the universe was not eternally preserved.87 Both Wren and Hooke 
incorporated laws in enquiries falling beyond the traditional problems of the science 
 
84 Gal, Meanest Foundations; Henry, ‘Gravity and De gravitatione’. 
85 Shapin, ‘Who Was Robert Hooke?’ 
86 Birch, The History of the Royal Society, 1754, 1:197. 
87 Gal, Meanest Foundations; Bennett, ‘Robert Hooke as Mechanic and Natural Philosopher’; 
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of mechanics as a mathematical discipline concerned only with the five manual 
powers or the classical machines. 
 
In the experiments that Hooke ‘demonstrated’ to the Society on the collision of 
motion, it is possible to appreciate topics that he will incorporate later into his own 
natural philosophy. Hooke’s first significant activity before the Society concerning 
laws in February 1662 referred to Descartes’ third law in connection with 
experiments on the free fall of bodies. In a meeting of 16 January 1667, Oldenburg 
reported that the Council ‘had thought fit that the experiments for making out a 
theory of the laws of motion formerly begun by Dr. Wren, Dr. Croune, and Mr. 
Hooke; as also those about the magnet formerly begun by Mr. Balle and Mr. Hooke, 
should be prosecuted’. The Society decided to consult Wren for his experiments but 
he argued that ‘the account of them was at Oxford’ so ‘Mr Hooke was desired to 
bring his, as also that Mr. Hooke should prosecute the experiments of the 
loadstone’.88 Hooke suggested experiments showing ‘that the motion of the celestial 
bodies might be represented by pendulums’.89  
 
Hooke greatly contributed to the tradition of the magnetical cosmology, including his 
appropriation of active principles and occult qualities as crucial elements in 
explaining the totality of phenomena.90 Hooke incorporated the Cartesian laws with 
his own view dominated by active principles and his experimental approach. In so 
doing, Hooke transformed the meaning of laws in the sense that they now referred to 
forces generating motion. The existence of these forces may be ‘demonstrated’ by 
experiments and represented by mathematics, although their causes remained occult. 
 
While the discussion on laws and the collision of bodies was gaining strength in the 
Royal Society, Hooke presented in 1666 a paper concerning ‘the inflection of a direct 
motion into a curve by a supervening attractive principle’, which situated the laws of 
nature in the context of the magnetical cosmology. ‘I have often wondered—Hooke 
 
88 Birch, The History of the Royal Society, 1756, 2:187. 
89 Birch, 2:89. 
90 Henry, ‘Robert Hooke: The Incongrous Mechanist’; Henry, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental 
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claimed—why the planets should move about the sun according to Copernicus’s 
supposition, being not included in any solid orbs (..) nor tied to it, as their center, by 
any visible strings; and neither depart from it beyond such a degree, nor yet move in 
a strait line, as all bodies, that have but one single impulse, ought to do’.91 This was 
the central problem of the magnetical cosmology: why the planets move around the 
Sun if there was no visible mechanism holding them. The planets revolve around the 
Sun in circular or elliptical motions, but ‘a solid body … must persevere in its 
motion in a right line, and neither deflect this way nor that way from it’. Assuming in 
this way Descartes’ first and second laws, Hooke concluded that the motion of 
planets ‘must have some other cause, besides the first impressed impulse, that must 
bend their motion into that curve’. Hooke offered two hypotheses to explain the 
‘inflection’: the first was a varying density in the medium in which planets move, but 
he quickly discarded it. The second hypothesis was ‘an attractive property of the 
body placed in the center; whereby it continually endeavours to attract or draw it to 
itself’. If this principle was assumed then, ‘all the phenomena of the planets seem 
possible to be explained by the common principle of mechanic motions’. And 
following this path, this ‘may give us a true hypothesis of their motion, and from 
some few observations, their motions may be so far brought to a certainty’.92 The 
‘common principle of mechanics motion’ was some laws concerning the motion of 
bodies in inclined planes which Hooke applied to the motion of a circular pendulum, 
from which he concluded that the ‘conatus of returning to the center in a pendulum is 
greater and greater’. According to the records of the meeting, Hooke ‘demonstrated’ 
two experiments ‘with a large wooden ball of lignum vitæ fastened to the roof’. 
Interestingly, Hooke considered that the analysis of circular motion ‘compounded of 
an endeavour by a direct motion by the tangent, and of another endeavour tending to 
the center’ could explain ‘the phaenomena of the comets as well as of the planets 
(…) and the motions of the secondary, as well as of the primary planets’.93 The 
solution to the problem did not include an explanation of the nature of the attractive 
power of the Sun. Hooke relied on the tradition of the magnetical cosmology 
explaining this attractive power in terms of magnets, claiming that the Sun has an 
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attractive power ‘whereby they may be said to attract in the same manner as the 
Load-stone hath to Iron, and the Iron hath to the Load-stone’.94 In his ‘Lectures of 
Light’ of the same year, Hooke speculated on the nature of this attraction, claiming 
that ‘there may be many other motions and Operations of Bodies at a distance, and 
several other ways by which the Bodies of the World may influence one another, 
though it has pleased God not to give us Organs or Senses to discover them, and 
thereby many things that are accounted Sympathetick or Magical may be done by 
Natural Causes and Powers of which we have no Organs to make us sensible’.95 
These ‘natural causes and powers’ could be clarified by experiments, but not entirely 
unveiled. In finding natural knowledge we go ‘from the lowest and most sensible 
Effects, to highest and higher Steps of Causes, the nearer shall we be to the highest 
and utmost pitch that human Nature is capable of arriving at’. This ‘highest point’ is 
‘the knowledge of the alterations’ of matter and motion that ‘flow from the 
Omnipotent Wisdom that ordered them to do so … which we call the Laws of 
Nature’. But these laws, or principles of alteration, were not grasped by an act of the 
mind, but by a faculty that God had ‘implanted in Man’ by which ‘he has a Power of 
understanding and finding out, by and according to what Order, Rule, Method, or 
Law, they act, and produce the Effects that are produced by them’. This faculty was 
not the Cartesian reason, but the capacity of ‘understanding’ how powers act from 
‘the lowest and more sensible effects’, that is, from experiments.96  
 
Hooke’s efforts were not restricted to the explanation of some phenomena. In the 
closing words of An attempt to prove the motion of the Earth by Observations 
(1674), he sketched a programme encompassing active principles, occult qualities 
and his unique mathematical approach. This programme would be the outcome of the 
improvement of instruments and experiments that shall correct astronomical tables, 
but also provide advances in navigation and geography. These instruments detected 
‘the properties and effects of motions from prompting secret and swift conveyance 
and correspondence’—a reference to the explanatory approach of the experimental 
tradition. But Hooke claimed that he has also ‘discovered some new Motions even in 
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95 Hooke, Posthumous Works, 79. 
96 Hooke, 173. 
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the Earth’, although he did not have enough experiments on them yet. Instead of 
uncovering the causes, Hooke stated that he would explain ‘a System of the World 
differing in many particulars from any yet known’, whose main feature would be that 
it would answer ‘in all things to the common Rules of Mechanical motions’. The 
system was based on three suppositions: the first is ‘That all Coelestial Bodies 
whatsoever, have an attraction or gravitating power towards their own Centers’. 
However, this power was not restricted to their particles but also to the entire 
universe; Hooke’s asserts the mutual attraction of all particles and bodies ‘that are 
within the sphere of their activity’. The second was that ‘all bodies whatsoever that 
are put into a direct and simple motion, will so continue to move forward in a streight 
line, till they are by some other effectual powers deflected and bent into a Motion, 
describing a Circle, Ellipsis, or some other more compounded Curve Line’. This is 
one of the Cartesian first two laws concerning the rectilinear conservation of 
impressed motion. The third supposition is that ‘these attractive powers are so much 
the more powerful in operating, by how much the nearer the body wrought upon is to 
their own Centers’, that is, these powers were proportional to the distance. The idea 
was not new, for Bacon had already suggested that (terrestrial) gravity may vary 
according to the distance from the earth.97 Hooke explained that this principle ‘will 
mightily assist the Astronomer to reduce all the Cœlestial Motions to a certain rule’ 
and that the key to understanding it was ‘the nature of the Circular Pendulum and 
Circular Motion’. Following this path shall lead to appreciate that ‘all the great 
Motions of the World to be influenced by this Principle, and that the true 
understanding thereof will be the true perfection of Astronomy’.98 
 
* * * 
 
The critical appropriation of Cartesianism in England transformed the meaning and 
uses of laws in function of the background against which Descartes’ postulates were 
evaluated. The core critique can be summarised in the words of Barrow, when 
claiming that Descartes had provided ‘the outer shell without the nucleus’, that is, 
that Descartes’ view just scratched the surface of nature but could not reach to the 
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principles of activity which were seen by English philosophers as central in 
explaining the natural world. In Barrow’s view, this omission was enough to 
abandon Cartesian philosophy. However, other English fellows kept the shell, so to 
speak, but incorporated nucleuses coming from their own background. The tradition 
of the magnetical cosmology provided a fine example of this. The Principia 
Philosophiæ brought the idea that bodies remained in their state if undisturbed and 
that the minimum motion was rectilinear. However, in the eyes of most English 
philosophers, the consideration of motion was not limited to the translatio depending 
on a relative frame of reference (the shell) but, as Hooke said, it should be seen as 
alteration: as the result of powers or forces interacting in nature (the nucleus). The 
actions of these powers were uncovered and clarified by experiments and their 
motions could be explained mathematically by laws of motion. In this way, ‘laws of 
nature’ were deprived of their causal role in natural philosophy, which was now 
attributed to powers and forces; however, the content of these laws was reworked in 




6. Mechanica sive motu geometria: Wallis and Barrow 
Any magnitude (among which I esteem even a Point …) is moveable, that is, in what Manner soever 
we behold it, the same may be made to change its Place continually, according to the prescribed 
differences, viz. with a strait or circular Motion; equally swift or in any matter more accelerated, or 
retarded: I say, Mathematicians assume at pleasure any Motions of this kind as evidently possible, in 
order to find out and demonstrate what follows from thence. 
Barrow, Geometrical lectures.1 
 
What need is there [in geometry] for the concepts of body or motion, since the concept of a line can be 
understood without them? (…) [This] is plainly physical, nor is it in any way connected with it, so to 
what purpose was any mention to be made of it in this mathematical definition of yours? 
Wallis, Elenchus Geometriæ Hobbianæ.2 
 
English natural philosophers criticised Descartes’ reductionist approach and, in so 
doing, rejected Descartes’ gambit to endow natural philosophy with the certainty of 
mathematics. Boyle, who appreciated mathematics, dismissed the idea of a natural 
philosophy governed by mathematics for considering it too selective, not to mention 
that mathematics ran at odds with the non-idealised approach championed by the 
experimental philosophy; mathematics was not an appropriate language for 
gentlemanly discussions on philosophical matters.3 In this light, while English 
natural philosophers incorporated the contents of Cartesian laws into their 
endeavours, the emphasis upon experiments and the probabilistic attitude towards 
knowledge discarded laws as a priori principles. Thus, ‘laws of nature’ were 
deprived of the causal role that Descartes’ had attributed them and, in their place, 
English natural philosophers put the activity in matter, such as gravity, magnetism 
and fermentation whose existence could be postulated initially without stipulating 
any mechanism of action. The contents of ‘laws of nature’ were as well reworked as 
mathematical laws of motion in mechanics. 
 
Although the experimental approach informed the developments in natural 
philosophy, the profound transformations in mathematics were also pivotal in 
 
1 Barrow, Geometrical Lectures, 9. 
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reordering the disciplinary boundaries in the second half of the seventeenth century. 
The invention of the method of indivisibles, the emergence of algebra and the ‘new 
analysis’, the discovery of new curves, the growing importance of the infinite series 
and calculus cannot be isolated from the transformations in astronomy and 
mechanics.4 Problems such as the centres of gravity, the behaviour of bodies at the 
beginning of motion and the definition of instantaneous or mean velocity occurred in 
conjunction with these mathematical achievements.5 Furthermore, given the growing 
application of mechanical resources to astronomical problems, the boundaries and 
connections among experimental practices, mathematics, astronomy and mechanics 
were open-ended. 
 
This chapter focuses on Wallis’ and Barrow’s ‘physicalisation’ of mathematical 
language, as a redrawing of disciplinary boundaries. I will highlight how 
mathematical language became aligned with the natural world and how this helps to 
understand the transformation of laws explaining motion, now relocated to 
mechanics, in the second half of the seventeenth century in England. Wallis’ 
Mechanica provides a respectable state of the art of mechanics at the time of its 
printing.6 He considered that the introduction of physical notions—such as motion—
into mathematics was adequate only in mechanics, that is, in the geometry of motion 
as an application of the study of continuous magnitude in a particular domain. 
Physical notions were inadequate and unnecessary in (pure) geometry, not to 
mention arithmetic and algebra. In Wallis’ view, geometry was founded upon 
arithmetic so that even geometric results should be achieved by arithmetic 
calculation. Against Wallis, Barrow claimed that it is not the abstract nature of 
number but the ‘conditions of matter’ to which numbers were applied that ultimately 
validated the result of any mathematical procedure. In his Lectiones, Barrow put 
forward a long-scale reform of mathematics and developed a geometry of motion, in 
connection with other aspects of his intellectual interests.7 In this reform, 
 
4 Cf. Mancosu, Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century; 
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mathematics was concerned with the generation of magnitudes and therefore 
geometry (of motion) became the model of knowledge. Because geometry primarily 
dealt with motion, the remaining mathematical sciences were but particular domains 
of geometry; natural philosophy was ‘coextensive’ with mathematics and mixed-
mathematical sciences became branches of physics. The place of motion in 
mathematics implied different conceptions of what was explained in the laws of 
motion. 
  
6.1. Wallis’ laws of motion as principles of mechanics 
In November 1668, Wallis wrote to Oldenburg disclosing his ‘principles for 
determining motions’ at the request of the Royal Society, inaugurating the debate on 
the collision of bodies.8 Wallis started off by mentioning that he had sent already two 
papers to the Royal Society, both founded upon ‘the general principles of motion’. In 
the first, he presented the reason why ‘a man can raise at least a hundred pounds by 
blowing up a bladder with his breadth’; in the second, he explained ‘several 
phenomena in the Torrcellian experiment upon the principles of hydrostatics’.9 
Wallis explicitly located the discussion on the laws of motion within mechanics, 
rather than in natural philosophy or cosmology: the use of devices (in this case a 
bladder) in which ‘a great weight can be moved by a small force’ and hydrostatics.10 
Wallis’ 1668 paper dealt with the collision of inelastic bodies, while Huygens and 
Wren studied the more complex situations of elastic bodies. Wallis assumed that the 
bodies were inelastic, equating elasticity with less than perfect hardness.11 Consistent 
with his approach, Wallis’ model for collisions derived from the law of the lever, 
assuming that the products of forces and velocities were the same at their end, rather 
than producing any acceleration. The core of Wallis’ approach is stated in rule 8: 
And this is the foundation of all machines for facilitating motion. 
For in whatever ratio the weight is increased, the speed is 
diminished in the same ratio; whence it is that the product of 
weight and the speed of a moving force is the same. Thus 
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 𝑉: 𝑃𝐶 = 𝑉:𝑚𝑃. (
)
= 𝑃𝐶	12 
Given that impetus was the product of ‘weight’ and ‘speed’, Wallis proceeded to 
calculate the impetus of each body assuming that that other was at rest and then to 
sum algebraically the two impetuses derived for each body. For example, if the initial 
impetuses were equal there was no motion after the collision.13 However, if there is 
any difference, rule 8 makes possible to calculate forces algebraically, something that 
Wallis specified in rules 9, 10 and 11. 
 
Wallis’ laws received critical comments by two anonymous fellows, although 
Huygens’ and Wren’s enquiries on elastic bodies attracted the most attention and 
praise.14 One reaction against Wallis’ terms came from William Neile (1637-1670), a 
young and talented mathematician friend of Wallis.15 Neile’s discomfort with the 
question appeared in a letter to Henry Oldenburg. Neile asked for ‘the nature of 
motion and the nature of quiet’; the knowledge of the outcomes of collisions ‘is good 
for use but it is not science or philosophye’.16 When Wallis’ paper was read at the 
Society in November 1668, Neile wrote to Oldenburg four questions addressed to 
Wallis. Neile asked: (1) Whether quiescent [resting] matter has any resistance to 
motion. (2) Whether motion may pass out of one subject into another. (3) Whether 
‘no Motion in the World perish’, nor new motion be generated. (4) Whether different 
motions meeting, destroy one another.17 Wallis replied to Oldenburg in December 
1668 to every question, without knowing who formulated them. To the first query, 
Wallis replied that it was taken for granted ‘by most of our moderns’ that matter was 
indifferent ‘as to rest or motion’ and also to any ‘direction of motion’, summarising 
the first two Cartesian laws. The reply to the second contrasts the experimental 
approach with the Scholastic philosophy. Wallis said that if the question concerned 
the issue of ‘migratio accidentis’, ‘it is onely to dispute of words’. All he could say 
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was that ‘ye Force or impetus whereby one body is moved, may, by percussion, 
cause another body against which it strikes, to be put into motion: &, withall, loose 
somewhat of its own strength or swiftness; experience tells us clearly inought yt it is 
so: And, in what proportion this is, my late Hypothesis teacheth’. Wallis disregarded 
the question for the transference and nature of motion that had been at the centre of 
the correspondence between More and Descartes by the late 1640s.18 His approach 
displays some distinctive features of the experimental philosophy: ‘it is inough yt it 
is so’ from experience, that the effects of the collision of bodies were clear enough 
from observations. Wallis did not commit himself to any precise terminology: bodies 
were moved by ‘force or impetus’ and once one body stroke the other, there was 
some change in their ‘strength or swiftness’. We observe this in experience. On the 
other hand, Wallis’ laws considered as ‘hypothesis’, ‘teacheth’ the proportion of 
these changes. Therefore, Wallis distinguished what could be gathered from 
experience from what could be explained by geometry (‘proportion’). Concerning the 
third and fourth questions, Wallis refused to provide a clear answer, arguing that 
‘needs distinguishing also’. In a further communication, Wallis argued that when two 
bodies in motion mutually stopped each other (‘as contrary forces’), ‘ye motion of 
both is thereby extinguished & both remain at rest’. Concerning Neile’s replies on 
this point, Wallis commented that ‘whether this motion shall be sayd to be lost, or to 
be onely virtually preserved, is as men shall please to call it’, avoiding again to be 
carried into the Scholastic arena. Neile refused to accept these conclusions, because 
in his view motion and rest were opposed and different motions could not be mixed 
in one body.19  
 
At the end of the questionnaire, Wallis made a general comment on these questions. 
Oldenburg seemed to have asked Wallis (according to Wallis’ quotation in the letter) 
that ‘ye Society in their present disquisitions have rather an Eye to ye Physical causes 
of Motion, & the Principles thereof, than ye Mathematical Rules of it’. Wallis’ 
clarified that, according to his ‘doctrine of motion’, ‘the Hypothesis I sent, is indeed 
 
18 Webster, ‘Henry More and Descartes: Some New Sources’; Leech, The Hammer of the Cartesians : 
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of ye Physical Laws of Motion, but Mathematically demonstrated’ because ‘what is 
Physically performed, is Mathematically measured’. Thus ‘there is no other way to 
determine ye Physical Laws of Motion exactly, but by applying ye Mathematical 
measures & proportions to them’.20 This final remark highlights the difference 
concerning disciplinary boundaries, between what constitutes a proper explanation of 
the phenomena at hand. Wallis felt that the questions came from a different shore and 
then addressed to the root of the problem. Laws of motion were mathematical 
measurements or the proportions accounting for physical phenomena. Mathematics 
and physics were complementary: ‘what is Physically performed, is Mathematically 
measured’. Because the question of the (physical) laws of motion belongs to 
mechanics, ‘there is no other way’ to determine them. Wallis’ laws were neither 
principles of an a priori physics, nor emanations of divine immutability operating as 
causes.21 Wallis’ paper also reflects that mechanics was no longer restricted to the 
study of the ‘violent’ motions or machines; it was extended now to topics that once 
belonged to natural philosophy, such as gravity or the principles of motion but from a 
different perspective. 
 
6.2. Geometria Motu, sive Mechanica 
Wallis’ Mechanica, sive de motu. Tractatus Geometricus was published between 
1669 and 1671 in three voluminous books dealing with the algebraic solution of 
geometrical problems. The book is usually judged by its title, suggesting that it 
expanded significantly the scope of mechanics by including the study of natural 
motions. However, Wallis’ Mechanica barely dealt with any subject that his 
contemporaries would have recognised as mechanical such as the application of 
some demonstrations to astronomy or the study on gravity. Wallis’ greatest 
achievement was to systematise most of what was already known in mechanics that 
had been developed in loosely connected practices.22  
 
 
20 Oldenburg, Correspondence, 1968, 5:221. 
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Following Euclid’s demonstrative way in the Elements, Wallis opened his 
Mechanica with definitions. The first definition established the nature of mechanics: 
‘I call Mechanics the geometry of motion’. Wallis’ definition was historical and 
linguistic, and this argumentative style is prominent in the initial twenty-two 
definitions.23 Wallis explored two uses of the term mechanics that he eventually 
rejected. In the first, mechanics referred to ‘mechanical arts’ as ‘illiberal arts’, that is 
to works concerning labor rather than ingenium. However, mechanics was not only 
differentiated from geometry but from the liberal arts requiring ingenio, and in 
consequence practised by the liberi in contrast with the illiberal arts relying on ‘the 
hand’ and accomplished by servi. The second definition was commonly found in 
geometry for non-constructive geometric solutions. ‘But we do not say Mechanics in 
any of those meanings’—Wallis follows—‘but we understand it as the part of 
geometry which considers motion and investigates by means of reasons and 
demonstrations the force by which any motion is effected’.24 In this definition, 
Wallis considered mechanics as the branch of mathematics dealing with some 
properties of continuous quantity and therefore it is applied geometry. Its method of 
demonstration is axiomatic, hence the style of the book.  
 
The subsequent definitions stated the main aspects of mechanics tanquam geometry 
of motion: its main subject was local motion. Wallis clarified that he did ‘not wish to 
investigate here’ other motions, such as generation, augmentation, alteration; he was 
only concerned with what Greeks called φορὰ or latio in Latin. Because mechanics 
dealt with local motion, it entailed the quantitative consideration of force (vis), time, 
resistance, longitude, momentum, impedimentum, speed, gravity, weight.25 
Definitions 2 to 21 explained these terms. This set of definitions concluded with that 
of machines as ‘the instruments to examine or to facilitate motion, applied from the 
outside’.26 Force, in general, was ‘the power that produces motion’ (potentiam 
efficiendi motum) and resistance ‘the power that is contrary to motion or resist 
 
23 See Beeley, ‘Physical Arguments and Moral Inducements: John Wallis on Questions of 
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motion’ (potentiam motui contrariam). Force, together with time, were related with 
‘momentum’, as generators of motion. Meanwhile, resistance and distance were 
associated with ‘impedimentum’, as preventing motion. In so doing, Wallis stated 
that motion and resistance to motion were outcomes of forces or powers. Meanwhile, 
this conception of force made possible the algebraic operation with them, as additive 
quantities. The central point here is that Wallis provided a definition of the cause of 
motion in an operative, quantitative way. Gravity as force appeared as a case of a 
broader class.  
 
Wallis further studied gravity in a short experimental ‘Discourse’ requested by the 
Royal Society in 1674.27 There, he defined gravity as ‘vix motrix downwards, that is, 
towards the Centre of the Earth’. In the discourse, Wallis explained the terms 
associated with this downwards motion:  
This Motion downward, we call Descent; the Endeavour so to 
move, we call Gravitation; and the Principle from whence this 
Endeavour proceeds, we call Gravity. And things are said to be 
more or less Heavy, as they have more or less of Gravity: Which 
may be understood, either Extensively, according to the Quantity of 
it; as when we say a Pound is heavier than an Ounce, though that 
be Feathers, and this be Lead: Or Intensively, according to the 
Degree; as when we say, that Lead is heavier than Cork, or Quick-
silver than Water; that is, gradually heavier, proportionably heavier 
(bulk for bulk) or (as it is now wont to be called) Specifically 
heavier. 28 
The precision in the vocabulary sheds light on the conception of mechanics at work. 
In the ‘Discourse’, Wallis denominated gravity the principle of gravitation, while in 
the Mechanica he designated it as a motive force (vis motrix, deorsum), as the cause 
of a specific kind of motion, descent. However, the explanation of the definition is 
neither historical nor linguistic, but experimental. Both in Mechanica and in the 
‘Discourse’, Wallis explained that the ‘physical consideration’ of the ‘principle of 
gravitation’ was not ‘investigated here’. It was not of interest for mechanics whether 
gravity was a ‘quality’ or an ‘affection of the body’ or any other ‘name’ by which it 
was called. Neither was it of importance whether it was an innate quality making 
 
27 Wallis, A Discourse of Gravity and Gravitation,. 
28 Wallis, 2. 
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bodies heavy or a common inclination (vergentia) towards the centre; or an electric 
or magnetic capacity (facultas) of the Earth enticing (alliciat) bodies; or if an 
effluvium of the Earth attracts (attrahat) them. ‘It is enough that by the name of 
gravity we understand the meaning we gave before, a force of moving downwards 
(vim deorsum movendi)’.29  
 
Unlike Euclid’s Elements and similar to Guidobaldo, Wallis’ Mechanica did not 
contain postulates or axioms. However, two sets of propositions inserted 
immediately after the definitions perform a similar function: the first group concerns 
the numerical or algebraic theory of ratios preparing the mathematical groundwork 
(1-9). The second group brings back the laws of motion circulated in 1668 and other 
general principles connecting different aspects of motion in terms of the numerical 
theory of ratio (10-30). Proposition 11, for example, established that  
if the momentum is greater than the resistance, motion will result. 
If there was none before, motion will begin; if it already existed, it 
will be increased. If the impedimentum is greater, it will oppose 
the motion if there was any, or at least check it. If the two are 
equal, motion will be neither started nor stopped, and the initial 
state of the body, either of rest or of motion, will persist.30 
This proposition and those dealing with the laws of motion, present similar results to 
those of the 1668 paper. However, there are two significant changes. First, Wallis 
formulated the proportions on the collision of bodies in a more general way, as a 
general theory of motion, by using the terminology he has just set out. Second, these 
propositions are presented within the framework of the theory of ratios. Proposition 
12 moves from momentum to forces, and states that 
A force will neutralise an equal and opposite force; if it is less, it 
will not even do that; if it is greater, it will move. And the opposite: 
if it moves, the force is greater; if it does not move, then or the 
force is less, or they are at least equivalent or there is some 
impediment. 
+𝐴 − 𝐴 = 0								 + 2𝐴 − 3𝐴 = −𝐴			 + 3𝐴 − 2𝐴 = +𝐴 
+𝑆 − 𝐷 = 0							 + 𝑆 − 𝐷 = −							+ 𝑆 − 𝐷 = + 31 
 
 
29 Wallis, Opera Mathematica, 1:576. 
30 Wallis, 1:585. 
31 Wallis, 1:586. 
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This approach to forces and motion related mathematics to physical motions. Some 
scholars have seen in it the reason why Newton did not claim any originality of his 
laws, not even of the third that seems to be implied here.32 But the Proposition 12 
was an example of the general statement that Wallis had established in Proposition 7, 
claiming that ‘Effects are proportional to their adequate causes’. In the Scholium to 
this Proposition, Wallis noted that ‘this universal proposition should be set out at the 
beginning, since it opens the way by which, from purely mathematical speculation, 
one may move on to physical [speculation], or rather that the one is connected to the 
other’.33 This proposition made it possible to infer from observable effects the 
proportion of the—not always observable—causes and from the proportion of the 
causes the expected and necessary effects. Wallis’ mathematical approach was 
arithmetical and algebraic, rather than geometric and representational as may be 
assumed from the title. The reasons behind this lies in Wallis’ view on the nature of 
mathematics. This was presented in detail in the Mathesis Universalis, but the 
Propositions 1-9 of the Mechanica, summarised the theory of ratios in order to build 
mechanics on it.34  
 
The theory of ratios appeared in Euclid’s Elements in order to make it possible to 
compare magnitudes of the same kind.35 A ‘ratio is a sort of relation in respect of 
size between two magnitudes of the same kind’.36 In this sense, magnitudes ‘have a 
ratio to one another which are capable, when multiplied, of exceeding one another’. 
For example, we can say that one angle is in proportion to another depending on their 
size. This ratio is normally expressed as a numerical relation (5:3, 2:1, for example). 
So far, so good. However, definitions 5 and 6 allow the comparison between ratios 
 
32 ‘It becomes more and more evident as we read through the pages of these [Wallis’] letters that when 
Newton enunciated the famous laws which bear his name he was merely giving utterance to what had 
been in Wallis’s mind for many years’ Scott, The Mathematical Work of John Wallis, 105. See. 
Section 7.1 
33 Wallis, Opera Mathematica, 1:584. 
34 My view on Wallis’ algebraic theory of ratio is based on Jesseph, ‘Ratios, Quotients, and the 
Language of Nature’; Neal, From Discrete to Continuous, 151–56. 
35 Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics. Volume 1: From Thales to Euclid, 84–90; Klein, Greek 
Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra; Grattan-Guinness, ‘Numbers, Magnitudes, Ratios, 
and Proportions in Euclid’s Elements. How Did He Handle Them?’; Thorup, ‘A Pre-Euclidean 
Theory of Proportions’; Drake, ‘Medieval Ratio Theory vs Compound Medicines in the Origins of 
Bradwardine’s Rule’; Jesseph, ‘Ratios, Quotients, and the Language of Nature’. 
36 Euclid, The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements, 2:114. 
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of magnitudes of different kind. In other words, definitions 3 and 4 define a ratio as a 
relation between magnitudes of the same kind, but definition 5 says that  
magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second 
and the third to the fourth, when, if any equimultiples whatever be 
taken of the first and third, and any equimultiples whatever of the 
second and fourth, the former equimultiples alike exceed, are alike 
equal to, or alike fall short of, the latter equimultiples respectively 
taken in corresponding order.  
And definition 6: ‘Let magnitudes which have the same ratio be called 
proportional’.37 The sameness of ratio in definition 5 is defined by the preservation 
of order relations under arbitrary equimultiples. For example, lines and angles are 
different kind of magnitudes and under definitions 3 and 4 we cannot establish any 
ratio between, say, a line and an angle. Nevertheless, if we stick to definitions 5 and 
6 we can claim that two lines are proportional to two angles if they have the same 
ratio.  
 
The puzzling definition 5 has led to different interpretations. Wallis, for example, 
followed what Jesseph has called the ‘numerical’ theory of ratios, as opposed to the 
‘relational’ theory.38 In the relational theory, ratios are not quantities but just 
relations between two quantities. In this sense, it is meaningless to claim that ratios 
are ‘greater than’ or ‘divisible by’; ratios are not magnitudes. Barrow championed 
this view. On the contrary, the numerical approach assumes that the comparability of 
ratios implied a general domain of magnitudes (‘ratios’) for which it was possible to 
determine their size—‘denomination’ or ‘exponent’. According to the numerical 
theory, ratios may be expressed as quotients, in the sense that the ratio 𝑎/𝑏 is 
proportional to 𝑐/𝑑 if 𝑎 ∗ 𝑑 = 𝑐 ∗ 𝑏.39 The problem here is that the quotients of 
ratios are the result of incommensurable magnitudes. Quotients were traditionally 
understood as fractions arising from the division of integers, in the sense that quoties 
means ‘how many’. This view of ratios as quotients implied the expansion of the 
traditional Greek notion of number to make ‘sense of expressions such as 
 
37 Euclid, 2:114. 
38 Jesseph, ‘Ratios, Quotients, and the Language of Nature’, 162. 




√7𝜋/√11= ’.40 The numerical theory required all ratios to be homogeneous in order to 
make a direct comparison with one another, leading to the difficult question of the 
status of irrationals.  
 
The idea that ratios are magnitudes and susceptible of direct comparison was rooted 
in Wallis’ views on the priority of arithmetic over geometry. Wallis followed the 
Aristotelian idea according to which arithmetic is more abstract and universal than 
geometry, for unlike points, units do not imply position. Thus, units are simpler than 
points.41 The assertion that arithmetic was more general than geometry is explained 
by the view that ‘arithmetical truths are of a higher and more abstract nature than 
those of geometry. For example, it is not because a two foot line added to a two foot 
line makes a four foot line that two and two are four, but rather because the latter is 
true, the former follows’.42 Arithmetical principles were seen as special cases of 
principles of algebra, the so-called ‘arithmetic of species’.43 In Wallis’ view, the 
foundation of mathematics is a mathesis universalis, conceived as a pure science of 
quantity completely abstracted from matter. Geometry deals with continuous 
quantity, while arithmetic is concerned with discrete quantity or number. ‘But of 
these one is indeed more and the other less pure’: the subject of arithmetic is ‘purer 
and more universal’ and their ‘speculations’ are applicable ‘to geometry’.44 
Meanwhile geometry depended on the principles of arithmetic to perform its 
operations. In Wallis’ view, ‘someone asserts that a line of three feet added to a line 
of two feet makes a line five feet long, he asserts this because the numbers two and 
three added together make five; yet this calculation is not therefore geometrical, but 
clearly arithmetical, although it is used in geometric measurement’. The equality of 
the number five with two and three ‘is a general assertion’ and it may be applied to 




40 Jesseph, ‘Ratios, Quotients, and the Language of Nature’, 164. 
41 Neal, From Discrete to Continuous, 153. 
42 Wallis, Opera Mathematica, 1:53. 
43 Jesseph, ‘The “Merely Mechanical” vs the “Scab of Symbols”’. 
44 Wallis, Opera Mathematica, 1:18. 
45 Wallis, 1:56; Cf. Jesseph, ‘Ratios, Quotients, and the Language of Nature’, 166. 
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The priority of arithmetic over geometry informs Wallis’ conception of mechanics as 
geometry of motion. In Wallis’ view, mechanics fell within the boundaries of the 
distinction between pure and mixed mathematics. In this sense, mechanics was the 
application of geometrical—and ultimately, arithmetical—principles to the study of 
motion. In other words, it was a mathematical study of the proportions of motions 
and forces and thus mechanics does not take the place of natural philosophy. On the 
contrary, in mechanics, Wallis’ assessment of the superiority of the abstract character 
of arithmetic over geometry was underpinned by the recurrent refusal to deal with 
physical causes coming from his experimental approach to nature. In other words, 
Wallis’ rejection of dealing with the cause of physical phenomena in mechanics 
depended on his experimental commitments and on his view of mechanics as a 
mathematical science, rather than as a part of physics. As he replied to Neile’s 
objections, ‘what is Physically performed, is Mathematically measured’.46 
 
6.3. Barrow’s reply to Wallis: magnitude and motion 
Barrow’s conception of mathematics is one of a piece with his criticism of Descartes 
and it is shaped by his views on authority, the ancients and the importance of the 
textual traditions.47 Barrow’s rejection of Cartesianism, and particularly of laws of 
nature, stemmed from rejection of the (metaphysical) framework that validated the 
laws, the cosmology of the Principia Philosophiæ and their methods. Barrow read in 
Descartes an insufficient account of the activity of nature and, therefore, a 
misleading view of providence. The tone of Barrow’s criticism is part of an anti-
metaphysical stance informing Barrow’s views on principles and definitions of 
mathematics that departed from the Euclidian tradition by considering them, not as 
self-evident and necessary, but as acceptable or true hypotheses, provided that they 
are not inconsistent or self-contradictory.48 
 
 
46 Oldenburg, Correspondence, 1968, 5:221. 
47 Mahoney, ‘Barrow’s Mathematics: Between Ancients and Moderns’; Stewart, ‘“Fleshy Books”’; 
Grafton, ‘Barrow as a Scholar’; Malet, ‘Isaac Barrow on the Mathematization of Nature’; Malet, 
‘Mechanics in the 17th Century’; Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science; Kargon, 
‘Newton, Barrow and the Hypothetical Physics’. 
48 Malet, ‘Mechanics in the 17th Century’, 52; 54. 
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Although Barrow never elaborated a natural philosophy nor a mechanics, his answer 
to Descartes was a reform of mathematics based on geometry. However, it would be 
a mistake to consider this reform as a departure from classical traditions, for 
Barrow’s judgment tends to favour the ancients, although his practice clearly moved 
off from Greek mathematics.49 For example, when claiming that arithmetic was 
subordinate to geometry, he remarked that his intention was to ‘restore it into its 
legitimate place, as being removed out of its proper Seat, and insert and unite it again 
into its native geometry’.50 This reform was sketched out in his Lectiones 
Mathematicæ delivered between 1663 and 1666 as first Lucasian professor of 
mathematics at the University of Cambridge; subsequent developments appeared in 
the Lectiones Geometriæ and in the Lectiones Opticæ. Barrow’s reform provided a 
new understanding of mathematics as a language aligned with nature, capable of 
accounting for change in causal and quantitative terms.51  
 
The first three of Barrow’s Lectiones Mathematicæ are devoted to the nature and 
division of mathematical sciences. The first lecture presents an overview of the 
conceptions of mathematics based on philological reflections on the name and then 
on a historical review of the divisions of mathematics in Greek and Roman. The 
name initially just meant ‘sciences acquired by discipline’ without any determination 
of its object so he moved on to investigate what the object of mathematics was. The 
answer, again, came from the Greeks and Romans. In the same discursive style, 
Barrow remarked that ‘whatsoever becomes of the general object, it is plain the 
Mathematics is conversant about two things especially, quantity strictly taken and 
quotity, or, if you please, magnitude and multitude. By others, they are called 
continued and discontinued quantity’.52 Magnitude and number could be considered 
either as abstracted from matter, circumstances and accidents or as they ‘inhere in 
some particular subject’, from which Plato, for example, affirmed that some 
 
49 Mahoney, ‘Barrow’s Mathematics: Between Ancients and Moderns’; Guicciardini, Newton on 
Mathematical Certainty, 169–79; Stewart, ‘“Fleshy Books”’; Kargon, ‘Newton, Barrow and the 
Hypothetical Physics’. 
50 Barrow, The Mathematical Lectures, 29; Barrow, Mathematical Works, 46. 
51 Panza, ‘Isaac Barrow and the Bounds of Geometry’; Malet, From Indivisibles to Infinitesimals; 
Malet, ‘Mechanics in the 17th Century’; Mahoney, ‘Barrow’s Mathematics: Between Ancients and 
Moderns’; Guicciardini, Reading the Principia; Guicciardini, Newton on Mathematical Certainty. 
52 Barrow, The Mathematical Lectures, 10. 
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disciplines were ‘pure and prime’ (arithmetic and geometry) and other disciplines 
were ‘impure, secondary and even less exact’. Because these lasts groups 
contemplated magnitude and number ‘as applied to certain bodies and particular 
subjects’, Aristotle called them physical and sensible, and others physico-
mathematical. 
 
Barrow concluded that there were two main branches of mathematics: ‘pure and 
primary parts’ conformed by geometry and arithmetic and ‘four mixed and 
subaltern’, optics, mechanics, music and astronomy with further ramifications.53 The 
point here is that there seems to be a fundamental distinction between two irreducible 
kinds of pure mathematics generating a diversity of fields depending on their 
applications to sensible objects. Nevertheless, Barrow put forward that all sciences 
could be reduced to geometry, because all of them have the same subject, magnitude, 
whose most general properties were investigated by geometry. Against Wallis and 
the modern analysis, Barrow dedicated the third lecture to explaining that arithmetic 
was to be included in geometry, for its calculative capacity derived from the nature 
of magnitude rather than from the abstract nature of number. His claim was that 
‘there is really no Quantity in Nature different from what is called Magnitude or 
continuous quantity’ and therefore ‘this alone ought to be accounted the object of 
Mathematics; whose most general Properties it enquiries into and demonstrates’.54 
Put otherwise, the identification of quantity with continuous magnitude rather than 
with number, entailed the primacy of geometry over all other sciences. Moreover, 
Barrow’s approach to magnitude was empirical rather than essentialist. Instead of 
providing a definition based on one fundamental attribute of magnitude, Barrow 
appealed to experience to claim that the subject of mathematics was not different 
from the quantities that we find in nature. In the ninth lecture, Barrow put forward 
some ideas concerning termination (limits), extension, composition and divisibility 
of magnitude implied in his geometry of motion. The main targets were Descartes 
and Hobbes, for they provided paradoxical definitions based on metaphysical 
assumptions about space. Barrow brought up the famous words of St. Agustin 
 
53 Barrow, 20; Barrow, Mathematical Works, 39–40. 
54 Barrow, The Mathematical Lectures, 20; Barrow, Mathematical Works, 39–40. 
224 
 
concerning time: ‘if none seek of me what Time is, I know; if any ask me I don’t 
know’ and extends it to extension, space and motion. 55 The bottom line was a 
rejection of a metaphysical definition of these notions. Rather than claiming that he 
found the essence of bodies, such as Descartes and Hobbes, and that from there he 
derived ‘the common affections and properties of magnitude’, he opted for a 
definition ‘more accommodate to common Sense than to metaphysical conceptions; 
and so far only as I judge useful to my Purpose, i.e. as they are subservient to 
Mathematical Hypothesis’.56  
 
The anti-metaphysical approach to magnitude allowed the reduction of arithmetic to 
geometry and aligned all other sciences with mathematics. The so-called mixed 
mathematical subjects were in fact natural sciences or ‘branches of Physics’ 
(Physicæ partes). In Barrow’s view, the reverse thesis was also valid, for physical 
sciences were no less entitled to be called mathematical than the traditional mixed 
mathematics.57 In his view, ‘there is no Branch of natural Science that may not 
arrogate the Title to itself; since there is really none, from which the Consideration of 
Quantity is wholly excluded, and consequently to which some Light or Assistance 
may not be fectched from Geometry’. The reason was that ‘Magnitude is the 
common Affection of all physical Things, it is interwoven in the Nature of Bodies 
[corporum naturae penitus illigata], blended with all corporeal Accidents, and well 
nigh bears the principal Part in the Production of every natural Effect’. Because of 
these, ‘All Bodies obtain their own Figures, and execute their own local Motions; by 
which means, if not all, yet the most and chiefest Effects (whatsoever admits of a 
philosophical Explication) are performed, for the determining and comparing of 
which the Theorems of Geometry do often conduce’.58 Therefore, geometrical 
theorems could account for the main cause of natural effects, that is, local motion. In 
this sense, physics was largely a branch of geometry. But Barrow’s position 
developed other ramifications: he agreed that different sciences have varying degrees 
of mathematisation, depending on the nature of their principles.  
 
55 Barrow, The Mathematical Lectures, 139–40. 
56 Barrow, 141. 
57 Barrow, Mathematical Works, 40. 




Barrow was aware that his view challenged Wallis’ approach, particularly the 
definition of number and the subsequent classification of sciences. Nevertheless, 
from a more general perspective, Barrow was not only opposing to Wallis’ specific 
developments but to modern tendencies of the new analysis in which mathematics 
dealt with relations of magnitudes rather than with magnitudes and, in consequence, 
these approaches favoured the abstract nature of number and the operations with 
them as performed in algebra.59 In Barrow’s conception, there was no need to 
formulate the separate existence of numbers and things counted. Numbers were 
symbols representing collections of units whose effectiveness depended on ‘the 
condition of things they are attributed to’, that is, the units. Put otherwise, numbers 
were not entities separable from the magnitude to which they were applied, for their 
operative capacity depended on the matter. In geometry, the connection between 
numbers and units was evident, because geometry was concerned with measurement. 
However, Barrow claimed that the use of numbers in arithmetical calculation implied 
the homogeneity of magnitude: ‘If the things which the numbers are brought to 
denote be homogeneous, of the same name, and when compared have a mutual 
proportion to one another, and consequently the one can be increased by the addition 
or diminished by the subtraction of other; then they impart the same attributes, 
proportions, and increments or decrements to the numbers by which they are 
denominated.’ Otherwise, operations would be impossible, given the 
incommensurability of units. Barrow did attribute any abstract property to numbers.60 
‘Number (at least that treated of by mathematicians) differs nothing from continued 
magnitude itself, nor seems to have any other property (composition, division, 
proportion and the like) than either from, or in respect to it, as it represents or 
supplies its place’. Because of this, Barrow reminded his students that ‘the writer of 
the Elements’ was correct in including arithmetical speculations in his work, 
‘assigning to arithmetic a suitable place in geometry’. 
 
 
59 Mahoney, ‘Barrow’s Mathematics: Between Ancients and Moderns’, 185–91. 
60 Barrow, The Mathematical Lectures, 36–37; Barrow, Mathematical Works, 52–53; Cf. Mahoney, 
‘Barrow’s Mathematics: Between Ancients and Moderns’, 185–87. 
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6.4.Geometria Motu, sive Mathematica  
Instead of assuming magnitudes as given, Barrow’s mathematician was concerned 
with ‘the several ways whereby the various species of magnitudes may be conceived 
to be generated or produced’.61 If geometry dealt with the generation, then it was 
possible to provide certain and causal demonstrations. These demonstrations were 
certain because they were rooted in principles proved by ‘induction or multiple 
experiences’; 62 and they were causal, because they provide the generative process, 
insofar as geometry determined the precise conditions of motion generating a 
magnitude.63  
 
In the Lectiones geometricæ, Barrow explained that local motion was the ‘primary 
and chief’ way of generating magnitudes. While philosophers ‘argue with great 
subtilty on the nature of motion’, for the mathematician it was enough taking ‘for 
granted what is allow’d by common sense, and proved by obvious experience, that is, 
that any magnitude is moveable; that is, in whatsoever manner we behold it, the same 
may be made to change its place continually, viz. with a straight or circular motion; 
equally swift, or in any manner accelerated or retarded’.64 In so doing, Barrow 
aligned the fundamental concepts of mathematics with experience, in the sense that it 
was enough for the mathematician to rely on experience to understand the definitions 
of magnitude and motion. In Barrow’s view, who would deny that objects of our 
experience change place in ‘straight’ or ‘circular’ motion and that they do it with 
different speeds? Although the understanding of basic notions derived from 
experience, geometrical investigation was not limited to experience, for the 
mathematician ‘assume[s] at pleasure any motions of this kind as evidently possible, 
in order to find out and demonstrate what follows from thence’.65  
 
Barrow’s geometry applied the terminology of local motion to geometrical objects, 
explaining in this way their origin as ‘generation’ in terms of ‘differences of motion’, 
particularly direction and speed. For solving any geometrical problem, it was enough 
 
61 Barrow, Geometrical Lectures, 2; Barrow, Mathematical Works, 159. 
62 Mathematical Works, 78. 
63 172. 
64 Barrow, Geometrical Lectures, 2–3; Barrow, Mathematical Works, 160–61. 
65 Barrow, Mathematical Works, 159–60. 
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to know: (1) ipse modus lationes and (2) quantitatis vis motivæ. The mode of ‘lation’ 
or manner of bearing was the determination of the direction of motion. Meanwhile, 
the quantity of motive force determined the speed at which the motion was performed 
and it could be ‘swifter, slower or equally swifter (accelerated)’. The direction and 
the speed of motion presuppose some notions of space and time. Indeed, the time is 
represented by a straight line symbolising its constant flow and direction by 
geometric figures. Barrow’s demonstration of Galileo’s motion uniformly 
accelerated illustrates this geometry of motion at work: 
Let’s suppose the triangle AEY, wherein the side 
AE denotes the time, and the parallel lines BY, 
CY, DY, EY applied to the points thereof, the 
several degrees of velocity, answering to every 
instant of time, equally increasing from point A, 
(representing rest, or the least degree of velocity) 
to a given degree represented by the greatest line 
EY, or decreasing back again from the said line 
EY, to the point A (…) The triangles ABY, ACY, 
ADY, AEY will represent the spaces moved 
through, from the beginning of the motion, in the 
respective times 66 
 
From these initial representations, Barrow expected to demonstrate all the remaining 
properties of this motion, following the synthetic method.67 In the case of motion 
uniformly accelerated, ‘that the spaces moved through by a motion uniformly 
accelerated from rest, are to one another, as the squares of the times (or in the 
duplicate ratio of the time)’.68 
 
This geometry founded upon magnitude as ‘interwoven in the Nature of Bodies’ 
entailed concepts of space and time. From the mathematical point of view, space and 
time were necessary to determine direction and speed—the components of motion. In 
his view, his approach was different from that of the philosophers, for he was 
concerned solely with the particular way of conceiving space and time proper to 
mathematicians.69 However, given the physical implications of Barrow’s conception 
 
66 Barrow, 171. 
67 Barrow, 45. 




Figure 9. Barrow’s 
Figure 8. Barrow’s 
representation of uniform and 
uniformly accelerated motion. 
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of motion, space and time were not only operative definitions for abstract exercises; 
they had physical and metaphysical implications. Indeed, Barrow had rejected the 
Cartesian reduction of matter to extension (as we saw) and the subsequent 
elimination of space by reducing it to the place filled by matter. In its place, Barrow 
developed concepts of space and time that have not received considerable scholarly 
attention. The resemblance of his approach with Newton’s has proved a hard topic 
for historians.70  
 
Time is connected to quantity of motive force and closely related to speed, for the 
determination of speed requires a referent. In Barrow’s view, ‘Time is the 
continuance of anything in its own being. But some things continue longer in their 
being than others; those were when these were not, and are when these are not … 
Time absolutely therefore is a quantity, as admitting in some manner the chief 
affections of quantity, equality, inequality and proportion’.71 Time can be measured. 
Although this view apparently implies a relational conception, in which time is 
nothing in itself but just a relation of equality and inequality arising from the 
difference of ‘continuance of being’ of magnitudes,72 Barrow explained that space 
and time existed before ‘the world was created’.73 The argument is far from clear, but 
Barrow’s point is that since ‘there was space before the world was created, and that 
there now is an Extramundane, infinite space (where God is present)’ in which there 
are also bodies that do not exist now, ‘time existed before the world began, and does 
exist together with the World in the extramundane space’. The reasoning shows, in 
Barrow’s view, that time does not depend on things for being and that, in fact, ‘time 
does not imply an actual existence, but only the capacity or possibility of the 
continuance of existence’.74 Put otherwise, space and time do not depend on the 
world and they constitute capacities or possibilities of existence (of ‘continuance in 
being’ and ‘position’) of things.75 The argument is that it is possible to conceive that 
 
70 Grant, Much Ado About Nothing, 236–38; Thomas, ‘Space and Time in Isaac Barrow: A Modal 
Relationist Metaphysic’. 
71 Barrow, Geometrical Lectures, 4–5. 
72 Thomas, ‘Space and Time in Isaac Barrow: A Modal Relationist Metaphysic’. 
73 Mathematical Works, 161. 
74 Barrow, Geometrical Lectures, 5–6. 
75 The obscurity of the passage and of Barrow’s reflection on this topic in general, lies in that he is not 
interested in providing an exhaustive definition of space and time, but he only needs to postulate their 
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something existed before the existence of the world (this world), and that thing may 
continue existing. Therefore, there is no necessary connection between the world and 
the existence of time. At the same time, the view that space and time were 
possibilities implied that they are prior to things and make them possible.  
 
Barrow did not specify what kind of existence time has, but his point was to affirm 
the independent existence even if the knowledge of time was commonly associated 
to something else (time to motion and rest to bodies). ‘The quantity of time, in itself, 
depends not on either of them [motion or rest]; for whether things move on, or stand 
still; whether we sleep or wake, Time flows perpetually with an equal tenor’. Time 
itself is a magnitude that could be measured or determined: ‘But as magnitudes 
themselves are absolute Quantums independent on all Kinds of Measure, tho’ indeed 
we cannot tell what their Quantity is unless we measure them; so Time is likewise a 
Quantum in itself, tho’ in Order to find the Quantity of it, we are obliged to call in 
motion to our assistance’.76 If time is independent of things moved, how can we 
measure and represent it? It was a mistake to think that time is measured by motion. 
On the contrary, the quantity of motion is determined by time. However, to 
‘determine and show’ the quantity of time, we need something flowing constantly. 
Barrow found the answer in the divine will of the Creator ‘who pronounced as 
follows: Let there be Lights in the Firmament of the Heaven, to divide the day from 
the night, and then let them be for Signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for 
years’.77 The quotation from Genesis was evidence indicating that celestial bodies, 
particularly the Sun and the Moon, were the adequate signs or units to measure time. 
The use of sundials as representation of the uniform motion of the Sun confirmed 
this. These serve as the standard to establish the precision of any other ‘time keeper’, 
such as mechanical clocks or even water or sand clocks. Thus, measurement of time 
 
existence as universal referents of motion, in the sense that they are stable and independent of things. 
Although this may be a metaphysical view, Barrow does not develop it and he is only concerned with 
an attempt to show that the possibility of a philosophical view of space and time as derived from his 
mathematical definitions is, at least, non-paradoxical. But this does not amount to develop a ‘doctrine’ 
of space and time (as Newton did not do either). 
76 Barrow, Geometrical Lectures, 7. 
77 Barrow, Mathematical Works, 162; Barrow, Geometrical Lectures, 9–10. 
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and the determination of motion was nothing else but the typical geometrical 
procedure of establishing a ratio (in the sense of the theory of ratios): 
We first assume Time from some Motion, and afterwards judge 
thence of other Motions, which in Reality is no more than 
comparing some Motions with others, by the Assistance of Time; 
just as we investigate the Ratios of Magnitudes by the help of some 
Space. For Example, he who computes the Proportion of Motion, 
by the Proportion of Time, does no more than get the said Ratio of 
Motions from Clocks, Dials; or from the Proportion of solar 
Motions performed in the same Time.78 
Time is measured by a uniform flux. Therefore, the determination of speed is a ratio 
comparing homogenous magnitudes: the motion of one body in proportion to a 
uniform motion standing for time. Consequently, time was represented in geometry 
by a straight line according to its properties: consisting of parts altogether similar, 
endowed with one dimension, and conceived as ‘the simple addition of rising 
moments, or the continual flux of one moment’.79  
 
Meanwhile, space was characterised in opposition to magnitude. As time was usually 
mistaken for motion, so space was usually mistaken for magnitude or extension.80 
However, magnitude is what occupies or fills the space, not space: ‘Everything 
subsists of itself, or is an accident to another thing, but neither of these seems to 
agree with space’.81 Space had not the ‘dignity’ of a substance, but it was not an 
accident either because it was extrinsic to all subjects, not the accident of a particular 
object. Instead, space was a ‘receptacle of immense capacity’ or ‘an immoveable 
vessel’, infinitely extended, without limits, perfectly penetrable, easily admitting 
‘everything within itself’, receiving the successions of moveable bodies, determining 
the velocities of motions and measuring the distances of things. Space ‘has no actual 
but only potential figures, dimensions and parts consentaneous to its nature; by 
which means the capacity of admitting a body includes the capacity of admitting 
lines and superficies’.82 In Barrow’s story, the confusion between space and 
extension had its roots in Aristotle and more recently in Descartes who ‘has failed in 
 
78 Barrow, Mathematical Works, 165; Barrow, Geometrical Lectures, 13. 
79 Mathematical Works, 166. 
80 165. 
81 150. 
82 150–51; 162. 
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this case’ to distinguish between place and space. In order to distinguish space from 
magnitude, Barrow offers a series of arguments directed towards Descartes’ specific 
claims, which cannot be detailed here but which were echoed in Newton’s De 
gravitatione and in the ‘Queries’ of the Opticks:83 First, since matter may be finite 
but God is infinite in essence, he must subsist beyond the bounds of matter; 
otherwise, he would be enclosed within his limits. Therefore, something is beyond, 
that is, some sort of space. Second, God can create other worlds beyond this, and we 
can imagine them to be created somewhere. Therefore, there has to be some space 
when these worlds could be created and exist. And, such as it happens in our world, 
God will also be present in these new worlds, ‘yet without being the least affected 
with motion itself’.84  
 
The idea that geometry dealt with motion not only implied a change of subject; it 
also had consequences for the demonstration that geometry could achieve and how it 
was connected to natural philosophy. If geometry established the most general 
properties of magnitude, and magnitude was the subject of any science, geometrical 
demonstrations provided guides to explain nature. However, the co-extension of 
mathematics and natural philosophy was not a reduction of the former to the latter. 
For Barrow, mathematical demonstration was concerned with possible existence, not 
with actual existence. Physics dealt with the motion of bodies actually existing in 
this world, while mathematics was concerned with motions that may be generated. 
Forces actually generating motion in this world, adumbrated by geometry, could be 
postulated in physics at least in formal terms, although the efficient cause remained 
beyond understanding.  
 
As mentioned above, Barrow’s mathematics was said to be causal because ‘the 
affections’ or properties of bodies, arose from the definitions or ‘forms’, ultimately 
founded on experience.85 Barrow rejected that any property or affection had primacy 
in definition; resembling Galileo, any affection ‘may be rightly supposed or assumed 
 
83 Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 89–156; Ruffner, ‘Newton’s De gravitatione: A Review and 
Reassessment’; Henry, ‘Gravity and De gravitatione’. 
84 Mathematical Works, 154–55. 
85 On Barrow’s definitions see Malet, ‘Mechanics in the 17th Century’; Malet, ‘Isaac Barrow on the 
Mathematization of Nature’.  
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in defining the subject, since they are connected together with such an essential, 
close, reciprocal tie, that if anyone be supposed, the rest must necessarily follow’. A 
circle may be defined as the figure generated by the rotation of a right line, but also 
by the drawing of perpendiculars or by the affection of right angles. Any of these 
properties ‘supply the place of a cause, in respect of the rest; because by the 
intervention of it, as a mean, the rest do necessarily follow’. This connection between 
different properties ‘may be called a formal causality, because the remaining 
affections do result from that one property, which is first assumed, as from a Form’.86 
In the natural world, ‘there is any other causality wherein a necessary consequence 
can be found’, because there could not be a necessary ‘connection of an external, ex. 
gr. Efficient cause with its effect (at least not such can be understood by us) through 
which, strictly speaking, the effect is necessarily supposed by the supposition of the 
efficient cause; or any determinate cause by the supposition of the effect’. In 
summary, ‘there can be no efficient cause in the nature of things of a philosophical 
consideration which is altogether necessary’.87 
 
This particular view on causation and the resulting limitations of human knowledge 
are underpinned by Barrow’s commitments with the unrestricted will of God when 
creating and ruling the world.88 God could produce any effect by any means, and the 
order already known to us could not restrict his will. For example, when we see ashes 
or smoke, Barrow exemplified, we not only infer that a fire took place but also that 
some kind of fuel was required to keep it, as we have been told by ‘[natural] history’. 
However, God could immediately create ashes or smoke or produce them by any 
other mean, unknown to us, without requiring fuel. No efficient cause is necessary 
from the point of view of the omnipotence of God. 
 
The dismissal of efficient causation has consequences for mathematics and physics. 
For Barrow, any demonstration assumed ‘the existence of God’, because all the 
‘possible existence or the effection of the things’ implied a reference to the possible 
or actual cause of the effect at hand. In all cases, the cause is ultimately ‘the infinite 
 
86 Barrow, The Mathematical Lectures, 86–88. 
87 Barrow, 88. 
88 Malet, ‘Isaac Barrow on the Mathematization of Nature’. 
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and incomprehensible power of God’.89 From here, he derived that non-contradiction 
was enough to claim a mathematical demonstration as true, as a demonstration on 
possible motions: ‘Hence also it follows, that Demonstrations may be made of 
Things, which never had Existence anywhere; because it is sufficient for a 
Demonstration to assume true Hypotheses, i.e., such as imply no Inconsistence in 
themselves’.90 However, these mathematical demonstrations of the possible causes of 
motion did not imply any necessary reference to our world; the connection had to be 
established by experience. Barrow illustrated this with examples from mechanics and 
astronomy. Galileo—Barrow claimed—supposed that heavy things were naturally 
carried towards the centre of the Earth with a motion uniformly accelerated. In the 
realm of mathematics, this may be assumed as true if it satisfied the principle of non-
contradiction, because ‘such a motion may exist at the Pleasure of God, as implying 
nothing in it contrary to possibility’. However, because Galileo was saying 
something about this world, his supposition had to be referred to ‘the Sense’: ‘Every 
particular Science of this Kind [mixed] produces its own Hypotheses, which require 
no other Proof, but to be explained and demonstrated by some example or 
Experiment more intelligible (…) and their possibility made evident as far as it may 
be done’. From astronomy, Barrow presented that before proving that planets moved 
in ellipses, Copernicus and Ptolemy were not wrong in the mathematical sense by 
supposing the perfect circular movement of stars: ‘God may create such a World, 
where the Stars will exactly agree with such motions’. Therefore, ‘their astronomy 
[is] true, not indeed of this World, but of the other, which is supposed capable of 
being created by God’. God endowed humans with the ‘power of creating 
innumerable imaginary worlds in our thoughts’, which himself, if he pleased, could 
‘cause to be real’.91 Imagination was associated with God’s unrestricted capacity to 
create anything he wanted and this may be outlined by geometry, while sense was 
concerned with the world that God actually created and is the subject of physics. 
 
* * * 
 
 
89 Barrow, The Mathematical Lectures, 109–10. 
90 Barrow, 110. 
91 Barrow, 111. For the importance of imagination in geometry and similar theological underpinnings, 




The two different approaches on mechanics put forward by Wallis and Barrow 
entailed divergent views on the nature of mathematics, particularly the role of motion 
in knowledge. At the same time, these assumptions sketched contrasting disciplinary 
settings, values and practices. While Wallis’ approach distinguished between 
quantity and matter and connected nature and numbers via computation of discreet 
and abstract quantities, Barrow’s reform of mathematics held that quantity was 
continuous magnitude and, therefore, geometry was essentially concerned with the 
generation of figures by motion rather than with computation of given figures; in this 
view, mathematics and nature were coextensive. The transformation of ‘laws of 
nature’ into mechanical laws of motion was embedded within local discussions on 
the connection between quantity, nature and God’s action on the world. 
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7. ‘The present frame of nature’: Newton on the laws of 
motion 
 
The business of experimental philosophy is [only] to find out by experience and observation  
not how things were created but what is the present frame of nature.  
 
Newton, ULC, Ms. Add 3970, f. 242v. 
 
 
The idea that Newton’s ‘laws of motion’ were in some way laws of nature was 
current in Newtonian circles at least since the early eighteenth century.1 Historians 
have assumed that Newton inherited the idea of laws of nature from Descartes and 
incorporated them into his own terminology. In this view, Newton’s laws of motion 
and the resultant law of gravitation would be his own version of the ‘laws of nature’ 
and therefore laws of nature. After all, the Principia seems modelled after Descartes’ 
Principia Philosophiæ and accordingly it seems reasonable that Newton would have 
re-fashioned the Cartesian laws into his own laws of nature. This reading is not 
absent in accounts of seventeenth-century mechanics and is also assumed in 
Newton’s scholarship. Recently, it has been claimed that Newton held a neo-
Aristotelian approach to ‘the metaphysics of laws’.2 In this way, Newton’s laws are 
said to operate as secondary causes in the sense of formal causes, by which the 
‘things themselves’ are formed: laws constituted and informed bodies and forces.3 
 
However, Newton did not denominate his achievements ‘laws of nature’. As in the 
case of his English fellows, Newton’s choice was bounded by the disciplinary 
transformations of mathematics, natural philosophy and mechanics connected with 
his theological and religious concerns. Similarly, causation was considered in terms 
of active principles rather than of immanent laws. In this context, I will argue that 
 
1 Charrak, Contingence et nécessité des lois de la nature au XVIIIe siècle; Shank, Before Voltaire; 
Snobelen, ‘On Reading Isaac Newton’s Principia in the 18th Century’. 
2 Biener and Schliesser, ‘The Certainty, Modality...’ For recent treatments making similar 
assumptions, Domski, ‘Laws of Nature and the Divine Order’; Giere, Science without Laws, 85.  
3 ‘Laws of nature are prior to bodies and forces, since they are the principles by which the ‘things 
themselves’ are formed’ Biener and Schliesser, ‘The Certainty 
, Modality...’, 319. 
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Newton considered that ‘laws of nature’ were part of a cosmology that he rejected as 
mistaken and harmful. The expression laws of nature was not neutral for Newton; it 
was embedded within a network of connections with determinism, necessity and a 
negative meaning of hypotheses. His preference for laws of motion over laws of 
nature points to his commitment with certainty and locates his enquiries in the 
context of the English appropriation of Cartesian philosophy presented in previous 
chapters, in which Descartes’ ‘laws of nature’ were reworked as laws of motion in 
mechanics. I will show that the only references to laws of nature in Newton’s printed 
works occurred in the context of controversies in which he broke the limits of the 
barriers that he had erected between different aspects of his studies.4  
 
In order to substantiate this claim, this chapter has three sections. In the first, I 
present Newton’s appropriation of ‘laws of nature’ in his early intellectual 
explorations. Newton assessed ‘laws of nature’ in the restricted context of mechanics 
and, in this sense, as laws of motion. As it appears from the Waste Book, Newton 
engaged with the content of ‘laws of nature’ in a mathematical way, as it was 
customary in the mechanical study of the collision of bodies. Following Barrow, 
Newton also formulated some philosophical criticism of Descartes in mechanical 
exercises, including the identification of matter with extension, the existence and 
infinite character of space and the relationship between God and nature. In the 
second section, I show how Newton’s solution to Halley after the visit of August 
1684 triggered a process in which Newton redefined the boundaries of mathematics, 
mechanics and natural philosophy in connection with values and ideas of his studies 
in religion and chronology. In solving Halley’s question, Newton realised that he had 
in his hands not only a mechanical problem but an insight into the true system of the 
world, the one represented in the Vestal temples of the true—and lost—religion. The 
mechanical laws of motion became, in this process, mathematical principles of 
natural philosophy. In the final section, I analyse the reactions against the universal 
gravitation and its law as controversial products of the new disciplinary order of the 
Principia. The conclusion that gravity was a force operating in nature transgressed 
the disciplinary practices of the Continent. Newton’s use in print of laws of nature 
 
4 See Iliffe, Priest of Nature, 315–54. 
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was part of his strategies of response to the Continental charge of reintroducing 
occult qualities. Newton publicly—although cryptically—mobilised in his defence 
ideas concerning the foundations of natural philosophy and outcomes of his 
theological and historical enquiries.  
 
7.1. Master of the whole   
In his last years, Newton recalled that in the 1660s he bought Descartes’ geometry 
and ‘when he got over 2 or 3 pages he could understand no farther than he began 
again & got 3 or 4 pages farther till he came to another difficult place, than he began 
again & advanced farther & continued so doing till he made himself Master of the 
whole without having the least light or instruction from anybody’.5 However, during 
his first years at Cambridge he not only became a master of the whole Géométrie but 
also of the Principia Philosophiæ, the Meditationes and the Discours de la méthode. 
The attention devoted to Descartes became a constant and evolving influence on 
different aspects of Newton’s thought, from mathematics to metaphysics. However, 
his approach to Descartes was critical since the beginning.6   
 
In the so-called Waste Book, Newton dealt with the contents of ‘laws of nature’ as 
principles of the mechanical analysis of the collision of bodies. Entries on the topic 
are registered from January 1665.7 Newton’s systematic examination of Descartes’ 
laws occurred in mechanics, not in natural philosophy, although he was familiar with 
the Principia.8 By dealing with ‘laws of nature’ as principles of mechanics Newton 
aligned his work with the traditions presented in previous chapters, detaching them 
from the metaphysical and natural philosophical implications in which Descartes 
initially formulated them. In the Waste Book, the contents of ‘laws of nature’ were 
reworked into an axiomatic structure mainly concerned with the quantitative 
definition of abstract concepts for mathematical computation with the intention of 
 
5 Conduitt, ‘Anecdotes’, fol. 1r. For different versions of Newton’s encounter with Descartes’ 
Géométrie see Westfall, Never at Rest, 98–101. 
6 Westfall, Force in Newton’s Physics, 323–34; Westfall, Never at Rest, 66–104; McGuire and Tamny, 
Certain Philosophical Questions; Iliffe, Priest of Nature, 84–122; Guicciardini, Isaac Newton and 
Natural Philosophy, 42–75. 
7 Herivel, Background, 120. 
8 McGuire and Tamny, Certain Philosophical Questions. 
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solving mechanical problems such as the impact of bodies or circular motion—which 
Newton reduced to a case of impact. In opposition to Descartes, these results are 
susceptible of contrast with experience. Aligned with the English practice of 
mechanics, Newton used some of these results to make some astronomical 
computations such as a deduction from Kepler’s proportion that planets’ ‘endeavours 
to recede from the sun will be reciprocally as the squares of their distances from it’ 
or a comparison of the endeavour of the Moon to recede from the centre of the Earth 
with the force of gravity at the surface of the Earth.9  
 
The Waste Book contains Newton’s efforts at formulating a general theory of 
collisions. Newton assumed ‘laws of nature’ without any explicit reference to their 
author; furthermore, they were not denominated laws but definitions or axioms 
without any visible criteria. Moreover, Newton transformed the contents of these 
laws as he faced the solution of specific problems. In this sense, the approach is 
piecemeal and indirect, although the jacket of axiomatic structure gives the 
impression of a deductive, coherent exercise.  
 
The first important change related to laws occurred when Newton introduced the idea 
that motion in collisions is a directed quantity, that is, that the direction is an 
inseparable variable in accounting for the outcome of impact. Descartes was aware of 
the importance of direction, but his treatment suggested that motion could be dealt 
independently of direction and then that the conservation of motion did not entail it.  
Explaining the collision of two inelastic bodies (‘have noe vis elastica’) in which one 
has less motion, Newton indicated that the quantity of motion was directed by the use 
of a negative sign, determinant in the resulting computation.10 After some 
propositions on inelastic collisions, Newton sketched some definitions and two sets 
of axioms intended to cover elastic bodies. In Definition 5, he stated that ‘reflection’ 
was the loss of determination (direction) of motion by rebounding. When bodies 
meet and rebound ‘they are parted either by some springing motion in themselves or 
in the matter crowded betwixt them’. Newton conceived impacts as springs, a 
 
9 Newton, ‘Geometrical Tract’, fol. 87v. See Herivel, Background, 183–91; Westfall, Never at Rest, 
150–53; Whiteside, MP, 6:4–5. 
10 Descartes, CSM, 1985, I:242–43; Fraser, ‘The Third Law in Newton’s Waste Book’, 48–49. 
239 
 
powerful resource that Boyle had exploited in his New Experiments Physico-
Mechanicall (1660).11 The comparison indicates that as the spring is more ‘dull or 
vigorous’ the bodies will be reflected with more or less force, ‘as if it endeavour to 
get liberty to inlarge itself’. An initial effort to refine this resultant idea of force 
appears in Definition 9: ‘Force is the pressure or crouding of one body upon 
another’.12 
 
This physical characterisation of force was afterwards connected—not without 
tensions–13 with axioms 1 and 2 in which Newton applied Descartes’ first two laws 
to bodies: ‘1. If a quantity once move it will never rest unlesse hindered by some 
externall caus. 2. A quantity will always move on in the same streight line (not 
changing the determination nor celerity of its motion) unless some externall cause 
divert it’. Associated to the first two laws, Descartes had sketched a theory of 
collisions in his third law and in seven rules. The key concept in this theory was the 
force of bodies (vis corporis) or quantity of motion, the product of size per speed, 
which determined the outcome of impact.14 For example, Descartes’ rule 2 
established that after impact two bodies, being one larger than the other and 
travelling at the same speed but in opposite directions, shall travel in the direction of 
the larger without any change in speed.15 Collision appears as a ‘contest’ between 
forces in bodies resulting in losers and winners, depending on the ‘forces of motion’ 
of bodies involved.16 In the following axioms, Newton defined force as the ‘externall 
cause’ referred to in the first two axioms and thus presented impact under a different 
light. Newton switched the point of reference in collisions from the force in the 
bodies to the external cause (also called force) that ‘reduce[s] the body to rest’ or 
‘put[s] it upon motion’. Although in his definitions Newton used the expression 
‘quantity of motion’, the context implies a shift in the meaning; for in assuming the 
viewpoint of the external cause Newton ended up talking of the ‘generation’ or 
 
11 McGuire and Tamny, Certain Philosophical Questions, 24. 
12 Newton, ‘Waste Book’, fol. 10v. 
13 For details see Westfall, Force in Newton’s Physics, 346–47; Fraser, ‘The Third Law in Newton’s 
Waste Book’. 
14 Descartes, AT, 1905, VIII:66–67. See section, 4.4. above. 
15 Descartes, VIII:68. 
16 Gabbey, ‘Force and Inertia in Seventeenth-Century Physics’, 20–29. 
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‘destruction’ of motion, of change of motion. Axiom 4, for example, reads: ‘Soe 
much force as is required to destroy any quantity of motion in a body, so much is 
required to generate it; and soe much as is required to generate it soe much is alsoe 
required to destroy it’.17 After the definition of force, Newton quantified the change 
of motion by stating that when unequal forces move equal bodies, their velocities are 
proportional to the forces (axiom 5) and when equal forces move unequal bodies, 
their velocities are inversely as their quantities (axiom 6).18 Finally, this initial set of 
axioms on motion as generated by forces led to the postulation of the conservation of 
motion in elastic collisions: ‘the difference of theire [two elastic bodies] motion shall 
not bee lost nor loose its determination’. According to the definition of force as 
pressure, when bodies collide ‘they presse equally upon one another and therefore 
one must loose noe more motion than the other doth; soe that the difference of their 
motions cannot bee destroyed’.19  
 
In the next page, a second set of axioms appears as the foundation of the previous 
series. In the axiom 100, Newton reformulated Descartes’ first law: ‘Every thing 
doth naturally persevere in that state in which it is unlesse it bee interrupted by some 
externall cause, hence axiome 1st and 2d (…) A body once moved will always keepe 
the same celerity, quantity and determination of its motion’. This formulation is more 
general than axioms 1 and 2; perseverance is said to be natural and its implications 
are translated into a quantifiable form by claiming that this axiom amounts to the 
conservation of celerity, quantity and determination of motion. In this new sequence 
of axioms, Newton resumed his functional idea of force as change of motion. After 
explaining some possible outcomes of collision, Newton claimed that  
it appears how and why amongst bodyes move some require a 
more potent or efficacius cause others a lesse to hinder or helpe 
their velocity. And the power of this cause is usually called force. 
And as this cause useth or applieth its power or force to hinder or 
change the perseverance of bodyes in theire state, it is said to 
Indeavour to change their perseverance. 
 
17 The importance of this change of perspective is studies by Westfall, Force in Newton’s Physics, 
345–49; Herivel, Background, 4–9; Whiteside, ‘Before the Principia’; Fraser, ‘The Third Law in 
Newton’s Waste Book’. 
18 Newton, ‘Waste Book’, fol. 10v. 
19 Newton, fol. 11r. 
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 Notice that this conception of force has no metaphysical connotation and is limited 
to name the generic cause of changes of motion in impacts. Meanwhile, in axiom 
106, Newton characterised the cause ‘which hindereth the progression’—the 
condition in the body also contemplated in axiom 100 opposing to the external 
cause—as a power of the body ‘to persever in its velocity or state and is usually 
called the force of the body’.20 In summary, force was the cause of the change of 
motion from the perspective of the colliding body and, at the same time, was the 
name of the power of the body by which it reacts against the external cause. 
Newton’s view of impact in terms of an external cause implied that when two bodies 
met the tendency to persevere in their state was a power or force internal to them, 
while in Descartes, the continuation of matter in its state was the necessary 
consequence of their definition as extended. 
 
This dual conception of force appeared again in an unfinished tract on hydrostatics, 
dating from the 1670s, commonly known as De gravitatione. This time Newton was 
aware of employing the term in two different forms: ‘Force is the causal principle of 
motion and rest. And it is either an external one that generates or destroys or 
otherwise changes impressed motion in some body; or it is an internal principle by 
which existing motion or rest is conserved in a body, and by which any being 
endeavours to continue in its state and opposes resistance’. The ‘resisted force’ or 
‘force in so far as it is resisted’ is named conatus, and the impressed, impetus. 
Newton denominated inertia the force in the body, ‘lest its state should be easily 
changed by an external exciting force’, making clear that the perseverance in a state 
is produced by a power in the body.21 In summary, forces considered in mechanics 
were: the acting force, the resisting force and the reacting force, this last generated 
by the interaction between the first two. Based on this conception of force, Newton 
derived the definition of density and rarity of bodies, central to hydrostatic. Not only 
the idea of force was reorganised in De gravitatione but also the ‘mutual pressing’ of 
bodies that in the Waste Book Newton seemed to have obtained from the initial 
caveat of force as a pressure or ‘crouding’. In the axioms, Newton succinctly stated 
 
20 Newton, fol. 12v. 
21 Newton, ‘De gravitatione’, fol. 32. 
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that ‘bodies in contact press each other equally’, equating in magnitude the action 
and the reaction. 
 
This tract on hydrostatics advanced a criticism to the foundations of Descartes’ 
natural philosophy in a long excursion inserted between definitions 4 and 5. De 
gravitatione elaborated a sustained rejection of Cartesian principles and traced 
ambitious alternatives. Newton did not mention the ‘laws of nature’ which seem to 
be restricted to mechanics, even if the main target here was the conception of motion 
on which the Principia Philosophiæ relies. Newton’s definition of motion as change 
of place entailed a distinction between bodies and space against Descartes. In fact, 
Descartes had reduced matter to extension and space to the place occupied by these 
three-dimensional bodies and thus ‘there is no real difference between space and 
corporeal substance’.22 Thus motion was determined by the change of position of one 
part of matter ‘from the vicinity of other bodies’; the ‘vicinity’ was always relative to 
the observer rather than a fix referent. Descartes further explained that by 
emphasising upon the idea of motion as transfer he showed that the ‘motion is 
always in the moving body’ as opposed to the force of action which brings about the 
movement. We saw that Newton forged a variant of the latter position in the 
mechanics of the Waste Book.23 In De gravitatione, Newton claimed that motion has 
to be determined ‘with respect to the parts of space, and not with respect to the 
position of neighbouring bodies’.24 This disagreement led Newton to the nature of 
space and its relation to matter. In the first part of his criticism Newton put forward 
some arguments against Descartes’ conception of motion, particularly concerning the 
contradictions implied in the relativity of the referent, such as that ‘motion can be 
generated where there is no force acting’. Newton took advantage of the paradoxes 
and contradictions of this definition, including that it is always possible to say that 
the planets do not move if we assume that their ‘vicinity’ is their vortex, even if God 
impressed some motion directly to celestial bodies.25 
 
 
22 Descartes, AT, 1905, VIII:46. 
23 Descartes, VIII:54–55. 
24 Newton, ‘De gravitatione’, 3; Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 123. 
25 Newton, ‘De gravitatione’, 7; Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 127–28. 
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Once Newton has criticised the concept of motion, he moved to the foundation of the 
Cartesian physics: ‘what extension and body are, and how they differ from each 
other’. In his view, this required correction ‘in order to lay truer foundations of the 
mechanical sciences’.26 The core of Newton’s criticism is that the identification of 
extension and body, from which the erratic conception of motion sprung, leads to 
atheism. In contrast, Newton claimed that extension defined as space where there is 
no matter is an ‘emanent effect of God’; in his terms, extension does not exist as an 
accident or as a substance, but as an infinite and eternal necessary consequence of 
divine existence.27 Newton considered that he had shed light on the necessary 
connection between God and matter that Descartes had removed by reducing bodies 
to extension. Newton’s strategy was to argue that bodies are parts of space which 
God, by his mere will, endows with ‘active powers’; these powers entail causal 
properties, such as mobility according to laws and impenetrability, but also the 
powers to generate sensations in human organs. The differentiation between matter 
and space also provides Newton with the occasion to advance a conception of space 
under Barrow’s influence. In a wording strongly resembling the Mathematical 
Lectures, space is said to be infinite and eternal. Thus, it provides the frame to 
determine the action of forces generating motion.28 The core of Newton’s criticism 
coincides with Barrow’s arguments, in the sense that Descartes had excluded the 
necessity of God in the world by making matter self-sufficient for motion.  
 
7.2. The force of human wit 
Sometime during the 1670s, Newton turned his attention to antiquity. The idea that 
some remote forms of religion and natural/moral knowledge were originally pristine 
but were corrupted over history was available to Newton in a wide range of literature 
 
26 Newton, ‘De gravitatione’, 11; Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 131. Some historians consider that in 
this extensive note Newton is no longer interested in hydrostatics This passage suggests otherwise. 
See, Stein, ‘On the Notion of Field in Newton, Maxwell, and Beyond’, 274–75; Palter, ‘Saving 
Newton’s Text: Documents, Readers, and the Ways of the World’, 1987; Dobbs, The Janus Faces of 
Genius, 139. Indeed, the lack of attention to this central aspect has misled some recent historians to 
claim that Newton cultivated a discipline called ‘metaphysics’ and De gravitatione would be the 
earliest and most important record of it, see Janiak, Newton as Philosopher; Schliesser, ‘Newtonian 
Emanation’; Kochiras, ‘Force, Matter, and Metaphysics in Newton’s Natural Philosophy’. 
27 On the details of these thorny topics see McGuire, ‘Space, Infinity and Indivisibility’; McGuire, 
‘Existence, Actuality and Necessity’; Henry, ‘Gravity and De gravitatione’. 
28 Barrow, Mathematical Works, 149–65. 
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from alchemy to mathematics going through theology and chronology.29 Following 
Neoplatonic philosophers and his Cambridge fellows’ interpreters of the biblical 
prophecies, Newton studied the corruption of primitive Christianity that furnished in 
him—as in others—the idea of an even more remote form of uncorrupted religion 
identified with Noah and his sons after the Deluge. This corruption over history 
fascinated the Lucasian Professor.30 After the long and exhausting controversy 
generated by the publication of his theory of light, Newton went through some ‘years 
of silence’ in the late 1670s until the early 1680s. During this time, alchemy and 
theology received his full attention, except for the intromission of some unwanted 
correspondents, some scattered work in mathematics and the appearance in the skies 
of one or two comets.31  
 
In studying the Book of Revelation and the history of the Church, Newton thought 
that diverse passages of the prophecy had been fulfilled. Most Protestant readers 
interpreted the Apocalypse as the persecution of the first Christians under the 
Romans, the establishment of the Catholic doctrines and the later persecution of 
Protestants by Roman Catholics. This prophetic view of history concluded with the 
second coming of Christ in the millennium, in which the elected will finally reign. 
Newton advanced in strategies to interpret the words and images of revelations first 
following the works of Joseph Mede and Henry More and later, as usual, by 
construing his own and unique approach.32 The prophecies of the Revelation referred 
to the ‘Great Apostasy’, identified with the period in which the establishment of the 
main doctrines of the Catholic Church occurred during and after the Council of 
Nicaea in 325 CE. Mede defined the core of the great apostasy as the institution of 
idolatry, that is, of the adoration of false gods. This covered the adoration of the 
 
29 Feingold, ‘Isaac Newton, Historian’, 525; Buchwald and Feingold, Newton and the Origin of 
Civilization, 143. Guicciardini, Newton on Mathematical Certainty, 79–107. Guicciardini, ‘Analysis 
and Synthesis in Newton’s Mathematical Work’, 316–17. 
30 The study of these topics have been recently invigorated by the publication of Iliffe, Priest of 
Nature. See also Manuel, The Religion of Isaac Newton; Westfall, Never at Rest, 335–401; Westfall, 
‘Newton’s Theological Manuscripts’; Force and Popkin, Essays on the Context, Nature, and Influence 
of Isaac Newton’s Theology; Schaffer, ‘Comets and Idols: Newton’s Cosmology and Political 
Theology’. 
31 The phrase ‘years of silence’ comes from Westfall, Never at Rest, 335–401. 
32 Full details of Newton’s complex and evolving ‘methodisation’ of the Apocalypse are presented by 
Iliffe, Priest of Nature, 219–353. 
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Virgin Mary, the saints and their relics. Based on intense readings of the Church 
fathers, ancient writers and historians, Newton went beyond. The main corruption 
was the introduction of Trinitarism, ‘the cult of three equal gods’.33 Newton found 
Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, guilty of introducing and circulating these 
heresies. Consequently, studies turned to the intricate ways in which these views 
corrupted the early Christianity and spread over the course of history. In so doing, 
Newton opened the door to heterodoxy and heresy in the eyes of both Roman 
Catholics and Protestants.34 
 
Newton’s interest in idolatry and corruption acquired a new dimension by moving 
from the investigation of the early Christianity to the wider perspective of a pre-
Christian religion dating back to Moses and Noah, which allegedly contained the 
core truths Adam possessed before the Fall. The idea of an original amalgamation of 
natural, divine and moral knowledge corrupted over history took different shapes in 
traditions that Newton studied fervently.35 As early Christianity was corrupted in the 
fourth century, Newton adopted the idea present in other scholars that the original 
religion was corrupted, in the first place, by worshiping nature and later by 
identifying gods with kings and then building statues to venerate them. Idolatry was 
at the root of human corruption of knowledge and religion. Newton elaborated 
complicated and heavily-documented genealogies showing that Egyptians, 
Chaldeans, Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans had corrupted this religion/knowledge. 
However, some of them were still in possession of uncorrupted remains. The true, 
pristine worship was represented in temples that reflected the universe, the divine 
creation. The reason behind these Vestal temples, as Newton claimed in a sermon on 
2 Kings 17:15-16 is that ‘ye wisest of beings requires of us to be celebrated not so 
much for his essence as for his actions, the creating and preserving & governing all 
things according to his good will & pleasure’.36 In fact, Newton came to believe that 
 
33 Newton, ‘“Proœmium” and First Chapter of a Treatise on Church History’, fol. 7. 
34 Snobelen, ‘Isaac Newton, Heretic’; Iliffe, Priest of Nature, 132–88; Westfall, Never at Rest, 310–30. 
35 Iliffe, Priest of Nature, 189–218; Westfall, ‘Isaac Newton’s Theologiae Gentilis Origines 
Philosophicae’; Buchwald and Feingold, Newton and the Origin of Civilization, 151–63; McGuire and 
Rattansi, ‘Newton and the “Pipes of Pan”’; Knoespel, ‘Interpretative Strategies in Newton’s Origines 
Philosophicae Theologiae Gentilis’. 
36 Newton, ‘Exposition of 2 Kings 17:15-16’, fol. 2r. 
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Vestal temples reproduced the universe having a central fire accompanied by seven 
lamps that signified the planets. In his historical enquiries, Newton found records of 
the existence of these temples all around the world and thus assumed them as 
evidence of the spreading of this original religion that worshipped God for his power 
and dominion. 
 
Newton’s devotion to history, prophecy and alchemy in the late 1670s and early 
1680s was occasionally interrupted by visitors and correspondents asking questions 
about astronomy, natural philosophy and mechanics. The questions dragged Newton 
to discussions outside his immediate concerns; he often made excuses avoiding 
further communication. Nevertheless, these exchanges provide clues on the evolution 
of Newton’s early engagement with different problems and traditions in 
mathematics, natural philosophy and mechanics. 
 
7.2.1. Interruptions 
In November 1679, Hooke, recently in charge of the correspondence of the Royal 
Society of London, contacted Newton asking him to resume the ‘former favours to 
the Society by communicating what shall occur to you that is philosophicall’. 
Newton politely replied that at the moment he was ‘unfurnished wth matter 
answerable’ Hooke’s expectations. In a confident tone, Newton claimed that ‘for 
some years past been endeavouring to bend myself from Philosophy to other studies 
… which makes me almost wholy unacquainted wth what Philosophers at London or 
abroad have of late been imployed about’.37 However, in trying to engage his 
potential contributor, Hooke had sent in the initial letter a ‘hypothesis and opinion of 
mine’ according to which the motion of planets is compounded by ‘a direct motion 
of the tangent & an attractive motion towards the centrall body’ and other questions 
of natural philosophy posed by correspondents to the Society. From the manuscript 
evidence, we know that Newton was dedicated to other topics, so his insistence on 
his affection for Philosophy ‘being worn out’ was not incorrect. However, Newton 
penned a ‘fansy’ of his own concerning the Earth’s diurnal motion in which a body 
falling to the centre of the Earth should travel slightly further than the place directly 
 
37 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:300. 
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beneath its point of release, describing a spiral. The curve and its demonstration 
ended up being entirely flawed.38 In a quick reply, Hooke politely pointed to 
Newton’s mistake and offered a different result, in which the released body was 
supposed to describe an elliptical path, according to Hooke’s ‘theory of circular 
motions compounded by a direct motion and an attractive one to a centre’.39 In a 
short and considerably less polite letter, Newton replied that Hooke was right, that 
the body would not descend to the centre and that it would circulate alternatively 
between an ‘ascent & descent’ but not describing an ellipse, as Hooke suggested. 
Newton replied that if gravity were assumed as uniform, the body would oscillate 
between gravity and its vis centrifuga and would describe a more complex curve. 
Newton provided a short proof. Hooke replied that his supposition was rather that the 
‘attraction always is in duplicate proportion to the distance from the center 
reciprocall, and consequently that the velocity will be in a subduplicate proportion to 
the attraction and consequently as Kepler supposes reciprocall to the distance’. In 
other words, Hooke was saying that this attractive force is as the square of the 
distance from which he derived Kepler’s law of velocities—a formulation that 
Kepler initially considered equivalent to the proportionality of areas and times but 
that he finally rejected.40 Hooke further adds that finding out the properties of this 
curve by these two principles ‘will be of great concern to mankinde’, because it will 
make intelligible ‘all the appearances of the Heavens’. In an attempt to advance into 
the matter, Hooke reported that he performed some experiments on falling bodies 
that Newton had implied in a former letter.41 Not receiving an answer, he wrote back 
to Newton insisting that his ‘tryalls’ succeeded under new conditions so that we was 
persuaded that the experiment was ‘very certaine’.42 In response, Newton sent a 
couple of paragraphs  recommending a book on fevers and his author, an Italian 
‘Doctor of Physick of the City of Lucca’ and two lines concerning the trials: that not 
 
38 For details on this correspondence, see Koyré, Newtonian Studies, 221–60; Westfall, Force in 
Newton’s Physics, 424–35; Westfall, Never at Rest, 382–88; Whiteside, MP, 6:8–17; Guicciardini, 
Newton on Mathematical Certainty, 237–38; Nauenberg, ‘Robert Hooke’s Seminal Contribution to 
Orbital Dynamics’; Gal, Meanest Foundations; De Gandt, Force and Geometry, 147–55. 
39 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:306–7. 
40 Gal, Meanest Foundations, 8; Westfall, Never at Rest, 987; Cf. Thoren, ‘Kepler’s Second Law in 
England’. 
41 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:309. 
42 Turnbull, 2:312–13. 
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having the opportunity to thank him ‘by word of mouth’ for them, he contented 
himself to do it by letter. Nothing more. 
 
Newton did not send any proof to Hooke. A short paper traditionally considered as 
Newton’s unsent reply, found a place amongst many other exercises in Newton’s 
mechanics, a field that had barely attracted his interest in the last few years.43 It is 
important to notice that the terminology and mathematical methods of this short 
paper remain within the boundaries of mechanics, in line with the Waste Book. On 
the other hand, Newton did not speak of planets in motion and there is no 
identification of this attraction with any physical force arising from the Sun. Newton 
was talking about bodies moving in ellipses under a tendency or attraction to the 
focus.  
 
The simultaneous correspondence with the Astronomer Royal, John Flamsteed, on 
the 1680 comet and with Thomas Burnet, a theologian writing a sacred history of 
earth, involving the discussion of physical topics, reveals that Newton was constantly 
relying on celestial fluids revolving and carrying with it the planets and comets, 
sometimes referring to vortices and drawing upon tendencies to move away from the 
centre to account for phenomena.44 Newton may have reworked some elements of 
Hooke’s views on the orbital motion based on his own achievements in mechanics. 
However, in natural philosophy and to some extent in astronomy when dealing with 
‘philosophy’, Newton was ‘deeply enmeshed’ in the Cartesian vortices.45 
 
7.2.2. De motu 
Another interruption shall prove more fruitful. In August 1684, Halley visited 
Cambridge in order to consult Newton’s opinion on a tough problem: to find the 
planetary orbit produced by an inverse-square central force. The problem was 
 
43 On the dating of this manuscript see Whiteside, ‘Before the Principia’, 53–54; Hall and Hall, 
Unpublished; Herivel, Background, 108–17; Westfall, Force in Newton’s Physics, 513–14; Westfall, 
Never at Rest, 387–88. 
44 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:315–56; Westfall, Never at Rest, 390–91; Schaffer, ‘Comets and 
Idols: Newton’s Cosmology and Political Theology’; Ruffner, ‘Newton’s Propositions on Comets: 
Steps in Transition, 1681–84’; De Gandt, Force and Geometry, 155–58. 
45 Cohen, ‘Guide’, 15. 
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embedded in the conceptions of orbital motion of the ‘elliptical astronomy’ as a 
compound of a ‘descent towards the sun and an imprest motion’. Hooke and Wren 
had widely discussed this idea in private and public since the 1660s, as we saw in the 
chapter 5. Newton claimed to have proved that the answer was an ellipse, but he 
could not find the demonstration so he promised to send it later.46 In November 
1684, Halley received a short tract entitled ‘De motu corporum in gyrum’ (On the 
motion of bodies in an orbit), formed by three definitions, four hypothesis, three 
theorems and seven problems.47  The opening definitions are Newton’s adaptations 
of Hooke’s components of orbital motion to his earlier work in mechanics. The first 
deals with ‘centripetal force’ (vis centripeta), a term Newton coined to denominate 
the force drawing a body towards the centre (as opposed to centrifugal introduced by 
Huygens in 1673 to denominate the tendency to recede from the centre). The second 
one is the ‘force of a body or the force inherent in a body’ (vis corporis seu corporis 
insita) by which the body tends to persevere in rectilinear motion. A third definition 
establishes resisting force as generated from the ‘uniform impeding medium’. Instead 
of providing a clear concept of force, these definitions outline the use of centripetal, 
inherent and resisting forces involved in the quantification of change of motion in 
order to elaborate some calculations. The hypotheses include: the assumption of the 
motion of bodies in vacuo for some of the problems; the claim that if a body moves 
only under the action of its ‘inherent force’ will move uniformly in a straight line 
unless something external hinders it; and an interesting consequence of Newton’s 
mathematical treatment of centripetal forces: that the space described by a body 
under the action of any centripetal force is proportional to the square of time at the 
beginning of its motion. In other words, that the ratio between the motion of a body 
under a centripetal force and its trajectory is only valid ‘at the beginning of 
motion’—an extension of Galileo’s results on the free fall to bodies to the motion 
under centripetal forces. In order to validate Galileo’s proportion under different 
conditions, Newton restricted the scope to the moment in which the centripetal force 
deviates the body from its rectilinear path, ‘the beginning of motion’. Based on these 
assumptions, the tract demonstrated that an inverse-square force to one of the focus 
 
46 Details of the visit, analysing contradictory evidence in Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s Principia, 
47–54; Westfall, Never at Rest, 402–7; Whiteside, MP, 6:1–21; Herivel, Background. 
47 Herivel, Background, 255–92; Whiteside, MP, 6:30–75; Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 231–92. 
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entailed the elliptical shape of the orbit (Problem 3). However, it also put forward 
other important generalisations: the demonstration of Kepler’s proportions between 
areas and times in orbital motion (Theorem 1); the demonstration of centripetal 
forces in circular motion (Theorem 2); the generalisation that an if the orbit is an 
ellipse, a parabola or an hyperbola, the force is directed towards a focus and then the 
force is as the inverse square of the distance (Theorem 3); and the demonstration of 
Kepler’s rule according to which the square of periodic times are as the cube of the 
transverse axes (Theorem 4). In other words, Newton showed that his mathematical 
treatment of orbital motion accounted for other widely accepted proportions of the 
planetary motion. At the same time, Newton’s hypotheses made possible to sketch 
some calculations on the motion of bodies in resisting media, such as hydrostatical 
questions and the motion of projectiles. 
 
There is no reason to think that these demonstrations from the 1684 autumn did not 
make an impression in the Lucasian Professor. However, it is important to stress that 
contrary to a frequent approach when studying the developments of ‘De motu’, 
Newton did not know at this point that he was going to be the author of the Principia 
and probably he had no idea of how this work was going to look in its final form. It 
is misleading to read ‘De motu’ as an intuition of the revolution or transformation 
that will take place in the Principia and its reception. Westfall, for example, 
attributed the impetus that encouraged Newton from ‘De motu’ to the Principia to 
‘the sheer grandeur of the theme’.48 It is important to consider three aspects. First, in 
previous situations Newton was also aware of significant results in mathematics, 
mechanics and optics, such as the generalisation of the binomial theorem that led to 
some successful applications in geometry and that his early calculations of the 
tendency to recede from the centre that were used to solve mechanical and 
astronomical problems, not to mention the method of fluxions. However, he was only 
moved to circulate some of these results by external pressure and more often than 
not, he tended to step back from the press. Second, Halley played an important role 
as external stimulus by asking the initial question and by providing constant 
motivation in subsequent visits and letters. However, Newton had similar 
 
48 Westfall, Never at Rest, 407. 
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encouragements by Oldenburg, Collins and Barrow in the past and even though he 
withdrew from the press. Finally, from the historiographical perspective, the 
teleological reading of ‘De motu’ as root of the Principia renders invisible the 
complexity of the process by which Newton redefined the boundaries of 
mathematics, natural philosophy and mechanics and decided to call his book 
Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, not Mechanicæ Principia 
Mathematica or Astronomiæ Principia Mathematica. Had Newton opted for any of 
the last two options, his claims on gravitation may not have generated such a reaction 
in the Continent. He would have been working within the comfort of widely accepted 
disciplinary boundaries.49  
 
If we turn back to the first ‘De motu’ (November 1684), Newton was not doing any 
significant transformation of the boundaries of mechanics. Since the Waste Book and 
the De gravitatione, Newton had distinguished between two forces in the analysis of 
motion: an inherent force keeping the body at rest or in uniform straight motion and 
the external forces of impact responsible of changing the trajectory of a body moved 
(or resting) by its own inherent force. On the other hand, Newton had found the idea 
of a tendency to move to the centre in Hooke’s correspondence, but it was already 
explained in Hooke’s Attempt to prove the motion of the Earth; it had been discussed 
by Wren and Halley also, as we saw in the chapter 5. Newton’s achievement in the 
first ‘De motu’ was to understand the tendency to move to the centre—that he coined 
centripetal—as a force in the terms of his previous explorations in mechanics: as an 
instantaneous force like impact, whose (constant) action on the body deviated it from 
the rectilinear tendency tracing conical paths. From the point of view of the 
explanatory resources, Newton stuck to traditional forms of classical geometry ‘at 
least for those adept to Euclid and Apollonius’.50 Some specific points of ‘De motu’ 
may hint at the use of infinitesimals or to a limits procedure. The hypothesis 4 
extended Galileo’s proportion for free fall to motion under centripetal forces by 
limiting the scope to the space described by a body at ‘beginning of its motion’, 
suggesting a restriction problematic from the point of view of classical geometry. 
 
49 Cf. Cunningham, ‘How the Principia Got Its Name’; Gabbey, ‘Newton’s Mathematical Principles’; 
Gabbey, ‘Between Ars and Philosophia Naturalis’. 
50 De Gandt, Force and Geometry, 55. 
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However, the appeal to this physicalised language was not uncommon in the learned 
circles, for it circulated in the works of Galileo, Roberval, Hobbes and Barrow.51 
Finally, the extension of mechanical procedures to tackle astronomical problems had 
been a defining characteristic of the English mathematicians of the ‘elliptical 
astronomy’ at least since the recension of Kepler’s work. Thus, the first ‘De motu’ 
moves within the blurry boundaries of mechanics and relies on the geometrical 




The first revision of ‘De motu’ dated in December 1684 exhibits a change of 
direction in Newton’s goals that probably occurred as the initial version was 
travelling down to London. In the hand of Newton’s amanuensis, this first revision 
now called ‘De motu sphæricorum in fluidis’ (On the motion of spherical bodies in 
fluids) seems ‘a faithful copy’ of the one sent to Halley with some substantial 
additions.52 The new title indicates that Newton already had an insight that under an 
inverse-square force a body behaves as though the mass were concentrated at its 
centre.53 But it also points to a consideration of physical elements, for Newton here 
conceived that planets moved in a fluid celestial ether. Indeed, Newton’s first major 
transformation here concerns the interaction of bodies under centripetal forces in a 
more detailed manner. The three initial definitions remain intact, but Newton 
changed the order of the hypotheses that moved up to five and reworked some 
lemmas. The purpose of the new set of hypotheses was to advance in the quantitative 
treatment of forces from a more general perspective. To the previous hypotheses, 
Newton added one that substantiates the quantitative properties of force, specifying 
that ‘the change of motion in a body is proportional to the impressed force and takes 
place along the straight line in which that force is impressed’ (Hypothesis 2). Thus, 
Newton incorporated his earlier achievements concerning Descartes’ first and second 
 
51 Malet, From Indivisibles to Infinitesimals. 
52 Herivel, Background, 294; Different editions of this version has been printed in Herivel, 294–303; 
Whiteside, MP, 6:74–80; Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 249–67. Because these editions tend to overlap 
materials from other similar versions, I have followed the manuscript Newton, ‘De motu sphaericorum 
corporum in fluidis’. 
53 Whiteside, MP, 6:31. 
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laws by expressing force as a directed quantity. The next one dealt with the 
indifference of relative motions in a space that rests or moves ‘perpetually and 
uniformly in a straight line without circular motion’ (Hypothesis 3). Another one, 
backed up by Hypothesis 3, stated that the mutual action between bodies does not 
affect their common centre of gravity, that is, the common centre does not change its 
state of motion or rest (Hypothesis 4). The last hypothesis (5) contained a revision of 
Newton’s earlier definition of resistance as a joint proportion between the density of 
the medium, the speed and the spherical surface of the body moved. The previous 
Hypothesis 3 became Lemma 1, expressed this time in terms of forces: when two 
forces act simultaneously on a body, this describes the diagonal of a parallelogram in 
the same time as it would be the sides if the forces acted separately. The Lemma 2 
opened the door to more advanced mathematics than the initial geometrical 
demonstrations of ‘De motu’. We had seen that in the initial Hypothesis 3 Newton 
limited the validity of the extension of the Galilean proportion of free fall to the 
space described by a body ‘at the beginning of motion’ in order to make it valid for 
the case of centripetal forces as impulses. Now, Newton generalised this proposition 
by claiming that ‘the distance a body describes from the beginning of its motion 
under the action of any centripetal force whatsoever is in the duplicate ratio of the 
time’. In the proof, Newton claimed that under uniform centripetal forces, the 
distance may be represented by the areas of a triangle and the demonstration 
proceeds ‘as shown by Galileo’. However, under non-uniform centripetal forces, the 
hypotenuse of the triangle becomes a curve. In order to calculate the areas under the 
curve, Newton introduced the idea of ‘the limiting ratio of the evanescent spaces or 
the first ratio of the vanishing spaces’.54 The earlier treatment of the mechanics of 
impact and, by extension, of the orbital motion was explained with the resources of 
(classical) geometry. The quantification of non-uniform centripetal forces described 
complex curves which required the calculation of areas under them, so Newton 
began to mobilise procedures that he had developed when he transformed his method 
of fluxions into the geometrical determination of the ratios of ‘nascent and 
evanescent’ quantities.55  
 
54 A detailed analysis of this proof is presented by De Gandt, Force and Geometry, 161–67. 
55 On this method see Guicciardini, Reading the Principia, 32–37; De Gandt, Force and Geometry, 




The introduction of Newton’s original geometrical developments is subordinated to a 
deeper change undergoing in this new ‘De motu’. Newton enlarged the Scholium to 
Theorem 4—which demonstrated Kepler’s rule according to which the square of 
periodic times is as the cube of the transverse axes.56 According to the achievements 
of this Theorem, there was a correlation between the period and size of the orbit that 
may be used to calculate the elliptical path of the planets. For the new ‘De motu’, 
Newton realised that the whole space of planetary heavens either rests (‘ut vulgo 
creditur’) or moves in a straight line and in consequence, that the common centre of 
gravity of the planets either rests or moves along with the space of the planetary 
system according to the Hypothesis 4. However, in either case, by the Hypothesis 3, 
the relative motions of the planets remain the same and their common centre of 
gravity rests in relation to the whole space, so the centre of the whole planetary 
system must be considered at rest. From here, Newton claims, ‘the true Copernican 
system can be demonstrated a priori’. Indeed, if the common centre of gravity can be 
proved to be at rest, then the motion of the planets is real, not apparent or relative. 
However, this conclusion implied another point: if the common centre of gravity is 
calculated for any position of the planets it will lay either in the body of the Sun or 
very near of it. However, this deviation of the Sun from the centre of gravity implied 
that centripetal forces did not always tend to the immoveable centre and then ‘the 
planets neither move exactly in ellipse nor revolve twice in the same orbit’. The 
cause was the mutual interference of all the celestial bodies, ‘so that there are as 
many orbits to a planet as it has revolutions’ and thus ‘the orbit of any one planet 
depends on the combined motion of all the planets, not to mention the action of all 
these on each other’. Newton was not making a light assumption. Between December 
and January 1684/5, he wrote to Flamsteed asking whether there was any important 
change in the speed of Saturn when approaching Jupiter, contrary to Kepler’s tables. 
Flamsteed replied with scepticism to Newton’s intuition of mutual perturbations but 
he sent some observations suggesting a variation in speed.57 The mutual interference 
posed a major challenge: ‘Unless I am much mistaken, it would exceed the force of 
 
56 Other readings of this Scholium can be found in Smith, ‘Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica’; Cohen, ‘Guide’, 18. 
57 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:413. 
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human wit to consider so many causes of motion at the same time, and to define the 
motions by exact laws which would allow of an easy calculation’.58 From this 
perspective, the trigonometrical methods of calculating the ellipse based on three 
observations became invalid, for the three observations may correspond to different 
ellipses or revolutions. The complexity of nature does not mean the impossibility to 
understand it. Newton’s ellipse ‘ought to be the mean among all errors’, and thus it 
should be calculated on the basis of ‘very many observations’ that may be assigned 
to ‘a single operation which mutually moderate each other and display the mean 
ellipse both as regards position and magnitude’.  
 
The major insight of December 1684 was that ‘De motu’ offered a glimpse into the 
authentic constitution of the world, beyond the boundaries of mechanics. Newton 
realised that his mathematical hypotheses could reach farther than the calculation of 
two points moving in vacuo satisfying Kepler’s geometrical proportions. 
Confidently, Newton claimed that his approach could demonstrate the Copernican 
system, the one represented in the Vestal temples. Revising his amanuensis writing, 
Newton crossed out the word ‘Hypothesis’, not only in the opening parts but in all 
other mentions—including those in the Scholium just analysed—and replaced it for 
‘Lex’. The hypotheses of the mechanical approach gave way to laws from which 
natural philosophical conclusions could be drawn (Figure 9). The Hypothesis 2, 
initially stating that ‘the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force’, 
was also revised in Newton’s hand by deleting the word ‘motion’ and inserting above 
‘state of movement or rest’. In this revised form, motion and rest appear as states 
equally responsive to external forces. 
 
The change of perspective is also manifest in Newton’s inclusion of a closing 
Scholium claiming that he had considered the motion of bodies in non-resisting 
media in order to ‘determine the motion of celestial bodies in ether’. The revised title 
(On the motion of spherical bodies in fluids), that may suggest to the modern reader 
that the text deals with hydrostaticsis, in fact the name of an all-encompassing study  
 
58 Newton says that ‘superat ni fallor vim omnem humani ingenij’. Herivel has pointed to the irony 
that Newton’s inscription in the statue of Newton in the chapel of the Trinity College reads ‘Qui genus 




Figure 9 Newton's introduction of laws. ULC, Ms.Add 3965 f.40 
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on the motion of bodies, including the celestial ones moving in an ether, ‘a fluid’ 
opposing no resistance. The importance of the move from Hypotheses to Laws is 
confirmed by Newton’s conclusions in this ur-General Scholium that the ‘Motions in 
the heavens are ruled therefore by the laws demonstrated’. Newton was not making 
reference to laws as a vague metaphor of divine or natural order, but to the specific 
statements that he had written down in his paper and assumed for mathematical 
demonstration.59 The quantitative correlations between motion and forces—including 
the conditions establishing their interaction denominated ‘laws’—adumbrated the 
actual constitution of the planetary system. In this same spirit, Newton declared that 
‘gravity is one kind of centripetal force’, suggested by the similarity between the 
force holding the Moon ‘in her monthly motion about the Earth’ and the force of 
gravity at the surface of the earth being nearly as the reciprocal square of the distance 
from the centre of the Earth. The motion of projectiles had to be referred now ‘to the 
immense and truly immobile space of the heavens, and not to the moveable space 
which turns around with the earth’. Newton’s laws of motion left the domain of 
mathematical mechanics and operated now as mathematical principles of natural 
philosophy. 
 
Some revisions after December 1684/5 considerably enlarged the definitions (18 
now), including absolute time and space in order to determine actual motions; the 
impenetrability of matter, the difference between place (as the space occupied by a 
body) and the absolute space, revisiting arguments from De gravitatione; a more 
detailed characterisation of forces, resistance and the ‘moments of quantities’ as their 
principles of generation or alteration in function of time. The new set of definitions 
was now directed to the determination of quantitative elements to distinguish actual 
from apparent motions. A note immediately after the definitions called the attention 
of the reader to the importance of being ‘freed from certain vulgar prejudices’ in 
order to understand ‘distinct principles of mechanics’. Here Newton introduced an 
argument from his Biblical studies: given that ‘ordinary people … fail to abstract 
thought from sensible appearances’, it would be absurd for wise men or even 
 
59 In the original version of this Scholium in Newton’s hand appears the term law, suggesting that the 
Scholium was added once he realised of the scope of what he had at hand. 
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Prophets to speak to them in terms of the ‘distinct principles of mechanics’. ‘Hence, 
the sacred writings and theological writings are always to be understood in terms of 
relative quantities, and he who would on this account bandy words with philosophers 
concerning the absolute motions of natural things would be labouring under a gross 
misapprehension’.60 The laws moved in number from 5 to 6 and the most important 
novelty is that Newton included a new third law stating that ‘as much as any body 
acts on another so much does it experience in reaction’, a principle sketched in the 
Waste Book and that now acquired a new dimension.61 Newton justifies this new law 
by definition 12 (stating the perseverance in direction of motions under their inherent 
forces) and 14 (presenting the varieties of impressed force, including centripetal 
forces).62 The first significant revised version composed between Winter and Spring 
1684/5,63 including the achievements of the previous papers on definitions and 
laws—now denominated ‘laws of motion’—got closer in the introductory sections to 
the first printed edition, particularly three laws that remained almost unaltered until 
1687. The election of ‘laws of motion’ indicated the advance in the transformation of 
the scope of disciplines from the initial ‘De motu’: Newton used an expression 
common in English (mathematical) mechanics as principle of mathematical 
explanation of the actual motion of bodies in nature. After the laws, Newton 
introduced some lemmas and presented his method of ‘prime and ultimate ratios’ in 
order to deal in more satisfactory ways with the varieties of curves generated by 
different forces considered mathematically.64 At the same time, this version included 
47 propositions and a diversity of Lemmas and Problems. Nevertheless, all these 
additions did not emerge ex nihilo. The new project motivated to revisit previous 
elaborations in astronomy, mechanics, mathematics and natural philosophy. Newton 
began to rephrase past developments and to integrate them, quantum in se est, in his 
new project. The absorbing process that reached to conclusion with the first printed 
 
60 A wider analysis of this point, its appearance in the Principia and its importance in Newton in Iliffe, 
Priest of Nature, 240–45. 
61 Cf. Cohen, ‘Guide’, 62–66; Fraser, ‘The Third Law in Newton’s Waste Book’. 
62 These versions are edited in different ways by Herivel, Background, 304–20; Whiteside, MP, 
6:188–94. 
63 Whiteside, MP, 6:92. 
64 On the introduction of this method into the Principia see Whiteside, 6:92–94; Guicciardini, Newton 
on Mathematical Certainty, 217–22; De Gandt, Force and Geometry, 159–68. 
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edition of the Principia in 1687 is, under this light, a synthesis.65 However, it is a 
synthesis of Newton’s piecemeal approach to a wide variety of fields reflecting 
typical interest of the seventeenth-century and, at the same time, his unique 
approach. Nevertheless, the idea of a synthesis does not imply that Newton put all 
this into a coherent, deductive whole. On the contrary, the successive revisions of 
‘De motu’ display how previous works in conics, calculations on the motion of 
planets and the moon, a geometrical incarnation of the method of fluxions, analytical 
solutions to specific problems, computations on previous observations of comets, 
speculations on the actions of light, were reworked once and again in an attempt to 
point to something: that the laws of motion made possible to demonstrate principles 
indicating the actual structure of the world, the one represented in Vestal temples 
before the original knowledge was corrupted.  
 
Between December 1684/1685 and the autumn 1685, the project took the form of 
two books denominated De motu corporum.66 The liber primus shall contain 
Newton’s mathematical principles concerning the properties of force in general, 
whose main aspects we have seen, while the liber secundus will present ‘the 
application of this Mathematical part, to the System of the world’, to the explanation 
of the (true) celestial motions and other phenomena such as the motion of comets and 
the ‘flux and reflux’ of the sea. The surviving evidence of this version of the 
philosophical part of the project is scattered and problematic,67 but it is enough to 
make my point. The fundamental change of perspective that invigorated the 
enlargement of ‘De motu’ came from Newton’s glimpse into the possibility of 
proving a priori the ‘Copernican system’. In the liber secundus, Newton projected 
his natural philosophy back into the knowledge of the ancients. Newton opens the 
book claiming that it was an  
 
65 Koyré, Newtonian Studies, 3–24; Westfall, ‘The Scientific Revolution Reasserted’; Dobbs, ‘Newton 
as Final Cause and First Mover’. 
66 Dating these manuscripts is speculative but important information comes from the correspondence 
with Halley in June 1686, see Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:434–40; Cohen, Introduction to 
Newton’s Principia, 113. 
67 Details of this in Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s Principia, 109–15; 327–35; and in the 
introduction to Newton, A Treatise of the System of the World. I have used this edition and the 
manuscript in Latin (different from this edition).  
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ancient opinion of not a few in the earliest ages of philosophy that 
the fixed Stars remain immoveable in the highest parts of the 
world; that under the Fixed Stars the Planets were carried about the 
Sun; that the Earth, as one of the Planets, described an annual 
course about the Sun, while by a diurnal motion it was in the mean 
time revolved around its own axe; and that the Sun, as the common 
fire which served to warm the whole, was fixed in the centre of the 
Universe.68   
This Copernican arrangement of the universe was the philosophy of ‘Philolaus, 
Aristarchus of Samos, Plato in his riper years, and the whole sect of Pythagoreans’. 
Also, it was the ‘judgment of Anaximander’ and of ‘Numa Pompilius who, as a 
symbol of the figure of the World with the Sun in the centre, erected a temple in 
honour of Vesta, of a round form, and ordained perpetual fire to be kept in the 
middle of it’. This knowledge can be traced back to the ‘ancient spirit of Egyptians’, 
who performed vestal ceremonies, though concealed them under ‘the veil of religious 
rites and hieroglyphic symbols’. Meanwhile, Anaxagoras and Democritus explained 
that the motions of celestial bodies ‘were performed in spaces altogether free, and 
void of resistance’, although philosophy ‘began to decline’ with the introduction of 
the solid orbs by Eudoxus, Calippus and Aristotle. The Chaldeans, ‘the most learned 
astronomers’, considered comets as ‘particular sort of planets which describing very 
eccentric orbits’. The ancients knew the Copernican arrangement of the celestial 
bodies including the comets. However, Newton claims that we do not know how the 
ancients explained ‘that the planets came to be retained within any certain bounds in 
those free spaces’, that is, that the celestial bodies deviated from their rectilinear path 
‘into regular revolutions in curvilinear forms’.69 Solid orbs were introduced to fill 
this gap. However, more recent philosophers, such as Kepler and Descartes 
formulated the existence of vortices or ‘Borelli, Hooke and other of our countrymen’ 
introduced ‘some other principle whether of impulse of or attraction’. Newton 
presented his own natural philosophy in this way: ‘From the first law of motion it is 
very certain that some force is required. Our purpose is to bring out its quantity and 
properties and to investigate mathematically its effects in moving bodies; further, in 
order not to delimit its type hypothetically, we have called by the general name 
 
68 Newton, A Treatise of the System of the World, 1; Newton, ‘Liber Secundus’, fol. 1r. 
69 Newton, A Treatise of the System of the World, 2–4; Newton, ‘Liber Secundus’, fol. 1r. 
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‘centripetal’ that force which tends towards the centre’.70 Newton attributed to the 
ancients a precise knowledge of the constitution of the universe and pointed to some 
moments of history in which this knowledge was corrupted. The remaining mystery 
was still how the ancients explained the motion of planets in free spaces assuming 
the first law, whose knowledge was evident in Anaxagoras, Aristotle and Lucretius.71 
Given the truth of the first law, some force is required to explain orbital motion. The 
whole point of his enquiry was, then, to investigate possible forces and then, in the 
liber secundus, to show that the force of gravitation, a kind of centripetal force, filled 
this gap (or recovered this bit of lost knowledge) in the understanding of the system 
of the world.  
 
However, this original plan of two books, including explicit references to the 
historical awareness that motivated Newton’s enquiry, changed radically as we know 
from his correspondence in 1686. Halley informed Newton that Hooke ‘has some 
pretension upon the invention of ye rule of the decrease of gravity’. ‘He says—
Halley continues—you had the notion from him, though he owns the demonstration 
of the curves generated therby [sic] to be wholly your own’. Hooke’s pretention was 
that Newton ‘make some mention of him, in the preface’.72 Newton’s anger can be 
guessed considering the wider perspective in which he was locating his own 
achievements.73 In one of the resulting replies to Halley, Newton mentioned two 
books on mathematics and one third on natural philosophy, including a theory of 
comets on which he has been working. ‘The Third I now designe to suppress’, 
famously claiming that ‘Philosophy is such an impertinently litigious Lady that a 
man had as good be engaged in Law suits as have to do with her’. Newton had been 
consumed for years replying to philosophical questions concerning the nature of 
light. He had found some peace of mind after cutting down this correspondence in 
the 1670s. The perspective of the publication of the Principia seemed to drag him 
again to a bitter dispute with Hooke. The suppression of the philosophical book 
 
70 Newton, ‘Liber Secundus’, fol. 2r; For the translation of this passage I have followed the manuscript 
and Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s Principia, 332. 
71 Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 309–11. 
72 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:431. 
73 Westfall, Never at Rest, 444–52; Iliffe, Priest of Nature, 341–46. 
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would render the title Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica ‘inadequate’, 
Newton claimed, so he thought that the version restricted to the mathematical 
properties of forces shall be called just De motu corporum libri duo. ‘But upon 
second thoughts I retain ye former title. Twill help ye sale of ye book wch I ought 
not to diminish now tis yours’. After all, we can conjecture, the first two books 
effectively contained mathematical principles of natural philosophy, although they 
did not explicitly contain their application to natural philosophy. Halley replied 
begging ‘not to let your resentments run so high, as to deprive us of your third book, 
wherin the application of your Mathematicall doctrine to the Theory of Comets, and 
several curious Experiments … will undoubtedly render it acceptable to those that 
will call themselves philosophers without Mathematicks’.74 Newton finally included 
a third book, but it was not written for ‘philosophers without Mathematicks’, as we 
suspect he may have presented the liber secundus to Halley. A scar of this story 
seems to be in the 1687 edition (and in all subsequent editions), in the opening of the 
book 3: ‘I composed an earlier version of book 3 in popular form, so that it might be 
more widely read. But those who have not sufficiently grasped the principles set 
down here will certainly not perceive the force of the conclusions’.75 
 
7.3.The effect of choice 
The first edition of the Principia appeared in 1687. The work opens with a ‘Præfatio’ 
that remained unaltered in the subsequent editions. The main purpose of this 
intriguing section is to introduce the subject of the book that is unfamiliar for 
readers.76 Newton was aware that his ‘way of philosophising’ reconfigured the 
boundaries of disciplines as they were widely practiced in his time, particularly of 
geometry, mechanics and natural philosophy. Indeed, what Newton called 
‘mathematical principles of natural philosophy’ was hardly intelligible as such for his 
contemporaries. Because of this, the first part of the ‘Præfatio’ attempts to 
(re)establish the boundaries of geometry and mechanics and in the second, once these 
 
74 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1960, 2:431, 435, 443. 
75 Newton, The Principia, 793. 
76 Detailed analysis of the ‘Præfatio’ in Guicciardini, Newton on Mathematical Certainty, 293–99. 




fields are reorganised, Newton shows their legitimacy to account for natural 
phenomena. The most important outcome of this new way of studying nature was the 
law of universal gravitation. 
 
7.3.1. Mechanics, geometry and motion 
The ‘Præfatio’ announced that the book’s main interest was ‘on mathematics as it 
relates to natural philosophy’. Newton mentioned two important antecedents: that the 
ancients considered ‘mechanics to be of the greatest importance in the investigation 
of nature’ and that recent authors have tried to ‘reduce the phenomena of nature to 
mathematical laws’.77 If we consider Wallis’ mechanics as some state of the art in the 
English context, Newton’s claim that mechanics deals with nature and provides the 
foundations of geometry is controversial. However, Newton’s argument attempts to 
shed light on two problematic notions associated with mechanics and geometry: (1) 
that mechanics is less exact and thus opposed to geometry and (2) that mechanics is 
restricted ‘to manual arts’.  
 
(1)  Newton claimed that the ancients divided mechanics into rational, which 
proceeds through rigorous demonstrations and practical, which deals with the 
manual arts—a distinction he most likely derived from Pappus’ Collectiones; this last 
branch was considered less exact than geometry and was mistakenly used as a 
synonym for mechanics in general, reducing the scope and nature of the rational part. 
Nonetheless, Newton argued that the attribution of less exactitude to mechanics is 
not an error of the art but of those ‘who practise the art’. In this way, ‘anyone who 
works with less exactness is a more imperfect mechanic, and if anyone could work 
with the greatest exactness, he would be the most perfect mechanic of all’. The 
distinction between mechanics and geometry has nothing to do with exactness pace 
Descartes.78 In its place, Newton claimed that geometry is founded upon mechanics. 
The argument runs this way: mechanics is mainly concerned with the description of 
straight lines and circles, that is, with the generation (tracing or construction) of 
circles and lines. As for geometry, it ‘teaches how problems are solved by these 
 
77 Newton, Principia Variorum, 1972, 2:15–17; Newton, The Principia, 381–83. 
78 Domski, ‘The Constructible and the Intelligible in Newton’s Philosophy of Geometry’. 
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operations’, that is, geometry shows how the construction of lines and figures solves 
geometrical problems. The very action of construction, Newton clarified, is not a 
geometrical problem because ‘geometry postulates the solution of these problems 
from mechanics and teaches the use of the problems thus solved’. In other words, 
mechanics provides the subject matter of geometry—actually, creates it. In 
consequence, geometry is that part of ‘universal mechanics which reduces the art of 
measuring to exact proportions and demonstrations’. What mechanics constructs is 
measured by geometry and based on these measurements, demonstrated. Geometry 
requires some kind of construction. The subordination of geometry to mechanics 
implied that geometry in general deals with the magnitude of motion, (the generation 
of motion). Geometry does not generate motion, but establishes its proportions based 
on mechanical production. Motion then is the raw material matter of geometry (and 
of the phenomena of the world, as we shall see). 
 
(2) The distinction between rational and practical mechanics displays Newton’s 
redrawing of the traditional distinction between the manual arts and a scientia of 
machines as it emerged in the late sixteenth century. In the first chapter, we saw that 
the science of mechanics emerged as an attempt to organise the mathematical 
principles of their functioning, while the manual arts were concerned with the 
construction and operation of machines. Newton traces different boundaries. 
‘Rational mechanics’ is not restricted to uncovering the principles of the construction 
and operations of machines, that is, the proportions of manual powers required to 
produce a desired motion. Instead, ‘rational mechanics will be the science, expressed 
in exact propositions and demonstrations, of the motions that result from any forces 
whatever and of the forces that are required for any motion whatever’. Because 
mechanics deals with motions and geometry is concerned with magnitude, rational 
mechanics establishes the proportions (magnitudes) between forces and motions, on 
the one hand, and motion and forces on the other. Rational mechanics has been 
mistakenly reduced to manual arts because the ancients hardly paid any attention ‘to 





Newton now turned to the subject of the book. Because mechanics can deal with 
natural powers (gravity, levity, elastic forces, resistance of fluids) according to the 
ancients and, against Descartes, geometry is founded upon mechanics, his work ‘sets 
forth mathematical principles of natural philosophy’. Both mechanics and natural 
philosophy deal with objects generated by motion that can be studied by geometry, 
whose main concern is the ‘generation of motion’. In this view, the ‘whole difficulty’ 
of (natural) philosophy is the discovery of ‘the forces of nature from the phenomena 
of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces’. The 
Principia advances in this direction. The first two books provide ‘general 
propositions’, while the third explains ‘the system of the world’ illustrating these 
propositions. While the first two books deal (mathematically) with forces and 
motions in general, the third book deduces from the first two the forces operating in 
our ‘system of the world’ and, assuming them, demonstrates other phenomena. The 
third book ‘deduces’ from celestial phenomena ‘the gravitational forces by which 
bodies tend towards the sun and towards the individual planets’. Once this force is 
deduced, he demonstrated phenomena such as the motions of the planets, the comets, 
the moon and the sea.  
 
This complex reorganisation of mechanical and geometrical principles as foundations 
of natural philosophy explains the dual function of the laws in the Principia. Newton 
called them ‘Axioms or laws of motion’ [Axiomata sive leges motus].79 Their 
function was to stipulate the most general conditions of interaction between forces 
and bodies in terms of motion. In other words, the axioms-laws provide the 
mathematician-natural philosopher the general framework to determine the motions 
generated by any force and the forces generating any motion. In the specific case of 
the natural philosopher, based on ‘very many observations’ and equipped with the 
mathematical principles, it was possible to determine the specific kinds of force 
generating certain motions and use them to explain some other phenomena.80 
 
 
79 Newton, Principia Variorum, 1972, 1:54–56. 
80 On Newton’s gathering of experimental evidence for his Principia see Schaffer, ‘Newton on the 
Beach: The Information Order of the Principia Mathematica’. 
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Newton’s most salient philosophical conclusion in the Principia was the ‘deduction’ 
of a law quantifying the effects of universal gravitation.81 In the first two books, he 
calculated the motion of bodies under centripetal forces (among many other things) 
and explained the motion of bodies when this force was proportional to the inverse-
square of the distance between the objects involved. In the third book, Newton 
concluded that ‘gravity exists in all bodies universally’ and was directly proportional 
to the quantity of matter and inversely proportional to the square of the distances.82 
The characterisation of gravity as a force acting at a distance did not specify its 
nature or its cause; the Principia did not provide any mechanism explaining how this 
attraction was performed. On the contrary, the entire point of the Principia, Newton 
insisted, was to show that this force existed and could be quantified in a law. This 
because assuming the force of gravity—on experimental evidence—explained with 
unprecedented accuracy a wide variety of phenomena different from those from 
which it was initially deduced. 
 
7.3.2. Crossing boundaries 
The most prominent aspect of Newton’s Principia was, at the same time, the centre 
of criticisms. One of the first reviews, published in the Journal des Sçavans, 
addressed its concerns to the disciplinary aspects, emphasising the impossibility of 
postulating the nature of gravity from the means Newton had employed. 
The work of Mr. Newton is a mechanics, the most perfect that one 
could imagine, as it is not possible to make demonstrations more 
precise or more exact than those he gives in the first two books on 
lightness, on springiness, on the resistance of bodies, and on the 
attractive and repulsive forces that are the principal basis of 
Physics. But one has to confess that one cannot regard these 
demonstrations otherwise than as only mechanical; indeed, the 
author recognizes himself (…) that he has not considered their 
Principles as a Physicist, but as a mere Geometer. 
He confesses the same thing at the beginning of the third book, 
where he endeavours nevertheless to explain the System of the 
 
81 On the complex structure of Newton’s ‘deduction’ see Cohen, ‘The Principia, Universal 
Gravitation, and the “Newtonian Style”, in Relation to the Newtonian Revolution in Science:’; Cohen, 
‘Newton’s Concepts of Force and Mass, with Notes on the Laws of Motion’; Smith, ‘Newton’s 
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica’; Westfall, Force in Newton’s Physics, 467–91; 
Guicciardini, Newton on Mathematical Certainty; Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method; 
Ducheyne, The Main Business. 
82 Newton, The Principia, 810. 
267 
 
World. But it is done only by hypotheses that are, most of them, 
arbitrary, and that, consequently, can serve as foundation only to a 
treatise of pure mechanics. He bases the explanation of the 
inequality of the tides on the principle that all the planets gravitate 
reciprocally towards each other … But this supposition is arbitrary 
and it has not been proved; the demonstration that depends on it 
can therefore be mechanics. 
In order to make an opus as perfect as possible, M. Newton has 
only to give us a Physic as exact as his Mechanics. He will give it 
when he substitutes true motions for those he has supposed.83  
Read against the background of the previous sections, this review criticised what 
Newton esteemed as his greatest achievements, stated as a hypotheses what he saw 
as rigorous demonstrations and demanded from him what he considered his major 
success: the determination of true motions by forces. At the same time, the review 
uses mechanics, geometry and physics in meanings that Newton had radically 
modified in the Principia. Huygens, who admired Newton’s mathematical skills, 
confessed that he neither agreed ‘with a Principle according to which all the small 
parts that we can imagine in two or several different bodies mutually attract each 
other or tend to approach each other’. In his view, ‘the cause of such an attraction is 
not explainable by any of the principles of Mechanics, or of the rules of motion’.84 
Leibniz was also perplexed by Newton’s introduction of attraction, as he said to 
Huygens: ‘I do not understand how he conceives gravitation or attraction. It seems 
that, according to him, it is nothing more than an inexplicable incorporeal virtue’.85  
 
Newton’s strategies of defence were complex, intertwined and varied and a full study 
of them and their interactions would deserve separate studies. From the point of view 
of his intellectual itinerary after the 1687 Principia, Newton further emphasised his 
admiration for ancient geometry and enhanced a distinction between analysis and 
synthesis as methods of mathematics that should be employed in natural philosophy 
as well.86 Meanwhile, he took shelter in the loose talk on ‘experimental philosophy’ 
that circulated in England since the 1660s and wrapped up his Principia and his 
 
83 Journal de Scavans, 2 August 1688, p.153 in Koyré, Newtonian Studies, 115. 
84 Huygens, Oeuvres Complètes., 22:471. 
85 Leibniz to Huygens, October 1690 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1961, 3:80. 
86 Guicciardini, Newton on Mathematical Certainty, 252–57; Guicciardini, ‘Analysis and Synthesis in 
Newton’s Mathematical Work’. 
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Opticks under different interpretations of the expression after 1706 until Leibniz’s 
passing.87 During the late 1680s and 1690s he deepened his theological studies and 
contrived industrious chronologies of religions, ancient kingdoms and different 
forms of corruption.88 Also in the 1690s, Newton seems to have achieved important 
results in alchemy.89 Furthermore, Newton began to create an ‘inner circle’, a group 
of followers that had access to private documents and had a view on some of his 
private ideas. These acolytes acted as emissaries and presented Newtonian ideas to 
different correspondents and audiences, arguably under the guidance of Newton. 
This circle included Fatio de Duillier, David Gregory, Samuel Clarke and William 
Whiston, just to name a few.90 After 1696 Newton moved to London, acquired a 
position in the Mint and became more visible for the circles converging in the Royal 
Society. Finally, the scenarios in which these strategies take place were varied: the 
correspondence, circulation of manuscripts, public lectures (like the ‘Boyle 
Lectures’), Newton’s indirect and direct intervention in the controversies with Hooke 
and Leibniz, the reworking, edition and publication of previous developments 
(Opticks) and, the most famous, the insertions of the ‘Queries’ to the Optice (to the 
1706 edition, the Latin translation by Samuel Clarke, that was expected to circulate 
abroad), Roger Cotes’ ‘Editoris Præfatio’ to the 1713 Principia, and the ‘Scholium 
Generale’ introduced for the first time to this second edition.91 
 
Newton’s references to laws of nature in print are part of the strategies that he 
mobilised to defend his work against these Continental reactions to the Principia—
specifically to the force of gravity and its law—that started as soon as the work was 
published and reached their peak in the 1710s with the dispute with Leibniz. The lack 
of understanding of the apologetic nature of Newton’s references to laws of nature, 
 
87 Schaffer, ‘Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of Experiment’, 91–96; Shapiro, ‘Newton’s 
“Experimental Philosophy”’; Feingold, ‘“Experimental Philosophy”’. 
88 Schaffer, ‘Comets and Idols: Newton’s Cosmology and Political Theology’; Iliffe, Priest of Nature, 
355–401; Buchwald and Feingold, Newton and the Origin of Civilization. 
89 Newman, Newton the Alchemist, 367–414. 
90 A general idea of Newton’s changes after the Principia can be appreciated in Westfall, Never at 
Rest, 469–550; Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s Principia, 227–64. 
91 It would be impossible to list all works dealing with this, but see Westfall, Never at Rest, 698–780; 
Bertoloni Meli, Equivalence and Priority; Vailati, Leibniz and Clarke: A Study of Their 
Correspondence; Guicciardini, Newton on Mathematical Certainty, 329–84; Iliffe, Priest of Nature, 
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including the audience to which these texts was directed, has misled scholars.92 In his 
works, Newton used consistently the expression ‘laws of motion’ to explain the 
connection between forces (active or passive principles) and motions as different 
from laws of nature, prevailing in Descartes’ and Leibniz’s approaches.93 While 
active principles—inherited from his fellow countrymen—highlighted that the world 
was the effect of divine choice, the idea of ‘laws of nature’ was for Newton and his 
followers a reduction of the universe to ‘fate and necessity’.94 Curiously, when the 
validity of active principles was questioned, Newton used the idea of laws of nature 
in order to defend them. 
 
Newton introduced the expression laws of nature in 1706. A summary of events 
immediately before this set this reference in context. After the publication of the 
Principia, the Cambridge divine Richard Bentley was invited to inaugurate the 
‘Boyle lectures’ in 1692, a series of sermons that according to Boyle’s will should 
prove ‘the Christian religion’. Bentley considered that Newton’s explanation of the 
universe may provide an excellent argument to ‘confute atheism’. In order to exploit 
Newton’s achievements, Bentley and Newton exchanged a few letters in 1692. At 
some point, Bentley seemed to have interpreted gravity as an inherent property of 
matter, a claim that Newton rejected in the Principia. In order to correct Bentley’s 
mistake, Newton explained that  
Tis unconceivable that inanimate brute matter should (without the 
mediation of something else which is not material) operate upon & 
affect other matter without mutual contact; as it must if gravitation 
in the sense of Epicurus be essential & inherent in it. And this is 
one reason why I desired you would not ascribe {innate} gravity to 
me. That gravity should be innate inherent & {essential} to matter 
so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a 
vacuum without the mediation of any thing else by & through 
which their action or force {may} be conveyed from one to another 
is to me so great an absurdity that I beleive no man who has in 
philosophical matters any competent faculty of thinking can ever 
fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent {acting} 
consta{ntl}y according to certain laws, but whether this agent be 
 
92 Brading, ‘Three Principles of Unity in Newton’; Schliesser, ‘Newtonian Emanation’; Biener and 
Schliesser, ‘The Certantinty, Modality...’; Domski, ‘Laws of Nature and the Divine Order’. 
93 Rutherford, ‘Laws and Powers in Leibniz’; Garber, ‘God, Laws, and the Order of Nature: Descartes 
and Leibniz, Hobbes and Spinoza’. 
94 Clarke IV Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 50. 
270 
 
material or immaterial is a question I have left to the consideration 
of my readers.95 
In this often misinterpreted, Newton claims that gravity is not an essential property 
of matter. Because gravity, according to the Principia, acts at a distance, the idea that 
matter can act at a distance in virtue of its essential properties is inconceivable. If 
gravity was not caused by the inherent properties of matter, it had to be caused ‘by an 
agent acting constantly according to certain laws’. This is all that Newton can claim 
based on the outcome of his book: whatever causes gravity has to act constantly—
because gravity operates instantaneously—and according to the laws of motion and 
the law of universal gravitation.96 Newton tried to explain in different ways how the 
Principia backed up these conclusions before the priority dispute broke out. In a 
letter to Leibniz in 1693, Newton expounded that vortices ‘contribute no to the 
regulation but to the disturbance of the motion of the planets’ and that ‘from nothing 
but gravity acting in accordance with the laws described by me’ it was possible to 
explain all the phenomena of the heavens and of the sea. ‘And since nature is very 
simple, I have myself concluded that all other causes are to be rejected and that the 
heavens are to be stripped as far as may be of all matter, lest the motions of planets 
and comets be hindered or render irregular’.97 Leibniz disagreed. Rejecting vortices 
and ‘all other causes’ led to dead-ends: to claim that gravity was a property of matter 
amounted to reintroducing occult qualities in philosophy. Or to affirm that gravity 
was a perpetual miracle, because the only possible explanation was the direct divine 
intervention. In the New essays (1704), Leibniz reasoned that the distinction between 
what is natural and what is unexplainable and miraculous solves all difficulties. ‘To 
reject it would be to uphold something worse than occult qualities, and thereby to 
renounce philosophy and reason, giving refuge to ignorance and laziness by means of 
an irrational system which maintains not only that there are qualities which we do 
not understand’.98  
 
 
95 Newton, ‘Original Letter from Isaac Newton to Richard Bentley’, fol. 7r. 
96 The debate on the reading of this passage and on Newton’s action-at-a-distance seems endless, see 
Newton, Principia Variorum, 1972, 1:149–63; Henry, ‘Gravity and De gravitatione’; Janiak, Newton 
as Philosopher; Ducheyne, ‘Newton on Action at a Distance’; Henry, ‘Action at a Distance’. 
97 Newton to Leibniz, 16 October 1693 Turnbull, Correspondence, 1961, 3:285–86. 
98 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, 66. On Leibniz criticism see the valuable insights 
of Psillos, ‘Laws and Powers in the Frame of Nature’. 
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7.3.3. Contradictions and will 
Newton addressed these charges in additions to the 1706 Latin translation of the 
Opticks. The Latin translation, carried out by Samuel Clarke, intended to reach a 
wider audience than the 1704 English edition and particularly Continental readers. 
The ‘Queries’ added to the end dealt with the activity of matter, with speculations 
about the existence, action and quantification of forces generating a wide range of 
phenomena such as the motion of planets, the cohesion of matter and the motion of 
animals.99 Indeed, Newton had established a strong connection between optical 
phenomena, active ethers and the properties of matter since his early experimental 
work.100 In the ‘Queries’ these explorations were connected to the outcomes of the 
Principia. In the concluding query, the 23rd, the voluminous experimental evidence 
pointed towards a general conclusion: that the motion in the world could not emerge 
only from the inherent properties of matter codified in the laws of motion (the three 
opening laws of the Principia). There had to be other sources of motion and other 
laws, such as gravity and its law, which were not inherent to matter. The Principia 
provided Newton confidence to claim that the action of active principles, such as 
gravity, could be revealed by further experiments and explained by mathematics just 
as laws of motion explained the force of inertia. The three passive laws of motion 
widely accepted according to Newton (even by the ancients)101 were the premises 
from which he inferred another law describing the effects of an active principle, the 
force of gravitation. He was confident that other active principles might be postulated 
and explained in a similar way. 
 
Against this background, Newton undertook the defence of the modus operandi and 
the conclusions of the Principia and remarkably of the universal force of gravitation. 
Facing Leibniz’s options, Newton’s strategy contended that gravity was an active 
principle backed up by experiments, although its cause remained unknown. 
Moreover, active principles were not Aristotelian occult qualities nor direct divine 
 
99 The literature on the ‘Queries’ is immense, but see McGuire, ‘Force, Active Principles, and 
Newton’s Invisible Realm’; McGuire, ‘Atoms and the “Analogy of Nature”’; Henry, ‘Enlarging the 
Bounds of Moral Philosophy’; Henry and McGuire, ‘Voluntarism and Panentheism’; McMullin, 
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100 Newman, Newton the Alchemist, 114–35. 
101 Newton, The Principia, 70–76; Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 310–11. 
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interventions. They may be thought of as laws of nature if by these we understand 
parts of a universe created by the free will of God. In other words, active principles, 
including gravitation, were similar to what his contenders meant by laws of nature—
an expression that, as we have seen, he avoided in mechanics and natural philosophy. 
In so doing, Newton did not compare his mathematical laws of motion—whose 
contents he reworked from Descartes’ laws of nature—to laws of nature; his reply to 
Leibniz was that active principles could be understood as universal laws of nature if 
these were considered as ‘effects of choice’. 
 
The only three references to laws of nature occur in Query 23: ‘Have not the small 
Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a 
distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting, and inflecting 
them, but also upon one another for producing a great Part of the Phænomena of 
nature?’102 Newton described abundant experiments suggesting that these 
phenomena should be the effect of active principles. After having presented 
chymical, optical and mechanical experiments, Newton claimed that nature will be 
‘very conformable to herself and very simple’ performing the motion of celestial 
bodies and of particles of matter by attractive and repulsive forces. According to 
these experiments, the force of inertia is central to the operations of nature, but were 
nature reduced to it, ‘the motion would constantly decay’. In fact, the motion of 
bodies ‘in oil or water, or some fluider matter’ can last for long, but unless matter is 
completely deprived of ‘all tenacity’ (which it is not), the motion would continually 
get lost. An account of the world restricted to inertial motions was typical of 
Descartes: ‘The Cartesians make God the author of all motion & its as reasonable to 
make him the author of the laws of motion. Matter is a passive principle & cannot 
move itself … these are passive laws & to affirm that there are no other is to speak 
against experience’.103 Consequently, Newton postulated the existence of active 
principles accounting for optical, chymical, magnetical, physiological and even 
celestial phenomena. In contrast with the cautious claims to Bentley two decades 
ago, Newton speculated here about a universe in which matter is moved by active 
 
102 Newton, Optice, 322; Cf. Newton, Opticks, 375–76. 
103 Newton, ‘Hydrostatics, Optics, Sound and Heat’, fol. 619r. 
273 
 
principles. In so doing, Newton followed the English experimental philosophers and 
Barrow, criticising the Cartesian Principia as a description of the ‘outer shell without 
the nucleus’. Given the variety of motion observed in the world, Newton claimed that 
there was ‘a necessity of conserving and recruiting it by active principles’ such as the 
causes of gravity, fermentation and cohesion of bodies—whose experimental 
evidence was presented to the reader. A world governed only by the force of inertia 
would not look like the one we gather from experiments.104 
 
From the postulation of this world based on the experimental evidence and the 
conclusions of the Principia, Newton moved to a more speculative level, recurrent in 
the ‘Queries’, to deal with two aspects: the creation of matter and the nature of active 
principles ‘conserving and recruiting’ motion. The distinction between levels of 
reasoning is clearly demarcated by the way in which the topics are introduced: ‘All 
these things being considered, it seems probable to me (illud mihi videtur denique 
simillimum veri) that God in the beginning form’d Matter in solid, massy, hard, 
impenetrable, moveable particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other 
Properties, and in such proportion to Space, as most adjusted to the End for which he 
form’d them’.105 In Newton’s view, these particles were created so hard and solid 
that ‘no ordinary power’ is able to divide ‘what God himself made one in the first 
Creation’.106 From experiments, we infer that the particles composing bodies are 
solid so it seems probable that God in the beginning created indivisible particles that 
do not ‘wear away’ and do not ‘break in pieces’. Accordingly, changes in nature do 
not emerge from the transformations or division of these particles but from ‘the 
various separations and new associations and motions of these permanent 
particles’.107 The variety of phenomena arises from the different configurations of 
these particles: from the motions resultant from passive and active principles. 
 
In the same speculative tone, Newton introduces his view on the causes of these 
motions: 
 
104 Newton, Opticks, 397–400. 
105  Newton, Optice, 343; Cf. Newton, Opticks, 400. 
106 On this thorny topic see McGuire, ‘Space, Infinity and Indivisibility’. 
107 Newton, Optice, 343–44; Cf. Newton, Opticks, 400. 
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[1] It seems to me farther, that these primitive Particles have not 
only a Vis inertiæ, accompanied with such passive Laws of Motion 
as naturally result from that Force, but also that they are 
perpetually moved by certain active Principles, such as is that of 
Gravity, and that which causes Fermentation, and the Cohesion of 
Bodies. [2] I consider these Principles, not as occult qualities, 
imagined (fingantur) to arise from the specific forms of things, but 
as universal Laws of Nature, according to which things themselves 
are formed (quibus res ipsæ sunt formatæ). [3] For, that such 
Principles do really exist, appears from the phenomena of nature; 
though what the causes of them are, be not yet explained. [4] To 
affirm that every distinct Species of Things, is endued with specific 
occult qualities, by means whereof the Things have certain Active 
Forces; this indeed is saying Nothing. [5] But to deduce from the 
phenomena of nature, two or three general principles of motion; 
and then to explain how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal 
things follow from those Principles; this would be a great progress 
in Philosophy, though the causes of those Principles were not yet 
discovered.108 
The general structure of the argument runs this way: [1] particles of matter only 
have, in virtue of their nature, a force of inertia—whose properties were described by 
the three laws of motion of the Principia. However, these particles are also 
‘perpetually’ moved by active principles, such as that of gravity, fermentation and 
cohesion of bodies. [2] He considers these principles as ‘universal laws of nature’, 
that is, as general causes of motion and in this sense as opposed to ‘specific forms of 
things’. Active principles are not singular qualities in matter generating concrete 
effects, such as the Aristotelian qualities [4]. That gravity and other active principles 
exist has been proved by phenomena (in the Principia, for example) [3]. Once active 
principles are ‘deduced from phenomena’, they can be assumed to explain properties 
and actions of things by their laws, such as the law of gravitation. Although the form 
in which these principles perform their action remained unknown, the quantitative 
explanation of their effects is a great contribution to ‘philosophy’ [5]. This last point 
was the focus of Leibniz’s charge of reintroducing occult qualities or 
supernaturalism. In order to defend his work from these accusations, Newton 
compared active principles to ‘universal laws of nature’, as opposed to particular 
occult qualities [2].  Next, he explains how active principles viewed in this way do 
 
108 Numbers added. Newton, Optice, 344–45; Cf. Cohen, ‘The First English Version of Newton’s 
Hypotheses non Fingo’, 386.  
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not entail supernaturalism. In fact, only if we make Newton’s laws of motion 
(mathematical descriptions) equal to laws of nature (causes of motion) is there room 
for supernaturalism; but this is not the case, as I will show. 
 
A close reading of the passage shows that Newton is making a comparison between 
active principles and ‘universal laws of nature according to which things are formed’, 
not claiming that active principles are laws of nature or that laws of motion are laws 
of nature. Put otherwise, Newton’s active principles are similar to universal laws of 
nature, in the sense that they form things. This last sentence has been interpreted as a 
metaphysical stance about the composition of substances, that is, as a thesis on the 
ultimate nature of bodies.109 Nevertheless, Newton used laws of nature to shake off 
the accusations against the universal principle of gravitation. From this perspective, 
Newton was not making a theory of matter but defending his views on active 
principles as non-essential to matter and generating motion in the world, although 
their cause remained occult. Newton had a local tradition behind him supporting this 
move.110 The expression laws of nature, coming from Descartes, is used to explain 
this point in a clearer way for his audience and to hit back at Leibniz’s attack. 
Interestingly, the Latin phrasing of the comparison between active principles and 
laws of nature makes clear that Newton is not putting forward a metaphysical 
doctrine in which laws of nature are previous to bodies and enter into their 
composition, but rather that active principles are not the specific occult qualities of 
the Scholastics.  
 
Newton claimed that particles are ‘moved’ by (rather than endued with) active 
principles by causes unknown and that the things themselves are formed by them 
[1,2,3]. Why does this expression avoid the proximity with the Scholastic doctrine of 
occult qualities? Newton had explained how the active principles of gravitation, 
fermentation and cohesion form ‘things’ (not substances) in connection with the 
experiments he had presented in the ‘Queries’. His point is that active principles are 
‘associated’ with the ‘primitive particles’ to form things. Active principles are 
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necessary to generate the phenomena of nature, but this does not amount to a 
description of how these things were initially created. After all, Newton’s bottom 
line is that the cause of these principles is unknown. Because motion arising from 
inertial force is passive, 
There is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it [motion] by 
active principles, such as are the cause of Gravity, by which 
Planets and Comets keep their motions in their Orbs: and the cause 
of Fermentation, by which the Heart and Blood of Animals are 
kept in perpetual motion and Heat: the inward Parts of the Earth 
are constantly warm’d, and in some places grow very hot; bodies 
burn and shine, Mountains take fire, the Caverns of the Earth are 
blown up, and the Sun continues violently hot and lucid, and 
warms all things by his Light. And if it were not for these 
Principles, the bodies of the Earth, Planets, Comets, Sun, and all 
things in them, would grow old and freeze, and become inactive 
Masses; and all Putrefaction, Generation, Vegetation and Life 
would cease, and the Planets and Comets would not remain in their 
Orbs.111 
This passage vividly describes how ‘things’ are ‘formed’ by active principles based 
on the experiments presented in the first part of the ‘Query’ and including the active 
principle of gravitation explained in the Principia. If the expression ‘things’ sounds 
inadequate, it seems hard to think of a better word to put together the planetary 
system, the life of animals, fires in mountains, the heat of the Sun. The active 
principles moving matter are responsible of ‘forming’ these ‘things’, that is, of 
generating phenomena which cannot be reduced to the mere actions of the inertial 
force of the primitive particles. These ‘things’ require active principles in order to 
behave as they do and, in this sense, active principles were considered as universal 
laws of nature, not as singular qualities postulated to explain specific phenomena.  
 
At this point, Newton turned to consider the ‘first creation’. The reason behind this 
move seems to be that Descartes’ ‘laws of nature’ were said to play a creative role 
that Newton’s theology explicitly forbids—and that Boyle, as we saw, also 
rejected.112 Immediately after comparing active principles to laws of nature [2-5], 
Newton claimed that ‘by the help of these [active] Principles, all material Things 
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112 See, section 5.3. 
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seem to have been composed of the hard and solid Particles above-mention’d, 
variously associated in the first Creation by the Counsel of an intelligent Agent’.113 
God probably introduced active principles in the creation, but these were not 
responsible for creating things. Thus, it is ‘unphilosophical to seek for any other 
Origin of the World’, particularly suggesting that the world ‘might arise out of a 
Chaos by the mere Laws of Nature’. Descartes had claimed that ‘laws of nature’ 
were such ‘even if we were to assume [the existence of] the Chaos; we could still 
demonstrate that, by these laws, this confusion must gradually be transformed into 
the order which is at present in the world’.114 Cartesian ‘laws of nature’ were 
sufficient principles of creation. Newton, in line with his English fellows, rejected 
this view and explained that the origin of the world was Deus Optimus Maximus. 
However, once the world was formed, ‘it may continue by those Laws for many 
ages’: motion can be transmitted and recruited by active principles. Active principles 
considered as laws of nature cannot be taken for principles creating the world but as 
principles ‘recruiting and conserving’ motion for many ages.  
 
Nevertheless, why active principles could not create the world from chaos such as 
‘laws of nature’? In order to answer this question Newton turned to theology. The 
move consists of two aspects: the argument from design and the inference that God 
not only created the world but also governs it by his unrestricted will: he is ‘a 
powerful ever-living Agent’ (entis potentis semperq; viventis).115 Against the claim 
that the world may be created by the mere course of necessary ‘laws of nature’, 
Newton argued that the singular configuration of the planetary system, including the 
‘very excentric orbs’ in which Comets move and the contrivance of the bodies of 
animals ‘must be allowed [to be] the effect of choice’. The constitution of the world 
and of living beings reveal that they are intentional actions of God. An important 
aspect is that God created this world at will but, given that he is omnipresent, he ‘is 
more able by his Will to move the bodies within his boundless uniform sensorium 
[space], and thereby to form and reform the parts of the universe, than we are by our 
 
113 Newton, Optice, 343. 
114 Descartes, AT, 1905, VIII:101–3. 
115115 On the theological references of this ‘Query’ see McGuire, ‘Space, Infinity and Indivisibility’; 
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will to move the parts of our own bodies’.116 God is everywhere and this means that 
he exists all over the infinite space in which, if he wanted, he could act according to 
his free will. The analogy between human motions at will and God’s action over the 
universe by his unrestricted will opened an important front in the dispute with 
Leibniz, particularly through the correspondence with Clarke.117 The point here is, as 
I said, that God created the world without any restriction and, in virtue of his 
omnipresence, he can ‘reform it at will’. In this context, Newton introduced another 
significant qualification to his comparison of active principles to laws of nature: that 
they are not necessary and therefore can ‘vary’.  
Since Space is divisible in infinitum, and Matter is not necessarily 
in all places, it may be also allow’d that God is able to create 
Particles of Matter of several Sizes and Figures, and in several 
Proportions to Space, and perhaps of different Densities and 
Forces, and therefore to vary the Laws of Nature, and make Worlds 
of several sorts in several Parts of the Universe. At least, I see 
nothing of Contradiction in all this.118 
This aspect, with Barrowian undertones,119 relies on Newton’s voluntarist theology, 
his conceptions of space and time and his criticism of Descartes’ identification of 
matter with extension. The divisibility of space, that is, that space does not have 
minimum parts, implies that the nature of space does not impose any restriction on 
God’s creative power. Seen the other way: had space indivisible parts, these would 
restrict God’s possibilities of creating other kinds of matter; for example, God could 
not create matter composed of parts divisible ad infinitum, for it would imply that 
some parts of matter may be smaller than the indivisible minima of space and 
therefore they would be ‘nowhere’.120 Moreover, because matter—at least in this 
world—is not identified with space and thus ‘is not necessarily in all places’, God 
may create different kinds of matter: of different sizes and figures ‘and in several 
proportions to space’. God could also create matter of varying densities and other 
forces and, therefore, establish other principles of motion (‘to vary the laws of 
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nature’). The outcome of these variations may generate ‘worlds of several sorts’ that 
may be in different parts of the universe, given the infinite extension of space.  
The infinite possibilities of worlds deriving from this theology does not imply that 
this world could not be explained with certainty. In a draft for the 1718 version of 
this query, Newton explained that ‘the business of experimental philosophy is [only] 
to find out by experience and observation not how things were created but what is the 
present frame of nature’.121 Likewise, Newton concluded the ‘Query’ by drawing a 
parallel between the mathematical procedures of analysis and synthesis and the 
‘method’ of investigation in natural philosophy (physica). The point is that both 
mathematics and natural philosophy explain causes by their effects and once these 
causes have been established they may be used to explain new effects.122 Causes 
cannot be known a priori—that would amount to understanding God’s infinite will. 
However, they can be assumed as such after being ‘deduced from phenomena’, that 
is, after ‘making experiments and observing phenomena’ and then, from compound 
things to ‘deduce’ (colligere) by reasoning from the simple things. This is the 
‘method of analysis’ by which we deduce ‘motive forces from motions and, in 
general, causes from effects and from particular causes more general ones until we 
find the most general’. The synthesis consists in assuming ‘the investigated and 
proved causes’ as principles and from them to explain ‘phenomena proceeding from 
them’ and in this sense ‘proving the explanations’.123 These pronouncements are 
aligned with the redrawing of disciplinary boundaries as presented in the 1687 
edition of the Principia: ‘For the basic problem of philosophy seems to be to 
discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to 
demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces’.124 In the conclusion of the 
query, Newton explains that if these methods are followed in natural philosophy it 
will be possible to reach a ‘perfect science’, restoring the lost knowledge and the 
uncorrupted religion—an expansion of the insight that motivated the Principia.125 
 
121 Newton, ‘Hydrostatics, Optics, Sound and Heat’, fol. 242v. 
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Newton’s strategy to defend his principle of gravitation as a universal law of nature 
did not work very well. When Newton was planning the second edition of the 
Principia in the early 1710s the dispute over the priority of the invention of calculus 
was reaching to its peak. Newton did not miss the chance to introduce some 
comments in his magnum opus, particularly the ‘Scholium Generale’ dealing again 
with topics similar to those of the Query 23. However, an important change of 
perspective here is that over the development of the priority dispute, Newton took 
shelter in the idea of ‘experimental philosophy’ as a reaction against Leibniz.126 In 
the 1710 Théodicée, Leibniz insisted on claiming that gravity was essential to matter 
and that this opinion has its roots in Scholastic doctrines: ‘remote operation has just 
been revived in England by the admirable Mr. Newton, who maintains that it is the 
nature of bodies to be attracted and gravitate one towards another’.127 In his 
provocative style, Leibniz denied Newton’s voluntarist consideration of laws, 
claiming that ‘God gave such laws not without reason, for he chooses nothing from 
caprice and as though by chance or in pure indifference but the general reasons of 
good and of order, which have prompted him to the choice, may be overcome in 
some cases by stronger reasons of a superior order’.128 A few years later, in 1712, 
some letters between Leibniz and Hartsoeker appeared in the Memoirs de Literature. 
This time, Leibniz attributed to Newton the view ‘that all bodies attract each other is 
a law of nature that God has commanded when creating the bodies. Because, not 
providing anything causing this effect, and not admitting anything that God had 
made that could explain how this is done, they recourse to a miracle, that is, to the 
supernatural’. Claiming that gravity is a law of nature became, in Leibniz’s hands, a 
recourse to supernaturalism. Newton drafted an anonymous letter to the editor of the 
journal criticising these views. Newton punched back claiming that from Leibniz’s 
perspective, impenetrability, extension and duration of matter would be occult & 
miraculous because ‘no man ever attempted to prove these qualities mechanically’. 
On the contrary, these were ‘natural real reasonable manifest qualities of all bodies’; 
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similarly, ‘bodies attract one another by a power whose cause is unknown’ a 
conclusion proved by experiments against the ‘fictions’ invented by Leibniz. The 
idea of laws of nature in connection with gravity became involved in the dispute, 
thanks to Newton’s Optice.129 
 
During the process of revision of the 1713 Principia, Cotes drew Newton’s attention 
to Leibniz’s letters in March 1712. Cotes took advantage of this situation to ask 
Newton if the word ‘attractio’ frequently used in the Principia did not imply a 
hypothesis to explain mutual attraction.130 Newton assumed the letter as an occasion 
to instruct his curious editor in the subtleties of experimental philosophy that shall 
inform this new edition. ‘The difficulty you mention,—Newton replied—which lies 
in the words [Et cum attractio omnis mutua sit] is removed by considering that as in 
Geometry the word Hypothesis is not taken in so large a sense as to include the 
Axiomes & Postulates, so in experimental philosophy it is not to be taken in so a 
large sense as to include the first Principles or Axiomes which I call the laws of 
motion’. The laws of motion were deduced from phenomena and made general by 
induction, Newton added. Given that the proposition concerning the mutual 
attraction was ‘a branch of the third law’ (action and reaction), it is not a hypothesis 
but a ‘deduction’ from phenomena. In a draft of this letter, Newton made a longer 
argument involving the third rule for philosophising—also introduced for the 1713 
edition—claiming that ‘if we break that rule, we cannot affirm any one general law 
of nature: we cannot so much as affirm that all matter is impenetrable’.131 Probably 
after checking Leibniz’s letters in the Memoirs, Newton wrote the version he finally 
sent to Cotes, summarising the way of proceeding in experimental philosophy and 
asking him to introduce some changes into the ‘Scholium generale’: ‘At the end of 
the last Paragraph but two now ready to be printed off I desire you to add after the 
words [nihil aliud est quam Fatum et Natura.] these words [Et haec de Deo: de quo 
utique ex phænomenis disserere, ad Philosophiam experimentalem pertinet.]’. This 
insertion, directed against Leibniz’s view of nature, makes more explicit that the 
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foundation of the experimental approach had implications for theology. In addition, 
with the intention of preventing ‘exceptions against the use of the word hypothesis’, 
Newton asked Cotes to add this:  
For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a 
hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or 
based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in 
experimental philosophy. In this experimental philosophy, 
propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made 
general by induction. The impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of 
bodies, and the laws of motion and the law of gravity have been 
found by this method. And it is enough that gravity really exists 
and acts according to the laws that we have set forth and is 
sufficient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies and of 
our sea.132 
A former version of this paragraph that Newton probably changed after reading 
Leibniz’s papers of 1712, followed the strategy of the Optice: 
From the phenomena it is very certain that gravity is given and acts 
on all bodies according to the laws described above in proportion 
to the distances, and suffices for all the motions of the Planets and 
Comets, and thus it is a law of nature although it has not yet been 
possible to understand the cause of this law from phenomena. For I 
avoid hypotheses [Nam hypotheses … fugio], whether 
metaphysical or physical or mechanical or of occult qualities. They 
are harmful and do not engender science.133  
Newton reworded this paragraph and removed the claim that ‘gravity … is a law of 
nature’ (not the law of gravity). As in 1706, gravity here is said to be a ‘law of 
nature’ but this version was discarded. The line of defence now was to claim the 
validity of universal gravitation as a legitimate product of the ‘experimental 
philosophy’, whose virtues were praised by Newton and his pupils. Accordingly, 
Cotes, guided by Bentley and Newton wrote the ‘Editoris Præfatio’ contrasting ‘this 
method of philosophising’ with the ‘Scholastic doctrines derived from Aristotle and 
the Peripatetics’ and with those ‘who speculate from hypotheses’.134 Cotes addressed 
the question of the nature of gravity following Newton’s ideas to the editor of the 
Memoirs de Literature: explaining that gravity could not be counted among ‘the 
primary qualities of bodies’ but that ‘from phenomena this force really exists’ even if 
 
132 Hall, Correspondence, 5:397. 
133 Hall and Hall, Unpublished, 350. 
134 Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s Principia, 227. 
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‘the cause of gravity is itself occult’. Cotes explained that the ‘province of true 
philosophy’ was ‘to derive the natures of things from causes that truly exist, and to 
seek those laws by which the supreme artificer willed to establish this most beautiful 
order of the world, not those laws by which he could have, had it pleased him’.135 
Making virtue of necessity, Cotes presented the lack of knowledge of the cause of 
gravity as a sign of Newton’s commitment to evidence and certainty and as an 
example of the rejection of hypotheses and speculations in experimental philosophy. 
This was a bold move in covering Newton’s Principia under the virtues of the 
‘experimental philosophy’, although no further references to laws of nature appear in 
the work.136 
 
For the 1718 English edition of the Opticks, Newton introduced some additions 
explaining the virtues of experimental philosophy. The comparison between active 
principles and laws of nature remained, but it acquired a new qualification based on 
the approach presented in the 1713 Principia. Newton introduced, between [3] and 
[4], the idea that active principles were ‘manifest qualities, and their causes only are 
occult’. In contrast to the Aristotelians ‘that gave the name of occult qualities’, not to 
manifest qualities, but to such ‘qualities only as they supposed to lie hid in bodies, 
and to be the unknown causes of manifest effects’. What Aristotelians denominated 
occult ‘would be the causes of gravity, and of mangnetick and electrick Attractions, 
and of fermentations, if we should suppose that these forces or Actions arose from 
Qualities unknown to us and uncapable of being discovered and made manifest’. He 
clarified that these ‘occult qualities’ were an obstacle to philosophy and therefore 
‘have been rejected’.137 Newton claimed that the cause of active principles might 
appear as occult, but that in truth they were causes of manifest qualities and thus 
there was no resemblance between his procedure and that of the Schoolmen. The 
methods of analysis and synthesis—now presented in experimental terminology—
guaranteed the validity of his procedure. 
 
 
135 Newton, The Principia, 385–99. 
136 Shapiro, ‘Newton’s “Experimental Philosophy”’; Feingold, ‘“Experimental Philosophy”’. 
137 Newton, Opticks, 403. 
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Newton did not suppress the reference to laws of nature, as he did in the draft of the 
‘Scholium generale’, probably because by 1718 Leibniz had passed away and the 
dispute over the priority of calculus had come to an end. However, Newton did not 
miss the chance to align the idea that the cause of gravity was unknown with the 
intellectual virtues of the experimental philosophy. But the recourse to laws of nature 
introduced for the 1706 Optice that escalated the controversy with Leibniz and was 
connected to the experimental philosophy for the 1718 Opticks, did not make a way 
into the Principia. Similarly, the references to ‘experimental philosophy’ for the 
1726 edition of the Principia were minimised. There is no evidence that Newton 
considered that natural philosophy or ‘rational mechanics’ were concerned with laws 
of nature or with the first creation. The entire task of ‘philosophy’ was ‘to discover 
the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the 
other phenomena from these forces’ by ‘exact laws which would allow of any easy 
calculation’.138 These laws were mathematical correlations between forces—whose 
cause is unknown—and motions formulated to make nature intellegible, not 









The idea that Descartes introduced ‘laws of nature’ into natural philosophy as an 
amalgamation of previous meanings and that ‘laws of nature’ remained roughly 
unaltered up to Newton, finds many difficulties in the light of the evidence examined 
throughout this thesis. That the ‘main sources for the later use of “laws of nature” as 
a concept to interpret the practice of science are to be found in the works of 
Descartes and then in Newton’ takes for granted that laws of nature operated in a 
similar way for both of them and that this use constitutes the key to understand 
contemporary science. This view assumes that for Descartes and Newton laws of 
nature were prescriptions laid down by God and therefore, ‘they are true, hold for the 
whole universe and are necessary in the sense of absolutely obligatory and 
independent of the beliefs of humans’.1 Although it is correct that Descartes’ used 
‘laws of nature’ in an innovative way, borrowing the term from mixed-mathematical 
sciences, the elucidation of previous uses does not explain, as it were, Descartes’ use 
of it. The meanings circulating before the Principia Philosophiæ, even those 
somehow referring to the natural world, could not prefigure or foreshadow 
Descartes’ reworking of ‘laws of nature’ as singular statements on matter and motion 
operating as causes. Similarly, examining Descartes’ laws does not explain Newton’s 
laws of motion and how they were conceived as universal or, at least, general.2 
Against this background, this thesis argued that ‘laws of nature’ and their immediate 
appropriation in England should be interpreted as functions of the redrawing of 
boundaries between mechanics, mathematics and natural philosophy. The 
transformation of the orders of knowledge, and mostly Descartes’ project of an a 
priori physics, constituted the specific problem that ‘laws of nature’ addressed.  
 
The disciplinary approach set the background to ‘laws of nature’ in the antecedents 
to Descartes’ reform of physics as a science capable of a priori demonstrations, not 
in the previous uses of the expression. I traced this project back to the sixteenth-
 
1 Giere, Science without Laws, 87. 
2 Bloor, Barnes, and Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, 46–80; Kusch, ‘Meaning 
Finitism and Truth’. 
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century reshaping of the loose set of mechanical practices into a mixed-mathematical 
scientia. The newly emerged practitioners of this science developed mathematical 
tools to explain physical objects—machines—in terms of their configuration or 
design. As part of their attempts to codify mechanics in an axiomatic form, they 
developed a procedure to reduce complex machines to simple geometrical principles. 
Against the assumptions validating this procedure, distinguishing natural and violent 
motions, Galileo applied the reductio to the study of natural phenomena and rendered 
plausible a mathematical science of motion. Galileo saw the possibility of 
formulating a largescale explanation of the world based on the reductio if the 
physical postulate of the motion of the Earth was granted. In his view, our 
knowledge was possible by a piecemeal approach providing certainty to limited 
portions of our understanding of reality. Therefore, a full-scale explanation of the 
natural world relying on mathematics was the addition of all these findings. Another 
attempt to connect mathematics to natural philosophy was put forward by Kepler. In 
his view, although the major astronomical ‘hypotheses’ (Ptolemaic, Copernican, 
Thyconic) may be mathematically equivalent, they were physically contradictory. 
Therefore, he sketched a reform of astronomy based ‘upon causes’, in which 
mathematics and natural philosophy were connected in an archetypal cosmology that 
uncovered the blueprints of the divine creation of the world. These archetypes were 
instantiated in matter and stamped in human soul. They constituted formal causes 
and thus Kepler turned to mechanics and natural philosophy to determine efficient 
causes of natural phenomena, including the motion of planets. Neither Galileo nor 
Kepler used the expression ‘laws of nature’ in a way similar to Descartes. On the 
contrary, their reforms of natural philosophy by appealing to mathematics appealed 
to other resources connecting different disciplines and assembling resources coming 
from the new science of mechanics. 
 
I showed that Descartes’ reform of an a priori physics was modelled after Kepler’s 
restructuring of astronomy as based upon causes. However, instead of an interaction 
of disciplines, Descartes conceived a more radical reduction of physics to 
mathematics in virtue of his conception of matter as (geometrical) extension. 
Descartes had access to Kepler by reading Beeckman’s Journal in an unexpected 
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visit in 1628. At that time, Beeckman was enthusiastically rewriting Kepler’s 
astronomy in terms of his ‘physico-mathematics’, replacing Kepler’s ‘animistic’ and 
‘occult’ causes for corpuscles in motion. Although Descartes had been working in 
the solution of mechanical problems in a way resembling Galileo—a piecemeal 
approach and the use of reductio—after he became acquainted with Beeckman in 
1618, the unplanned visit of 1628 gave him the new outlook of finding a definitive 
account of the effects of the natural world by their causes. From the correspondence 
with Mersenne from 1628 to 1630, I traced how Descartes construed this project and 
how the ‘laws of nature’ appeared as the principles explaining motion in nature. The 
a priori nature of Descartes’ project entailed that these principles were not 
descriptions of matter in motion but, on the contrary, they made motion possible. The 
disciplinary perspective also revealed that Descartes shaped the account of specific 
phenomena based on these a priori ‘laws of nature’ after the model of enquiry of 
mechanicians. Descartes’s moved away from the reductio and established a different 
connection with the sixteenth century mechanics as a physical rather than a 
mathematical discipline. 
 
Descartes affirmed that mechanics in ancient times was a branch of natural 
philosophy that took temporarily shelter in mathematics during the ‘confusing’ age 
of Aristotle and that he had restored its foundations. Unconvinced by Descartes’ 
genealogy, Barrow replied that Descartes’ ‘mechanical constructions, experiments 
concerning motions of projectiles, the ebb and flow of tides which I understand are 
all very elegantly explained by this [Cartesian] method’ are part of ‘Mathematics 
rather than Physics’.3 The English critics of ‘laws of nature’ considered that 
Descartes’ principles explained the motion of bodies in collision with some success, 
but that his philosophy was insufficient to account for the activity in matter that 
collective experimental work had revealed. The disciplinary focus of this thesis 
revealed an intricate panorama in the English appropriation of Descartes’ laws. 
English writers rejected, in general, the idea of a universe governed by immanent 
‘laws of nature’ and the metaphysics that Descartes used to support his principles. 
However, they integrated the stipulation of these ‘laws of nature’ into their local 
 
3 Barrow, ‘Oratio’, 85–86. 
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traditions accounting for the motion of bodies in mechanics and astronomy, while 
natural philosophy tried to illuminate the operations of nature based on active 
principles by experiments. In this way, they kept the expression laws of nature as a 
vague term to talk about order in the world, and reworked the Cartesian ‘laws of 
nature’ in laws of motion expressed in mathematical terms and ‘verified’ by 
experiments. This thesis showed how these laws of motion were integrated into the 
tradition of the ‘elliptical astronomy’ that in the hands of Wren and Hooke explained 
circular and conical motions in terms of reworked versions of Descartes’ first two 
laws and an attractive force or power towards the centre.  
 
The relocation of ‘laws of nature’ from natural philosophy to mechanics occurred as 
mathematicians and scholars debated the nature of mathematics including the 
introduction of physical notions—such as motion—in mathematics and the nature of 
geometry and arithmetic. I explored two perspectives, Wallis’ and Barrow’s, that 
revealed divergent approaches, techniques and assumptions related to mechanics as a 
mathematical science. While for Wallis the laws of motion were arithmetical 
principles that could explain physical motions via geometry, Barrow postulated that 
motion was the principle generating geometrical figures and, therefore, the study of 
motion in geometry was the foundation of arithmetic, natural philosophy and any 
other science. 
 
In line with some general features of the English appropriation of Descartes, the 
young Newton discussed the laws of motion as explaining the collision of bodies in 
mechanics. Similarly, when asked by Halley about the orbit of planets in 1684, 
Newton replied with a short piece of mechanics within the boundaries of the 
common practices in England. My thesis explained how Newton moved from this 
shared view of laws of motion in mechanics to the ‘axioms of laws of motion’ of the 
Principia which postulated a ‘rational mechanics’. I provided evidence showing that 
Newton was moved to redraw the disciplinary boundaries of mechanics, mathematics 
and natural philosophy by the realisation that the mathematical ‘hypotheses’ that he 
drafted in his first solution to Halley proved a priori the Copernican arrangement of 
the world. His historical and religious studies had revealed to him that this was the 
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true system of the world known to the ancients and lost by idolatry and corruption. 
Newton, then, transformed the ‘hypotheses’ into ‘axioms or laws of motion’ that 
could account for the motion of points but also for the path of planets and in general, 
for the motion of any particle in the universe as generated by forces. In this way, 
Newton modified a somewhat consolidated use of laws of motion that was restricted 
to mechanics as a mathematical science. The Principia, a ‘rational mechanics’, 
established three passive laws of motion—derived from the force of inertia—and 
uncovered one active law—derived from universal gravitation. Although this 
conclusion was acceptable in the eyes of most of his English fellows, Leibniz and 
other Continental philosophers criticised Newton’s misunderstanding of geometry, 
mechanics and natural philosophy and accused him of reintroducing occult qualities 
in establishing the law of gravity and the reality of its force. Newton’s only use in 
print of the expression laws of nature occurred in the Optice as part of his defence 
against Leibniz. When the reality of gravitation came under attack, Newton 
compared it with ‘universal laws of nature’ in a move that has puzzled historians. But 
Newton did not use the concept of laws of nature (as causes of motion) in natural 
philosophy, in line with other English philosophers, and in his place, he formulated 
‘axioms or laws of motion’ that described the action of principles, sources of activity 
in the world and causes of motion. The Principia uncovered one law of activity in 
nature; the ‘Queries’ of the Opticks pointed to other laws describing other active 
principles, such as fermentation, cohesion of bodies and electricity as plausible 
candidates to exist in a world created by the free will of God.  
  
Throughout this thesis, it became clear that ‘laws of nature’ did not emerge as a 
neutral label to qualify specific findings of sciences. On the contrary, they emerged 
as concrete achievements with an operative function within Descartes’ attempt to 
replace the Scholastic natural philosophy and consequently embedded within a 
network of assumptions, traditions and practices that were central to the 
appropriation of ‘laws of nature’. English natural philosophers and mathematicians 
reworked these ‘laws of nature’ within different disciplinary settings and put forward 
alternative ‘laws of motion’ in ways not previously noticed by scholars. The picture 
that emerges is not that of an amalgamation of previous meanings into a more 
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complex one that was subsequently disseminated. The dissemination model excludes 
the transformation of disciplines that constitutes the key to appreciate the complex 
appropriation of ‘laws of nature’, including their relocation to mechanics and 
Newton’s use of laws in the context of active and passive principles of motion. 
Instead of a unified concept of ‘laws of nature’, Descartes’ project triggered reactions 
framed within local traditions and therefore it is hard to claim that at the end of the 
seventeenth century there was any agreement on the meaning of ‘laws of nature’ or 
even laws of motion beyond the narrow circles that shared disciplinary commitments 
and values. 
 
How Newton’s laws of motion and the law of gravity became laws of nature is 
another story to be told, emerging from the Scientific Revolution and making its way 
into the appropriation of Newton’s works. The name and achievements of Newton 
became historically associated to laws of nature. Pope’s epitaph stated that ‘Nature 
and nature’s laws lay hid in night: God said ‘Let Newton be!’ and all was light’. It is 
hard to know if Pope had in mind Newton’s specific laws of motion or—more 
probably—he was just going through the well-trodden path of using laws of nature as 
a general reference to the natural order. However, the idea that Newton’s laws were 
in a more defined way laws of nature became current in Newtonian circles at least 
since the early eighteenth century. In 1705 the Scottish mathematician John Keill set 
forth Newton’s laws of motion under the heading ‘De legibus naturæ’, explaining 
that laws of nature are such ‘as it is necessary that all natural bodies do obey’. Keill 
presented them in the ‘same order and in the very same words, as they were laid 
down by the Illustrious Sir Isaac Newton’. Later in 1721, Keill explained that Kepler 
ignored the reason of his third ‘law of nature’ that he had found by computation. It 
was not until ‘our great Newton (…) demonstrated that no other relationship could 
have place in the Universe, given the laws of nature’, that is, the three initial axioms 
of the Principia.4 Maybe more significant is that one of the main vehicles for the 
early dissemination of Newton’s natural philosophy was Samuel Clarke’s translation 
of Rohault’s Traité de Physique (1697). Rohault’s work was a popular textbook 
replacing the Aristotelian natural philosophy for the Cartesian theses of the Principia 
 
4 Keill, Lectiones Physicae, 107–30; Keill, Lectiones Astronomiae, 37. 
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Philosophiæ. Clarke translated the work into Latin and presented Newtonian 
postulates in the form of extensive comments, antagonising with the Cartesian main 
text. In explaining ‘the continuation and cessation of motion’, for example, Rohault 
mentioned Descartes first ‘Law of Nature’. In the comments, Clarke explicitly 
elaborated Newtonian topics such as the collision of bodies, the action of elastic 
forces and gravitational attraction. This latter is explained as ‘the action of some 
immaterial cause which perpetually moves and governs matter by certain laws’, in 
contrast with the idea that matter can act by itself on other matter at a distance. For 
the untrained student, Newtonian laws of motion were woven with the Cartesian 
terminology.5 This bond of the Cartesian terminology of ‘laws of nature’ with 
Newton’s achievements dominated the views of the Encyclopaedists and largely, the 
subsequent developments in modern science during the eighteenth century.6 In fact, it 
was during the appropriation of Newton in the eighteenth century—to a large extent, 
through the Opticks—that his accomplishments and those of others honoured as his 
peers were linked as a succession of laws, inaugurating a foundational myth of the 
origins of modern science that reached up to the twentieth century.  
 
5 Rohault, Physica, 51–53; See Schüller, ‘Samuel Clarke’s Annotations in Jacques Rohault’s Traité de 
Physique’. 
6 Charrak, Contingence et nécessité des lois de la nature au XVIIIe siècle; Snobelen, ‘On Reading 
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